Opinion
35 C.D. 2023 371 C.D. 2023 388 C.D. 2023
08-26-2024
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Eight Hundred Thirteen Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents ($813.83) in United States Currency Appeal of: William E. Jones
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Submitted: July 5, 2024
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION
STACY WALLACE, JUDGE
In these consolidated cases, William E. Jones (Jones), pro se, appeals three orders issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court). The trial court's orders denied Jones' requests for relief related to hiring a private investigator and discovery requests in a pending forfeiture matter before the trial court. After review, we quash the appeals.
BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a petition for forfeiture (Forfeiture Petition) of $813.83 cash in United States currency that police seized from Jones when they arrested him on September 26, 2019. Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 5. In its Forfeiture Petition, the Commonwealth asserted the following. In May 2019, the Coatesville City Police and Chester County Detectives High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Unit opened a drug trafficking investigation into Jones based on information from a confidential informant. Id. After conducting several controlled drug buys where Jones sold methamphetamine and cocaine in exchange for money to confidential informants, the police arrested Jones for violating The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act). Id. When the police took Jones into custody, they searched him and seized $813.83 cash, as well as cocaine. Id. The police conducted a search of his vehicle and seized other suspected drugs, empty plastic packaging bags, and a digital scale. Id.
Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 780-101 - 780-144.
On February 12, 2020, Jones filed a Petition for Return of Property in which he argued the money the police seized was not related to drug trafficking, but rather was money he won from Pennsylvania lottery machines the night before he was arrested. Id., Item No. 7. Jones filed various motions in the pending forfeiture case including: a motion to challenge the veracity of a sworn statement; a motion to disclose the identity of the informant; and a motion for discovery, disclosure, and inspection. Id., Item No. 3.
The trial court scheduled a forfeiture hearing for August 31, 2021, which it then rescheduled numerous times. Id. Meanwhile, Jones filed additional motions related to seeking discovery materials. Id. Ultimately, Jones appeals three orders to this Court.
First, on August 8, 2022, Jones filed a "Motion to have the courts hire a private investigator per rule 706" (Motion for Investigator). Id., Item No. 32. In his Motion for Investigator, Jones again asserted the money the police seized was money he won "on the Pennsylvania skills machines that are in gas stations and [b]ar[s] in the state of Pennsylvania," and "Rule 706 gives the courts the power to hire a private investigator for [Jones]." Id. Jones indicated he did not have the money to hire a private investigator "to go and talk to the cashiers at the gas stations to get witnesses for the defendant." Id. The trial court held a hearing on August 16, 2022, and subsequently denied Jones' Motion for Investigator (Order Denying Motion for Investigator). Id., Item No. 35. In its Order Denying Motion for Investigator, the trial court explained Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 706 did not address any issues that were pending before the trial court, but rather addressed a defendant's inability to pay fines and costs. Id. Additionally, the trial court explained that proceedings under the Controlled Substance and Forfeiture Act are civil in nature and thus the "full panoply of protections" afforded to criminal defendants are not applicable. Id. Finally, the trial court noted the Commonwealth agreed to provide Jones a copy of the forensic download of his cell phone. Id. On August 25, 2022, Jones filed a "motion to appeal the Judges [sic] decision and to have a new Judge to hear [his] case" (Appeal of Order Denying Motion for Investigator). Id., Item No. 37.
Second, on August 25, 2022, Jones filed a "Motion for the District Attorney to release a paper copy of the Forensic download of the defendants [sic] phone" (Motion for Forensic Download). Id., Item No. 39. On October 5, 2022, the trial court denied Jones' Motion for Forensic Download as moot (Order Denying Motion for Forensic Download). Id., Item No. 47. On October 19, 2022, Jones filed a "Petition to appeal the order that was filed on the 5th day of October 2022 'To Release a paper copy of the Forensic Download of the Defendants [sic] Phone'" (Appeal of Order Denying Motion for Forensic Download).
