Opinion
No. 17 WAP 2022
09-28-2023
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Rodney Sterling MCGEE, Appellant
Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Amicus Curiae Office of the Attorney General, 16th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120. Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Peter Rosalsky, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia. Maureen Flannery Spang, Esq., Kevin R. Steele, Esq., for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association. Corrie Allen Woods, Esq., Woods Law Offices PLLC, for Appellant. Danielle M. Deklewa, Esq., Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Cassidy Miller Gerstner, Esq., Washington County District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.
Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Amicus Curiae Office of the Attorney General, 16th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120.
Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Peter Rosalsky, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia.
Maureen Flannery Spang, Esq., Kevin R. Steele, Esq., for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association.
Corrie Allen Woods, Esq., Woods Law Offices PLLC, for Appellant.
Danielle M. Deklewa, Esq., Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Cassidy Miller Gerstner, Esq., Washington County District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.
OPINION
CHIEF JUSTICE TODD
We granted appeal in this matter to consider whether the Superior Court erred in holding that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to correct a patent and obvious error in a sentencing order when the defendant's request for correction is filed outside the time limitations of the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). For the following reasons, we affirm.
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 - 9546.
On November 5, 1994, Appellant Rodney Sterling McGee fatally assaulted Barry Williams. Appellant also assaulted the victim's daughter, Donna Lee Williams (hereinafter, "Donna"), who suffered numerous skull fractures. Following the assaults, Appellant kidnapped the victim's wife, Patricia Williams (hereinafter, "Patricia"), forcing her into a police vehicle. After driving a brief distance, Appellant stopped the vehicle in the parking lot of a nearby bar and dragged Patricia inside, at which time she escaped. Appellant returned to the parking lot and kidnapped two other women, Twyla Chambers and Beth Ann Ross, fleeing in Ross's vehicle. After driving approximately two miles, Appellant stopped the vehicle and the women escaped. Appellant, still in Ross's vehicle, fled the scene, and eventually was apprehended.
Although this is Appellant's name as reflected in the docket, at his plea hearing, Appellant indicated that his full name is Rodney Sterlinglee McGee.
On March 27, 1996, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to one count of criminal homicide ; one count of attempted homicide (Donna) ; two counts of aggravated assault (one each against Donna and Patricia) ; four counts of kidnapping (two against Patricia, one each against Chambers and Ross) ; and two counts of theft by unlawful taking. Following Appellant's plea, the trial court, the Honorable Thomas D. Gladden, orally imposed the following sentence: 10 to 20 years for criminal homicide; a consecutive term of 10 to 20 years for the aggravated assault of Donna; a concurrent term of 5 to 10 years for the attempted homicide of Donna; a consecutive term of 10 to 20 years for the aggravated assault of Patricia; a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for the kidnapping of Patricia; and five concurrent sentences of 2½ to 5 years on the remaining three kidnappings and two theft offenses. N.T. Hearing, 3/27/1996, at 31-32. The court stated that Appellant's aggregate sentence for all of the offenses was 32½ to 65 years.
On the same day that Appellant entered his plea and the trial court orally imposed the above sentence, the trial court issued a three-page typed document titled "Order" ("typed sentencing order"). The typed sentencing order, dated March 27, 1996, indicated that the trial court "will accept" Appellant's guilty plea and imposed, inter alia , a sentence of 10 to 20 years for criminal homicide, two consecutive sentences of 10 to 20 years for the aggravated assaults of Patricia and Donna, a concurrent term of 5 to 10 years on the charge of attempted murder of Donna; a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for the kidnapping of Patricia; and five concurrent sentences of 2½ to 5 years each for the kidnappings of Patricia (second offense), Twyla, and Beth, and the two theft offenses. Order, 3/27/1996, at 1. The typed sentencing order also specified that Appellant's aggregate term of imprisonment was 32 ½ to 65 years. In short, it was wholly consistent with the sentence the trial court orally imposed on the record. The official date stamp on the typed sentencing order indicates that it was filed on March 28, 1996.
Finally, we note that the original record in this case contains a one-page, pre-printed form titled "Sentence," also dated March 27, 1996, that contains handwritten notations by the trial court imposing, inter alia , a sentence of 10 to 20 years for criminal homicide; two consecutive terms of 10 to 20 years for aggravated assault; and a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for kidnapping. Notably, this order ("handwritten sentencing order") did not provide for a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years for the attempted murder of Donna, nor did it provide for additional concurrent sentences of 2½ to 5 years for the kidnappings of Twyla Chambers and Beth Ross, or Patricia (second offense), or the two theft offenses. The handwritten sentencing order does indicate, however, that Appellant's aggregate sentence was 32½ to 65 years. There is no date stamp on the handwritten sentencing order to indicate when it was filed. Appellant did not appeal his judgment of sentence.
Decades later, on June 3, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, and counsel was appointed. On August 5, 2020, Appellant, through his counsel, filed in the court of common pleas a "Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence" ("Motion"), asserting that, in the course of counsel's representation, counsel discovered the handwritten and typed sentencing orders, and arguing that there is an obvious incompatibility between the two orders because the typed sentencing order imposed a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 year for the attempted murder of Donna, whereas the handwritten sentencing order did not, and, further, that the offenses of attempted murder and aggravated assault of Donna should have merged for sentencing purposes.
Following a hearing, the trial court, the Honorable Gary Gilman, granted Appellant's motion, and vacated the concurrent 5-to-10-year sentence imposed for the attempted murder of Donna, as set forth in the typed sentencing order. In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court reasoned that courts have the inherent authority to correct orders that are "patently erroneous" and "contrary to common sense." Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/2020, at 2. The court further opined that its "inherent jurisdiction ... to correct patent and obvious mistakes" is "not barred by traditional time limits," such as those applicable to PCRA petitions. Id. at 3. Finally, the court explained that "challenges to an illegal sentence can never be waived and may be raised sua sponte " by the court. Id.
Finding that the orders in question were "patently erroneous" and "contrary to common sense," the trial court concluded that amendment of the orders was proper, as the time limits of the PCRA did not apply. The trial court further determined that, because the crimes of aggravated assault and attempted homicide merge for purposes of sentencing, the trial court's imposition, in the typed sentencing order, of a sentence on both crimes was illegal, and, therefore, Appellant's sentence for the attempted murder of Donna must be vacated, as both Appellant and the Commonwealth understood the primary offense to be aggravated assault. The Commonwealth appealed the trial court's decision to the Superior Court, asserting that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's Motion because the underlying claim was cognizable under the PCRA, and had been filed outside the PCRA's jurisdictional time constraints.
