Opinion
No. 04-57.
April 15, 2005.
Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, W. Thomas Sullins, J.
Representing Appellant: Richard R. Jamieson of Jamieson Robinson, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J. Ret.
[¶ 1] An eighty-three-year-old man was sentenced to the penitentiary for aggravated vehicular homicide and he appeals, alleging abuse of discretion in the district court's rejection of a plea agreement, in its refusal to consider probation, and in its sentencing him to prison. We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶ 2] The appellant raises the following issues:
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by rejecting the parties' plea agreement?
2. Did the district court violate the appellant's right to due process of law by not allowing enough time to hear his motion to reconsider?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to consider probation?
4. Did the district court violate the appellant's rights under Article 1, § 15 of the Wyoming Constitution?
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing the appellant to prison?
[¶ 3] The State adds the following issue for our consideration:
6. Did the appellant's guilty plea waive the issues that involve matters preceding entry of that plea?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 4] We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion.
"Sentencing decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial court. Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Wyo. 1997). `A sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.' Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 (Wyo. 1997). `An error warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights. The party who is appealing bears the burden to establish that an error was prejudicial.' Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted); see also, Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo. 1966)."
Lee v. State, 2001 WY 129, ¶ 10, 36 P.3d 1133, 1138 (Wyo. 2001) ( quoting Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 13 (Wyo. 2000)). In imposing sentence, trial courts have broad discretion to consider a wide range of factors about the defendant and the crime. Halbleib v. State, 7 P.3d 45, 47 (Wyo.), cert. denied 531 U.S. 968, 121 S.Ct. 404, 148 L.Ed.2d 312 (2000) ( quoting Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 371 (Wyo. 1989)); Mehring [ v. State, 860 P.2d 1101,] 1115 [(Wyo. 1993)].
Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003). "The abuse-of-discretion standard of review reaches the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice." Martinez v. State, 2002 WY 10, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d 394, 396 (Wyo. 2002). It is an abuse of discretion for a sentencing judge to premise a sentence upon a mistaken reading of the law. Jones v. State, 2003 WY 154, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Wyo. 2003) ( quoting DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 1233, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2002)). Furthermore, the record should "be reasonably clear with respect to the findings of the district court in its sentencing decision, in order that meaningful appellate review can be achieved." Id. at ¶ 12, 79 P.3d at 1025.
FACTS
[¶ 5] On December 12, 2002, while driving intoxicated, the appellant caused a motor vehicle accident that killed Kevin Johnson. The appellant was charged with aggravated vehicular homicide, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b) (LexisNexis 2003), which offense is a felony punishable by not more than twenty years imprisonment. At the time of the accident, the appellant was eighty-two years old.
[¶ 6] The appellant waived his right to a preliminary hearing and entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment in district court. Subsequently, however, the appellant changed his plea to guilty pursuant to a plea agreement containing the following terms: (1) a guilty plea; (2) a joint sentencing recommendation of eight to ten years imprisonment; (3) suspension of that sentence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107 (LexisNexis 2003); (4) the length of any county jail sentence to be argued by the parties; and (5) supervised probation for a period of seven years, with certai