Opinion
1500 MDA 2020
08-20-2021
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MICHELLE L. VAUGHN Appellant
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 27, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14- CR-0001366-2019
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. [*]
MEMORANDUM
McCAFFERY, J.
Michelle L. Vaughn (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, following her non-jury trial convictions of two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Appellant claims the trial court erred in: (1) denying her motion to suppress, where, Appellant maintains, her seizure was not justified under the community caretaker doctrine; and (2) finding sufficient evidence to support both DUI counts. We affirm.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment), (b) (high rate of alcohol).
This Court has explained:
Commonwealth v. Hampton, 204 A.3d 452, 455 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2019), citing Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 626-27 (Pa. 2017).Additionally, we acknowledge the recent decision in Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (plurality). Alexander returned to the pre-Gary lines of cases and held "the Pennsylvania Constitution requires both a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of an automobile." Alexander, 243 A.3d at 180 (emphasis added). Alexander is not implicated in this case, as there was no search of Appellant's vehicle. See Opinion & Order, 5/13/20 (Suppression Order), at 2 ("At no point in time did [the trooper] conduct a search of [Appellant's vehicle].").The community caretaking doctrine has been characterized as encompassing three specific exceptions to the state and federal (Footnote Continued Next Page) constitutional requirements that police obtain a warrant prior to conducting an unreasonable search or seizure[, including] the public servant exception, . . . sometimes referred to as the public safety exception. Each of the exceptions contemplates that the police officer's actions be motivated by a desire to render aid or assistance, rather than the investigation of criminal activity.
We glean the following facts from the suppression hearing transcript and the trial court's suppression order. On August 3, 2019, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Joginder Grewal, the owner of a gas station in Snow Shoe Township, Centre County, observed Appellant's vehicle arrive at the gas station, and park. Inside the vehicle were a female driver and a female passenger. N.T. Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 2/10/20, at 6. The "vehicle was not obstructing other cars from entering or exiting the . . . gas station." Suppression Order at 2. At approximately 10:15 a.m., a red vehicle arrived, the passenger in Appellant's vehicle got into the red vehicle, and the red vehicle left. Id. "After finding [Appellant] unconscious in the driver seat . . . and being unable to wake her, Grewal called the police and requested a welfare check to make sure [Appellant] was not injured or in need of assistance." Id. at 1.
Pennsylvania State Trooper Ryan Maggs responded to the call and arrived at the gas station at 10:40 a.m. Suppression Order at 2. Neither Grewal nor dispatch had reported any criminal activity. "The vehicle had not moved for a period of three hours prior to Trooper Maggs' arrival[, ]" and Appellant had not exited the vehicle. Id. at 1, 2. When Trooper Maggs arrived, a sergeant of the Fish Commission, who "was getting fuel there," was talking with Appellant, who was now conscious. N.T. Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 2/10/20, at 20.
The trial court made the following findings of fact:
9. [Appellant's] car key was not in the ignition, the motor was not running, and none of the lights were on.
* * *
11. Upon making contact with [Appellant], Trooper Maggs immediately noticed the smell of alcoholic beverage emanating from her breath, and her speech was slurred and incoherent.
12. At no point in time did Trooper Maggs conduct a search of [Appellant's] vehicle.
13. Trooper Maggs observed a thirty-pack of Budweiser beer in the backseat with some of the containers missing and not visible within the vehicle, but no containers were open.
14. [Appellant] admitted to drinking Budweiser beer the previous night, but denied consuming any alcohol after arriving at the [gas] station that morning.
15. [Appellant] denied, but [then] admitted to driving to the gas station from a camp in Kato.
* * *
19. Troopers Maggs asked [Appellant] to perform a field sobriety test, which [Appellant] failed.
20. At that point in time, Trooper Maggs concluded [Appellant] was unable to safely operate a vehicle and placed her under arrest for [DUI].
21. [Appellant] was transported to [the hospital], where she consented to have her blood drawn.
22. The blood test showed [Appellant's] blood alcohol content was .127 percent.Suppression Order at 2-3.
Trooper Maggs filed a criminal complaint, charging Appellant with DUI under both Subsection 3802(a)(1) (general impairment) and Subsection 3802(b) (high rate of alcohol). On November 20, 2019, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, seeking suppression of the evidence and arguing her seizure and arrest were illegal. The trial court conducted a hearing on February 10, 2020. The sole witness was Trooper Maggs, who testified to the facts as summarized above.