In a unanimous memorandum opinion, the Superior Court reversed. See Commonwealth v. McGee , 1032 WDA 2020, 2021 WL 2826693 (Pa. Super. filed July 7, 2021). In doing so, the court first observed that the PCRA allows criminal offenders to seek collateral relief when convicted of crimes they did not commit, or when serving illegal sentences, and, further, that when an action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the "sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose." Id. at 4 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 ) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, the court held that the trial court was required to treat Appellant's Motion as a petition under the PCRA. Id. at 7 (citing Commonwealth v. Guthrie , 749 A.2d 502 (Pa. Super. 2000) ). Finding that Appellant's Motion was filed outside the PCRA's one-year deadline, and that Appellant failed to plead and prove any exceptions to the PCRA's time requirements, the Superior Court held the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant relief.
Section 9542 of the PCRA provides, in part:
This subchapter provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis .
42 Pa.C.S. § 9542.
Section 9545(b) provides, in relevant part:
Time for filing petition.
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves [one of three enumerated exceptions.]
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).
The Superior Court acknowledged that this Court, in Commonwealth v. Holmes , 593 Pa. 601, 933 A.2d 57 (2007), recognized a trial court's "inherent power to correct patent errors despite the absence of traditional jurisdiction" when we "created a narrow exception" to the 30-day time limitation for modifying or rescinding court orders prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. McGee , 1032 WDA 2020 at 4 (quoting Holmes , 933 A.2d at 65 ). However, the Superior Court noted that, in Commonwealth v. Jackson , 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011), it interpreted Holmes in the specific context of an untimely PCRA petition, and found that, while " Holmes ... recognized the limited authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in sentences absent statutory jurisdiction under section 5505 [,] it did not establish an alternate remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA." McGee , 1032 WDA 2020 at 5 (quoting Jackson , 30 A.3d at 521 ). Thus, in the instant case, the Superior Court reversed the trial court's order vacating Appellant's sentence for attempted murder, and remanded for reinstatement of that portion of Appellant's sentence.
Section 5505, titled "Modification of orders," provides: "Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed." 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this Court, and we granted review to consider whether the Superior Court's application of its holding in Jackson for the proposition "that a trial court's inherent jurisdiction to correct patent and obvious mistakes in its records and orders is subject to the time-bar provisions of the PCRA" conflicts with this Court's holding in Holmes . Commonwealth v. McGee , 276 A.3d 701 (Pa. 2022) (order). As the question of whether a court has jurisdiction to grant relief is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo . Holmes , 933 A.2d at 65.
By way of background, Holmes was a consolidated appeal of two cases, the first involving Christopher Holmes. Holmes had committed a parole violation, for which he could be sentenced only to serve the balance of his original sentence. The trial court, however, sentenced him as if he had violated his probation, as opposed to parole, and imposed a new sentence of 3 to 6 years incarceration, to run concurrently to any sentence Holmes was serving for unrelated crimes. When it realized its error, the trial court sua sponte vacated the sentence, despite the fact that more than 30 days had elapsed since its imposition. The Commonwealth appealed, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to correct or vacate its prior sentence once the 30-day period prescribed in Section 5505 expired.
The Superior Court reversed, observing, inter alia , that the trial court's vacatur of Holmes’ sentence more than 30 days after the imposition thereof was impermissible under Section 5505. The court acknowledged that challenges to the legality of sentence cannot be waived, and may be raised by a court sua sponte , but reiterated that jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the court's ability to address the illegality. In rejecting Holmes’ assertion "that the trial court had inherent jurisdiction to correct patent and obvious errors in orders," the court distinguished this Court's prior decisions in Commonwealth v. Jones , 520 Pa. 385, 554 A.2d 50 (1989) (approving a trial court's correction of an illegal sentence the same day it was imposed), and Commonwealth v. Cole , 437 Pa. 288, 263 A.2d 339 (1970) (approving the trial court's correction of an order more than three months after its entry because it was internally inconsistent, providing for both a grant of a new trial and the arrest of judgment), explaining that "the order sentencing Holmes was neither ‘facially self-contradictory or irreconcilable nor did it contain a clerical error.’ " Holmes , 933 A.2d at 60-61 (citation omitted).
On appeal to this Court, Holmes argued, inter alia , that the trial court acted within its power to correct the patent and obvious mistake of imposing a new higher sentence, rather than recommitting him to serve the remainder of his original sentence. In response, the Commonwealth reiterated its position that the trial court lost jurisdiction when the 30-day period prescribed in Section 5505 expired. Recognizing that a claim of an illegal sentence can never be waived , the Commonwealth argued that a court must first have jurisdiction to address it, and the only method by which the trial court could have obtained jurisdiction was through the PCRA. The Commonwealth also suggested that Holmes misinterpreted our decisions in Cole and Jones as suggesting that trial courts have inherent power to correct illegal sentences at any time because (1) there was no jurisdictional question in Jones because the court acted immediately to correct the erroneous sentence, and (2) Cole was distinguishable because it involved an obvious clerical error apparent from the face of the order.
The other appeal in Holmes involved Rufus Whitfield, who pled guilty to theft and was sentenced to 11½ to 23 months incarceration; no term of probation was imposed. Subsequently, Whitfield was convicted on a separate charge, and, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court erroneously entered an order revoking Whitfield's "probation." Whitfield filed a motion to vacate the sentence, arguing it was illegal because no probation had been imposed for the theft offense. The court denied the motion and Whitfield appealed to Superior Court. While the appeal was pending, the trial court entered an order vacating the sentence on the ground that it was illegal, and Whitfield withdrew his appeal. The Commonwealth appealed, asserting the trial court did not have jurisdiction to vacate its sentence while Whitfield's appeal was pending. Relying on Cole and Commonwealth v. Klein , 566 Pa. 396, 781 A.2d 1133 (2001) (holding that trial court had jurisdiction to correct a manifest error in the calculation of sentence notwithstanding a pending appeal), the Superior Court affirmed, concluding that "the [trial] court's correction was authorized by the legal necessity of rectifying a patent illegality." Holmes, 933 A.2d at 64 (citation omitted).
