Opinion
J-S79005-16 No. 2654 EDA 2014
11-01-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. JAMAL SWINTON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 15, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011984-2012 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellant, Jamal Swinton, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following Appellant's bench trial convictions of one count each of criminal trespass, conspiracy to commit trespass, and criminal mischief. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii), 903(c), and 3304(a)(2), respectively.
The trial court opinion fully sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no need to restate them.
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on May 15, 2014. Appellant's motion was denied by operation of law on September 19, 2014, and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal that same day. On February 4, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); and Appellant timely complied on February 20, 2015.
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS 18 PA.C.S. § 3503, CONSPIRACY 18 PA.C.S. § 903, AND CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 18 PA.C.S. § 3304(B)?(Appellant's Brief at 7).
WHETHER THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS AGAINST APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR CRIMINAL TRESPASS 18 PA.C.S. § 3503, CONSPIRACY 18 PA.C.S. § 903, AND CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 18 PA.C.S. § 3304(B)?
With respect to a sufficiency claim:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Jones , 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick , 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
Our standard of review for a challenge to the weight of the evidence is as follows:
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may only reverse the lower court's verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court's role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.Commonwealth v. Champney , 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Anne Marie B. Coyle, we conclude Appellant's issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed February 17, 2016, at 4-10) (finding: police officers saw torso and arms of Appellant's co-conspirator positioned inside front porch window of victim's residence at approximately 12:30 a.m., while Appellant stood nearby and served as lookout; officers observed Appellant alert co-conspirator to police presence, at which point both assailants attempted to flee; Appellant and co-conspirator gave police incompatible explanations for their presence at victim's residence, and Appellant initially gave police false name; officers observed porch window through which co-conspirator entered residence was damaged and occupants of residence were frightened; Commonwealth witnesses' testimony was credible; Appellant's explanation to officers at scene for his presence there conflicted with Appellant's witnesses' testimony; Appellant and his co-conspirator did not own residence and had no permission to enter residence; Appellant and co-conspirator actively participated and shared common intent; Appellant and his co-conspirator demonstrated consciousness of guilt when they attempted to flee and gave dissimilar explanations to officers; weight and sufficiency of evidence supported verdict for all charges). The record supports the court's decision. Thus, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 11/1/2016
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