Opinion
2318 EDA 2023 J-S16019-24
08-23-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DOMINIC D. HAYNES APPEAL OF: FINANCIAL CASUALTY AND SURETY, INC.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered August 1, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004481-2020
BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
LANE, J.
Financial Casualty and Surety, Inc. ("Financial Casualty"), which provided a bail bond for Dominic D. Haynes ("Haynes"), appeals from the order denying its motion to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court provided a detailed summary of the relevant factual and procedural history of this case, as follows:
On July 31, 2020, [Financial Casualty], in its capacity as a professional bonding company, executed a bond on behalf of . . . [Haynes] in the amount of $10,000. [Under the terms of his bail bond, Haynes agreed to "attend all scheduled court dates." Surety, Bondsman, Realty Bail Bond, 7/31/20, at 1 (unnumbered). On that same page, which Financial Casualty signed, it acknowledged that "[t]his bond is valid for the entire proceedings and until full and final disposition of the case including
final disposition of any petition for writ of certiorari or appeal timely filed in the Supreme Court of the United States." Id.]
On June 29, 2022, the [trial] court issued a bench warrant and an order forfeiting bail due to [Haynes'] failure to appear at a pre-trial conference. [Haynes] was eventually taken into custody and on September 13, 2022, the [trial] court revoked the bench warrant and reinstated bail.
On November 17, 2022, the [trial court issued another bench warrant and order forfeiting bail due to [Haynes'] failure to appear at a pre-trial conference. On April 20, 2023, [Financial Casualty] filed its first motion to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety. [This motion was filed by an employee of Financial Casualty who was not an attorney licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania]. . . . [T]he [trial] court denied [the motion] on May 17, 2023 due to the fact that [Haynes] was not in custody. On May 31, 2023, [Financial Casualty] filed a motion to reconsider the [trial] court's denial of the motion to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety, which the [trial] court denied on June 12, 2023.
On June 29, 2023, [Financial Casualty] filed another motion to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety, which the [trial] court denied on July 10, 2023 due to the fact that [Haynes] was not in custody. [Haynes] was eventually taken into custody and on July 24, 2023, the [trial] court revoked the bench warrant. On July 27, 2023, [Financial Casualty] filed another motion to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety, which the [trial] court denied on August [1], 2023, following a hearing. On August 22, 2023, [Financial Casualty] filed a motion to reconsider the [trial] court's denial of the motion to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety.Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/23, at 1-2 (paragraph break inserted, unnecessary capitalization and footnote omitted).
Financial Casualty filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court thereafter filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Financial Casualty raises the following issue for our review: "Can the [trial] court ignore the requirement to obtain written consent of the bail bonds person before reinstating bail as required by Title 42 Chapter[ ]57 'Bonds and Recognizances?'" Financial Casualty's Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Financial Casualty avers that the trial court abused its discretion when it twice ordered Haynes' bail forfeited and then reinstated it without the written consent of the bail bondsmen, in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5747.1(b) (providing that the "bail bondsman shall not be continued by the court as surety on reinstated bail unless a written consent is signed by the bail bondsman agreeing to such extension of suretyship").
Initially, we note that Financial Casualty's issue involves statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. 2013). Therefore, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id. As our Supreme Court has held:
In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 1501 et seq., which directs us to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(a). To accomplish that goal, we interpret statutory language not in isolation, but with reference to the context in which it appears. A statute's plain language generally provides the best indication of legislative intent. See Penna. Fin. Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 541 Pa. 424, 664 A.2d 84, 87 (1995) ("Where the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity the legislative intent is to be gleaned from those very words."). Only where the words of a statute are ambiguous will we resort to other considerations to discern legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(c)[.]Commonwealth v. Kingston, 143 A.3d 917, 922 (Pa. 2016) (some citations omitted).
Bail has been long recognized as a procedure whereby an individual defendant provides a form of collateral in exchange for the defendant's release from custody; it secures his future appearance and other requirements of his bond. See Commonwealth v. Chopak, 615 A.2d 696, 702 (Pa. 1992). The trial court has the authority to order forfeiture of bail upon the occurrence of a breach of condition of bail. Id. Bail forfeiture is a process whereby an individual defendant surrenders part or all of his bond and is appropriate when he breaches a condition of his bail. See id. at 703 n7. Revocation of bail simply denies an individual defendant the opportunity to remain outside of custody pending the outcome of his judicial process. See Chopak, 615 A.2d at 703 n 7.