The Commonwealth, on appeal to this Court, argued that the alleged illegality was not comparable to the clerical errors under Cole and Klein, and that the Superior Court erred in holding that a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Additionally, the Commonwealth averred that, not only had the 30-day period for correction of orders under Section 5505 expired, but the court had been divested of jurisdiction when Whitfield appealed to the Superior Court. Finally, the Commonwealth asserted that the PCRA was the sole means by which Whitfield could obtain relief. In response, Whitfield argued that the imposition of a sentence for violation of non-existent probation was an obvious and patent error, which the trial court had inherent jurisdiction to correct. He further challenged the Commonwealth's contention that the error was not an obvious or patent mistake, emphasizing that notations in the Quarter Session file, which was part of the certified record, demonstrated that no probationary period was imposed. Finally, citing Cole and Klein , Whitfield averred that statutory jurisdictional requirements must yield to the inherent power of courts, and he suggested that public policy demands that trial courts be permitted to correct erroneous sentences in order to avoid squandering judicial resources when a petitioner would ultimately be entitled to relief under the PCRA.
Upon review, this Court observed that "[t]he trial courts in both cases ... clearly lacked jurisdiction, absent the exercise of the rarely used power of the courts to correct patent errors." Holmes , 933 A.2d at 65. We further noted that, "[w]hile the causes of the two trial courts’ lack of jurisdiction are undeniably distinct," both implicated Section 5505, and we stated:
both cases fall within the limited class of cases amenable to the exercise by a trial court of the inherent power to correct patent errors despite the absence of traditional jurisdiction. As we have in the past, we hold today that the limits of jurisdiction enshrined in Section 5505 do not impinge on that time-honored inherent power of courts.
Id. (citing Klein, 781 A.2d 1133 ; Cole, 263 A.2d at 341 ).
Finally, we determined that both Holmes and Whitfield were entitled to relief:
Holmes's sentencing order, like the order in Cole, contained a patent mistake, a fact apparent from a review of the docket without resort to third-party information. The order stated, "parole is hereby revoked," and then sentenced Holmes to serve "Not less than three (3) years nor more than six (6) years in the State Correctional Institution, to run concurrently with any sentence now serving." ... The Commonwealth has not disputed that the sentence imposed was in direct conflict with the longstanding precedent that a parole violator cannot be sentenced to a new sentence but instead can only be recommitted to the remainder of the original sentence.... There is no dispute that Holmes's original sentence entailed a maximum of twenty-three months of incarceration. Considering that the error of the sentence was clear from the order and the docket sheet, the trial court properly exercised its inherent power to correct the mistake.
Similarly, ... Whitfield is entitled to the relief granted by the trial court under our caselaw upholding the inherent jurisdiction of courts to correct patent and obvious mistakes. The trial court imposed a new sentence of incarceration on Whitfield for a violation of probation even though probation was never imposed. While the mistake is not apparent based on the face of the order itself, one need only look to the Quarter Session notes in the record to see the mistake.
Id. at 66.
Notwithstanding the above, we cautioned that:
[a]lthough the defendants before this court warrant relief under the inherent power of courts to correct patent errors, we must also emphasize the limits of this power. This exception to the general rule of Section 5505 cannot expand to swallow the rule. In applying the exception to the cases at bar, we note that it is the obviousness of the illegality, rather
than the illegality itself, that triggers the court's inherent power. Not all illegal sentences will be amenable to correction as patent errors. Moreover, the inherent power to correct errors does not extend to reconsideration of a court's exercise of sentencing discretion. A court may not vacate a sentencing order merely because it later considers a sentence too harsh or too lenient.... These cases involve clear errors in the imposition of sentences that were incompatible with the record, as in Whitfield, or black letter law, as in Holmes.
Id. at 66-67.
Notably, former Justice Eakin filed a dissenting opinion, contending that, unlike the errors in Cole and Klein , the error in Whitfield's sentencing order was not facially contradictory or illegal, nor was it clerical or patent. He further opined that the majority's observation that "one need only look to the Quarter Session notes in the record to see the mistake," demonstrated that "it is not a patent mistake – it is a mistake which requires inquiry into the record, far beyond the face of the order." Holmes , 933 A.2d at 72 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (emphasis original; citation omitted).
Several years after our decision in Holmes , the defendant in Jackson pled guilty to burglary and related charges and was sentenced to 20 years probation. Approximately six years later, Jackson violated his probation, and, in 1988, following a probation violation hearing, the trial court revoked Jackson's probation and sentenced him to 2 to 20 years incarceration, to be served consecutively to other sentences Jackson was serving. Jackson's subsequent appeal to the Superior Court was denied, as was his petition for further review by this Court. Thereafter, in 2010, Jackson filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, asserting that the sentence he received for violating his probation was illegal under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9754(a) because it did not specify "the authority that shall conduct the supervision." Jackson , 30 A.3d at 518. Treating Jackson's motion as a PCRA petition, the PCRA court dismissed it as untimely. On appeal to the Superior Court, Jackson conceded that (1) his petition was untimely, and (2) the PCRA court lacked statutory jurisdiction to consider his claim. He argued, however, that his claim involved a challenge to the legality of his original sentence as a violation of black letter law, and, therefore, the PCRA court had authority to consider his claim under its inherent jurisdiction to correct patent errors in sentences.
The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of Jackson's PCRA petition, noting that, where an action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA provides the sole means of obtaining collateral relief. Id. The court further observed that the time limitations of the PCRA are jurisdictional, and a court has no authority to consider the merits of untimely petitions unless an exception has been pled and proven. Id. at 519. The court acknowledged, however, that this Court has upheld "the inherent authority of trial courts to correct patent mistakes in sentences despite the absence of statutory jurisdiction" at least in the context of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. Id. (citing Cole, 263 A.2d at 341 ).
Nevertheless, the Superior Court found Jackson's reliance on Holmes to support his claim that the PCRA court had jurisdiction to consider his claim unavailing for two reasons. First, the Superior Court opined that, contrary to the sentences at issue in Holmes , "there was no error in Jackson's sentence, let alone a patent and obvious illegality." Id. at 521. Second, the court determined that, "even if there was an obvious illegality in Jackson's sentence, the PCRA court would not have had jurisdiction to consider Jackson's claim," as this Court in Holmes "recognized the limited authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in sentences absent statutory jurisdiction under section 5505 ; it did not establish an alternate remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA." Id.
