Opinion
No. 15426
8-31-1953
CLEMENTS et al. v. T. R. BECHTEL CO. et al. * Civ.
Price, Macdonald & Knox, Orlando J. Bowman, Oakland, for appellants. Royal E. Handlos, San Francisco, for respondents.
CLEMENTS et al.
v.
T. R. BECHTEL CO. et al.
Aug. 31, 1953.
Hearing Granted Oct. 29, 1953.
Price, Macdonald & Knox, Orlando J. Bowman, Oakland, for appellants.
Royal E. Handlos, San Francisco, for respondents.
GOODELL, Justice.
The plaintiffs sued to foreclose a mechanics' lien on a tract of land known as 'Tree Haven, Contra Costs County, California'. The principal defendants are the contractors for whom the work was performed and materials furnished, namely, T. R. Bechtel and T. R. Bechtel Co. Among numerous defendants are Pioneer Investors Savings & Loan Association, First Pioneer Co., and Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. The demurrer of these three to the complaint was sustained. Plaintiffs declined to amend, and judgment was entered for costs. This appeal followed.
The complaint alleges the following facts: In March, 1950 John and Rose Ragghianti owned a portion of the Rancho San Miguel, which they caused to be subdivided into 220 lots, all of which have been conveyed to new owners. As a condition to the recordation of the subdivision map the Ragghiantis made an agreement with the county to cause road and street improvements and tract drainage to be completed as required by a county ordinance, by the construction of eight streets, drives, lanes, and courts within the subdivision. Between May 25, 1950 and February 9, 1951 plaintiffs did this construction, paving and drainage work, valued by them at $48,161.93, of which $12,073.04 was paid, leaving $36,088.89 owing. The county ordinance provides that all work and materials shall be subject to the inspection and approval of the County Surveyor. He has not accepted or approved the work, although plaintiffs allege that they have satisfactorily completed it.
On August 9, 1951 appellants recorded their lien, exactly six months after the completion.
The complaint alleges that defendants claim some right, title or interest in the land but that such claims are subject and subordinate to plaintiffs' lien.
One of the grounds of demurrer is that the action is barred by § 1187 Code Civ.Proc. At the time the work was done that section read: '* * * all persons claiming the benefit of this chapter, shall have 90 days after the completion of said work of improvement within which to file their claims of lien. * * *' If § 1187 applies, the lien was 90 days late.
Appellants rely on § 1191 which read at the time: '(a) * * * provided, that in cases where the improvement made or work done is subject to acceptance by any municipal board or officer, the time for filing claims of lien shall not commence to run until after such acceptance shall have been made.' (Emphasis added.) If § 1191 applies, the filing on August 9, 1951 was not too late since there was no acceptance by the County Surveyor.
To bring the case within § 1191 appellants have to show that the County Surveyor is a municipal officer. They state the problem thus: 'The issue is solely a question of statutory interpretation, i. e., Is the County Surveyor a municipal officer within the meaning of the foregoing provision of Section 1191(a)?'
The principal if not the only basis for appellants' contention is that in the law the word 'municipal' means public or governmental, not city or town. In their brief respondents say that they 'have no argument with the appellants that the word municipal, when used generally as municipal law, is broad enough to include all governmental law' but they argue that 'it is not so used, nor is that the sense of the meaning of the language in Section 1191 * * *.'
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1938) gives the third and last meaning of 'Municipal' as: '3. Of or pertaining to the internal or governmental affairs of a state, kingdom, or nation;--used chiefly in the phrase municipal law.' (Emphasis added.) Funk & Wagnalls' Standard Dictionary, 1911, gives the primary meaning of 'Municipal' as: '1. Of or pertaining to a town or city, or to its corporate or local government; hence, pertaining to local self government in general; as, municipal politics; municipal freedom' and the secondary meaning as: '2. Of or pertaining to the internal government of a state, kingdom, or nation.' (Emphasis added).
As early as 1866, in People v. Johnson, 30 Cal. 98, 99, the same argument as that now made by appellants was unsuccessfully addressed to the Supreme Court as follows: 'The word municipal has long since ceased to be limited in its application to cities; perhaps in America it never had any such limited acceptation. It is the particular law of a State or nation, as distinguished from public or international law. 2 Bouvier's Law Dict., Rawles Third Rev., page 2269, and Burrill's Law Glos.; 1 Black's Com. 44; 1 Kent's Com. 447. Hence, a municipal offense, in its legitimate and constitutional significance, is one against the law of the State or nation.' The court rejected this argument and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction saying 30 Cal. at page 102: 'As to the first point, the argument turns upon the meaning of the word 'municipal,' as used in the Constitution, and it is insisted that the word is used in its broadest and most enlarged sense, and therefore includes all fines imposed by the laws of the State, and is not limited to such as are imposed by the local laws of particular places, such as towns or cities. Such, however, cannot be the case. To give it the broad meaning contended for, would be to strip it of all meaning in the place where we find it, for the meaning of the sentence would be the same without it as with it. Under the definition of counsel, the word 'fine' would mean precisely the same thing as if the qualifying word 'municipal' had been omitted, which in effect strips the latter word of all meaning in the connection in which it is used. The word 'municipal' is obviously used in its strictest sense, as indicating an inferior power or jurisdiction. There would seem to be no occasion for using the word in the Constitution or organic law of a State or Government, except for the purpose of indicating an inferior or local jurisdiction, and it was undoubtedly used in that sense here. It qualifies and limits the word 'fine', and thus serves to distinguish the fine intended from all other fines.'
