From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Clayton v. Taylor

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division
Mar 18, 2008
No. B196655 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2008)

Opinion


GEORGE CLAYTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RANDY TAYLOR et al., Defendants and Respondents. B196655 California Court of Appeal, Second District, Seventh Division March 18, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Barbara M. Scheper, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PC037131

Polk & Berke and Jeff Berke for Plaintiff and Appellant George Clayton.

Cunningham & Treadwell, James H. Treadwell and Ryan L. Arnett, for Defendants and Respondents Randy Taylor and Heather Taylor.

ZELON, J.

George Clayton appeals from a judgment after a court trial in favor of defendants Randy Taylor and Heather Taylor in his action to enforce his secondary easement rights relating to a water supply on the Taylors’ property. He contends the trial court improperly entered injunctive relief prohibiting him from entering the Taylors’ property and erred as a matter of law in limiting his secondary easement rights. We reverse and remand for the trial court to enter declaratory, rather than injunctive relief, in favor of the Taylors.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Clayton has elected to proceed without a reporter’s transcript under California Rule of Court 8.130.

On July 19, 2005, Clayton filed his complaint to quiet title, establish easement, and for damages or injunctive relief, and moved for a preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged that Clayton owned property at 28803 North Bouquet Canyon Road in Saugus, California and that the Taylors were the owners of an adjacent parcel at 28797 North Bouquet Canyon Road. Clayton alleged he had a perpetual easement entitling him to take water from the Taylor’s property as evidenced by a grant deed filed on November 19, 1985 as Instrument No. 85-1370297. Except for an emergency tank maintained for the Fire Department, the water supply (consisting of a well, water tank and pipes) was Clayton’s sole source of water.

Clayton acquired the property in 1994 from the Artmans, and alleged that the Skinners, his predecessors in interest, had acquired the easement from the Acton Valley Company, and had transferred it to the Artmans. For the 10 years preceding the filing of the complaint, Clayton had, on a monthly basis, accessed and inspected the water system on the Taylors’ property. The Taylors acquired the property in approximately 2001.

Clayton alleged that beginning in November 2003, the Taylors threatened to prevent Clayton from accessing the well, water tank and pipes for the purpose of maintenance. The parties had also become embroiled in a dispute over a common driveway. On May 21, 2005, the Taylors cut off Clayton’s water, claiming there was a break in the pipe. When Clayton attempted to access the Taylors’ property to repair the leak and to install a water meter to measure the parties’ respective water usage, the Taylors refused him access and claimed only a licensed contractor could repair the pipe.

Clayton sought to quiet title to an express easement, and asserted that in the alternative, he had a prescriptive easement as evidenced by the facts that he and his predecessors had used the well, water tank and pipes on a regular basis for the previous five years, and that such use was open and notorious. Clayton also sought an irrevocable license to the water supply, and injunctive relief and damages.

In support of his motion for a preliminary injunction, Clayton asserted the easement was also evidenced by the a “Water System Agreement as to Ownership of Land,” dated March 25, 1985, which provided in relevant part that Acton Valley Company owned two contiguous parcels of land at 28797 and 28803 North Bouquet Canyon Road in Saugus (Parcel 3 and Parcel 2, respectively), that Acton Valley Company had constructed a residence on Parcel 3 and 2, had installed a private water system to serve both parcels, and the system would be extended to service any parcels created out of Parcels 2 and 3.

The Water System Agreement also provided that, “[b]ecause the water system originates on Parcel 3, ownership of the system will be in the name of the owner of Parcel 3. [¶] The owners of Parcels 3 and 2 will each own, as tenants in common, an interest in the well, the water tank and the four-inch fire control pipe. [¶] . . . [¶] The owners of Parcels 3 and 2 will each have the right to partition their respective parcels. In doing so, each owner will have the right to convey and grant to each such transferee an interest in the exiting well and water facilities needed for the full development of such transferred property.”

Ralph Kephart, a title engineer, reviewed the easement grant deed, deeds in the chain of title from the Skinners to Clayton, deeds in the chain of title from Acton Valley to the Taylors, and the Water System Agreement. Kephart determined the deed from Acton Valley described a perpetual easement for the taking of water, which easement burdened the Taylors’ property and benefited the Clayton property. Further, Kephart concluded the easement ran with the land.

