Opinion
J-A28012-18 No. 1504 MDA 2017
01-25-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. LUCAS ALLEN NEWNAM Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 9, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003420-2016 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:
Lucas Allen Newnam appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, following his conviction of first-degree murder. Newnam was sentenced to life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole. After careful review, we affirm.
On May 27, 2016, Newnam fatally shot Julius Dale, III, at Newnam's residence located at 304 Creek Road, Sadsbury Township, in Lancaster County. We refer to pages 2-11 of the attached trial court opinion, dated December 20, 2017, for a recitation of the relevant trial testimony and factual background of the case.
Following a five-day jury trial, first-degree murder conviction, and sentencing, Newnam filed timely post-sentence motions alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the Commonwealth provided insufficient evidence to disprove his defense of justification. The court denied the motion and, on September 20, 2017, Newnam filed the instant, timely notice of appeal. After being granted an extension by the trial court, Newnam filed a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
On appeal, Newnam raises the following issues for our consideration:
(1) Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying [Newnam's] request to have newly[-]retained counsel of his choice assume his defense of his pending murder trial and afford counsel a brief continuance to prepare, where [Newnam's] original attorney abruptly withdrew from his case for medical reasons and the court appointed new counsel to [Newnam's] case[?]
(2) Did the trial court err when it allowed the Commonwealth to introduce [Newnam's] intercepted prison visit conversations, in the absence of explicit consent by both parties or judicial authorization, in violation of the Wiretap Act, 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 5701, et se[q]., and Commonwealth v. Fant [, 146 A.3d 1254 (Pa. 2016)?]
(3) Did the trial court err when it refused to suppress [Newnam's] statements during a custodial interrogation when the state police troopers failed to properly inform him of the nature of the investigation prior to advising [Newnam] of his Miranda rights[?]
(4) Did the trial court err by refusing to charge the jury pursuant to [Newnam's] requested castle doctrine instruction when [Newnam] testified, as well as put on witnesses buttressing
his claim of self-defense and the decedent's stated intent to kill [Newnam?]Appellant's Brief, at 7-9.
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The Commonwealth has presented our Court with a post-submission communication, attaching a recent decision, Commonwealth v. Cannavo , 3729 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 3, 2018), that addresses the castle doctrine and 18 Pa.C.S. § 505. The Commonwealth asserts that Cannavo is relevant to our analysis of Newnam's last issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2501 (after argument of case, no brief, memorandum or letter relating to case shall be presented either directly or indirectly to court or any judge, except upon application or when expressly permitted to bar at time of argument) (emphasis added). We accept the submission pursuant to Rule 2501.
In his first issue on appeal, Newnam contends that the trial court improperly denied his request to have newly-retained, private counsel appointed and permit counsel to have a brief continuance to prepare his case. He asserts the denial was an abuse of discretion where Newnam's original attorney withdrew from his case for medical reasons and the court appointed new counsel for him, depriving him of his right to choose counsel.
It is a fundamental principle that a defendant has a constitutional right to choose any lawyer he may desire, at his own cost and expense. Commonwealth v. Rucker , 761 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2000); Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. I, § 9; U.S. Constitution, Amend. V. Cf. Commonwealth v. Moore , 633 A.2d 1119, 1125 (Pa. 1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson , 236 A.2d 805, 807 (Pa. 1968) (defendant who is not employing counsel at own expense and seeks court-appointed counsel, at public expense, does not have right to choose particular counsel to represent him)). In Commonwealth v. Robinson , 364 A.2d 665, 674 (Pa. 1976), our Supreme Court noted:
Due process demands that the defendant be afforded a fair opportunity to obtain the assistance of counsel of his own choice to prepare and conduct his defense; the constitutional mandate is satisfied so long as the accused is afforded a fair or reasonable opportunity to obtain particular counsel, provided there is no arbitrary action prohibiting the effective use of such counsel.Id. at 674 (citations omitted).
