Opinion
J-S12002-18 No. 1199 MDA 2017
04-23-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. MATTHEW ALLEN PLESKONKO
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000395-2017 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, granting Matthew Allen Pleskonko's petition for writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the charges filed against him under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) (persons not to possess firearms). Upon careful review, we affirm based upon the opinion authored by the Honorable Katherine V. Oliver.
On January 25, 2017, Pennsylvania State Police responded to a report of a domestic dispute between Pleskonko and his wife at their home in Philipsburg, Centre County. Dispatch informed the troopers that there were firearms in the home and that one of the parties (Pleskonko) had a lawfully issued, non-expiring protection from abuse ("PFA") order from New Jersey. During the course of the investigation, Pleskonko admitted to the troopers that he was the subject of a New Jersey PFA. The troopers found three rifles, four shotguns, and one revolver at the residence. After obtaining a copy of the New Jersey PFA, the troopers took Pleskonko into custody and filed a criminal complaint charging him with eight counts of persons not to possess firearms. Pleskonko waived his preliminary hearing, but the parties agreed that he could nonetheless file a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The complaint was subsequently amended to correct improper grading and to add an additional count of persons not to possess firearms.
A criminal information was filed on April 5, 2017; Pleskonko waived arraignment. On April 12 2017, the Commonwealth moved to amend the criminal information to reflect that Pleskonko is prohibited from possessing a firearm due to the active PFA against him. The court granted the motion on April 17, 2017. That same date, Pleskonko filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case to support the charges against him because section 6105 does not criminalize the possession of a firearm by someone subject to an out-of-state PFA. After a hearing and review of the parties' memoranda of law, the court granted Pleskonko's petition and dismissed the charges against him.
We note that the appropriate procedural means by which an accused may challenge the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence at the pre-trial stage is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Commonwealth v. Huggins , 836 A.2d 862, 868 n.2 (Pa. 2003). When a charge is dismissed on a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus, the Commonwealth may appeal. Id.
This timely appeal follows, in which the Commonwealth raises the following issue for our consideration:
Did the trial court err in granting [Pleskonko's] [p]etition for [w]rit of [h]abeas [c]orpus because [Pleskonko] was not permitted to possess a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1)?Brief of Appellant, at 4.
We begin by noting our standard and scope of review when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a habeas corpus petition:
[W]e will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In order to constitute an abuse of discretion, the record must disclose that the trial court exercised manifestly unreasonable judgment or based its decision on ill will, bias or prejudice. Furthermore, our scope of review is limited to determining whether the Commonwealth has established a prima facie case. In criminal matters, a prima facie case is that measure of evidence which, if accepted as true, would justify the conclusion that the defendant committed the offense charged.Commonwealth v. Heckman , 66 A.3d 765, 767-68 (Pa. Super. 2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Ruby , 838 A.2d 786, 788 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). The evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth's prima facie case for a charged crime is a question of law as to which an appellate court's review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Karetny , 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005).
Here, Pleskonko was charged under section 6105 of the Crimes Code, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--
(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.
. . .
(b) Enumerated offenses.--The following offenses shall apply to subsection (a):
[Enumerating specific offenses]
Any offense equivalent to any of the above-enumerated offenses under the prior laws of this Commonwealth or any offense equivalent to any of the above-enumerated offenses under the statutes of any other state or of the United States.
(c) Other persons.--In addition to any person who has been convicted of any offense listed under subsection (b), the following persons shall be subject to the prohibition of subsection (a):
. . .
(6) A person who is the subject of an active protection from abuse order issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108, which order provided for the relinquishment of firearms during the period of time the order is in effect. This prohibition shall terminate upon the expiration or vacation of an active protection from abuse order or portion thereof relating to the relinquishment of firearms.
. . .
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)-(c), (g).
(g) Other restrictions.--Nothing in this section shall exempt a person from a disability in relation to the possession or control of a firearm which is imposed as a condition of probation or parole or which is imposed pursuant to the provision of any law other than this section.
In arguing before the trial court, Pleskonko noted that subsection (b), which enumerates specific underlying offenses which preclude ownership of firearms under subsection (a), contains a catch-all provision imposing criminal liability for "[a]ny offense equivalent to any of the above-enumerated offenses under the prior laws of this Commonwealth or any offense equivalent to any of the above-enumerated offenses under the statutes of any other state or of the United States." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(b). Conversely, Pleskonko noted that subsection (c)(6), barring firearms ownership by those subject to an active Pennsylvania PFA, contains no such catch-all provision. Citing the rule of statutory interpretation that "[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion," Russello v. United States , 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), Pleskonko argued that the legislature intentionally omitted to impose liability for subjects of foreign PFAs. Pleskonko also relied on the rule of lenity, which requires that penal statutes be strictly construed, see 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1), with the accused receiving the benefit of the doubt.
In response, the Commonwealth argued that, although subsection (c)(6) references only the Pennsylvania PFA statute, subsection (g) acts as a catch-all provision and covers "any law," including foreign PFA statutes. The Commonwealth further asserted that Pleskonko's narrow interpretation of section 6105 is contrary to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute, which was to keep its citizens safe from gun violence. Finally, the Commonwealth claimed that the exclusion of foreign PFAs from the reach of section 6105 violates the principle of comity between the states.
The trial court agreed with Pleskonko's interpretation of section 6105 and dismissed the charges against him. We have reviewed the record and the briefs submitted by the parties in this matter and conclude that Judge Oliver's excellent opinion thoroughly, comprehensively and correctly disposes of the Commonwealth's claim. In particular, we note our agreement with Judge Oliver's determination that subsection (g) does not function as a catch-all provision. Rather, the plain language of that subsection establishes that, "even in cases where a person makes successful application for exemption from weapons prohibitions imposed by section 6105, that exemption is not broad enough to lift firearms prohibitions imposed by probation or parole orders, or laws other than Crimes Code section 6015." Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/17, at 5. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of Judge Oliver's opinion and instruct the parties to attach a copy in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 04/23/18
Image materials not available for display.