Opinion
Argued September 1, 1977
Decided October 4, 1977
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, ABRAHAM J. GELLINOFF, J.
Donald E. Byrne for appellant.
Allen N. Ross for respondent.
MEMORANDUM.
Order affirmed. The grant of summary judgment, "`the procedural equivalent of a trial'" (Capelin Assoc. v Globe Mfg. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 338, 341; Falk v Goodman, 7 N.Y.2d 87, 91), results in a final judgment on the merits, which bars another action between the same parties based upon the same cause of action (Dye v Lincoln First Bank of Rochester, 38 N.Y.2d 769, 771; 6 Carmody-Wait 2d, N Y Prac, § 39:39, p 492). On this record, we cannot say that the Appellate Division's denial of the plaintiff's application to vacate the judgment entered after plaintiff's default on the summary judgment motion constituted an abuse of discretion (see Hitchcock v Peaslee, 145 N.Y. 547; Williams v Montgomery, 60 N.Y. 648; Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, § 151, p 596).
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur.
Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.