However, a person's right to be represented by the counsel of his choice is not absolute. "[T]he right of the accused to choose his own counsel, as well as a lawyer's right to choose his clients, must be weighed against and may reasonably be restricted by 'the state's interest in the swift and efficient administration of criminal justice.'" Id. at 676. Effectively, a defendant cannot "utilize his right to choose his own counsel so as unreasonably to clog the machinery of justice and hamper and delay the state in its efforts to do justice with regard to both him and to others whose right to a speedy trial may thereby be affected." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.Id. at 675 (emphasis added). Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Brooks , 104 A.3d 466 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme Court noted that:
[a]ppellate review of a trial court's continuance decision is deferential. The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. Rather, discretion is abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record.Id. at 469. Our federal courts have recognized that a defendant must be "given a reasonable time and a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his [or her] own choice, Chandler v. Fretag , 348 U.S. 3, 10, (1954), that this right cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct a reasonably prompt trial, Releford v. United States , 288 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir., 1961), and that [a defendant cannot be] deprived of his [or her] constitutional right to have assistance of counsel at his [or her] trial. In United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney , 220 F. Supp. 801, 805 (W.D. Pa. 1963), the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, held that "[a]n accused without [] sufficient funds who failed to engage counsel of choice within a 70-day period prior to trial must rely on court-appointed counsel if he desires an advocate. He does not have the right to tell the court whom to appoint, the choice is that of the court. Id. at 805.
We note that pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 106, "a court may grant a continuance 'in the interests of justice.'" Pa.R.Crim.P. 106(A). In addition, "[a] motion for continuance on behalf of the defendant shall be made not later than 48 hours before the time set for the proceeding." Id. at 106(D).
Here, Newnam's original trial counsel, Randall Miller, Esquire, who was court-appointed on July 28, 2016, and was fully prepared to go to trial, had to withdraw from the case just ten days shy of trial, in April 2017, due to medical reasons. On April 27, 2017, the court quickly appointed new counsel for Newnam, Edwin Pfursich, Esquire, who requested a two- or three-month continuance to properly prepare a defense for trial. The court granted the unopposed motion for a 60-day continuance and trial was rescheduled for July 29, 2017. During the following two months, Newnam became increasingly dissatisfied with Attorney Pfursich's representation. As a result, he retained new, private counsel, Michael V. Marinaro, Esquire, on July 19, 2017 - just ten days before his scheduled trial.
On July 20, 2017, the court held a hearing on Newnam's change of counsel and intended request for an additional two- to three-month continuance. The court noted at the hearing that the court's continuance decision would be based on the following facts: the case had already been continued one time; that continuance was on the defense because of the appointment of new counsel; the continuance was for two months; the case was now 14 months old; Newnam had more than one year to secure private counsel; Newnam secured private counsel only eight days before the rescheduled trial start date; Newnam had been in court on several occasions over the prior nine months and never indicated that he intended to hire private counsel or that he was dissatisfied in any way with Attorney Pfursich; and that the Commonwealth has already subpoenaed and met with witnesses for trial. N.T. Hearing, 7/20/17, at 3-6.
Current counsel, Attorney Pfursich, testified at the hearing that while he and his client disagreed over trial strategies, Newnam never personally indicated to him that he wanted to hire private counsel. He did state, however, that Newnam's family mentioned on a number of occasions that they were dissatisfied and were seeking to hire Newnam new counsel. Attorney Pfursich also told the court that he was prepared to go to trial at the end of July, that he did not believe that Newnam was hiring new counsel as a delay tactic, that Newnam had no reason to hire private counsel during the first year that the case was pending because he was satisfied with Attorney Miller, and that from experience he knew it required substantial effort to interview new attorneys and secure funding for private counsel in a murder case. Id. 10-14. The court also noted that if it did continue the case, it would not be able to reschedule trial before October, approximately 17 months after the criminal complaint was filed. Id. at 5.
Newnam's intended private counsel, Attorney Marinaro, indicated that without a continuance there was "no possible way that [he could] get up to speed at this point to be an effective attorney for [Newnam]" and would need two to three months to prepare for trial. Id. at 10-11.
Our Courts have repeatedly stated that upon review of the denial of a continuance motion, "we are to give attention to the 'reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.'" Commonwealth v. Wolfe , 447 A.2d 305, 308 (Pa. Super. 1982). Instantly, Newnam testified that he waited so long to hire private counsel after Pfursich was hired because he "didn't have the funds." Id. at 17. Newnam also testified that he did not speak up sooner and express his dissatisfaction with Attorney Pfursich at prior hearings because he was afraid he would be held in contempt of court for speaking out of turn. Id. at 18. He also indicated that counsel had not given him access to a witness statement and that counsel "didn't seem as enthusiastic about defending [his] case as [he] thought counsel should be." Id. at 22-23.
Finally, the assistant district attorney testified that he had no way of knowing if the Commonwealth's witnesses would be available if the trial were continued until October, id. at 36, the Commonwealth would not suffer any substantial prejudice if trial were continued, id. at 37, and it was not opposed to a continuance as long as Attorney Pfursich did not leave the case. Id . at 38.
