Opinion
No. 05-07-00433-CR
Opinion Filed March 6, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 004-87189-05.
Before Justices O'NEILL, RICHTER, and LANG. Opinion By Justice LANG.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On January 24, 2008, this Court issued its original, unpublished opinion in this case affirming the trial court's judgment, which convicted Darren Scott Coakwell of driving while intoxicated and assessed his punishment at thirty days of confinement, suspended for one year of community supervision, and a $500 fine. In our original, unpublished opinion, we concluded the State was not barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating the issue of reasonable suspicion in the criminal proceeding after it was adversely decided to the Texas Department of Public Safety in the appeal of the civil administrative license revocation proceeding. Coakwell filed his motion for rehearing on February 8, 2008, arguing: (1) the Court incorrectly concluded the Collin County District Attorney was not a party to his appeal of the civil administrative license revocation proceeding; and (2) he "never argued or implied that the civil appeal of the revocation hearing some how turned into a criminal proceeding or a successive criminal prosecution as stated in the Court's opinion." This supplemental opinion on motion for rehearing is issued in order to clarify our earlier, unpublished opinion. Coakwell's motion for rehearing is denied.
I. DISTRICT ATTORNEY WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCEEDING
First, we address Coakwell's argument that the Court incorrectly concluded the Collin County District Attorney was not a party to his appeal of the civil administrative license revocation proceeding. He claims the Collin County District Attorney was a party because the Collin County District Attorney is listed as the attorney for the Texas Department of Public Safety and filed the answer in the appeal. In our original, unpublished opinion, we stated, "The administrative license revocation proceeding was brought by the Texas Department of Public Safety, while the criminal proceeding was brought by the District Attorney of Collin County. The Texas Department of Public Safety and the Collin County District Attorney are not the same parties." We cited the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's opinions in Reynolds and Brabson in support of this statement. See Reynolds v. State, 4 S.W.3d 13, 16 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). In Reynolds, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated, "Consistent with the authority from other jurisdictions, [footnote omitted] the Court's holding on original submission in Brabson on the `parties' issue is the `Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are not the same parties' for collateral estoppel purposes. [citation omitted.]" Reynolds v. State, 4 S.W.3d at 16. In that case, Reynolds argued the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney were the same parties for collateral estoppel purposes because they are different parts of the executive branch of the State of Texas. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this issue in Reynolds stating:While there is some merit to the position that the Texas Department of Public Safety and a District Attorney represent the same client[, ] which is the citizens of this State, these governmental entities nevertheless should not be considered the same parties for collateral estoppel purposes in cases like this. The citizens of this State have no power, as does a private litigant, to control the course of the litigation by the lawyers representing these governmental entities. These lawyers exercise governmental powers in the public interest. They do not represent any private citizen or private interest as does a private lawyer.
It is well-settled that sometimes the rules that apply to private lawyers representing private citizens do not apply to public lawyers exercising governmental powers in the public interest. For example, it has been held that "when a unit of government is exercising its governmental powers, it is not subject to estoppel."Id. at 17 (citations omitted). In Brabson, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed whether the parties to the administrative proceeding and the criminal prosecution were the same and concluded they are not:
The party that sought to revoke [Brabson's] driver's license in the administrative proceeding was the Texas Department of Public Safety. [citation omitted]. The Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are not the same parties. Therefore, collateral estoppel principles do not preclude the Dallas County District Attorney from litigating the issue of probable cause for [Brabson's] arrest at the suppression hearing in the criminal prosecution.Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 184. We followed this language in our original, unpublished opinion in this case. As we stated in our opinion, the appeal of the administrative proceeding was styled "Coakwell v. Texas Department of Public Safety." At the trial level, this case was styled "State of Texas v. Coakwell" and on appeal it is styled "Coakwell v. The State of Texas." While the Collin County District Attorney may have provided legal representation to both the Texas Department of Public Safety and the State of Texas, the provision of legal services does not make the District Attorney a party to the case.
