Opinion
5-21-0043
03-01-2022
MICHAEL COLEMAN JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEIL SCHROEDER, THOMAS D. GIBBONS, and JACOB HARLOW Defendants-Appellees.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County. No. 20-MR-1008 Honorable Ronald J. Foster, Judge, presiding.
WHARTON, JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
WHARTON, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the Madison County circuit court's order dismissing Michael Coleman Jr.'s petition for mandamus relief.
¶ 2 The plaintiff, Michael Coleman Jr., appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for mandamus relief.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The plaintiff, Michael Coleman Jr., is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. In October 1994, Coleman was convicted of murder, and in January 1996, he was sentenced to a term of life in prison. That conviction was reversed, and the sentence vacated. On retrial in 1999, Coleman was again convicted of murder and sentenced to a term of life in prison.
¶ 5 In October 2019, Coleman filed a petition seeking relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)). That petition was filed in his criminal case. He asked the court to vacate his murder conviction and sentence, claiming that his indictment was "illegal and unauthorized" because a grand jury was not convened to return a true bill; that Judge J. Lawrence Keshner, who presided over his murder trial, did not have the required Illinois Supreme Court Rule 295 (eff. May 28, 1975) authority to preside over the trial because he was an associate circuit judge; and that the court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over his case.
¶ 6 In October 2020, Coleman filed a complaint for mandamus in a separate action against Judge Neil Schroeder, Thomas Gibbons, and Jacob Harlow. Judge Neil Schroeder (Judge Schroeder) was the criminal judge assigned to Coleman's criminal case when his postconviction petition was at its third stage and when Coleman filed his section 2-1401 petition. Thomas Gibbons (Gibbons) was the Madison County state's attorney and Jacob Harlow (Harlow) was the assistant state's attorney assigned to represent the State for Coleman's postconviction and section 2-1401 petitions. With his mandamus complaint, Coleman sought to compel Judge Schroeder to vacate the murder conviction and life sentence, release Coleman from custody, and enter an order expunging "Case No. 93-CF-1931." In support of his mandamus petition, Coleman alleged that his previously filed section 2-1401 petition in the criminal case established that he was entitled to the relief sought.
Although not part of the record on appeal, the attorney representing defendants Gibbons and Harlow filed uncertified copies of documents from Coleman's criminal case-Madison County No. 93-CF-1931-in an appendix to the brief in this appeal. Included in the appendix is an order entered by Judge Schroeder on May 25, 2021, denying Coleman's postconviction and section 2-1401 petitions.
¶ 7 The three named defendants were served and motions to dismiss were filed. The attorney representing Gibbons and Harlow alleged that Coleman failed to state a cause of action for mandamus relief in that he was using the mandamus proceeding to circumvent the appellate process. The Illinois Attorney General, who represented Judge Schroeder, asked the court to dismiss Coleman's mandamus petition because Coleman did not seek relief that could be afforded through mandamus in that his request sought to overrule a judge's discretionary decision; his complaint was barred by laches because his mandamus petition sought to vacate his 21 -year-old conviction; and Judge Schroeder was protected by judicial immunity to the extent that Coleman claimed that the judge acted unconstitutionally.
¶ 8 On January 15, 2021, the trial court dismissed Coleman's petition for mandamus against Judge Schroeder. The court found that dismissal was appropriate pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)) under the doctrine of laches. The court also concluded that dismissal was appropriate pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (id. § 2-615) because Coleman sought inappropriate relief. The court found that dismissal was warranted "because [the mandamus relief sought] seeks to overrule a judge's exercise of discretion and bypass the established and available appellate avenues." The trial court also found that Judge Schroeder had judicial immunity from Coleman's petition for mandamus relief.
¶ 9 On January 21, 2021, the trial court dismissed Coleman's petition for mandamus relief against Gibbons and Harlow without stating its basis or bases for dismissal.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his mandamus complaint. We disagree.