On May 13, 2020, the trial court issued an opinion and order, denying Appellant's suppression motion. Generally, it found: (1) the initial interaction between the trooper and Appellant did not constitute a seizure or restraint; (2) furthermore, Trooper Maggs' initial interaction with Appellant was justified under the community caretaker doctrine; (3) when the trooper directed Appellant to exit the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests, the interaction transitioned into an investigation detention; and (4) the investigative detention was supported by reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity, based upon Trooper Maggs' observations of Appellant.
As we discuss infra, the trial court's first two findings are somewhat incongruous. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621, 625 (court shall first determine whether the defendant was seized, and if so, then consider whether the seizure was justified under the Fourth Amendment and the community caretaker doctrine).
The case proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial on September 8, 2020. The parties stipulated to: (1) what the blood alcohol test lab personnel would testify to; (2) Trooper Maggs' "MVR" video, played without sound for the court, and (3) the suppression hearing transcript. N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 9/8/20, at 3-4. Neither party presented any further evidence. The trial court found Appellant guilty of both counts of DUI, specifically concluding: (1) she was in actual physical control of the vehicle, as she admitted she drove to the gas station; and (2) furthermore, she admitted she "consumed Budweiser beer the night before but not that morning," and she did not satisfactorily complete the field sobriety tests. 1925(a) Op., 2/8/21, at 2-3.
On October 27, 2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six months' probation with restrictive conditions. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion, but filed a timely notice of appeal on November 25, 2020. She subsequently complied with the trial court's order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the Lower Court erred in denying [Appellant's] Motion to Suppress.
II. Whether the Commonwealth met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle when the vehicle was parked in a parking lot and the engine was not running and no one saw her driving or operating the vehicle.Appellant's Brief at 9.
Appellant first challenges the denial of her suppression motion, arguing the trial court erred in finding the "seizure" was justified under the community caretaker doctrine. Appellant's Brief at 19. In support, Appellant avers the initial report to police was merely of "a woman . . . in a vehicle who didn't respond to knocking on her window or yelling," and there was no mention of any possible overdose, serious injury, or vehicle accident. Id. at 18.
Appellant points out that this evidence - Grewal's observations as communicated to the police - was not offered for the truth of the matter, but rather to "explain why Trooper Maggs did what he did." Appellant's Brief at 18. Although not entirely clear, it appears Appellant is arguing this Court should, therefore, likewise not accept as true the contents of the call. See id. ("Appellant stresses to this Honorable Court to review carefully how the lower court ruled on certain testimony. . . . The [trial court] recognized that what Trooper Maggs testified to regarding the reason for dispatch was not being used for the truth of the matter asserted."). However, as we discuss infra, under our standard of review we "consider only the Commonwealth's evidence and so much of the [defense evidence] as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole."). See Hampton, 204 A.3d at 456.
Furthermore, Appellant alleges Trooper Maggs' own observations would have revealed "no objective facts that would reasonably suggest [she] was in need of assistance," where she was conscious and talking and there was nothing unusual about how the car was parked. Id. at 18-19. Appellant maintains that Trooper Maggs questioned "her about criminal activity," and not her health and safety, and he commanded - rather than requested - her to exit the vehicle. Id. at 21. Appellant asserts she did not feel free to leave and thus "the encounter became a seizure which was not supported by . . . reasonable suspicion." Id. We conclude no relief is due.
We first note the standard of review of the denial of a suppression motion:
We may consider only the Commonwealth's evidence and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. An appellate court, of course, is not bound by the suppression court's conclusions of law.Hampton, 204 A.3d at 456, quoting Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 619.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has recognized three categories of interaction between citizens and the police. The first is a mere encounter, or request for information, which need not be supported by any level of suspicion. The second category of interaction, an investigative detention or Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 . . . 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), "subjects an individual to a stop and period of detention but is not so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest." To survive constitutional scrutiny, "an investigative detention must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal
activity and may continue only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion." Finally, an arrest or custodial detention must be supported by probable cause to believe the person is engaged in criminal activity.Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 613 n.1.