The court elaborated:
Inherent jurisdiction has been upheld as an exception to section 5505 because section 5505 was never intended to create a strict jurisdictional deadline for correcting orders where there is an obvious illegality in the sentence. See [ Holmes ]. This intent is evident from the plain language of the statute. Section 5505 confers on the trial court an affirmative right to modify orders within 30 days after its entry if there is no appeal, and does not expressly limit this authority after the 30-day period has expired. Because section 5505 does not directly prohibit a court from correcting an order after the deadline, our courts have recognized a limited equitable exception to the statute that permits a trial court to correct obvious illegalities in its sentences that are not discovered within the 30-day statutory period.
Section 9545 of the PCRA is not amenable to such equitable exceptions. Section 9545 expressly states that a PCRA petition "shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final" unless one of the statutory exceptions is pled and proven. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545. Our courts have strictly interpreted this requirement as creating a jurisdictional deadline.... Further, our courts have interpreted jurisdiction under section 9545 differently than section 5505. Unlike section 5505, section 9545 does not merely grant a court authority to consider a PCRA petition for a limited period of time; it acts to divest a court of jurisdiction once the filing period has passed. See [ Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2008) ] (courts are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of untimely PCRA petition). Therefore, when the one-year filing deadline of section 9545 has expired, and no statutory exception has been pled or proven, a PCRA court cannot invoke inherent jurisdiction to correct orders, judgments and decrees, even if the error is patent and obvious.
Id. at 522-23.
Turning to the parties’ arguments in the case sub judice , Appellant contends that the Superior Court erred in concluding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant him relief. Relying on, inter alia , this Court's decisions in Cole , Klein , and Holmes , Appellant maintains that trial courts have the "inherent authority to correct patent and obvious mistakes in its records," as "evidenced by the record and/or black-letter law," notwithstanding the time constraints of the PCRA. Appellant's Brief at 10-11. Appellant avers that the trial court in the instant case entered "two irreconcilable sentencing orders," which "cannot both be intentional." Id. at 28. Appellant further claims that, in light of the fact that "the hand-filled order correctly merges the two inchoate murder offenses, whereas the typewritten order does not, it is patent and obvious that the latter contains a mistake as demonstrated by its nonconformance with black-letter merger law," which the trial court had inherent authority to correct. Id. Finally, Appellant asserts that the Superior Court erred in relying on its decision in Jackson , as that decision is contrary to this Court's decision Holmes , and, in Appellant's view, should be disapproved. Id. at 27.
Despite Appellant's repeated references to merger principles, a concept that implicates a challenge to the legality of sentence, see Commonwealth v. Prinkey , --- Pa. ––––, 277 A.3d 554, 567 (2022), Appellant insists that he is not raising a challenge to the legality of his sentence under Section 9543(a)(2)(vii) of the PCRA (providing relief from the imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum), and, thus, the trial court's authority to correct the error was not constrained by the timeliness provisions of the PCRA. In this regard, Appellant posits that, while "there are instances in which a claim that a sentence is a mistake as evidenced by its clear illegality will lie at the same time that a claim that sentence exceeds the lawful maximum," that will not always be the case. Appellant's Brief at 19 (emphasis omitted). Appellant offers the following distinction: "the claim that the sentence is a mistake is predicated in its inadvertence as evidenced by clear illegality, whereas the claim that the sentence exceeds the lawful maximum is predicated on its illegality." Id. at 20 (emphasis original).
The Defender Association of Philadelphia ("DAP") filed an amicus brief in support of Appellant. DAP asserts, inter alia , that the authority of a trial court to correct its own errors is an inherent power which exists independent of the legislature and, specifically, the PCRA. Indeed, DAP submits that this Court's reference in Holmes to the jurisdictional time constraints of the PCRA "equated the effects of jurisdictional divestiture under Section 5505 with jurisdictional divestiture under the PCRA." DAP's Brief at 10. DAP also suggests that the language of Section 9542 of the PCRA, which states that "[t]his subchapter is not intended to limit the availability of remedies in the trial court," is particularly apropos to the instant case, where the trial court corrected its own patent mistake in a sentencing order. Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
In response, the Commonwealth argues that the Superior Court properly reversed the trial court's decision . First, the Commonwealth contends that "the negotiated plea agreement here was not patently and obviously illegal." Commonwealth's Brief at 19. Referring to the dissenting opinion of former Justice Eakin in Holmes , the Commonwealth maintains there was no patent and obvious error in the sentencing orders in this case because, unlike the error on the face of the order in Holmes , "the merits of Appellant's claim are not as clear [as to what] order dictates and whether the doctrine of merger applies." Id. at 22. The Commonwealth further argues that the Superior Court properly relied on its decision in Jackson to conclude that Appellant's sole means of obtaining relief is the PCRA, as both Jackson and the instant case are distinguishable from Holmes . As the PCRA petition filed by Appellant was untimely, the Commonwealth avers that the PCRA court did not have jurisdiction to address Appellant's claim.
The Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") and the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association ("PDAA") filed amicus briefs in support of the Commonwealth. Both the OAG and PDAA take the position that a trial court's power to address an obvious sentencing illegality is subject to the time limits of the PCRA, and they maintain that Holmes did not purport to hold otherwise. PDAA further avers that Appellant's sentence is not "patently illegal" simply because the trial court failed to merge his sentences for aggravated assault and attempted murder, and it notes that, at the time Appellant's sentence was imposed, the trial court would have been required to consider the facts and elements of the offenses to determine whether they merged for sentencing purposes, and the propriety of such determination is not amenable to correction by the trial court pursuant to Holmes . PDAA Brief at 12-13.
Prior to determining whether the trial court erred in granting Appellant relief based on its inherent authority to correct patent and obvious errors in the record despite the time limitations of the PCRA, we must resolve the threshold issue of whether there is, in fact, a patent and obvious error in the record to correct. As noted above, Appellant's claim of a patent and obvious error is premised on trial court's entry of what Appellant asserts are "two irreconcilable sentencing orders," Appellant's Brief at 28, one of which provides for a concurrent sentence for the attempted murder of Donna, and one which does not. Upon review of the record in this case, we conclude there is no patent and obvious error.