Third, on August 29, 2022, Jones filed a "Motion to Release the pictures of Sep[tember] 26, 2019[,] when the Defendant was arrested and finger[]printed by Trooper Botta and the pictures that Detective Shave took when he finger[]printed the defendant, plus the paperwork from Chester County prison for Sept[ember] 26, 2019[,] when the defendant arrived there. Plus the hard drive of the defendants [sic] security system" (Motion to Release Pictures). Id., Item No. 41. On October 4, 2022, the trial court denied Jones' Motion to Release Pictures (Order Denying Motion to Release Pictures). Id., Item No. 46. On October 19, 2022, Jones filed a "Petition to Appeal the order from the 4th day of October, 2022 'a motion to release the Pictures on the Forensic download' that was filed on August 29, 2022" (Appeal of Order Denying Motion to Release Pictures).
The trial court issued three opinions in compliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(1), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1). In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion in response to Jones' Appeal of the Order Denying Motion for Investigator, the trial court explained that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 706, on which Jones relied does not require a court to hire a private investigator as Jones asserts, but rather it governs a criminal defendant's inability to pay fines and costs. Trial Court's 1925(a) Opinion, 10/10/2022, at 4. Additionally, the trial court relied on Commonwealth v. All That Certain Lot or Parcel of Land Located at 605 University Drive, 104 A.3d 411 (Pa. 2014), to support its assertion the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure generally govern a forfeiture proceeding, not the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. Thus, Jones would not be entitled to the "full panoply" of protections afforded to criminal defendants in this civil proceeding. Id.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion in response to Jones' Appeal of the Order Denying Motion for Forensic Download, the trial court asserts this order is related to the exchange of discovery in the underlying case and thus is not a final order in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341. Id. Because the order is not appealable, the trial court asserts this matter is not properly before this Court. Trial Court's 1925(a) Op., 12/27/2022, at 3. Furthermore, the trial court explained that during the hearing wherein Jones requested certain discovery, the Commonwealth agreed to provide Jones with a copy of the forensic download of his cellular phone. Id.
Similarly, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion in response to Jones' Appeal of the Order Denying Motion to Release Pictures, the trial court asserts this order is not appealable. The trial court indicated Jones filed his Motion to Release Pictures wherein he requested "a number of documents and items, in addition to the requested and agreed upon download of his phone." Trial Court's 1925(a) Op., 12/27/2022, at 3. The trial court reviewed the request "for a variety of prison records and a download of the prison's security system" and found it was "overly broad and unduly burdensome," and denied the request. Id.
In Jones' Amended Brief filed with this Court, Jones focuses his argument entirely on the merits of his appeal, specifically, he asserts he obtained the subject money from winning lottery games, and he is entitled to the discoverable materials he requested because those materials will disprove the Commonwealth's alleged facts. See Jones' Amended Br. generally. In response, the Commonwealth focuses solely on alleged inadequacies of Jones' appellate brief, including assertions that Jones' brief makes statements without legal support or citation to the record, fails to develop his argument, and fails to comply with the appellate brief rules. Commonwealth's Br. at 3. The Commonwealth contends Jones' brief is presented improperly, incompletely, and inaccurately, and it requests this Court dismiss and quash his appeal. Id. We must note, despite this Court's specific directive that the parties "address the appealability of the orders in their principal briefs on the merits or in an appropriate motion," inexplicably, neither party has addressed this issue in their briefs. See Order, 5/4/2023.
In his "Questions" section of his brief, Jones sets forth the following:
1) Why am I not allowed to have Discovery?
2) How can I show proof that the money they took from me is not drug money if they deny me all the stuff they have that shows the truth?
3) How can I have a f[air] trial if the judge is working with the District Attorney?
4) Why is the District Attorney allowed to use the Discovery and they tell me I am not allowed?
5) Why couldn't I have a face to face hearing about my motions?Jones' Amended Br. at 6.