The community caretaker doctrine and public safety exception may apply if a court has found there was a seizure or investigative detention. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621, 625 (court "must first determine whether [the defendant] was seized by considering whether a reasonable person in [her] shoes would have believed she was free to leave," and if finding so, then "proceed to determine whether" the detention was justified under the community caretaker doctrine). See also id. at 619-20 ("[I]f community caretaking were just another name for consensual encounters, there would have been no need for courts to formulate the exception in the first place.").
"[E]ven community caretaking activity must be performed in accordance with Fourth Amendment protections." Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 629.
[I]n order for a seizure to be justified under the public servant exception to the warrant requirement under the community caretaking doctrine, the officer must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts which would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that assistance was needed; the police action must be independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence; and, based on a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the action taken by police must be tailored to rendering assistance or mitigating the peril. Once assistance has been provided or the peril mitigated, further police action will be evaluated under traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.Id. at 637 (emphases added).
Here, the trial court found the initial interaction was appropriate under the community caretaker doctrine. Suppression Order at 5, 7. The court emphasized the gas station owner, Grewal, was "concerned upon observing [Appellant's] vehicle parked in the lot for a three-hour period . . . and [unsuccessfully] arousing" her. Id. at 9-10. The court considered that Trooper Maggs' presence "was requested to make sure [Appellant] was not injured or in need of assistance," and this was "not a situation wherein Trooper Maggs[ ] was investigating criminality." Id. at 9. The court concluded a "reasonable person in [Appellant's] shoes and under the circumstances would understand the officer's initial presence as the rendering of assistance." Id. at 9. We agree.
Nevertheless, Appellant does not challenge this finding on appeal. We do not disturb the trial court's conclusion - that "whether [Appellant] was seized at the beginning of the interaction or sometime later is of no consequence to the outcome of the matter. In either scenario, the seizure was justified by the reasonableness of Trooper Maggs' actions." See Suppression Order at 7. See also Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 456 (Pa. Super. 2012) (this Court may affirm on any basis). As stated above, the trial court also found the initial interaction was not a seizure. See Suppression Order at 7 ("[T]here clearly was no seizure until [Appellant] was asked to exit the vehicle and perform the field sobriety tests[;]" "Trooper Maggs' initial response to the phone call and observation of the problem did not amount to any restraint."), 9 ("[I]t cannot be argued Trooper Maggs' initial response to the call constituted a restraint of [Appellant] prior to asking her to exit her vehicle."). If so, as court itself properly observed, the inquiry concluded and there was no need to further consider the community caretaker doctrine. See id. at 7 ("[I]t is imperative to first determine if Trooper Maggs' actions amounted to a seizure. Second, if it is determined there has been a seizure, the Court must determine whether the community caretaker doctrine applies."); Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621, 625.
The crux of Appellant's argument on appeal is that there were no objective facts indicating she was in need of assistance. We conclude, however, that her supporting discussion goes to the weight of the evidence presented - whether there was anything "unusual about how . . . the vehicle was parked," and that by the time Trooper Maggs arrived, she was "conscious and talking." See Appellant's Brief at 18. Under our standard of review, we "consider only the Commonwealth's evidence and so much of the [defense evidence] as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole." See Hampton, 204 A.3d at 456. We are bound by the trial court's findings of fact, and thus do not disturb the weight accorded to the evidence presented. See id.; Carter, 105 A.3d at 773. Here, we find record support for the trial court's factual finding that the initial interaction was not related to any "detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence," and that trooper "point[ed] to specific, objective, and articulable facts which would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that assistance was needed." See Suppression Order at 9; Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637.
Finally, we observe the crux of Appellant's discussion goes to the initial safety and welfare check. To the extent she also challenges the subsequent interaction, we would conclude no relief is due. As stated above, the trial court found that following the public safety check, the interaction "transitioned into an investigative detention" when the trooper directed Appellant to exit the vehicle and perform sobriety tests. Suppression Order at 7. The court further found this investigative detention was supported by reasonable suspicion:
Troopers Maggs immediately noticed several indicators of intoxication such as . . . slurred and incoherent speech, and the immediate odor of alcohol emanating from her person. Additionally, a case of beer with missing bottles was observed in the rear of the vehicle.Suppression Order at 10.