Matters concerning the administration of bail are subject to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 42 Pa.C.S.A § 5702 (providing that "all matters relating to the fixing, posting, forfeiting, exoneration and distribution of bail and recognizances shall be governed by general rules"). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 536 provides two sanctions when a defendant violates a condition of his bail - revocation of the defendant's release or forfeiture of the posted bail bond. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(1)-(2). The forfeiture procedure set forth in Rule 536 provides that "[w]hen a monetary condition of release has been imposed and the defendant has violated a condition of the bail bond, the bail authority may order the cash or other security forfeited and shall state in writing or on the record the reasons for so doing." Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(a). Upon forfeiture, the money deposited to secure the defendant's appearance or compliance with the conditions of the bail bond technically becomes the property of the county. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(e). However, the bail bond remains subject to exoneration, set-aside, or remission by the court. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(C). A forfeiture, once declared by the court, may be set aside or remitted as justice requires. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(d).
Our standard of review in cases involving remittance of bail forfeiture is well-established:
The decision to allow or deny a remission of bail forfeiture lies with the sound discretion of the trial court. Trial courts unquestionably have the authority to order the forfeiture of bail upon the breach or violation of any condition of the bail bond. In bond forfeiture cases, an abuse of that discretion or authority will only be found if the aggrieved party demonstrates that the trial court misapplied the law, exercised its judgment in a manifestly unreasonable manner, or acted on the basis of bias, partiality, or ill-will. To the extent the aggrieved party alleges an error of law, this Court will correct that error and our scope of review in doing so is plenary.In re Hann, 111 A.3d 757, 760 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
When a bondsman petitions for remittance, the burden is on the bondsman to prove that his or her efforts contributed to the apprehension and return of the fugitive defendant or that those efforts at least had a substantial impact on his or her apprehension and return. See Commonwealth v. Gaines, 74 A.3d 1047, 1050-51 (Pa. Super. 2013). Additionally, if a refund of forfeited monies is requested by a surety, the court is obligated to hold a hearing and consider the equities of the claim. Id. This Court has deemed it both equitable and consistent with default judgment jurisprudence in bail forfeiture remittance proceedings, to place the burden of proof on the petitioner seeking remittance, as the Commonwealth bears the burden of proof at the bail forfeiture hearing. Id.
As this Court has explained:
Remission of forfeitures is a practice calculated to encourage bondsman to seek actively the return of absent defendants. For this reason, the results of a bondsman's efforts as well as the extent of these efforts are prime considerations in the determination of the amount of remission. [T]his is precisely the undertaking which every bondsman implicitly agrees to guarantee. A hearing is required on a bail bondsman's request for remission of forfeited money.
[A] hearing is necessary . . . so that the court may have before it evidence of the extent of the appellant's participation in the return of the defendants, . . ., and any other relevant evidence appellant may produce which may properly guide the [trial court] in its future decision as to whether to return any portion of the forfeited bonds . . . involved.
Nevertheless, [m]ere participation in the search for the defendant is not enough. The apprehension or return of the defendant must either be effected by the efforts of the bondsman or [those efforts must] at least have a substantial impact on his apprehension and return.Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 886 A.2d 231, 237 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted, emphasis in original).
Financial Casualty claims that after the trial court ordered Haynes' bail forfeited, the trial court erred in reinstating the bail without the written consent of its bondsman, as is required by section 5747.1(b). Section 5747.1 provides, in relevant part, the following:
§ 5747.1. Forfeited undertaking
(a) General rule.--If a defendant in a criminal prosecution fails to appear for any scheduled court proceeding, the defendant's bail may be revoked and notice of revocation shall serve as notice of intent to forfeit the bail of the defendant. The notice or order of revocation shall be served by the office of the clerk to the defendant, surety or bail bondsman and insurer who has issued the qualifying power of attorney for the bail bondsman by certified mail, return receipt requested.
(b) Payment.--The following shall apply:
(1) Ninety days from the date of the service of the notice of revocation or order of revocation, the revocation shall become a judgment of forfeiture, payment of which shall be immediately required by the defendant or surety. Failure of a bail bondsman to make a timely payment of a forfeiture judgment shall result in the district attorney or county solicitor commencing proceedings to suspend or nonrenew the license of the bail bondsman otherwise consistent with section 5746 (relating to suspension or revocation of authority to conduct business in a county).