DISCUSSION
Before this Court can address the merits of either party's arguments, we must first determine whether this Court has jurisdiction to address appeals of these orders. Whether this Court has jurisdiction over an appeal raises a question of law, subject to our de novo review. Pa. Mfrs.' Ass'n Ins. Co. v. Johnson Matthew, Inc., 188 A.3d 396 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). This means we do not defer to the lower court when reaching our decision. Mercury Trucking, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 55 A.3d 1056, 1082 (Pa. 2012) (citing Heath v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole), 860 A.2d 25, 29 n.2 (Pa. 2004)).
Generally, excluding exceptions not relevant here, this Court's appellate jurisdiction extends only to review of final orders. 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(1); Pa.R.A.P. 341. A final order is one which disposes of all claims and all parties or is entered as a final order by a trial court or other government unit. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1), (3). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he final order rule reflects the long-held limitation on review by . . . appellate courts. Considering issues only after a final order maintains distinctions between trial and appellate review, respects the traditional role of the trial judge, and promotes formality, completeness, and efficiency." Shearer v. Hafter, 177 A.3d 850, 855 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).
This Court also has jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals as of right, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(a); Pa.R.A.P. 311, and interlocutory appeals by permission, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b); Pa.R.A.P. 312.
The final order rule serves to maintain the appropriate relationship between the [trial courts] and appellate courts . . . by ensuring that [a trial judge's] every determination is not subject to the immediate review of an appellate tribunal. . . . The consolidation of all contested rulings into a single appeal provides the [appellate court] with an opportunity, furthermore, to consider a trial judge's actions in light of the entire proceedings below, thereby enhancing the likelihood of sound appellate review.Rae v. Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass'n, 977 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Pa. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
In an exception to the final order rule, this Court also has appellate jurisdiction to entertain appeals under the collateral order doctrine, codified in Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 (Rule 313), Pa.R.A.P. 313. A collateral order is "an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost." Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
To determine if an order is a collateral order, we must apply a three-prong test and consider whether: "1) the order is separable from and collateral to the underlying action; 2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and 3) if review is postponed until final judgment, the claim will be lost." MFW Wine Co., LLC v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., ___ A.3d ___ (Pa., No. 75 & 76 MAP 2022, filed July 2, 2024). Under the first prong of the collateral order doctrine framework, review of the order in question must not implicate the merits of the underlying dispute. Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 551-52 (Pa. 1999). Thus, we must decide whether the issue involved in the order "can be addressed without analysis" of the underlying allegations. Id. at 552. Under the second prong, an issue is "important if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by the final judgment rule." S. Hills Cath. Acad. v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 308 A.3d 915, 922 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (citation omitted), appeal denied, (Pa., No. 51 WAL 2024, order filed July 23, 2024). Notably, "it is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties. Rather[,] it must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand." Geniviva v. Frisk, 725 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). Finally, under the third prong, we must determine whether a right is "effectively reviewable." Id. (citation omitted). This question "cannot be answered without a judgment about the value interests that would be lost through rigorous application of" the final order rule. Id.
Where an order satisfies this three-pronged test, we may exercise appellate jurisdiction even though the order being appealed is not final. Rae, 977 A.2d at 1125. The collateral order doctrine is to be interpreted narrowly, and each prong of its test must be "clearly present before an order may be considered collateral." In re Est. of Rowley, 84 A.3d 337, 340 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Where the test it not met, and in the absence of another exception to the final order rule, we have no jurisdiction to consider an appeal of a non-final order. Rae, 977 A.2d at 1125 (citation omitted).
Generally, discovery orders are not considered final orders and are "not appealable until there is a final judgment in the underlying action." Smith v. Phila. Gas Works, 740 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). However, a discovery order may be appealable where it satisfies the collateral order doctrine's three-prong test. Pennsylvania courts have applied the three-prong collateral order test and determined certain discovery orders to be collateral orders. For example, in Northumberland County Children and Youth Services v. Department of Public. Welfare, 2 A.3d 794 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), this Court considered whether an order granting a motion to compel, in the context of a child expunction hearing, qualified as a collateral order. In that case, an alleged child abuse perpetrator filed a motion to compel Children and Youth Services (CYS) to produce an expert report of a victim child's treating physician, medical records, and films, as well as all information contained in CYS's investigatory file. Id. at 796. The Department of Public Welfare, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (BHA), directed CYS to provide all medical records and films of the victim child that CYS's expert would use in the hearing. Id. CYS appealed to this Court, maintaining the order was a collateral order, and asserting confidentiality of the information in its possession. Id. at 798.
