Opinion
22-CV-6584 (LTS)
09-26-2022
RICKEY COFIELD, Plaintiff, v. THE PLAZA AKA THE CITADEL MANAGER OF OBSERVATIONS UNIT ASIAN AMERICAN FEMALE, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court's federal question jurisdiction. By order dated August 4, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was in “the Plaza” or “the Citadel” in the Bronx, when the following occurred:
Plaintiff appears to refer to the Plaza Rehabilitation Center and Nursing Center. https://www.nyshfa-nyscal.org/find-care-new-york/the-plaza-rehab-and-nursing-center/.
The staff was extremely abusive and neglectful. The entire staff was also extremely antagonistic, as well as management from day 1. One day the observation unit manager was in an[d] out of my room acting extremely antagonistic immature and basically ridiculous. She kept walking in and out randomly checking the call button on the wall. She had already bumped my foot earlier causing me tremendous pain. The last time she entered to check I grabbed my cane and just held it. She froze and she said to me What are you going to do with that cane Mr. Cofield? I said simply “I'm going to watch the news, and finish my lunch.” Before I could even finish my lunch F.D.N.Y. N.Y.P.D. were in my
room. She said she ordered me to have a psychiatric evaluation. The N.Y.P.D. and F.D.N.Y. brough[t] me to Jacobi [Hospital]. They cleared me on the psych eval, but admitted me on the medical unit . . . I was often having to beg for water, food, and most of the time Tylenol. The room was never cleaned. I lay in my own feces and filth most of the time.(ECF 2 ¶ III.) Plaintiff asserts claims of defamation, “physical abuse,” and “verbal degradation.” (Id. ¶ I.) It is not clear what relief Plaintiff seeks.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983
The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint, which invokes its federal question jurisdiction, as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
In addition, under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants' direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official ....” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
I. The Plaza/Citadel and the Jane Doe employee
Plaintiff's complaint does not contain sufficient facts to state a Section 1983 claim against either the Plaza/Citadel or the Jane Doe employee. First, it is not clear that the named Defendants qualify as state actors. Even if the Court were to assume that they are, the facts alleged do not give rise to an inference that they violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that Jane Doe was “antagonistic,” “immature,” and “ridiculous”; that she bumped his foot, which caused him pain; and that she called law enforcement when Plaintiff “grabbed” his cane and “just held it.” Plaintiff may be asserting that he grabbed his cane to protect himself, and that Jane Doe misconstrued his movement as threatening, but it is not clear from these facts the nature of the constitutional violation Plaintiff alleges that he suffered. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to provide any additional facts suggesting that the named Defendants violated his constitutional rights.
2. Jacobi Hospital
Plaintiff asserts that he was denied proper medical treatment, and mistreated generally, at Jacobi Hospital. “It is well established that a hospital is not a ‘person' [for the purposes of] Section 1983” liability. Mejia v. Davis, No. 1:16-CV-9706, 2018 WL 333829, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018) (collecting cases); Kearse v. Lincoln Hosp., No. 07-CV-4730 (PAC) (JCF), 2009 WL 1706554, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2009) (hospital not a “person” within meaning of Section 1983). But Jacobi Hospital is operated by New York City Health+Hospitals (H+H), which is a public benefit corporation created by New York State law; H+H operates Jacobi Hospital, and H+H can be sued under Section 1983. See N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 7384(1), 7385(1). Plaintiff does not name Jacobi Hospital as a defendant, but he discusses events occurring there, and the Court construes Plaintiff's claims against Jacobi Hospital as brought against H+H.
When a plaintiff sues H+H under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that H+H's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that H+H itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.” (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978))); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a claim against H+H under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of an H+H policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); see Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted); Rookard v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying standard for Section 1983 municipal liability to H+H).
Plaintiff has alleged no facts suggesting that a policy, custom, or practice of H+H caused a violation of his federal constitutional rights. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to provide facts suggesting that a municipal policy, custom, or practice contributed to a violation of his constitutional rights.
“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). But the Constitution “imposes no affirmative obligation on the State to provide the general public with adequate protective services.” Id. at 197. The events at Jacobi Hospital discussed in the complaint occurred after Plaintiff had been “cleared . . . [] on the psych eval.” (ECF 2 ¶ III.) It appears that Plaintiff was therefore not being held involuntarily, and H+H had no affirmative duty to provide him with medical treatment.
B. State law claims
Plaintiff's allegations could give rise to state-law claims. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). It is not clear that Plaintiff can state a federal claim of which the Court has original jurisdiction. The Court will decide at a later stage whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of Plaintiff's state-law claims. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because it is not clear that amendment would be futile, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his claims. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights; how, when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 22-CV-6584 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.