Opinion
Appeal No. 3-14-0395
04-21-2015
CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN W. ARISS, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Will County, Illinois, Circuit No. 12-CH-2732 Honorable Thomas A. Thanas, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Carter and Wright concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Trial court properly denied defendant's untimely motion to quash service that was filed over a year after defendant participated in mortgage foreclosure pre-mediation sessions. ¶ 2 Plaintiff, Citimortgage, Inc., filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint against defendant, John Ariss. Defendant attended two pre-mediation sessions with plaintiff before the mediator terminated mediation and reinstated the case in circuit court. Two months later, plaintiff filed a motion for default against defendant, which the court granted. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final judgment confirming the sale of defendant's real property. Six months after that, defendant filed a motion to quash service, which the trial court denied. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash service. We affirm.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 In May 2012, plaintiff Citimortgage, Inc. filed a foreclosure complaint against defendant John Arris, seeking to foreclose on a mortgage for real property located at 550 Pheasant Chase Drive in Plainfield. Attached to the complaint was a "Notice of Mandatory Mediation." Both plaintiff and defendant appeared at pre-mediation screening sessions held on August 8, 2012, and October 10, 2012. Following the second session, the mediator filed a pre-mediation report terminating the mediation because the criteria for mediation were "not met." The case was reinstated in the trial court. ¶ 5 In December 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for default against defendant for failing to file an appearance and answer to the foreclosure complaint. The trial court granted the motion and entered an order of default against defendant, as well as a judgment of foreclosure and order of sale. In July 2013, the trial court entered final judgment confirming the sale of the property. ¶ 6 In January 2014, defendant filed a motion to quash service of process. Plaintiff filed a response, arguing, in part, that defendant's motion was untimely because it was not filed within 60 days of defendant appearing at the pre-mediation sessions, as required by section 15-1505.6(a) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (Law) (735 ILCS 5/15-1505.6(a) (West 2012)). Defendant filed a reply, arguing that the pre-mediation sessions did not constitute hearings within the meaning of section 15-1505.6(a) of the Law. The trial court denied defendant's motion to quash service, holding that plaintiff's participation in the court-ordered mediation sessions barred him from filing a motion to quash service over a year later.
Plaintiff later filed a motion to amend the common address of the real property after the Plainfield Village Board adopted a new numbering system for the entire village. The address of the property in question was changed from 550 Pheasant Chase Drive to 24101 W. Pheasant Chase Drive.
¶ 7 ANALYSIS
¶ 8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash service as untimely. He contends that he was not required to file his motion within 60 days of appearing at the pre-mediation sessions because they did not constitute hearings. ¶ 9 Plaintiff responds that the trial court properly determined that the pre-mediation sessions were hearings because the local rules refer to them as such and that interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the Law. ¶ 10 Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret section 15-1505.6(a) of the Law. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 506-07 (2003). ¶ 11 The primary objective in construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Id. at 507. We determine legislative intent by examining the language of the statute, which is the most reliable indicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting the law. Id. The statutory language must be given its plain, ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Id. "[W]e are to afford the statutory language the fullest, rather than the narrowest, possible meaning to which it is susceptible." Id. ¶ 12 Absent statutory definitions, it is assumed that the legislature intended statutory language to have its commonly understood meaning. Swanson v. Board of Education of Forman Community Unit School District #124, Mason County, 135 Ill. App. 3d 466, 471 (1985). However, where a different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the statute, the plain language will not control. Id. In determining legislative intent, courts may consider the reason for the law and the evil to be remedied or purpose to be obtained. Id. ¶ 13 Section 15-1505.6(a) of the Law provides in relevant part:
