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Commonwealth v. Heath

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Sep 13, 2022
178 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 13, 2022)

Opinion

173 WDA 2021 174 WDA 2021 175 WDA 2021 176 WDA 2021 177 WDA 2021 178 WDA 2021 J-A12021-22

09-13-2022

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTONIO REDMAN HEATH Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTONIO REDMAN HEATH Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTONIO REDMAN HEATH Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTONIO REDMAN HEATH Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTONIO REDMAN HEATH Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTONIO REDMAN HEATH Appellant


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 5, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0000398-2015, CP-63-CR-0000399-2015, CP-63-CR-0000400-2015, CP-63-CR-0000401-2015, CP-63-CR-0000402-2015, CP-63-CR-0001494-2015

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J. [*]

MEMORANDUM

McCAFFERY, J.

In these consolidated appeals, Antonio Redman Heath (Appellant) appeals from the orders entered in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas denying his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Appellant seeks relief from the judgment of sentence imposed after a revocation of probation hearing where the trial court found Appellant in technical violation of his probation conditions at six separate dockets. Appellant contends his revocation counsel, Eric Yandrich, Esquire, was ineffective for failing to object to the court's consideration of "unpled aggravating circumstances" when imposing Appellant's sentence. For the reasons below, we affirm.

This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. Order, 2/25/21.

On August 4, 2015, Appellant pled guilty to the following: (1) at Criminal Docket No. CP-63-CR-0000398-2015 (Docket No. 0398-2015), one count of attempted burglary; (2) at Criminal Docket No. CP-63-CR-0000399-2015 (Docket No. 0399-2015), one count of conspiracy to commit burglary; (3) at Criminal Docket No. CP-63-CR-0000400-2015 (Docket No. 0400-2015), one count of conspiracy to commit burglary; (4) at Criminal Docket No. CP-63-CR-0000401-2015 (Docket No. 0401-2015), one count of conspiracy to commit burglary; (5) at Criminal Docket No. CP-63-CR-0000402-2015 (Docket No. 0402-2015), one count of conspiracy to commit burglary; and (6) at Criminal Docket No. CP-63-CR-0001494-2015 (Docket No. 1494-2015), one count of burglary.

The trial court sentenced Appellant at Docket Nos. 0398-2015, 0399-2015, 0400-2015, 0401-2015, and 0402-2015, to five concurrent terms of five years' intermediate punishment, with the first six months to be served in the Washington County Correctional Facility and the next six months to be served under electronic home monitoring. Order of Sentence, 8/4/15, at 1-3 (unpaginated). At Docket No. 1494-2015, the court imposed a consecutive term of five years' probation. Id. at 3. The trial court later amended Appellant's sentence from the first six months to the first 12 months in a correctional facility due to Appellant's lack of housing. Amended Order of Court, 9/3/15. Subsequently, on September 14, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to be assessed for entrance into a drug placement program upon his release from prison. Order, 9/14/15.

On January 12, 2018, the trial court found Appellant in technical violation of his intermediate punishment program conditions - specifically, failing "to report, absconding and for drug use" - and revoked his intermediate punishment sentence. See Order, 1/12/18. After deferring sentencing to determine if Appellant was eligible for the Restrictive Drug Treatment Program, the trial court resentenced him on February 22, 2018, to three concurrent terms of five years' intermediate punishment, including 23 months in the Washington County Restrictive Treatment Program and one year of electronic home monitoring (Docket Nos. 0398-2015, 0399-2015, and 0400-2015); two terms of five years' intermediate punishment, to run concurrent to each other and consecutive to the prior terms of intermediate punishment (Docket Nos. 0401-2015 and 0402-2015); and one term of five years' probation to run consecutive to the above sentences (Docket No. 1494-2015). Order, 2/27/18, at 1-4 (unpaginated).

Though the trial court imposed this sentence on February 22, 2018, the sentencing order was not filed until February 27, 2018.

On May 15, 2019, the Office of Probation and Parole filed the present petition for revocation, alleging Appellant violated the following conditions of his probation:

1. [Appellant would] not take any mind or mood altering substances of any sort. [Appellant] admitted to using [k]ratom.Appellant] tested positive for [b]uprenorphine on April 9, 2019[,] and May 6, 2019. Both Samples were sent to SteelFusion Toxicology [Lab] and were confirmed positive.
14. [Appellant would not], in any way, knowingly communicate with persons on probation, parole, ex-convicts, or inmates, no[r] associate with persons having a criminal record. [Appellant] was in communication with multiple people within the Restrictive Treatment Court Program. He was also in a partnership with a graduate of the program, though he was told specifically to not be in contact with him any longer.