Appellant does not challenge these findings on appeal, and in any event, we would conclude the record evidence supports the trial court's findings. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 613 n.1; Hampton, 204 A.3d at 456. Finally, we note Trooper Maggs' ultimate arrest was supported by probable cause that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity, namely DUI. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 613 n.1. In addition to the above observations by Trooper Maggs, by the time he arrested Appellant, she had also failed to satisfactorily perform the field sobriety tests. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court's suppression ruling.
In her second issue, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain her two convictions of DUI. In support, she asserts the following. First, under the general impairment subsection (75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1)), the Commonwealth "must sufficiently relate the defendant's impairment to the actual time of driving or operation." Appellant's Brief at 23-24. However, here, "the Commonwealth produced absolutely no evidence . . . establishing the time of [her] drinking[ nor] the time of [her] driving." Id. at 30. "The Commonwealth only called Trooper Maggs who testified that he responded to a . . . dispatch about a car that had been parked . . . for about three hours." Id. at 23-24. "Appellant did not make a critical admission that she had been drinking before driving or operation [of] her car. She only admitted to drinking the night before without any further specificity." Id. at 37. Furthermore, the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence that Appellant "was in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle." Id. at 23. Upon Trooper Maggs' arrival on the scene, "the vehicle was not running[, ] the keys were not in the ignition[, and t]he car was parked in a legal manner." Id. at 24. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence for DUI/high rate of alcohol (75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b)), Appellant avers the Commonwealth likewise failed to establish when she "last operated her car," and thus "failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [she] operated her car less than two hours before her BAC" test. Id. at 43. We conclude no relief is due.
Our standard of review of a sufficiency challenge is well-settled:
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, subject to plenary review. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the appellate court must review all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner. Evidence will be deemed to support the verdict when it establishes each element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence or establish the defendant's guilt to a mathematical certainty. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Brotherson, 888 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).
The DUI statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a)General impairment.
(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
* * *
(b) High rate of alcohol. - An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the individual's blood or breath is at least 0.10% but less than 0.16% within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
* * *
(g) Exception to two-hour rule. - Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection . . . (b), . . . where alcohol . . . concentration in an individual's blood or breath is an element of the offense, evidence of such alcohol or controlled substance concentration more than two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle is sufficient to establish that element of the offense under the following circumstances:
(1) where the Commonwealth shows good cause explaining why the chemical test sample could not be obtained within two hours[.]75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (b), (g)(1). The Commonwealth may establish the elements of DUI by circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Starry, 224 A.3d 312, 318 (Pa. 2020).
Here, the trial court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions under both the general impairment and high rate of alcohol subsections of the DUI statute. First, the court found Appellant was in actual physical control of a vehicle, emphasizing her admission, to Trooper Maggs, "that she drove to the [gas station] from a camp in Kato." 1925(a) Op. at 3. The court also considered:
[Appellant] was seated in the driver's seat behind the wheel. Trooper Maggs smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from [her] breath. [Appellant's] speech was confusing and slurred. [She] admitted to having consumed Budweiser beer the night before but not that morning. The trooper also observed an open 30-pack of Budweiser cans in the back seat and there were cans missing.Id. Additionally, Appellant did not satisfactorily complete field sobriety testing. Id.
We reiterate that the parties stipulated that Appellant's BAC testing result was .127%. At trial, the Commonwealth relied on Subsection 3802(g), which provides "an exception" for not "hav[ing] blood taken within the two-hour rule," if the Commonwealth "can show good cause explaining why it wasn't done." N.T., 9/8/20, at 12. The Commonwealth argued the police did not "have any concern until they" received the request to conduct a welfare check, and the BAC test was performed "within two hours of the police appearing." Id. at 12-13.
On appeal, Appellant presents no discussion of the BAC test-timing provision at Subsection 3802(g). Furthermore, while Appellant would attribute no significance to her admission, to Trooper Maggs, that she drank beer sometime before driving, drove to the gas station that morning, and did not drink any alcohol after arriving at the gas station, the weight of this evidence was for the trial court to weigh. See Brotherson, 888 A.2d at 904. Viewing all the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude the record evidence supports the verdicts. See id. The trial court properly found the circumstantial evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was in actual physical control of the vehicle, she was "incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control," and her BAC was more than .10% within two hours of the actual physical control. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (b); Starry, 224 A.3d at 318; Brotherson, 888 A.2d at 904. Accordingly, we do not disturb the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Matter Omitted
[*]Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.