In Commonwealth v. Prysock , 972 A.2d 539 (Pa. Super. 2009), our Court set forth the following factors to consider on appeal from a trial court's ruling on a continuance motion to obtain private representation: (1) whether the court conducted "an 'extensive inquiry' into the underlying defendant's dissatisfaction with current counsel;" (2) whether the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel amounted to "irreconcilable differences;" (3) "the number of prior continuances;" (4) "the timing of the motion" for continuance; (5) "whether private counsel had actually been retained;" and (6) the readiness of private counsel to proceed in a reasonable amount of time. Id. at 543.
Here the trial court conducted a thorough inquiry regarding why Newnam was dissatisfied with Attorney Pfursich; the court did not believe that Newnam's dissatisfaction constituted "irreconcilable differences;" a continuance was being sought one week before scheduled trial; private counsel had already been retained; new counsel was not immediately ready to proceed, but would need two to three additional months to prepare for trial. Prysock , supra. The court ultimately concluded that "[Newnam's] right to counsel of his choice was not exercised in a reasonable time and manner when weighed against the public need for the efficient and effective administration of justice." See Trial Court Opinion and Order, 7/21/17. Consequently, counsel's motion to withdraw was denied because granting it would have required a trial continuance. Id.
A comprehensive review of the record indicates that the trial court properly weighed Newnam's right to counsel of his choice against the state's interest in the efficient administration of justice. In Commonwealth v. Harding , 369 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. 1959) (en banc), our Court noted that "[i]t is necessary to balance the desirability of permitting a defendant additional time to retain private counsel against the equally desirable need for efficient and effective administration of justice. The accused's right to select his own counsel cannot be exercised in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same." Id. at 430.
Here, the court did not deny the appointment of private counsel, so much as it did not sanction a two to three month delay in bringing the case to trial. In fact, the court was willing to permit Attorney Marinaro to represent Newnam, so long as he was ready to go to trial on the scheduled date. Admittedly, this is a close case. We do not find that Newnam was intentionally trying to delay trial in bad faith, Commonwealth v. Ross , 350 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1976), or that he unreasonably clogged the machinery of justice by his request. Robinson , supra , at 674. However, we cannot conclude that the court's denial of Newnam's requires rises to the level of a deprivation of due process or an abuse of the trial court's discretion. See Brooks , supra (defining abuse of discretion as "a manifestly unreasonable judgment, a result of prejudice, bias or ill-will, or a misapplication of law.").
We remind the trial court that in future cases it must be sure to take all factors into consideration when ruling on a defendant's request to secure private counsel, including the gravity of the offenses lodged against the defendant, his reasons for securing new counsel and the reason why any prior continuances were granted for the defense.
The Commonwealth's acquiescence to a continuance was equivocal where the assistant district attorney first stated that he "certainly would not be opposed to a continuance . . . if Mr. Marinaro [were] granted permission to enter[,]" N.T. Hearing, 7/20/17, at 37, and then, only moments later, stated that if having Mr. Pfursich leave the case would result in a continuance, he would be opposed to having him leave the case. Id. at 38. Moreover, the Commonwealth did not definitively state that it would not be prejudiced where the assistant district attorney stated at the hearing that he could not "speak [as] to how successful [it would] be at staying in contact with [the witnesses] between [then and the rescheduled trial date in the fall]" and qualified this statement with the fact that many of the witnesses "do not have steady addresses or steady phone numbers" and "getting them to stay . . . in touch with [the Commonwealth] can be a bit of a challenge." Id. at 37. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to deny Newnam's continuance.
In his next issue on appeal, Newnam contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion in limine and permitted the Commonwealth to introduce several non-contact, intercepted prison visit conversations without first obtaining explicit consent by both parties or judicial authorization, in violation of the Wiretap Act ("the Act"), specifically 18 Pa.C.S. § 5704(14). We disagree.
On May 5, 2017, Newnam filed a motion in limine to preclude the Commonwealth from admitting "visit conversations inside Lancaster Prison" as a violation of the Wiretap Act. We equate this motion to, and treat it as, a motion to suppress the conversations.
Because Newnam was on non-contact status while incarcerated and awaiting trial on the instant homicide charge, all of his visits took place in the non-contact visitation room where he sat face-to-face with his visitors, on opposite sides of a pane of glass, and talked to them through telephone-style handsets. All of these non-contact conversations were recorded; bilingual signage on both sides of the glass pane notified inmates and visitors of the fact that their conversations may be recorded. Further, when Newnam and his visitors picked up the handsets, an audio recording informed them that, "This call is subject to recording and monitoring."