Kratom is an "unscheduled substance" that, in larger amounts, has the effects of an opiate and is a "mood and mind-altering substance." N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding, 5/23/19, at 33.

Buprenorphine is an opioid and a "mind and mood-altering substance." N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding at 34.

Petition for the Revocation of Probation and Parole, 5/15/21, at 2 (unpaginated).

On May 23, 2019, the trial court held a revocation hearing. Appellant was represented by Attorney Yandrich. Adult Probation Officer Courtney Bonner testified that Appellant admitted to using kratom and tested positive for buprenorphine, both mind or mood-altering substances. N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding at 3-4. She also stated that Appellant was communicating with "multiple people within the Restrictive [Drug] Treatment Program," including current participant Miranda Levers, and he had a business partnership with a graduate of the program, Nathan Cataldo. Id. at 4, 7. Officer Bonner recommended that Appellant's probation be revoked and stated the following in support:

[Appellant] has been trying to discredit [the trial court], he has been trying to point the finger at everybody on the treatment team, he's been manipulating as much as possible to continue using [k]ratom and doing what he wanted to do. He's done web searches on it. He has tried to talk to others about drug testing. He has tried to contact Steel[F]usion [Toxicology Lab] to question them on their drug testing.
Id. at 6.

Appellant testified at the hearing, and admitted taking kratom and buprenorphine, though he knew the terms of probation prohibited him from doing so. N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding at 10, 15. Appellant also admitted to communicating with Levers and Cataldo. Id. at 11-12.

During Appellant's testimony, the trial court noted that "at least three different people" from the drug treatment program were using kratom because of Appellant's recommendations. N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding at 17. The trial court noted the details of Appellant's substance use. Id. at 25-29. Officer Bonner also spoke with Appellant concerning his dishonesty about his substance use, the purpose of the drug treatment program, and accusations Appellant made against SteelFusion Toxicology Lab. Id. at 21-22, 24-25.

The trial court mentioned program participant Levers, a woman named "Crystal," and Kim Stout. N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding at 23-24. However, it is unclear whether "Crystal" and Stout are the participants Appellant influenced to use kratom. Appellant claimed not to know Stout. Id. at 24. The trial court also mentioned "Molly Orange" as a person Appellant "got . . . in trouble." N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding at 24. Neither the trial court nor Appellant further explained what actions Appellant took regarding Orange, but in his brief, Appellant mentions Orange is a "correctional official completely unrelated to the program." Appellant's Brief at 36.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Appellant violated the conditions set forth in the revocation petition. N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding at 41. The court also noted "[a]dditional technical violations[,]" including Appellant's continued "lying about substance use, his corruption of other members of the [drug treatment p]rogram, and his contact with other members of the [p]rogram." Id.

Immediately following the May 23rd hearing, the trial court filed a sentencing order, stating, in relevant part:

[T]he Court finds that [Appellant] is in technical violation of his Intermediate Punishment and Restrictive Treatment Program sentence for the reasons set forth in the Revocation Petition, including [Appellant's] intentional use of kratom and admission that he has been using kratom; his positive test for buprenorphine; his continual lying about his substance use; and his corruption of other members of the [Restrictive Drug Treatment P]rogram.

Order of Sentence, 5/23/19, at 1 (unpaginated). The trial court then resentenced Appellant at each of his criminal dockets to the following: (1) at Docket No. 0398-2015, to two to five years' incarceration; (2) at Docket No. 0399-2015, to one and one half to five years' incarceration; (3) at Docket No. 0400-2015, to one and one half to five years' incarceration; (4) at Docket No. 0401-2015, to one and one half to five years' incarceration; (5) at Docket No. 0402-2015, to one and one half to five years' incarceration; and (6) at Docket No. 1494-2015, to one to five years' incarceration. The trial court ordered the sentences at Docket Nos. 0398-2015, 0399-2015, 0400-2015, 0401-2015, and 0402-2015 to run consecutive to each other and the sentence at Docket No. 1494-2015 to run concurrent, making Appellant's aggregate sentence eight to 25 years' incarceration. Attorney Yandrich did not file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal.

Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition alleging revocation counsel, Attorney Yandrich, was ineffective for failing to adequately communicate with Appellant, prepare for the revocation hearing, or file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. Appellant's Pro Se Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition, 4/27/20, at 5-6. On April 30, 2020, the PCRA court appointed Corrie Woods, Esquire, to represent Appellant for his PCRA proceedings. Order, 4/30/20. Attorney Woods filed an amended PCRA petition alleging Attorney Yandrich was further ineffective for failing to object to "unpled allegations" discussed at the revocation hearing, which he alleged the trial court used in fashioning his sentence. Amended Petition for Relief Pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 6/8/2020, at 10-13. Appellant also requested reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc because Attorney Yandrich failed to file post-sentence motions and a notice of appeal. Id. at 6-10.

The PCRA court held two evidentiary hearings on Appellant's petition, the first on August 10, 2020, and the second, on October 8, 2020. At the August 10th hearing, the Commonwealth did not appear. Appellant testified that he requested Attorney Yandrich challenge his sentence and file an appeal. N.T. PCRA H'rg, 8/10/20, at 5-6. Appellant did not present any other witnesses and the PCRA court continued the hearing for further evidence and testimony. Id. at 12. At the October 8th hearing, where the Commonwealth did appear, Appellant presented two additional witnesses, Sheena Watters, his sister, and Debbie Jenkins, his mother. N.T. PCRA H'rg, 10/8/20, at 3-4, 17-18. Watters and Jenkins both testified that they asked Attorney Yandrich to appeal Appellant's sentence and investigated hiring another attorney to file an appeal on Appellant's behalf. Id. at 7, 9, 12-13, 19-20.

Attorney Yandrich did not testify at either hearing nor did Appellant offer any evidence with regard to his allegation that Attorney Yandrich failed to object when the revocation court considered additional, unpled technical violations of his probation. Appellant simply stated this claim was "almost exclusively on the record" and argued that had Attorney Yandrich objected, Appellant would have received a lesser sentence. N.T. PCRA H'rg, 10/8/20, at 25.

On October 13, 2020, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's claims regarding the reinstatement of his post-sentence and appellate rights, but held his third claim under advisement. Order, 10/13/20. On December 4, 2020, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss all of Appellant's claims. Appellant filed a timely response, but the PCRA court subsequently dismissed his petition on January 5, 2021. Appellant filed separate timely appeals at each docket.

While the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice and accompanying opinion, it was not required to do so as it had provided Appellant two opportunities to argue his position at evidentiary hearings. Rule 907 notice is required when the court is satisfied that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and as such, the petitioner is not entitled to a hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (1). Thus, the court's designation of its filing as a Rule 907 notice was a misnomer.

Because Appellant filed separate notices of appeal at each docket, he complied with the requirements of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018). See Walker, 185 A.3d at 977 (separate notices of appeal must be filed when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one trial court docket), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021) (reaffirming that Pa.R.A.P. 341 requires separate notices of appeal when single order resolves issues under more than one docket, but holding Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits appellate court to consider appellant's request to remediate error when notice of appeal is timely filed).

Appellant complied with the PCRA court's order to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following claim on appeal:

In his 1925(b) statement, Appellant also alleges the PCRA court erred when it denied his claims regarding Attorney Yandrich's failure to file both post-sentence motions and a notice of appeal. Appellant's Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 4/20/21, at 1. He abandons these claims on appeal.

Did the PCRA court err in denying Count III of [Appellant's] petition where the record clearly demonstrates that [Attorney Yandrich] was ineffective in failing to object to the sentencing court's consideration of unpled aggravating circumstances in fashioning his sentence?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

Our review of an order denying a PCRA petition is well-settled: "We must determine whether the PCRA court's ruling is supported by the record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1156 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). Furthermore, "[t]he PCRA court's factual findings and credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding upon this Court." Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. 2020).

Where a petitioner's claims raise allegations of prior counsel's ineffectiveness, the law presumes counsel has been effective and it is the responsibility of the appellant to demonstrate otherwise. Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1158 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and, (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding would have been different. Failure to satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection of the appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

In his only issue on appeal, Appellant argues the PCRA court erred when it denied his claim that Attorney Yandrich was ineffective for failing to object to unpled allegations raised at his revocation hearing. Appellant's Brief at 33. Appellant alleges he received written notice of only two violations of his probation: (1) that he "used kratom and buprenorphine[,]" and (2) that he "communicated with . . . Levers and . . . Cataldo." Id. at 35. He maintains that at the hearing, though, he faced

a litany of unpled violations that, inter alia, he lied about and attempted to mask his use of kratom and buprenorphine,
promoted the use of kratom to other participants in the drug-court program, undermined the rehabilitative progress of women participating in the program, including Levers[,] an unidentified woman named Crystal[,] a woman named Kim Stout[, and preyed] on Molly Orange, a correctional official completely unrelated to the program. . . .
Id. at 35-36. Appellant goes on to argue that Attorney Yandrich's failure to object to the introduction of these "unpled allegations" amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 36-38.