¶ 12 We begin our analysis by noting our standard of review. "The grant of a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a cause of action filed pursuant to section 2-615 or a motion for an involuntary dismissal based on defects or defenses in the pleadings pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure *** is subject to de novo review." Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 376 Ill.App.3d 429, 433 (2007) (citing White v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 368 Ill.App.3d 278, 282 (2006)). "To survive a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a cause of action, a complaint must be both legally and factually sufficient." Id. at 434. "Where the dismissal was proper as a matter of law, we may affirm the circuit court's decision on any basis appearing in the record." Id. at 433 (citing MKL Pre-Press Electronics/MKL Computer Media Supplies, Inc. v. La Crosse Litho Supply, LLC, 361 Ill.App.3d 872, 877 (2005)).
¶ 13 "Mandamus is an extraordinary civil remedy that will be granted to enforce, as a matter of right, the performance of official nondiscretionary duties by a public officer." Id. (citing Lee v. Findley 359 Ill.App.3d 1130, 1133 (2005)); see also People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash, 118 Ill.2d 90, 96 (1987). "Mandamus will issue only where the plaintiff has fulfilled his burden (see Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill.App.3d 834, 840 (2002)) to set forth every material fact needed to demonstrate that (1) he has a clear right to the relief requested, (2) there is a clear duty on the part of the defendant to act, and (3) clear authority exists in the defendant to comply with an order granting mandamus relief." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 433-34 (citing Baldacchino v. Thompson, 289 Ill.App.3d 104, 109 (1997)). "Because Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, a plaintiff is required to set forth a legally recognized claim and plead facts in support of each element that bring the claim within the cause of action alleged." Id. at 434 (citing Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill.2d 363, 369 (2003)). "To survive a motion to dismiss ***, a complaint must be both legally and factually sufficient." Id. "A writ of mandamus is appropriate when used to compel compliance with mandatory legal standards but not when the act in question involves the exercise of a public officer's discretion." McFatridge v. Madigan, 2013 IL 113676, ¶ 17.
¶ 14 A. Failure to State a Claim for Mandamus Relief
¶ 15 The trial court concluded that Coleman was unable to state a claim for mandamus relief against Judge Schroeder because Coleman was attempting to bypass appellate review of the section 2-1401 claim he filed in his criminal case, and because he was asking Judge Schroeder to overrule a trial court judge's discretionary decision in the case. Although the trial court did not provide the foundation for its dismissal of Coleman's mandamus petition against Gibbons and Harlow, we note that Gibbons and Harlow alleged Coleman was improperly attempting to use the mandamus process to circumvent the appellate process.
¶ 16 In this case, Coleman's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and the dismissal of his postconviction petition was affirmed on appeal. Coleman's section 2-1401 petition seeking relief was pending in his criminal case when he filed this separate mandamus petition. Whether the claims Coleman made in his section 2-1401 petition have merit has no bearing on the merits of this mandamus case. Coleman sought mandamus relief to have his criminal conviction and sentence vacated. However, no court has found that his conviction is void. The Illinois Supreme Court "has made it clear that a judgment is void for purposes of mandamus only if the court lacked the power to enter the order due to an absence of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or the judgment is based on a facially unconstitutional statute that is void ab initio." Oliver v. Kuriakos-Ciesil, 2020 IL App (4th) 190250, ¶ 25 (citing In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 18); see also People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 11-19. Mandamus cannot be used to review orders or judgments for error or to alter a judge's actions when he had the jurisdiction to act. See In re Commitment of Phillips, 367 Ill.App.3d 1036, 1042 (2006). Without a determination that the conviction is void, Coleman's complaint for mandamus was correctly dismissed by the trial court pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
¶ 17 The trial court's dismissal was also appropriate because Coleman's request necessarily would have required Judge Schroeder to make a discretionary determination. Mandamus is inappropriate to direct an official to reach a particular decision or to exercise his discretion in a specific manner. Hadley v. Ryan, 345 Ill.App.3d 297, 301 (2003). The difference between a discretionary act and a ministerial act is not exact. Roark v. Macoupin Creek Drainage District, 316 Ill.App.3d 835, 840 (2000) (citing Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill.2d 466, 474 (1995)). The determination of whether an act is discretionary or ministerial is unique to each factual setting. Id. "Discretionary acts are those which are unique to the particular public office and involve the exercise of judgment, while ministerial acts are those performed in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the exercise of discretion as to the propriety of the acts being done. Id. (quoting Corning v. East Oakland Township, 283 Ill.App.3d 765, 768 (1996)). More simply, "discretionary acts are those that require personal deliberation, decision, and judgment, while ministerial acts are those amounting to the performance of a task in accordance with an order." Id. (citing Bonnell v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 258 Ill.App.3d 485, 489 (1994)). Coleman's request that Judge Schroeder vacate his conviction and sentence would require a discretionary act. We conclude that mandamus is inappropriate to attempt to compel Judge Schroeder to reverse Coleman's conviction. Oliver, 2020 IL App (4th) 190250, ¶ 23. The trial court's order dismissing the mandamus petition pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure was correct.