When reviewing a grant of a suppression motion, the appropriate scope and standard of review are as follows:
Commonwealth v. Burgos , 64 A.3d 641, 647 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation omitted). Moreover, interpreting the language of Pennsylvania's Wiretap Act is a pure question of law and, thus, demands a de novo standard of review. Commonwealth v. Deck , 954 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. Super. 2008).[W]here a motion to suppress has been filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible. In reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, our task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. If so, we are bound by those findings. Where, as here, it is the Commonwealth who is appealing the decision of the suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the defendant's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontradicted.
Moreover, if the evidence supports the factual findings of the suppression court, this Court will reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those findings.
Pennsylvania's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act generally prohibits intercepting, using, or disclosing communications except those according to specified procedures. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5703, et. seq. The Act is designed to safeguard individual privacy, while also giving law enforcement authorities a tool to combat crime. Consistent with the Act's emphasis on privacy, its provisions are to be strictly construed. Section 5704 of the Act provides, among others, two relevant exceptions to the general prohibition on intercepting communications. One exception, memorialized in section 5704(4) of the Act, does not make it unlawful and requires no prior court approval for the interception of communications "where all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception." 18 Pa.C.S. § 5704(4). The other relevant exception allows employees of county correctional facilities to "intercept, record, monitor and or divulge any telephone calls from or to an inmate in a facility" so long as inmates are notified in writing that their telephone conversations "may be intercepted, recorded, monitored or divulged" and that after the interception or recording only designated official personnel may have access to that recording. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5704(14)(i). Moreover, under section 5704(14)(iii), "[p]ersons who are calling into a facility to speak to an inmate shall be notified that the call may be recorded or monitored." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(14)(iii) (emphasis in original). Use of the word "into" in section 5704(14)(iii) contemplates a call originating outside the prison. Fant , 146 A.3d at 1262.
In 2017, section 5704 was amended, effective on September 5, 2017 - exactly one month after Newnam's trial concluded and he was sentenced. The relevant 2017 amendment to section 5704(14) substituted "oral communication, electronic communication or wire communication for "telephone calls." More specifically, section 5704(14)(iii) now provides:
(iii) Persons who are engaging in an oral communication, electronic communication or wire communication with an inmate shall be notified that the communication may be recorded or monitored. Notice may be provided by any means reasonably designed to inform the non-inmate party of the recording or monitoring.18 Pa.C.S. § 5704(14)(iii).
In Fant , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined the term "telephone call" under the Act as a communication that: (1) involves the dialing of a telephone number[;] (2) involves an apparatus that is connected by wire or the like to a telephone company[; and] (3) permits a caller to converse with a call recipient whose similar apparatus is associated with the dialed telephone number." Id. at 1263. In Fant , where the subject communications did not go through a telephone company, telephone company lines, or equipment outside the prison, only a personal ID number (not a telephone number) was used to activate the visit conversation, and the recordings of the visit conversations were saved to a prison computer server, the subject conversations were not subject to the county correctional facility "telephone" exception of the Act. Id. at 1265. Similarly, here the subject conversations did not go through a telephone company, telephone company lines, or equipment outside the prison, and only a personal ID was used to activate the conversation. Thus, the Act's section 5704(14)(iii) exception is not applicable to the instant matter.
However, our Court has held that any expectation of privacy that an inmate has in a conversation taking place in a prison visitation room, when separated from the visitor by a glass partition and speaking with the visitor through a closed-circuit telephone system, is unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Prisk , 13 A.3d 526, 532 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unreasonable for inmate to expect privacy in conversations that take place in prison visitation room; such expectation of privacy is not one society is prepared to recognize). Moreover, Robert Barley, an inmate disciplinary coordinator and investigative assistant at Lancaster County Prison where Newnam was housed at the time of the recorded conversations, testified that in the no-contact area there are "several phones on one side of the glass, along with several phones on the other side of the glass [and] right above the phone[s] is a [sign] that talks about the inmate's phones may be recorded, monitored or divulge[d]." N.T. Hearing, 5/5/17, at 4-5. The signs are written in English and Spanish and are located on both sides of the glass partition above the phones. Id. at 5. Moreover, after the inmate enters his or her passcode on the phone, a recording audibly informs the listeners that the calls may be intercepted, monitored, or divulged at any time. Id. at 9.
A separate, independent phone is used for attorney conversations with inmates. No conversations, which are considered privileged attorney-client communications, are recorded on those phones. Id. at 7-8.