Appellant maintains that he did not receive written notice of the "novel allegations" and was "forced . . . to essentially improvise a defense without the aid of counsel[,]" satisfying the first prong of the ineffectiveness test. Id. at 37. He contends Attorney Yandrich had no reasonable basis for his conduct, stating "there was only potential gain" and no risk to putting an objection on the record. Id. Appellant then insists that he experienced prejudice from Attorney Yandrich's failure to object because the trial court imposed a sentence "harsher than it otherwise would have been" due to the "[a]dditional technical violations[.]" Id. at 37-38, citing N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding at 39-46. He avers the trial court's conduct at the hearing "reflects that it considered the additional, unpled violations as aggravating circumstances." Id. at 38.

Preliminarily, we note that while Appellant raised this ineffectiveness claim before the PCRA court, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, he only raised the present issue under the purview of trial court error. See Appellant's Concise Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal, 4/20/21, at 2 (asserting the PCRA court "erred in denying Count III of [Appellant's] petition where the record clearly demonstrates that it considered unpled aggravating circumstances in fashioning his sentence."). For this reason, Appellant's ineffectiveness claim is subject to waiver. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (issues not included in the statement are waived); see also Commonwealth v. Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 693 (Pa. 2020) (issues not raised in 1925(b) statement on PCRA appeal are waived). Despite this, the parties and the PCRA court address Appellant's claim under the framework of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, in the interests of justice, we address Appellant's claim under both arguments.

The decision to revoke a sentence of probation requires the court to ask two questions. Commonwealth v. Moriarty, 180 A.3d 1279, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). First, whether the Commonwealth demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer has committed one or more violations of the conditions of their probation. Id. The second question arises only after the court is satisfied that a violation has been established: "should the . . . probationer be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation?" Id. (citation omitted).

The PCRA court concluded there was sufficient evidence to revoke Appellant's probation and resentence him to incarceration. PCRA Ct. Op., 8/27/21, at 14. Specifically, the PCRA court opined:

[Appellant] alleges that because the court discussed multiple "unpled" allegations during the course of the revocation hearing, he was sentenced more harshly. However, this is
incorrect. [Appellant] was revoked and resentenced based on his own substance use, his repeated lying about his behavior, and his inappropriate relationships with current and former members of the [drug treatment] program. [Appellant] admitted to these violations as set forth in the petition. [Appellant] was a member of a treatment court program, and his inability to be accountable for his own substance use, as well as promoting substance use, was relevant to the court's determination that he should be revoked from that program.
Id. at 16. Attorney Yandrich did not object to the discussion of other unpled violations or the trial court's reasoning.

We cannot conclude the PCRA court erred where Attorney Yandrich failed to place an objection on the record, as it is not within the court's power, nor is it the court's responsibility, to advocate on behalf of either party to a proceeding. In any event, we conclude the court's statements explaining why it revoked Appellant's sentence are supported by the record.

While the trial court stated at the revocation hearing that Appellant committed "[a]dditional" violations, in its opinion, it clarified that Appellant's sentence was based only on the violations included in the revocation petition - Appellant's substance use and prohibited communications. PCRA Ct. Op. at 16. At the sentencing hearing and in its sentencing order, the court stated it revoked Appellant's probation for

the reasons set forth in the Revocation Petition, including [Appellant's] intentional use of kratom and admission that he has been using kratom; his positive test for buprenorphine; his continual lying about his substance use; and his corruption of other members of the [Restrictive Drug Treatment P]rogram.
See Order of Sentence, 5/23/19, at 1; see also N.T. Probation Revocation Proceeding at 41. Thus, Appellant's assertion that the court considered other impermissible factors when it imposed his sentence is not supported by the record. No relief is due.

Moreover, even if Appellant properly preserved his ineffectiveness claim, he would not be entitled to relief. To prevail on such a claim, it is Appellant's responsibility to plead and prove each prong of the ineffectiveness test, which he has failed to do. See Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1158. At the October evidentiary hearing, Appellant stated this claim was "almost exclusively on the record" and argued that had Attorney Yandrich objected, Appellant would have received a lesser sentence. N.T. PCRA H'rg, 10/8/20, at 25. However, the PCRA court disputes that assertion. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 16 (stating it based Appellant's sentence only on his own substance abuse, lying about this behavior, and inappropriate relationships with people in the drug treatment program). As such, this claim has no arguable merit.