"(a) In any residential foreclosure action, the deadline for filing a motion *** to quash service of process that objects to the court's jurisdiction over the person, unless extended by the court for good cause shown, is 60 days after the earlier of these events: (i) the date that the moving party filed an appearance; or (ii) the date that the moving party participated in a hearing without filing an appearance." 735 ILCS 5/15-1505.6(a) (West 2012).The purpose of this section is to eliminate the ability of parties to "stall" or "slow down" foreclosure proceedings by bringing motions to quash service more than sixty days after they file an appearance or participate in a hearing. 97th Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 17, 2011, at 155 (statements of Senator Dillard). ¶ 14 The local court rules of Will County provide for mandatory mediation in mortgage foreclosure cases. 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.06 (Aug. 3, 2009). The purposes of the "foreclosure mediation program" are "to alleviate the burden of costs and expenses to lenders, borrowers and taxpayers caused by Residential Mortgage Foreclosures[]" and "to aid the administration of justice by reducing the backlog of court cases." 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.06(A). Plaintiff's counsel and "any defendant borrower" are required to attend all pre-mediation sessions. 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 1706(C)(7). ¶ 15 At the pre-mediation session, the mediator may "determine whether the borrower can deed the property to the lender or consent to a judgment waiving any deficiency judgment against the borrower" or "assist the parties to determine whether the property can be sold to a third party that will result in the dismissal of the foreclosure action." 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.06(C)(6). Upon the conclusion of pre-mediation, if the borrower does not meet criteria for loan workout or resolution of the action, "the mediator shall file a report with the court terminating mediation services and indicating the outcome of the conferences." 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.06(C)(8). ¶ 16 The local rules further provide: "The mediator shall at all times be in control of the mediation and the procedures to be followed in the mediation." 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.03(G). A party who fails to appear at a "duly noticed mediation conference without good cause" is subject to "sanctions, including an award of mediator and attorney fees and other costs." 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.03(E). An approved mediator "shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge, under the authority conferred by Supreme Court Rule 99(b)(1) as amended, effective October 10, 2001." 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.04(D) and R. 17.06(G). The local rules refer to the pre-mediation session as both a "conference" and a "hearing." See 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.06(C)(1) ("pre-mediation conference"); R. 17.06(C)(7) (same); R. 17.06(C)(6) ("pre-mediation hearing"). ¶ 17 "The word 'hearing' has two distinct usages, as a generic term and as a term of art." In re Marriage of Fine, 116 Ill. App. 3d 875, 877 (1983). The more precise definition is a "[p]roceeding of relative formality (though generally less formal than a trial), generally public, with definite issues of fact or of law to be tried, in which witnesses are heard and parties proceeded against have right to be heard, and is much the same as a trial and may terminate in final order." Black's Law Dictionary 649 (5th ed. 1979). However, the term is frequently used in its broader and popular sense to mean "any formal proceeding before a judge or other magistrate exercising a judicial function." Fine, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 877; see also Black's Law Dictionary 649 (5th ed. 1979) ("It is frequently used in a broader and more popular significance to describe whatever takes place before magistrates clothed with judicial functions and sitting without jury at any stage of the proceedings subsequent to its inception ***."). In its generic sense, "magistrate" refers "to a person clothed with power as a public civil officer, or a public civil officer invested with executive or judicial power." Black's Law Dictionary 857 (5th ed. 1979). ¶ 18 Here, plaintiff and defendant attended pre-mediation sessions with an approved mediator. The mediator had the power to control the sessions and the procedures followed in it. See 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.03(G). At the conclusion of pre-mediation, the mediator drafted a report determining that the criteria for mediation were "not met" and terminating the mediation. At the pre-mediation sessions, the mediator acted in a quasi-judicial capacity and enjoyed the same immunity as that conferred upon judges. See 12th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.04(D), R. 17.06(G). ¶ 19 We must afford the term "hearing" "the fullest, rather than the narrowest, possible meaning to which it is susceptible." See Carver, 203 Ill. 2d at 507. In its broadest sense, the term "hearing" includes the pre-mediation sessions that defendant attended. Because defendant did not file his motion to quash within 60 days of his attendance at those hearings, the trial court properly denied his motion.
¶ 20 CONCLUSION
¶ 21 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. ¶ 22 Affirmed.