We find that the phone calls admitted at trial fall within the Act's section 5704(4) exception, where both Newnam and visitors were given written and aural notice that their communications may be recorded. Commonwealth v. Byrd , 185 A.3d 1015 (Pa. Super. 2018) (two-party consent exception to Wiretap Act applied to inmate-visitor conversations where, before inmate and visitor could converse, recording stating visit may be recorded or monitored was played, visitor acknowledged that she heard prerecorded message and still decided to speak with inmate; Court found hyper-technical analysis of "consent" under section 5704(4) unreasonable). To require more evidence of "explicit" consent, as is suggested by Newnam, would elevate form over substance and give "inmate[s] [the opportunity to] easily avoid the consent element by simply holding the phone away from [their] ear[s] for a period of time prior to speaking with a visitor" or by stating that they did not read the posted signs. Id. at 1022.
In his next claim, Newnam argues that the trial court erred when it refused to suppress his statements made during a custodial interrogation, when the state police troopers failed to properly inform him of the nature of the investigation prior to advising Newnam of his Miranda rights.
After a review of the record, relevant case law and the parties' briefs, we rely on the trial court's Rule 1925(a) opinion to conclude that Newnam effectuated a valid waiver and was not improperly subjected to a custodial interrogation. See Rule 1925(a) Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/17, at 30-35. Here, the officers clearly told Newnam the direction and purpose of their questioning after they advised him of his Miranda rights but, critically, before they began their interrogation. Moreover, Newnam was apprehended in close proximity to the shooting scene and the questioning took place less than one day after the murder. See Commonwealth v. Green , 683 A.2d 659 (Pa. Super. 1996) (no requirement that suspect have knowledge of specific crimes about which he or she is to be questioned); Commonwealth v. Travaglia , 467 A.2d 288 (Pa. 1983) (fact that interrogation follows hard upon criminal episode and there is no circumstance lending ambiguity to direction and purpose of questioning may suffice as necessary evidence that defendant knew of occasion for interrogation).
In his final claim on appeal, Newnam contends that the trial court erred by refusing to charge the jury on the "castle doctrine" when Newnam testified and presented supporting witnesses to buttress his claim of self-defense and the decedent's stated intent to kill him. In essence, he alleges that he had a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself from the victim inflicting serious bodily injury or death upon him. Again, we rely upon the trial court opinion to dispose of this issue on appeal. See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/20/17, at 35-40.
Our standard of review in regard to a trial court's decisions on jury instructions is well-settled. "[W]hen considering the denial of jury instructions[,] . . . an appellate court will reverse a court's decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law." Commonwealth v. Galvin , 985 A.2d 783, 788-89 (Pa. 2009). "[Our] key inquiry is whether the instruction on a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its deliberations." Commonwealth v. Hamilton , 766 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa. Super. 2001).
The castle doctrine "is an evidentiary means by which a defendant may attempt to prove justification by self-defense." Commonwealth v. Cannavo , 2018 PA Super. 327 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 3, 2018). Specifically, it "is a specialized component of self-defense, which recognizes that a person has no duty to retreat from his or her home before using deadly force as a means of self-defense." Commonwealth v. Childs , 142 A.3d 823, 824 n.1 (Pa. 2016) (citations omitted). Standards for permitting a castle doctrine instruction are the same as when reviewing whether a self-defense instruction is appropriate. Thus, a "valid claim of . . . the castle doctrine must be made out as a matter of law, and this determination must be made by the trial judge." Id. at *6. In essence, the court must determine whether there was any evidence to justify the instruction.
The Castle Doctrine, originally a common law doctrine, was codified in Pennsylvania in 1972 with the enactment of 18 Pa.C.S. § 505. In June 2011, the legislature passed Act 10, which did not substantively alter the law regarding the use of deadly force within one's residence. Both the former and current section 505(b)(2)(ii) provide that a person may use deadly force if he or she believes that it is necessary to prevent death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat, and that there is no duty to retreat from the person's dwelling or place of work unless that person is the initial aggressor or is assailed by a person who also works in the same place. Childs , supra at 829-30. --------
Here, there was no evidence to support a finding that the victim unlawfully or forcefully entered Newnam's residence. Moreover, ample evidence existed to prove that Newnam's residence was being used for illegal drug trafficking. Both of these facts negate the applicability of the castle doctrine. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 505(b)(2.1)(i), 505(b)(2.2)(iii). Thus, the court did not err in failing to give a castle doctrine instruction.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 01/25/2019
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