II. CIVIL APPEAL OF REVOCATION PROCEEDING
Second, we address Coakwell's argument that he "never argued or implied that the civil appeal of the revocation hearing some how [sic] turned into a criminal proceeding or a successive criminal prosecution as stated in the Court's opinion." He states that the administrative proceeding was always a civil proceeding. Also, he states this Court cited "multiple cases and established case law where a ruling by an [administrative law] judge cannot be used as a basis to preclude litigation of an issue in a criminal case" and that he agrees with that proposition. However, Coakwell claims his case is different because his case was not before the administrative law judge because it was on appeal to the County Court at Law No. 4. He complains that this Court failed to address how the County Court at Law No. 4 could hear the same legal issue in two different proceedings and decide them differently. In our original, unpublished opinion, we stated:We address Coakwell's argument that the State was barred from relitigating the issue of reasonable suspicion under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because once he appealed the administrative proceeding to the County Court at Law No. 4, it was no longer a civil proceeding and, in that appeal, the County Court at Law No. 4 determined the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him.We also stated:
Coakwell argues once he appealed the administrative law judge's decision to the county court at law, it was no longer a civil proceeding. Coakwell does not explain or point us to any authority showing that an administrative license revocation proceeding becomes a criminal prosecution, an "essentially criminal" proceeding, or carries the possibility of criminal punishment when it is appealed to the county court at law.Coakwell appears to argue that our summary of his argument misstated his issue. However, in his brief, Coakwell stated "The key difference in [his] case is this was not an administrative law `civil' proceeding or a `justice court' decision, but a decision by a County Court at Law that was fully and fairly litigated," and" labeling a proceeding civil or administrative does not insulate the proceeding from the protections of the constitution." (emphasis added). Further, Coakwell argued collateral estoppel applied to prevent the County Court at Law No. 4 from determining the issue of reasonable suspicion in the criminal prosecution. Collateral estoppel applies to the states only in cases that implicate the protections of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. See Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 20. As a result, Coakwell necessarily had to be arguing that his appeal of the civil administrative license revocation proceeding was a criminal prosecution, an "essentially criminal" proceeding, or carried the possibility of multiple punishments. As we stated in our opinion, the decision of an administrative law judge is a civil matter and does not implicate the rule of collateral estoppel as embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy because it does not constitute a successive criminal prosecution, it is not an "essentially criminal" proceeding, and it does not carry the possibility of multiple punishments. Further, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that no one would argue the reverse, that is collateral estoppel prevented a defendant from relitigating the issue of reasonable suspicion in a criminal prosecution, if it had been decided against him in the administrative license revocation proceeding, when it stated:
No one would seriously argue that had the Texas Department of Public Safety won on the issue of reasonable suspicion to stop [Reynold's] car in the administrative proceeding to revoke [Reynold's] driver's license, then collateral estoppel principles would prevent [Reynolds] from relitigating that issue against the Harris County District Attorney in the subsequent criminal prosecution.Id. at 18 (citations omitted). Now, we evaluate Coakwell's argument that we did not address how the County Court at Law No. 4 could hear the same legal issue in two different proceedings and decide it differently. The County Court at Law No. 4's order granting Coakwell's appeal of the civil administrative license revocation proceeding states: Upon rehearing, and after review of the transcript of the Administrative hearing, the Court makes the following findings:
1. By Order of the Administrative Law Court (ALR) dated May 4, 2006, [Coakwell's] operator's license , was suspended for a period of 180 days.
2. After reviewing the transcript to determine if substantial evidence supported the officer's decision to stop Darren Coakwell on the date of the arrest, this Court finds that the officer received a report of a traffic complaint involving Mr. Coakwell, not an "intoxicated driving complaint" as indicated on the findings. The officer proceeded to follow behind the vehicle of Mr. Coakwell and noted "weaving left and right". The officer failed to note any traffic offenses and failed to mention any other vehicles in the area. The officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Coakwell on October 8, 2005.
3. There is not substantial evidence to support the findings of the administrative law judge.
The transcript of the hearing shows the only evidence offered by the Texas Department of Public Safety during the civil administrative license revocation proceeding were certified copies of the officer's report and the statutory warning. The officer did not testify. However, during the criminal prosecution, the officer testified, before he stopped Coakwell, he observed Coakwell's vehicle swerving or weaving from lane to lane and speeding. He also stated the reporting vehicle was behind him, and there were other vehicles in the area, but he could not recall where the other vehicles were when he was observing Coakwell's vehicle. The record shows the evidence before the County Court at Law No. 4 in the criminal prosecution was different from evidence before it in the appeal of the civil administrative license revocation proceeding.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in our original, unpublished opinion, and in this supplemental opinion on motion for rehearing, we conclude the County Court at Law No. 4 did not err when it denied Coakwell's motion for new trial.Coakwell's motion for rehearing is denied.