Opinion
No. 10–P–2129.
2012-06-8
COMMONWEALTH v. Kalonji S. HOLLOWAY.
By the Court (TRAINOR, SMITH & SULLIVAN, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant was tried before a jury on one count each of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, § 15A( b ); attempted murder, G.L. c. 265, § 16; assault and battery, G.L. c. 265, § 13A; and kidnapping, G.L. c. 265, § 26. In a jury verdict issued on January 27, 2010, the defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and acquitted of attempted murder and assault and battery. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the kidnapping charge, a mistrial was declared, and a nolle prosequi was filed by the Commonwealth with respect to that charge.
The conviction arose from incidents that occurred on or about December 27, 2008, in which the defendant was accused of restraining the victim against her will, and forcibly holding her head under water in a filled bathtub.
The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial judge erred in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts to show the victim's state of mind during the alleged crimes.
The defendant argues that the prejudice caused by the admittance of the prior bad acts evidence outweighed its probative value, and that therefore a new trial is required. We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence, and we affirm.
The victim was allowed to testify that she witnessed the defendant stab another person on three occasions during 2007 and 2008, and that the defendant had told her about a fourth stabbing.
Discussion. “It is well settled that the prosecution may not introduce evidence that a defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably or not, for the purposes of showing his bad character or propensity to commit the crime charged, but such evidence may be admissible if relevant for some other purpose.” Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 744 (2011), quoting from Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986). Such a purpose can include to show the victim's state of mind. See Helfant, supra; Commonwealth v. McKinnon, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 398, 404 (1993). See also Commonwealth v. Errington, 390 Mass. 875, 880 (1984) (evidence of defendant's prior bad acts admissible to show why victim “was silent in circumstances naturally calling for expression”).
If evidence of a prior bad act is relevant, the judge must only admit it if its probative value outweighs its potential prejudice. Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 454 Mass. 135, 143 (2009). “The decision to admit such evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the judge.” Ibid., citing Commonwealth v. Valentin, 420 Mass. 263, 270 (1995). A judge abuses his discretion only if no conscientious judge acting intelligently honestly could have made the same decision. Commonwealth v. Vallejo, 455 Mass. 72, 87 (2009).
Here, the victim's testimony describing the prior incidents was relevant to explain why she did not attempt to run away from the defendant, or alert the authorities to her plight, despite apparently having several opportunities to do so. The judge was within his discretion to admit this evidence after concluding that its prejudicial effect did not outweigh its substantial probative value. See Sharpe, supra. Moreover, it is clear that the judge made every effort to lessen the prejudicial effect of the victim's testimony regarding the stabbing incidents. Directly after her description of the incidents, the judge gave a detailed instruction to the jury that the testimony was admitted “only on the issue of the witness's state of mind and her motivation on what she did on that day and it's for you to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” The judge continued: “I'm instructing you strictly. You may use it only for that limited purpose.” The judge repeated this limiting instruction in more detail during the jury charge. The judge was “entitled to assume that the jurors would follow his instructions.” Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 477 (2010).
We also note that the verdict in this case reflected the jury's powers of discernment, and was in no way indicative of a jury that was improperly swayed by propensity evidence. They convicted the defendant only of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and acquitted him of the attempted murder and assault and battery charges. They were unable to reach a verdict on the kidnapping charge, which was nol prossed.
For the foregoing reasons, and substantially for the reasons stated in pages 19 through 27 of the Commonwealth's brief, we hold that the judge did not err in admitting the prior bad acts evidence.
Judgment affirmed.