Opinion
April 24, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs payable to the non-party respondent.
Where, as here, an attorney is discharged without cause, he or she "is entitled to recover compensation from the client measured by the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered whether that be more or less than the amount provided in the contract or retainer agreement" (Lai Ling Cheng v Modansky Leasing Co., 73 N.Y.2d 454, 457-458; see also, Matter of Cohen v Grainger, Tesoriero Bell, 81 N.Y.2d 655, 658; Artache v Goldin, 173 A.D.2d 667).
An evaluation of what constitutes reasonable counsel fees is a matter that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Matter of Aronesty v Aronesty, 202 A.D.2d 240) which is often in the best position to determine those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees (see, Lefkowitz v Van Ess, 166 A.D.2d 556; Shrauger v Shrauger, 146 A.D.2d 955, 956).
We find no basis to conclude that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in fixing the counsel fees in this case (see, Buckley v Nucraloy Corp., 213 A.D.2d 365). Bracken, J.P., Balletta, Copertino and Hart, JJ., concur.