(2) Payment of forfeited undertaking shall be made directly to the office of the clerk not later than the close of business on the 91st day following the service of the notice of revocation. If the defendant has been recovered and placed into custody through the efforts of the bail bondsman or proof has been provided to the court that the defendant was discovered by the bail bondsman to be in custody in another jurisdiction prior to the 91st day, no payment of the forfeited undertaking shall be required. If the defendant is placed into custody or discovered to be in custody, the court shall set aside the bail revocation and may release the defendant with the reinstitution of bail pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. The bail bondsman shall not be continued by the court as surety on reinstated bail unless a written consent is signed by the bail bondsman agreeing to such extension of suretyship.42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5747.1(a)-(b)(2) (emphasis added).
Importantly, section 5747.1 applies when a criminal defendant fails to appear for a scheduled court proceeding and the court has subsequently decided to revoke his or her bail. Indeed, the plain and unambiguous language of the statute reflects that it concerns only the situation in which bail has been revoked and provides the specific procedures to be followed after such revocation. Consequently, the statute is inapplicable where the trial court did not revoke a defendant's bail.
On the other hand, Rule 536 addresses bail forfeiture and exoneration if a defendant violates the conditions of bail, providing the trial court with substantial discretion to grant forfeiture of the bail bond. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 827 A.2d 462, 467 (Pa. Super. 2003). The Rule provides that "[t]he bail authority may direct that a forfeiture be set aside or remitted if justice does not require the full enforcement of the forfeiture order." Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(d). Further, "[a] bail authority, in his or her discretion, may exonerate a surety who deposits cash in the amount of any forfeiture ordered or who surrenders the defendant in a timely manner." Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(C)(1).
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 526 (listing five conditions of the bail bond which must be imposed in every criminal case in which a defendant is released on bail).
Here, a review of the record demonstrates that the trial court issued bail forfeiture orders on June 29, 2022, and November 17, 2022, but issued no orders revoking Haynes' bail. Thus, because the docket indicates Haynes' bail was forfeited and not revoked, the mandates of section 5747.1 are inapplicable.
In reaching this determination, we are mindful of this Court's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Rondon, 298 A.3d 1135 (Pa. Super. 2023), which is now pending on appeal in our Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Rondon, 312 A.3d 316 (Pa. 2024). In Rondon, a panel of this Court considered the issue of whether the written consent requirement of section 5747.1(b)(2) is triggered when the trial court's order of forfeiture of a defendant's bail was entered as the result of a court error regarding the date of the scheduled court proceeding. As in the instant case, the defendant's bail in Rondon was not revoked, but merely forfeited. Nevertheless, we believe that, because the order of forfeiture was entered solely as a result of trial court error, the facts in Rondon are sufficiently distinguishable from the instant matter such that we are not bound to follow its holding.
Therefore, when Haynes breached the conditions of his bail by failing to appear for his scheduled court hearings, the trial court had the authority to order the forfeiture of bail funds. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 526(A)(2), 536(A)(2)(a). Financial Casualty filed several motions to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety. The trial court held a hearing on Financial Casualty's July 27, 2023 motion to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety, giving it the opportunity to present evidence to satisfy its burden of proof that it was entitled to remittance. See N.T., 8/1/23, at 3-4. At the hearing, Financial Casualty did not present any evidence to demonstrate that its efforts contributed to the apprehension and return of Haynes or had a substantial impact on his apprehension or return. Id. at 4-8. In concluding that Financial Casualty did not meet its burden, the trial court explained:
[Financial Casualty's] counsel failed to produce any evidence during the course of the hearing to demonstrate that [Financial
Casualty's] efforts contributed to the apprehension and return of [Haynes] or that those efforts at least had a substantial impact on his apprehension or return. Counsel's self-serving assertions during the hearing did not constitute evidence and could not satisfy [Financial Casualty's] burden.Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/23, at 6.
Although the trial court incorrectly determined that section 5747.1 was controlling in this matter, this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any valid basis appearing of record. See Commonwealth v. Fant, 146 A.3d 1254, 1265 n.13 (Pa. 2016) (explaining that "[a]ccording to the 'right-for-any-reason' doctrine, appellate courts are not limited by the specific grounds raised by the parties or invoked by the court under review, but may affirm for any valid reason appearing as of record").
After our independent review of the record, we conclude that the trial court appropriately determined that Financial Casualty failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that it was entitled to remittance of the forfeited bail, albeit on a slightly different basis. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order denying Financial Casualty's motion to vacate bail and exonerate surety.
Order affirmed.
[*]Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.