Opinion
11-P-947
04-12-2012
COMMONWEALTH v. DIMITRI HARRIS.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The Commonwealth appeals from the denial of a motion in limine to admit certain statements by the defendant. On the same day, the defendant filed a motion for a voir dire on whether he should have received Miranda warnings and whether his statements were voluntary. The judge suppressed the defendant's statements because there were not preceded by Miranda warnings. We reverse.
Given the result we reach, we do not address the Commonwealth's argument that the defendant failed to comply with Mass.R.Crim.P. 13(a)(2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004). See Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 388-391 (2010); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 588 (2010).
'In reviewing the judge's decision, we 'give substantial deference to the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law, but independently review the correctness of the judges's application of constitutional principles to the facts found." Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 122 (1998), quoting from Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 384 (1996). The Commonwealth claims that because the defendant was not the
target of the investigation and not in custody, Miranda warnings were not required. We agree. Even though the judge concluded that the defendant was not in custody, she suppressed statements from three different instances, holding that Miranda warnings were required because there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. However, 'Miranda warnings are only necessary where one is subject to 'custodial interrogation." Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 688 (1995).
The initial questioning took place while the defendant was in the living room of his mother's house. The rifle at issue came up in conversation, but the police told the defendant that they were more concerned with the homicide, and not the rifle. The defendant, at that point, stated that he did not know anything about the rifle. He also told the detectives that he associated with the Norfolk/Morris group.
The second statement came from the defendant while outside of the grand jury room. He told the detectives that another individual had put the rifle in his car. On this day, the defendant did not testify before the grand jury and he left freely.
The third statement was given by the defendant before the grand jury. He again stated that he told another person to place the rifle in the car and that he associated with the Norfolk/Morris group.
'In Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737 (1984), [the Supreme Judicial Court] set forth four indicia of custody, drawn from Federal law, including ' (1) the place of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation has begun to focus on the suspect, including whether there is probable cause to arrest the suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the suspect; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the suspect was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview terminated with the defendant's arrest." Commonwealth v. Morse, supra at 121 n.4, quoting from Commonwealth v. Bryant, supra. The judge placed much weight on the second factor, that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. However, 'the subjective beliefs held by law enforcement officers are irrelevant in the determination whether a person being questioned is in custody for purposes of the receipt of Miranda warnings, except to the extent that those beliefs influenced the objective conditions surrounding an interrogation.' Id. at 123-124. In Morse, the court determined that even at the point where the defendant may be considered a suspect, 'Federal decisional law makes clear that this fact, in and of itself, does not carry the legal significance that the judge attached to it.' Id. at 123.
Here, the police were investigating the death of an individual, and they believed the defendant had knowledge of the killing. The detectives informed the defendant that while they knew about the rifle, they were not concerned about it. They stated that they were more concerned with the homicide. There is no indication on this record that police suspicion influenced the conditions of their questioning the defendant. Indeed, each time the defendant spoke to detectives he was free to leave.
Furthermore, the record here was generated by the prosecutor's proffer to the judge. Nothing in that proffer indicated that this is a case like Commonwealth v. Weed, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 463, 469 (1984), where the prosecutor misled or misinformed the defendant before he testified before the grand jury. Therefore, as a grand jury witness the defendant was 'entitled to no warnings of constitutional rights.' Id. at 468-469, quoting from United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.d 178, 181 (1st Cir. 1975). Even as a potential defendant, no target warnings were required. Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 742- 743 (1999).
The order suppressing the defendant's statements is reversed, and a new order shall enter allowing the Commonwealth's motion in limine.
So ordered.
By the Court (Rapoza, C.J., Kafker & Meade, JJ.),