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Commonwealth v. Jaimlett

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Aug 27, 2018
No. 2732 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2018)

Opinion

J-A14035-18 No. 2732 EDA 2017

08-27-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. JAMEL JAIMLETT Appellee


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order August 3, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0002439-2017 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:

Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court's order granting the motion to suppress of Appellee, Jamel Jaimlett. We reverse and remand.

The Commonwealth asserted in its notice of appeal that the court's decision terminates or substantially handicaps its case. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); Commonwealth v. Flamer , 53 A.3d 82, 85 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2012).

We take the following facts and procedural history from our independent review of the record and the trial court's December 28, 2017 opinion. On February 18, 2017, at approximately 10:00 P.M., Officer Joseph Kochmer and his partner, Brian Homan, were on duty in a high crime area of Philadelphia. The block they were on was within an area classified as PSA-2, an area that is one of the most violent in the district, and prone to gun violence. Because of this, a PSA-2 requires that a police cruiser be present at all times.

The officers observed a group of men, including Appellee, at 2305 West Sergeant Street. Appellee looked at the officers nervously, grabbed an object in the area of his front waistband, and turned toward the officers and the steps of a home. He walked toward the house, continuing to hold the object in a downward gripping motion with one hand to secure it. The officers had been to the same house in the prior month and witnessed the abandonment of a firearm.

Based on his observations of Appellee's actions, Officer Kochmer informed Officer Holman that he believed Appellee had a gun, and that he wanted to stop him to investigate. When Officer Holman asked Appellee to stop, Appellee did not do so, and continued to grip his waistband as he hurried up the stairs, and into the house at 2305 Sergeant Street. The officers followed him inside, locating him inside a bedroom with a woman and two children. The woman said she did not know Appellee, and that he did not have permission to be there. The officers secured Appellee, and when the woman told them he discarded something on the floor, they found a gun approximately six feet from where Appellee was sitting when they entered the room. They placed Appellee under arrest for violations of the Uniform Firearms Act.

On August 3, 2017, the court held a hearing on Appellee's motion to suppress the gun seized by the officers. Officer Kochmer testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. Appellee presented no evidence. Although the trial court found Officer Kochmer credible, it granted Appellee's motion to suppress the gun on the basis that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. The Commonwealth timely appealed.

On August 29, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal contemporaneous to filing its notice of appeal. The court filed an opinion on December 28, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The Commonwealth raises one question for the Court's review.

Did the [trial] court err in suppressing [Appellee's] gun on the theory that police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him after an experienced officer observed him clutching his waistband in a manner consistent with securing a firearm at a location in a violent high crime area where a firearm had previously been recovered?
(Commonwealth's Brief, at 4).

Our standard of review of this matter is well-settled.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the [grant] of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. . . . Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. . . . The suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the development of three categories of interactions between citizens and the police. The first of these is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to
constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Raglin , 178 A.3d 868, 871-72 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).

Further:

A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct. This standard, less stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable suspicion. In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In making this determination, we must give due weight . . . to the specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, [e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.
Id. at 872 (citations, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted).

We find this Court's en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Carter , 105 A.3d 765 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 295 (Pa. 2015), pertinent to our review. In Carter , the arresting officer testified that defendant was in a high crime area, on a known drug corner, at night. He had "a weighted and angled bulge in his coat pocket." Carter , supra at 774 (record citation omitted). When the defendant saw the officers, he attempted to conceal the bulge. The arresting officer stopped the defendant based on his suspicion that the defendant possessed a firearm. See id. at 774-75. The arresting officer:

formed his suspicions based in part on his six years' experience as a Philadelphia police officer, conducting over 75 gun arrests, eight to ten of which were specifically located at the corner at which he encountered Appellee. [The officer] further testified that in his experience, many people who carry guns do so in their coat pockets.
Id. at 774 (record citation omitted).