As noted above, at Appellant's plea and sentencing hearing, Judge Gladden orally stated, on the record, that he was imposing, inter alia , a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years for the attempted murder of Donna. See N.T. Hearing, 3/27/96, at 31 ("On the charge of Criminal Attempt/Homicide against Donna Lee Williams, the defendant is sentenced to a concurrent sentence of five to ten years."). Notably, Appellant does not reference the transcript of the plea hearing. The typed sentencing order, which is dated the same day as the sentencing hearing and bears an official date stamp indicating it was filed on March 28, 1996, precisely reflects the trial judge's intended sentence as stated on the record, including the concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years for the attempted murder of Donna.
We acknowledge that, in Commonwealth v. Borrin , 622 Pa. 422, 80 A.3d 1219 (2013) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court), we explained that a "signed sentencing order, if legal, controls over oral statements of the sentencing judge not incorporated into the signed judgment of sentence," and we held that "comments the trial court made after-the-fact ... regarding its subjective intent when sentencing [the defendant] and the sentence it meant for [the defendant] were irrelevant to the process of order clarification the trial court was authorized to undertake." Id. at 1226-27. As noted, however, the trial court's oral statements in the instant case were not made after-the-fact to explain its prior sentence; rather, the court described the sentence it was going to impose, which was fully consistent with the typed sentencing order.
Admittedly, the handwritten sentencing order, which does not contain an official date stamp, does not reference a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years for the attempted murder of Donna. However, it also does not list the five additional concurrent sentences of 2½ to 5 years for the kidnappings and two theft offenses orally imposed at Appellant's sentencing hearing and listed on the typed sentencing order. Instead, in the limited space available on the pre-printed form, the trial court listed the consecutive sentences which resulted in Appellant's aggregate sentence of 32½ to 65 years imprisonment, a sentence which is not disputed. In our view, the trial court's abbreviated recitation of the Appellant's sentence on the handwritten sentencing order does not render the handwritten and typewritten sentencing orders "irreconcilable," nor does it evidence a patent and obvious error in the record.
Indeed, we observe that we have no way of knowing at what point during the proceedings on March 27, 1995, the handwritten sentencing order was created by the trial court, although it was included among the plea waiver forms in the original record reviewed by this Court. Further, as noted above, there is no date stamp indicating when it was filed.
As we have determined that there is no patent and obvious error in the record, Appellant's claim for relief rises and falls on his assertion that the sentences for the aggravated assault and attempted murder of Donna should have merged for sentencing purposes. This is plainly a challenge to the legality of his sentence, see Prinkey , 277 A.3d at 567, which is subject to the time limitations of the PCRA, and it is undisputed that Appellant's Motion, if treated as a PCRA petition, was untimely.
Accordingly, and in conclusion, as there is no patent and obvious error in the trial court's sentencing orders, we hold that the trial court erred in granting Appellant relief under Holmes , and so we affirm the Superior Court's decision reversing the trial court's grant of relief. Further, in light of our determination that there is no patent and obvious error in the record, we do not reach the question of whether a trial court's inherent authority to correct patent and obvious errors in the record is subject to the time limitations of the PCRA.
Notably, even if we were to find that Appellant was entitled to relief, his aggregate sentence would remain unchanged.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Wecht asserts that our decision "undermines the inherent authority" of courts to correct patent and obvious errors, and that we "fail[ ] to give due regard" or "adhere" to this principle. Dissenting Opinion (Wecht, J., dissenting) at 670–71, 676. To the contrary, as the dissent otherwise seems to recognize, id. at 670 (noting that, "rather than resolving the timeliness question," we find there was no error to correct); id. at 671–72 (same), we do not speak to the timeliness question. While we certainly disagree with the dissent that there was a patent and obvious error to correct in this case, our analysis ends with the threshold conclusion that there was no such error.
Affirmed.
Justices Dougherty, Mundy and Brobson join the opinion.
Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Donohue joins.
JUSTICE WECHT, dissenting
Under our Constitution, the courts of this Commonwealth "have certain inherent rights and powers to do all such things as are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice." Included in those inherent powers is the right of a court to correct its patent errors evident on the face of an order. So innate is this power that it is not subject to enactments of the General Assembly that purport to limit it. That power lies at the heart of the case sub judice .
Pa. Const. art. V, § 1 (vesting judicial power in the Unified Judicial System); Sweet v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. , 457 Pa. 456, 322 A.2d 362, 365 (1974).
Commonwealth v. Holmes , 593 Pa. 601, 933 A.2d 57, 65-67 (2007) (upholding the court's inherent authority to correct patent and obvious mistakes in its orders against purported statutory limitations upon this authority).
Id .
The trial court in this case entered two irreconcilable sentencing orders. Upon Rodney McGee's motion, the trial court remedied this error by entering an order modifying the sentence. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court reversed. The Superior Court held that, because McGee sought relief in the trial court beyond the timeliness requirements of the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to provide relief. According to the Superior Court, the PCRA and its time-bar superseded the trial court's ability to correct the error under its inherent authority.
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 -46; id. § 9545(b)(1) (requiring all petitions for relief be filed within one year of a judgment of sentencing becoming final, unless a timeliness exception applies).
Commonwealth v. McGee , 1032 WDA 2020, 2021 WL 2826693 (Pa. Super. July 7, 2021) (non-precedential decision).
Today's Majority affirms the Superior Court's wayward ruling. However, rather than resolving the timeliness question presented in this appeal, the Majority instead holds that the two sentencing orders did not actually involve a patent and obvious error that would trigger the trial court's inherent authority. In addition to resolving a question that is not before us, and doing so upon a basis advanced by neither party, the Majority's analysis undermines the inherent authority that is necessary for the judiciary to protect the integrity of the judicial process. I dissent.
On November 5, 1994, McGee fatally assaulted Barry Williams and assaulted Donna Lee Williams. McGee then kidnapped Patricia Williams, Twyla Chambers, and Beth Ann Ross. McGee was apprehended shortly after the three women escaped. On March 27, 1996, McGee entered a negotiated plea to one count of criminal homicide, one count of attempted homicide (relating to Donna), two counts of aggravated assault (one each relating to Donna and Patricia), four counts of kidnapping (two relating to Patricia, one each relating to Chambers and Ross), and two counts of theft by unlawful taking.
Maj. Op. at 660–61.