The Taylors opposed Clayton’s motion for a preliminary injunction, contending Clayton could not show an express easement because the grant deed did not describe an easement on the Taylors’ property. Further, Clayton could not establish a prescriptive easement because prior owners contradicted his claims that he regularly came onto the Taylor property to maintain the water supply, and his use was permissive; nor could Clayton establish an irrevocable license because no such agreement had been made with the Taylors. The Taylors also alleged that under the pretext of inspecting the well, he had been spying on their teenage daughter while she was using the Taylors’ pool.

In support of their opposition, the Taylors submitted the declaration of Cynthia Koutes, who had sold the property to the Taylors, in which she stated that she and her husband owned the property for 10 years before selling it to the Taylors in 2001. Her husband had instructed Mr. Clayton not to come onto the property, although they permitted him to come once or twice to observe repair work her husband made to the well. Heather Taylor submitted a declaration stating that she permitted Clayton to come onto the property to inspect the well before November 2003; however, at that time, she had become concerned because she had seen him physically confront a female neighbor; he had startled their teenage daughter while she was sunbathing by their pool and became belligerent when she confronted him; and on several other occasions saw him stare into their home. She contended the water had been shut off one time in May 2005 because of the need to repair a corroded pipe and that the Taylors repaired the pipe because Clayton’s plumber could not get there soon enough. Randy Taylor, her husband, submitted a declaration containing substantially the same facts.

On November 3, 2005, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the Taylors from interfering with Clayton’s ability to obtain water, prohibiting them from obstructing his access to the water system for maintenance and repair, and ordering that any repairs must be performed by a licensed contractor.

A court trial commenced on July 20, 2006.

Clayton argued that the express easement gave him secondary easement rights, including the right to enter upon the Taylors’ property for the purpose of inspecting and maintaining the water system, that his historical use of his easement rights did not overburden the servient tenement, and that equity required the installation of water meters on the property.

Clayton relied upon what he termed the “granting easement,” Document No. 83-201416, relating to his property and the “reservation easement” recorded on defendant’s property as Document No. 83-201417, and the Water System Agreement. The granting easement provided for “An easement for water lines, a water well and a water storage tank site to be used in common with present and future owners of that certain parcel of land described in the hereto attached Exhibit A.” The reservation easement similarly provided for “an easement for public utilities, water pipe line, water well and water storage tank site to be used in common with present and future owners of that certain parcel of land. . . .”

At trial, the Taylors did not contest Clayton’s easement, but challenged the scope of his secondary easement rights. The Taylors argued that the easement did not provide for ingress and egress, but only provided for the use of the water storage tank. The Taylors submitted photographic evidence that showed the water storage tank was located next to their pool, and separated from it only by a wrought-iron fence, and argued that the secondary easement rights could not be exercised in a manner that increased the burden on the servient tenement. They also contended Clayton had stopped paying his share of the electricity bill required to run the well.

On November 30, 2006, the court filed its judgment. The trial court found Clayton had an express easement to the water system. The court entered an injunction providing, in pertinent part:

(1) The parties were to agree upon a licensed plumbing professional to inspect and maintain the water system twice a year, and in the event of an emergency, the parties would use this agreed-upon plumber to repair the system.

(2) The parties were to share the cost of the twice-yearly inspections; in the event of repairs that only affected the water supply to one property, that property would bear the cost of the repairs.

(3) The court enjoined Clayton from entering the Taylors’ property under any circumstances, and enjoined the Taylors from entering Clayton’s property except for the use of driveway easements. The Taylors were enjoined from interfering with Clayton’s water rights.

(4) The Taylors were to continue to administer the bill for electricity to run the pump, and to deliver it to Clayton; non-payment of the bill was not grounds for shutting off Clayton’s water.

(5) The injunction would remain in effect as long as the Taylors and Claytons continued to own their respective properties, and would be dissolved upon the sale of either party’s property.