Appellant also failed to establish that Attorney Yandrich had no reasonable basis for failing to object at the revocation hearing. Appellant had two evidentiary hearings where he did not present the testimony of Attorney Yandrich or any evidence regarding why counsel did not object to the testimony regarding these other allegations. Without evidence demonstrating Attorney Yandrich's unreasonableness, Appellant failed to meet his burden, and as such his claim must fail. Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1158.

Furthermore, Appellant failed to establish he was prejudiced by Attorney Yandrich's conduct. The court stated that it only considered those allegations pled in the revocation petition in fashioning Appellant's sentence, a statement supported by the record. Though Appellant contends that lying about his substance use was an "unpled allegation[,]" this argument is without merit. See Appellant's Brief at 35. Lying about using kratom and buprenorphine is but a surrounding circumstance of his violation regarding substance use. Likewise, his "corruption" of other members of the drug treatment program requires communication which was prohibited. See Order of Sentence, 5/23/19, at 1. The court stated, and the record supports, that it would not have sentenced Appellant differently had Attorney Yandrich objected at the hearing. See Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1156, 1158. Thus, even if Appellant had preserved his ineffective assistance claim, he would be entitled to no relief.

Orders affirmed.

Judge Murray joins the Memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM

COLINS, J.

I concur with the result but write separately to express that I agree with the merits analysis to the extent that it finds that Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice necessary for relief on his ineffective assistance claim below, however, I do not join the discussion of waiver pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant challenges the denial of his claim below that his probation revocation counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the sentencing court's consideration of "unpled aggravating circumstances." In his concise statement of errors claims of on appeal, Appellant identified the issue for our review as follows: "This Honorable Court erred in denying Count III of Heath's petition where the record clearly demonstrates that it considered unpled aggravating circumstances in fashioning his sentence." Rule 1925(b) statement, 4/20/21, ¶ 3. The majority finds that Appellant's ineffectiveness claim on appeal "is subject to waiver" because "while Appellant raised [ ]his ineffectiveness claim before the PCRA court, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, he only raised the present issue under the purview of trial court error." Maj. memo. op. at 13-14. I would not have considered the relevance of waiver in this circumstance.

The Rule 1925(b) pleading accurately sets forth, consistent with the applicable standard of review on appeal, that the focus of Appellant's claim is the denial of his ineffectiveness claim. There is no issue with any vagueness in the Rule 1925(b) statement that could hinder the PCRA court's review of its opinion because, by referring to the number of the ineffectiveness claim as it was presented in Appellant's PCRA petition below ("Count III"), Appellant clearly identified the claim he wished to raise on appeal. His Rule 1925(b) statement did not transform the ineffectiveness claim at issue into a trial court error claim as the majority memorandum alleges. He merely properly addressed it under the standard of review that this Court's opinion should apply. We should not find waiver based on this apt pleading. We should encourage it. Appellate ineffective assistance claims raised by a defendant, following the denial of relief, are properly directed at the lower court's denial of the ineffectiveness claims presented below.

In any event, I concur with the result because Appellant failed to meet his burden of pleading and proving that he was prejudiced by his former counsel's failure to raise objections at his revocation hearing. There were ample circumstances supporting the revocation of his probation and the PCRA court plainly informs this Court that it would have imposed the same revocation sentence assuming arguendo that counsel had raised the objections proposed by Appellant's ineffectiveness claim. PCRA Ct. Op., 8/27/21, at 16-17 (stating that it based Appellant's sentence only on his own substance abuse, lying about his behavior, and inappropriate relationships with others in his drug treatment program, and noting that Appellant "received a lenient sentence in light of the multiple felony burglaries under the circumstances"). Accordingly, Appellant could not demonstrate - as was necessary for relief - that there was a reasonable likelihood that, if only counsel had taken the proposed action, then the outcome of the revocation proceeding would have been different and more beneficial to him. I thus join the majority's prejudice analysis and concur in the result.

[*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.


Summaries of

Commonwealth v. Heath

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Sep 13, 2022
178 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 13, 2022)
Case details for

Commonwealth v. Heath

Case Details

Full title:COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTONIO REDMAN HEATH Appellant…

Court:Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Date published: Sep 13, 2022

Citations

178 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 13, 2022)