In open court, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten to twenty years’ incarceration for criminal homicide; a consecutive term of ten to twenty years’ incarceration for aggravated assault (Donna); a concurrent term of five to ten years’ incarceration for attempted homicide (Donna); a consecutive term of ten to twenty years’ incarceration for aggravated assault (Patricia); a consecutive term of two-and-a-half to five years’ incarceration for kidnapping (Patricia); and five concurrent sentences of two-and-a-half to five years’ incarceration for the remaining three kidnapping offenses and two theft offenses. In the aggregate, the court sentenced McGee to thirty-two-and-one-half to sixty-five years of incarceration.
After orally announcing the sentence, the trial court entered two conflicting sentencing orders. The first order, dated March 27, 1996, was typed and was consistent with the sentence as stated on the record in open court. The second sentencing order, also dated March 27, 1996, was handwritten. Diverging from the oral and typed orders, the handwritten order omitted any concurrent sentences and instead listed only the consecutive sentences. In particular, the handwritten order imposed a sentence for the aggravated assault of Donna, and no sentence for the attempted murder of Donna.
It was not until decades later that McGee's counsel noticed this discrepancy. Invoking the trial court's inherent authority to correct patent and obvious mistakes, McGee filed a "Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence," asserting that the typed and handwritten orders were incompatible inasmuch as the typed order imposed a concurrent sentence for the attempted murder of Donna, while the handwritten order did not. McGee further argued that the handwritten order accurately reflected that the sentences for the attempted murder of Donna and the aggravated assault of Donna merged for sentencing purposes, whereas the typed order did not. The trial court agreed, and vacated the concurrent sentence for attempted murder contained in the typed order and omitted from the handwritten order.
On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court, relying upon its decision in Commonwealth v. Jackson to hold that McGee's motion should have been considered a PCRA petition. As such, the Superior Court applied the jurisdictional time restrictions of the PCRA and held that McGee's petition was untimely. We then granted review to decide whether the trial court's inherent authority to correct patent and obvious mistakes in its records and orders is subject to the time-bar of the PCRA. Rather than answering this question, the Majority instead explores the unasked question of whether there was a patent and obvious error that would trigger the court's inherent authority. Reviewing the two sentencing orders and the trial court's oral sentence, the Majority concludes that there was no such error in the orders. This is so, according to the Majority, because the trial court's oral sentencing matched the typed sentencing order, whereas the handwritten order, in contrast, only included the consecutive sentences. Because the handwritten order was the outlier in this universe of three, the Majority believes that there was nothing irreconcilable about the two orders. Believing that the court's inherent authority was not implicated, the Majority subjects the motion to the PCRA's time bar and affirms the Superior Court.
30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011).
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).
Commonwealth v. McGee , 276 A.3d 701 (Pa.2022).
Maj. Op. at 668–70.
Id. at 668–69.
I cannot agree. As a preliminary and fundamental matter, the Commonwealth has never been concerned, as the Majority has proven itself to be, with the court's oral sentencing or with the fact that the handwritten order reflected only consecutive sentences. Before this Court, the Commonwealth makes no such argument. The Commonwealth focuses instead upon the timeliness of the filing and upon disputing McGee's argument that the attempted murder conviction merged with the aggravated assault conviction. Because of the disagreement about merger, and for this reason only, the Commonwealth asserts that "the sentence was not patently illegal," and the trial court's inherent authority was not implicated. The Commonwealth offers no other basis for its argument that there is no patent and obvious mistake. The Majority divines this line of reasoning entirely on its own. The decision to disregard the conflicting orders by focusing instead upon what the trial court said at sentencing or upon other discrepancies between the two orders is a post-hoc contrivance of the Majority's own making.
Commonwealth's Brief at 22 (arguing that the "merits of [McGee's] claim" are not clear because "[w]hether what order dictates and whether the doctrine of merger applies is not a patent error that the Holmes court contemplated to provide a court with inherent authority outside of § 5505 ’s 30 day time period, let alone twenty-five years or more later").
Id.
The Majority's resolution falls well beyond the scope of the issue before us, which unambiguously states as follows:
Does the Superior Court's continued application herein and elsewhere of its holding in Commonwealth v. Jackson , 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011), that a trial court's inherent jurisdiction to correct patent and obvious mistakes in its records and orders is subject to the time-bar provisions of the PCRA improperly constrict trial courts’ jurisdiction, improperly expand the scope of the time-bar, and/or conflict with this Honorable Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Holmes , 593 Pa. 601, 933 A.2d 57 (2007), which recognized that claims invoking said jurisdiction are not cognizable under the PCRA and thus not subject to the time-bar?
McGee , 276 A.3d at 701.
This phrasing, of course, assumes that there was a patent and obvious mistake that implicated the trial court's inherent authority, and asks this Court to determine only if the motion invoking the trial court's inherent authority was time barred.
The Commonwealth has never denied that there is a patent and obvious mistake in the way that the Majority Opinion does. Before the trial court, the Commonwealth argued only the (un)timeliness of McGee's attempt to invoke the trial court's inherent authority in this context. In the Superior Court, the Commonwealth raised two issues, and argued in both of them that "the PCRA court erred by considering McGee's motion independent of the PCRA." In particular, the Commonwealth asserted that the trial court "made an error of law when it determined the issue of an illegal sentence is not a PCRA issue" and argued that "the issue of an illegal sentence is waived if not brought within the time periods [ ] set by the PCRA." The Commonwealth always has focused upon the timeliness of McGee's motion, accompanied by bald assertions about merger. It has never argued that there was no patent and obvious error on the merits. Our well-trodden appellate principles demand that we deem any such argument to be waived had it been raised by the Commonwealth. Yet, the Majority finds that position to be determinative.
See Tr. Ct. Op., 10/13/2023, at 3 (recounting the Commonwealth's timeliness argument).
Sup. Ct. Op. at 3.
Id. (citing Commonwealth's Superior Court Brief at 8).
See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) ("Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." ); Commonwealth v. Shabezz , 641 Pa. 92, 166 A.3d 278, 288 n.6 (2017) (observing that claims not raised before the Superior Court are waived before this Court).
Because of the Majority's wandering, I am compelled to explain the basis of my disagreement. A trial court's inherent authority is not a new phenomenon. However, the power originally did not extend to all patent and obvious errors. The broader authority we recognize today applied to clerical errors that occurred in documenting judicial proceedings in the record. For instance, in 1911, this Court in Commonwealth v. Rusic , recognized a court's inherent power when a trial court amended its record to reflect accurately the defendant's presence at a hearing. When the defendant appealed, this Court held that the trial court had the inherent authority to correct such clerical errors and to ensure the integrity of its records.