¶ 18 Finally, we note that mandamus is not a substitute for the appellate process. Bremen Community High School District No. 228 v. Cook County Comm 'n on Human Rights, 2012 IL App (1st) 112177, ¶ 14. At the time that the parties filed their briefs, the section 2-1401 petition remained pending. The claims raised in this mandamus petition are identical to those raised in his section 2-1401 petition. Instead of waiting for Judge Schroeder to rule upon his section 2-1401 petition in Coleman's criminal case, Coleman filed this mandamus petition. As argued by the three defendants, by filing this mandamus petition, Coleman was attempting to bypass the appellate process. As this is an inappropriate use of the mandamus process, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Coleman's petition pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
¶ 19 Although we do not know the trial court's basis or bases for dismissing Coleman's mandamus petition against Gibbons and Harlow, we can affirm a trial judge's decision on any basis that appears of record. People v. Huff, 195 Ill.2d 87, 91 (2001); People v. Yarber, 279 Ill.App.3d 519, 524 (1996).
¶ 20 B. Judicial Immunity
¶ 21 The trial court also concluded that Judge Schroeder was entitled to judicial immunity from Coleman's mandamus petition. On appeal, Coleman does not argue that the trial court erred in holding that Judge Schroeder was entitled to judicial immunity. "Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing." Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 22 Although Coleman has forfeited this issue, we also conclude that the issue lacks merit. A judge is immune from liability for actions taken while exercising the authority vested in him. Grund v. Donegan, 298 Ill.App.3d 1034, 1039 (1998). Even if the judge made grave procedural errors within his or her exercise of judicial authority, the judge still maintains immunity from suit. Generes v. Foreman, 277 Ill.App.3d 353, 355 (1995).
¶ 23 Judicial immunity exists, in part, to protect judicial independence by" 'protecting the finality of judgments or discouraging inappropriate collateral attacks ***[.] [J]udicial immunity also protected judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants.'" Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)). Judges need to feel free to act upon their beliefs and convictions without fear of personal consequences. Id. (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978), quoting Bradley v. Fisher, (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)).
¶ 24 There are two exceptions to the doctrine of judicial immunity: (1) actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity and (2) actions, though judicial in nature, taken without jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)). "An act is judicial when 'it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.'" Id. (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362).
¶ 25 We agree with the trial court's conclusion that to the extent that Coleman was seeking to hold Judge Schroeder liable for any decisions he had made in the criminal case where the postconviction and section 2-1401 petitions were filed, the claim is barred by judicial immunity. Judge Schroeder is protected by judicial immunity because Coleman did not allege that Judge Schroeder lacked jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings or acted outside of his judicial capacity. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Coleman's petition against Judge Schroeder on the basis of judicial immunity.
¶ 26 C. Laches
¶ 27 The trial court additionally concluded that Coleman's mandamus petition was barred by the doctrine of laches. As we have already concluded that the complete dismissal of Coleman's mandamus petition against Judge Schroeder, Gibbons, and Harlow was appropriate, we do not address the laches issue.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the reasons stated in this order, we affirm the Madison County circuit court's order dismissing Michael Coleman Jr.'s petition seeking mandamus relief.
¶ 30 Affirmed.