Appellants' contention that the word 'municipal' was used in § 1191 in its broadest and most enlarged sense is virtually the same as the government's contention in Re Estate of Burnison, 33 Cal.2d 638, 204 P.2d 330, 331, that the words 'the state' were so used in § 27 Prob.Code. In that case the testator bequeathed his entire estate to 'The United States government U.S.A.' The government contended that it was entitled to take by will under California law. Section 27 names 'the state' among those to whom testamentary disposition may be made, and the government argued that those words included the Federal Government, since in their broadest and most enlarged sense they mean sovereignty. The Supreme Court said: 'The Government cites the opening language of the statute, in its designation of 'the state' as a proper recipient of a 'testamentary disposition,' as embracing the United States. But in construing a statute, words are to be taken in their ordinary sense and normal signification, 23 Cal.Jur. sec. 109, p. 730; Taylor v. Lundblade, 43 Cal.App.2d 638, 641, 111 P.2d 344; Gayer v. Whelan, 59 Cal.App.2d 255, 262, 138 P.2d 763, and the Government's suggested extension of the meaning of 'the state' runs counter to this settled rule. Although it must be recognized that historians and other writers frequently use the literary or rhetorical expression and refer to the nation as 'the state,' the draftsmen of legislation as a rule employ language notable for its precise and definitive character rather than for its elegance. So it would appear that if the legislature had intended to include the United States within the purview of the statute, "the ordinary dignities of speech would have led' to its mention by name.' United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600, 606, 61 S.Ct. 742, 744, 85 L.Ed. 1071, citing Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 318, 45 S.Ct. 549, 69 L.Ed. 974.'
In Gayer v. Whelan, 59 Cal.App.2d 255, 262, 138 P.2d 763, 767, cited in the Burnison case, the court said: 'It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, when the words used are given their ordinary and usual meaning, the courts should not look further in its interpretation and should not change its effect by giving the words some unusual or seldom used meaning. Bagg v. Wickizer, 9 Cal.App.2d 753, 50 P.2d 1047; Taylor v. Lundblade, 43 Cal.App.2d 638, 111 P.2d 344; People v. Stanley, 193 Cal. 428, 225 P. 1; Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Court, 214 Cal. 668, 8 P.2d 140, 80 A.L.R. 1217.'
If, as we have seen, in construing a statute, words are to be taken in their ordinary sense and normal signification, then certainly when § 1191 speaks of 'acceptance by any municipal board or officer' it must be held to mean a board or an officer of a city or town. That is in accord with the primary sense given in the dictionary definitions of the word 'municipal' and with the sense in which the California cases use the word. For example, in the case of In re Werner, 129 Cal. 567, 572-573, 62 P. 97; cited, by the way, by appellants, the Supreme Court discussed the subject at some length as shown in the footnote.
Appellants' second contention is that 'Legislative history requires interpretation of 'municipal officer' to include county officer.' They point to the change made in § 1191 in 1913. After § 1191 was amended in 1901 it read: 'Any person who, at the request of the owner of any lot in any incorporated city or town, grades, fills in, or otherwise improves the same, or the street or sidewalk in front of or adjoining the same * * * has a lien upon such lot for his work done and materials furnished' (then follows a provision for the filing of a lien after completon; emphasis added).
In 1913 § 1191 was again amended. The principal change was to strike out the words 'in any incorporated city or town,' emphasized above, thereby extending the right to lien to suburban tracts as well as city lots. The legislature added 'or tract of land' after 'lot', and 'highway' after 'street', and extended the right to lien to an outlying tract as well as to a lot. The fact that it then added the proviso (now involved and already quoted) respecting 'acceptance by any municipal board or officer' by no means shows (as appellants contend) that it intended to extend the 90-day statute of limitations to work done on tracts lying outside city or town boundaries. Had such been the intention 'the ordinary dignities of speech',' see 33 Cal.2d at page 641, 204 P.2d at page 332, would have led to the addition of some such language as 'acceptance by any county or municipal board or officer.' There is of course a marked difference between a county government and that of a city or town, and the question was exclusively legislative. We find nothing 'incongruous' or 'unreasonable' about the proviso.
There seems to be no reason to discuss the other points raised by the demurrer--which was special as well as general. The plea of the statute of limitations was alone sufficient, and ended the case as to the three demurring defendants.
The judgment is affirmed.
NOURSE, P. J., and DOOLING, J., concur. --------------- * Subsequent opinion 273 P.2d 5. 1 'Webster defines 'municipal' as pertaining to a city or corporation having the right of administering local government--as municipal rights, municipal officers; and 'municipality' is defined as a municipal district, a borough, a city, town or village. The Century Dictionary defines 'municipal' as pertaining the local self-government or corporate government of a city or town; and 'municipality,' as a town or city ossessed of corporate privileges of local self-government; a community under municipal jurisdiction. Bouvier's Law Dictionary says 'municipal' strictly applies only to what belongs to a city. Among the Romans cities were called municipia. In a general sense, we say that all law other than international is municipal law, but when we speak of corporations as municipal we mean cities or towns. These existed before the constitution. They came down to us from former times, and they have always formed an important part of our system of government.'