229 Pa. 587, 79 A. 140 (1911).
Id. at 141 ("[T]he amendment was allowed for the purpose of making the record conform to the fact in these respects. There can be no doubt as to the power of the court to amend its record so as to make it conform to the truth, even after the term has expired."); see also Smaltz v. Hancock , 118 Pa. 550, 12 A. 464, 466 (1888) (upholding the power of the court to set aside a six-year-old verdict that was "vague and uncertain" and "impossible of execution"); Commonwealth v. Liscinsky , 195 Pa.Super. 183, 171 A.2d 560 (1961) (validating a trial court's authority to correct clerical errors in docket entries at any time); Commonwealth v. Mount , 172 Pa.Super. 258, 93 A.2d 887 (1953) ("Clerical errors or inaccuracies in docket entries may be corrected by the trial court so that they conform to the facts.").
Over time, however, the authority to correct clerical errors in the record evolved to include the ability to correct patent and obvious mistakes in its orders and records. In Commonwealth v. Cole , the trial court entered an order granting two irreconcilable forms or relief. After the thirty days within which the trial court had the authority to rescind that order under the predecessor to Section 5505 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, the trial court entered an order partially rescinding one of the orders. When the defendant appealed, this Court rejected the argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the second order because thirty days had lapsed. Instead, we held that the original order was "patently erroneous" because the grant of irreconcilable forms of relief was clearly antagonistic on the face of the order. We upheld the trial court's authority to correct such mistakes so as to "make the order ... speak the truth." The statutory limitation upon the trial court's authority to rescind its orders was not implicated when the court was exercising this inherent authority.
437 Pa. 288, 263 A.2d 339 (1970).
Id. at 340 (citing Act of June 1, 1959 (P.L. 342, s 1, 12 P.S. § 1032)). Section 5505 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed." 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
Cole , 263 A.2d at 341.
Id.
Id. (describing the trial court's inherent authority "to correct obvious and patent mistakes in its orders, judgment and decrees.").
In Commonwealth v. Klein , a trial court sentenced a defendant and later learned from the county prison that there had been an error in the presentence investigation report regarding how many days of incarceration the defendant already had served. The trial court entered an order directing the defendant to appear for resentencing. The defendant appealed the original sentence. At the resentencing hearing, the defendant challenged the trial court's jurisdiction to modify the original sentence due to the defendant's appeal of that sentence which he argued, under Section 5505, deprived the court of jurisdiction to modify or rescind its orders. On appeal, this Court upheld the trial court's inherent authority to correct the mistake, explaining that Section 5505 could only "be read in conjunction with a court's inherent powers ‘to amend its records, to correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court, inadvertencies of counsel, or supply defects or omissions in the record.’ " This inherent authority allowed the trial court to correct a "patent defect or mistake in the record."
566 Pa. 396, 781 A.2d 1133 (2001).
Id. at 1135 (quoting Cole , 263 A.2d at 341 ).
Id.
The evolution continued. This Court's decision in Holmes was a consolidated appeal involving two separate defendants. The first defendant, Holmes, was on parole when he pleaded guilty to new charges. Instead of sentencing Holmes to serve the balance of the original sentence as a parole violator, the trial court mistakenly sentenced Holmes for a violation of probation. Several years later—well beyond the thirty-days allotted by Section 5505—the trial court sua sponte vacated the sentence. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under Section 5505 to vacate the sentence.
933 A.2d at 57.
Id. at 59–60 (observing that the trial court presumably realized "that the parole violation sentence imposing three to six years of incarceration was improper because it set a minimum sentence and because its maximum exceeded the eleven and one-half to twenty-three month sentence Holmes received when sentenced for the original probation violation on September 16, 1997").
In the companion case, Rufus Whitfield was sentenced on several charges to a term of incarceration with no probation to follow. After Whitfield was later convicted of another charge, the trial court entered an order purporting to revoke Whitfield's probation. Whitfield appealed to the Superior Court, divesting the trial court of authority to modify its orders under Section 5505. Notwithstanding the appeal, the trial court determined on its own that the sentence was illegal, and entered an order vacating it. The trial court explained that it mistakenly believed that Whitfield had been on probation, but, upon obtaining the notes of testimony from the original sentencing hearing, realized its mistake. Whitfield withdrew his pending appeal, and the Commonwealth appealed the trial court's new order.
On appeal, this Court observed that both appeals implicated the trial court's authority to correct patent errors. With respect to Holmes, the Court explained that the "sentencing order, like the order in Cole , contained a patent mistake, a fact apparent from a review of the docket without resort to third-party information." Although the order stated that parole was revoked, the sentence imposed was consistent with that of a probation violation. We considered this error "clear from the order and docket sheet." But in Whitfield :
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. (reviewing the order that sentenced Holmes to serve "[n]ot less than three (3) years nor more than six (6) years in the State Correctional Institution, to run concurrently with any sentence now serving," a sentence that the Commonwealth did not dispute "was in direct conflict with the longstanding precedent that a parole violator cannot be sentenced to a new sentence but instead can only be recommitted to the remainder of the original sentence").
Id.
[t]he trial court imposed a new sentence of incarceration on Whitfield for a violation of probation even though probation was never imposed. While the mistake is not apparent based on the face of the order itself, one need only look to the Quarter Session notes in the record to see the mistake.
Id.
Because both of these errors were patent and obvious, we held that the trial courts properly exercised the inherent power to correct the mistakes. In doing so, we rejected the argument that Section 5505 somehow limited this inherent authority.
Id.
Id. at 65 ("[T]he limits of jurisdiction enshrined in Section 5505 do not impinge on that time-honored inherent power of courts [to correct patent errors].").
To distinguish between those mistakes that are patent and obvious, and therefore fall within the trial court's inherent authority, and those that are not, we held that:
[I]t is the obviousness of the illegality, rather than the illegality itself, that triggers the court's inherent power. Not all illegal sentences will be amenable to correction as patent errors. Moreover, the inherent power to correct errors does not extend to reconsideration of a court's exercise of sentencing discretion. A court may not vacate a sentencing order merely because it later considers a sentence too harsh or too lenient. The cases at bar are not cases where a court reconsidered the application of its sentencing discretion or its interpretation of a nuanced or ambiguous statutory provision. These cases involve clear errors in the imposition of sentences that were incompatible with the record, as in Whitfield , or black letter law, as in Holmes .