DISCUSSION

Clayton contends that (1) the trial court erred in granting affirmative relief to the Taylors in the form of an injunction because the Taylors had not pleaded any claim for affirmative relief, and (2) as a matter of law, the easement entitles him to enter upon the Taylors’ property for the purpose of maintaining the easement.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

“A permanent injunction is very different from a pendente lite injunction. . . . A permanent injunction is not issued to maintain the status quo but is a final judgment on the merits.” (Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 640, 646.) In issuing an injunction, a court in equity will consider the circumstances, the consequences of granting the injunction, and the equities of the case to determine whether an injunction will be granted. (Thompson v. 10,000 RV Sales, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 950, 964.)

The granting or denial of a permanent injunction is within the discretion of the trial court. However, a permanent injunction, notwithstanding its discretionary component, must be supported by substantial evidence. We ordinarily review such factual findings under a substantial evidence standard and resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge all reasonable inferences to support the trial court’s order. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 390) Here, however, Clayton has proceeded without a reporter’s transcript. Therefore, the judgment is not subject to evidentiary challenge or review and it is presumed the evidence supports the judgment and the court’s findings. (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.)

II. ALTHOUGH CLAYTON FAILED TO EXERCISE HIS SECONDARY EASEMENT RIGHTS IN A REASONABLE MANNER, ABSENT A SHOWING THAT CLAYTON FAILED TO ABIDE BY THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS REGARDING THOSE RIGHTS, AN INJUNCTION WAS IMPROPER.

With respect to his secondary easement rights, Clayton argues that (1) insofar as the trial court’s ruling quieting title in his easement incorporates improper injunctive relief, it must be reversed; (2) that portion of the judgment personally barring Clayton from exercising his easement rights must be reversed; and (3) he may not be required to pay a third party for the exercise of his easement rights. None of these arguments has any merit.

A secondary easement is an easement which accompanies a principal easement, and consists of no more than the right to do such things as are necessary to the enjoyment of the principal easement (for example, to make repairs and inspect). These acts must be done in a reasonable manner without an undue burden on the servient tenement; also the servient tenement may use his or her property in any manner not inconsistent with the easement so long as it does not unreasonably impede the dominant tenement in his rights. (Ward v. City of Monrovia (1940) 16 Cal.2d 815, 821; City of Los Angeles v. Howard (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 538, 543.) The rights of the dominant tenant to use the servient tenement are not unlimited. (Langazo v. San Joaquin Land and Power Co. (1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 678, 686.) “The rule is that every incident of ownership not inconsistent with the easement and the enjoyment of the same, is reserved to the grantor.” (Dierssen v. McCormack (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 164, 170.) Whether a particular use of the land is an unreasonable interference with the rights of the other tenement is a question of fact, and the trier of fact’s findings based on conflicting evidence are binding on this court. (City of Los Angeles v. Howard, supra, 244 Cal.App.2d at p. 543-544.)

Secondary easements may arise by prescription or by grant. (Blankenship v. Whaley (1904) 142 Cal. 566, 570-571.)

“The land to which the easement attaches is called the dominant tenement; the land on which the burden is imposed is called the servient tenement.” (Tract Development Services, Inc. v. Kepler (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1374, 1384.)

The trial court’s conclusion that Clayton had exercised his secondary easement rights in an unreasonable fashion that overburdened the servient tenement was not contrary to the law governing secondary easements, nor was the court’s order requiring him to reimburse the servient tenement for its expenses associated with his exercise of his secondary easement rights. However, absent a showing that Clayton failed to abide by the trial court’s declaration establishing the scope of his easement rights, the trial court erred in issuing an injunction because the court cannot grant affirmative relief absent a pleading requesting same. (See Wilson, McCall & Daoro v. American Qualified Plans, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1036 [function of cross-complaint is to assert claim independent of complaint].) Because the trial court correctly ruled on the merits of Clayton’s secondary easement rights, we reverse and remand the matter for the trial court to enter declaratory judgment in favor of the Taylors consistent with this opinion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the superior court is reversed with directions. Respondents are to recover their costs on appeal.

We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., WOODS, J.


Summaries of

Clayton v. Taylor

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division
Mar 18, 2008
No. B196655 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2008)
Case details for

Clayton v. Taylor

Case Details

Full title:GEORGE CLAYTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RANDY TAYLOR et al.…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division

Date published: Mar 18, 2008

Citations

No. B196655 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2008)