Importantly, in reversing the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion to suppress, the Carter Court observed:

In conducting a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a suppression court is required to afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer's experience[.] . . . Among the circumstances that can give rise to reasonable suspicion are the [officer]'s knowledge of the methods used in recent criminal activity and the characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices.
Id. at 773 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

In this case, Officer Kochmer testified that he had over seven years of experience as a police officer and had conducted between forty and fifty firearms arrests. ( See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/03/17, at 5, 7). The "very violent district" in which he worked included "shooting[s], robberies, [and] gun violence[.]" ( Id. at 6). Area 2 of the PSA-2 district, where the incident relevant to this case occurred is, "the worst . . . most violent one." ( Id.). In fact, just the prior month, the officers witnessed the abandonment of a firearm at the same house, 2305 West Sergeant Street. ( See id. at 9-10). At the suppression hearing, Officer Kochmer demonstrated, based on his experience, that an individual walking or running with a gun in his waistband holds his hand "in a downward position gripping onto his waistband." ( Id. at 8).

The officer then testified to what occurred in this case. He stated that, when he was on routine patrol in Area 2, he noticed a group of males, including Appellee. When Appellee saw the police car, he looked "like a de[e]r in headlights . . . [and] immediately reached with his right hand[,] . . . grabbed onto an object in . . . the front of his waistband area[,]" and turned to walk up the steps of the residence. ( Id. at 12). "All the other males just stood there." ( Id. at 13). Based on Appellee's actions, Officer Kochmer told his partner that he believed Appellee had a gun, and that he wanted to stop him. ( See id.). When the officers exited their vehicle, Appellee began walking up the steps more quickly and, when told to stop, he ran into the residence. ( See id. at 13-14).

Based on Carter , we are constrained to conclude that the trial court erred in failing "to afford due weight" to Officer Kochmer's experience, and finding that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Appellee. Id. Appellee's arrest was supported by the officer's "specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of [his] experience," including his knowledge of the way people hide illegal firearms on their persons. Id. at 773. In the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellee. See Raglin , supra at 871-72.

Moreover, the twenty-year-old case on which the trial court relied in granting Appellee's motion to suppress, Commonwealth v. Martinez , 588 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 1991), appeal denied, 608 A.2d 29 (Pa. 1992), does not compel a contrary result. ( See Trial Ct. Op., at 3-4). In Martinez , plain clothed police officers, in an unmarked car, approached an intersection where four or five individuals were standing on a corner. See Martinez , supra at 515. After looking in the direction of the unmarked vehicle, Martinez and the other individuals scattered in different directions. See id. The police drove alongside Martinez and observed her "holding her hands in the front of her coat, leaning forward, as if to be holding something, leaning forward, walking quickly up the street." Id. (record citation omitted). One of the officers then asked Martinez to walk over to the police car, take her hands out of her jacket, and put her hands on the car. See id. Martinez complied, and when she put her hands on the car, a plastic bag containing drugs fell from her coat onto the ground. See id. The arresting officer did not testify that, based on his experience, the way in which Martinez was holding her hands was indicative of criminal activity.
On appeal, a panel of this Court held that the suppression court had erred in determining that the above facts established reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful investigative detention. See id. at 516-17. The panel stated that the suppression court improperly "mixed together facts of events occurring both before and as a result of the stop" and "seemingly believed that Martinez brought the search and seizure upon herself by 'drawing attention to herself.'" Id. at 516 (emphases in original). Importantly, there was no evidence regarding the arresting officer's experience or "knowledge of the methods used in recent criminal activity." Carter , supra at 773 (citation omitted); see Martinez , supra. Therefore, Martinez is inapposite. See Carter , supra at 775 (finding facts of Martinez do not affect conclusion).

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

President Judge Gantman joins the Memorandum.

Judge Shogan notes her dissent. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 8/27/18


Summaries of

Commonwealth v. Jaimlett

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Aug 27, 2018
No. 2732 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2018)
Case details for

Commonwealth v. Jaimlett

Case Details

Full title:COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. JAMEL JAIMLETT Appellee

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Aug 27, 2018

Citations

No. 2732 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2018)