Id. at 66–67.
In this case, there is a patent and obvious error in the two conflicting sentencing orders in the record. One order imposed a sentence for the aggravated assault of Donna and the other included sentences for the aggravated assault and attempted murder of Donna. Similar to the trial court's order in Cole , which entered two irreconcilable forms of relief, the trial court here entered two orders with irreconcilable terms. The irreconcilability of the two orders is a patent and obvious mistake, as both orders cannot be accurate or intentional. Under Holmes , the obviousness of this illegality triggers the trial court's inherent authority.
This is so notwithstanding what the trial court announced orally at sentencing, which happened to be consistent with the typed sentencing order but was inconsistent with the handwritten order, and despite the fact that the handwritten order included only consecutive sentences. In a universe of three, the mutual consistency of two does not obviate the inconsistency of the third. Indeed, it is quite the opposite. We cannot simply ignore the third order because the other two match. The fact that the handwritten order also omitted other concurrent sentences only increases its incompatibility with the typed order. And the fact that the oral sentence is consistent with the typed order only means that the handwritten order is incompatible with the typed order and the oral sentence. Both of these facts lend more irreconcilability to the handwritten order, not less.
Once the mistake is identified as patent and obvious, the trial court has the inherent authority to remedy it. This is true despite the statutory limitations upon jurisdiction imposed by Section 5505 and by the PCRA. Indeed, Holmes already conclusively resolves this issue. Although the Commonwealth in Holmes challenged the trial court's inherent authority as inconsistent with Section 5505 ’s deprivation of jurisdiction, our reasoning as to Section 5505 applies with equal force and persuasion to the PCRA's jurisdictional limitations. Section 5505 and the PCRA are both statutes that purport to extinguish a trial court's jurisdiction after a period of time has elapsed; thirty days for § 5505 and one year for the PCRA. We decided Holmes over the Commonwealth's argument that the PCRA was the only way for Holmes and Whitfield to obtain relief, and over Justice Eakin's insistence that the PCRA precluded relief in dissent. Indeed, we phrased the issue before us as implicating "the power of courts to correct allegedly illegal sentencing orders absent jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 5505 or the PCRA." Holmes has already decided that the court's inherent authority is so deeply engrained and essential to judicial functioning that it supersedes any jurisdictional limitations imposed by statute. The Majority entirely fails to give due regard, let alone adhere, to this principle.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 74 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (opining that, by not filing a PCRA petition, Holmes "chose to forego the only means available to correct his illegal sentence"); but see Commonwealth v. Borrin , 622 Pa. 422, 80 A.3d 1219, 1235 (2013) (Eakin, J., dissenting) (opining that the trial court had the inherent authority to enter a new sentencing order several years after the initial order to conform to the trial court's intended, more severe sentence).
Holmes , 933 A.2d at 65.
The Superior Court in this case relied upon Commonwealth v. Jackson , which involved a probation revocation sentence that the trial court imposed in 1988. In 2010, Jackson filed a "motion to correct an illegal sentence," arguing that the 1988 sentence was illegal because it did not identify the agency that would supervise Jackson's probation, as the sentencing code requires. The trial court considered the motion to be a PCRA petition and dismissed it as untimely. The Superior Court affirmed, offering two rationales. First, the Superior Court held that Jackson was factually incorrect, as the 1988 sentenced did, in fact, identify the supervising agency. Although this conclusion ended the matter, the Superior Court continued on to its second rationale: that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion because of the PCRA time-bar. Despite this Court's decision in Holmes , the Jackson court held that there was no authority extending the trial court's inherent authority beyond the time restrictions of the PCRA.
30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Id. at 518.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 521-23.
Id. at 521 (holding that Holmes "did not establish an alternate remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA").
The PCRA-based rationale of Jackson is dicta , given the definitive resolution offered by the first. It was also wrong when it was decided, and wrong when the Superior Court applied it in this case. That non-binding dicta is patently and obviously inconsistent with Holmes . Contrary to the Jackson court's understanding, Holmes did, in fact, recognize that a court's inherent authority exists independently of the jurisdictional requirements of legislative enactments.
The holdings of the Superior Court in Jackson and in this case also are inconsistent with the authority of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government, which vests the judiciary with certain inherent judicial powers. In the context of the inherent power of federal courts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that:
Pa. Const. art. V, § 1 (vesting judicial power in the Unified Judicial System).
[t]his use of inherent power, which might be termed irreducible inherent authority, encompasses an extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms "court" and "judicial power." In this limited domain of judicial autonomy, courts may act notwithstanding contrary legislative direction. These inherent powers are grounded in the separation of powers concept, because to deny this power and yet to conceive of courts is a self-contradiction.
Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc. , 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985) (cleaned up).
As a matter of constitutional separation of powers, a trial court's inherent power to correct patent errors in its orders inheres in the judiciary and is not subject to legislative command. In the wake of Holmes , we recognized in Commonwealth v. McMullen that the court's inherent power could not be limited by contrary legislation. In McMullen , the Court considered legislation limiting the punishment available to a court for indirect criminal contempt. We recognized that courts maintain their own inherent power to enforce their orders by way of contempt—a right inherent in courts and incidental to the grant of judicial power under Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution. By limiting the potential penalty for contempt, the legislature had "unconstitutionally restrict[ed] the court's ability to punish for contempt." As a structural consequence of the constitutional separation of powers, the legislature cannot limit the court's inherent authority.
599 Pa. 435, 961 A.2d 842 (2008).
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 4136 (held unconstitutional in McMullen , 961 A.2d at 850 ).
McMullen , 961 A.2d at 849.
Id. at 850.
Once there is a patent and obvious error established in a case, both the separation of powers doctrine and Holmes preclude a trial court's inherent authority to correct such errors from being limited by any time limitations purportedly imposed by the PCRA. The Majority simply is wrong to find that there was no such error. Not only was that issue not presented to this Court for review, but it also is clear that there was such an error. The only question upon which we granted review is whether the trial court's inherent authority is subject to the PCRA's time-bar. Holmes dictates that it is not. I dissent.
Justice Donohue joins this dissenting opinion.