On review, we applied the three-prong collateral order test, and determined the issue of the alleged perpetrator's entitlement to the information was separate from and collateral to the substantive issue, thus satisfying the first prong. Id. at 797-98. We also concluded the alleged perpetrator's right to reputation was too important to be denied review, thus satisfying the second prong. Id. at 798. As to the third prong, we concluded "there exists 'no effective means of reviewing after final judgment an order requiring the production of putatively protected material.'" Id. (quoting Ben, 729 A.2d at 552) (emphasis added). We explained that if we deferred review of the discovery order until after the final decision on the child abuse appeal, "the parties' challenge to the order would be irreparably lost and remain unresolved." Id. Therefore, we concluded the order was a collateral order and this Court had jurisdiction to decide the appeal. Id.
Discovery orders compelling the production of material are generally considered collateral orders, and thus appealable, because the disclosure of documents cannot be undone, and subsequent appellate review would be meaningless. MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Res., LLC v. Clean Air Council, 71 A.3d 337, 342 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Id. Therefore, when considering whether a discovery order is a collateral order, the distinction between whether the order compels disclosure or denies it is vital. Id.
Here, Jones seeks to appeal three orders. First, we will address his appeals of the Order Denying Motion for Forensic Download and the Order Denying Motion to Release Pictures together because, in substance, both orders denied Jones' requests for discovery. Neither of these orders disposed of the litigation, and therefore, they are not final orders. Thus, for this Court to exercise jurisdiction, the orders must be collateral orders.
The Order Denying Motion for Forensic Download and the Order Denying Motion to Release Pictures both address the specific issue of whether the Commonwealth must produce and provide discoverable materials to Jones. These issues are separable from the underlying forfeiture action because the issue of whether Jones is entitled to discoverable materials could be resolved independent of consideration of the merits of the Commonwealth's Forfeiture Petition. Jones' entitlement to the materials at issue is "clearly separate from and collateral to the substantive issue" of whether the seized money is subject to forfeiture. See Northumberland, 2 A.3d at 797-98. Therefore, the first prong of the collateral order test is met. As to the second prong, we are unable to discern any right here too important for us to deny immediate review of the challenged orders. These orders denying Jones' requests for discoverable materials are an inadequate basis for invoking the collateral order doctrine. Furthermore, as to the third prong, Jones will not suffer irreparable harm if we decline to consider these appeals, as this refusal will not deprive him of his ability to seek review of the trial court's final order in this matter. Therefore, the Order Denying Motion for Forensic Download and the Order Denying Motion to Release Pictures are not collateral orders. These discovery orders fail to meet all three elements of a collateral order, and we have no jurisdiction to consider the appeals from the orders. See Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., 259 A.3d 359, 370 (Pa. 2021). Accordingly, we quash Jones' appeals of the Order Denying Motion for Forensic Download and the Order Denying Motion to Release Pictures. Next, applying the three-prong test to the Order Denying Motion for Investigator, we likewise conclude this is not an appealable order. The first prong of the collateral order test is met because the issue of whether Jones is entitled to an investigator could be resolved independent of consideration of the merits of the underlying Forfeiture Petition. However, again, we cannot discern any right justifying immediate review of the challenged order. Jones will not suffer irreparable harm if we decline to address this appeal, and our refusal to address this appeal will not deprive him of the ability to later seek review of the trial court's final order in this matter. Therefore, the Order Denying Motion for Investigator is not a collateral order, and thus we lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal of this order. Accordingly, we quash Jones' appeal of the Order Denying Motion for Investigator.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Jones' appeals of the orders at issue and, accordingly, quashes Jones' appeals.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of August 2024, the appeals filed by William E. Jones from the orders entered on August 17, 2022, October 4, 2022, and October 5, 2022, by the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County are QUASHED.