Summary
In Ciccarelli v. Turner, supra, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 399, a Connecticut court interpreted § 14-100a(c)(3) in a similar manner.
Summary of this case from Landolfi v. BarnettOpinion
No. 5000551.
November 17, 2006.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #110
On June 15, 2006, the defendants Ryan Scarpa and Steven Scarpa filed a motion to strike subsection (a) of count two of the complaint, on the ground that General Statutes § 14-100a(c)(3) prohibits the introduction of evidence of failure to wear a safety belt in any civil action. The defendants argue that the motion to strike should be granted because the plaintiff cannot claim the statutory violation set forth in the complaint without safety belt evidence. On July 13, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.
On March 3, 2006, the plaintiffs, Chad Ciccarelli, PPA, Rosemarie Ciccarelli and Rosemarie Ciccarelli, individually, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, Ronald E. Turner, Jr., the town of Montville, Ryan Scarpa and Steven Scarpa. Count one was brought against Turner and the town and count two was brought against the Scarpas, both counts sounding in negligence. In the complaint, the plaintiffs allege, inter alia, the following facts. On April 22, 2005, Chad Ciccarelli, a minor, was a passenger in a pickup truck driven by Ryan Scarpa. Chad Ciccarelli was not wearing his seatbelt. A town-owned ambulance made a left turn to enter a firehouse, at which time the ambulance and pickup truck collided. Chad Ciccarelli sustained injuries from the accident, including contusions and a severe laceration of the forehead. In count two, paragraph nine, subsection (a), the plaintiffs claim that Ryan Scarpa was negligent because he "violated Section 14-100a(c)(1) of the General Statutes by failing to secure with a seatbelt his passenger Chad Ciccarelli, who was 15 years of age."
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CT Page 21561 Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading . . . and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 347, 890 A.2d 1269 (2006). "[The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113, 117-18, 889 A.2d 810 (2006). "The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 277 Conn. 347.
In their motion to strike, the defendants argue that § 14-100a(c)(3) precludes the admission of evidence of failure to wear a safety belt, barring the plaintiff's claim under § 14-100a(c)(1). In opposition to the motion to strike, the plaintiffs counter that § 14-100a(c)(3) is a rule of evidence that cannot be used to attack the sufficiency of a cause of action. Alternatively, the plaintiffs claim that § 14-100a(c)(3) was designed to protect injured plaintiffs from the defense that their injuries were caused by their failure to wear safety belts.
Although Ronald E. Turner, Jr., and the town of Montville are also named as defendants, the motion to strike was brought only by Ryan Scarpa and Steven Scarpa. Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, references herein to the "defendants" are to Ryan and Steven Scarpa.
The plaintiffs argue that the defendants are misusing the rule by using it to protect defendants. A review of the text and legislative history of § 14-100a reveals that the purpose of subsection (c)(3) of that section is to prevent a defendant from introducing evidence of a plaintiff's violation of § 14-100a(c)(1) as a defense in a civil action to reduce the plaintiff's damage award; neither the text nor the legislative history contains any indication that it was intended to preclude a plaintiff from stating a claim against a defendant based on a violation of § 14-100a(c)(1). During the discussion of the amendment to this statute in 1985 in the House of Representatives, House Bill No. 5338, entitled "An Act Requiring the Use of Seat Safety Belts", Representative Wenc described how the statute would operate without the amendment by stating: "If this amendment is rejected . . . the seatbelt defense will be used to reduce or eliminate the damages to the injured party." 28 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23, 1985 Sess., p. 8359. Representative Farr stated that the amendment "is about the question of mitigation of damages . . . This [amendment] would make the law say that it doesn't matter whether you wear the seatbelts or not. If you [don't] wear the seatbelts and you get injured, you're going to get exactly the same recovery . . ." 28 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 8343-44. Representative Farr, an opponent of the amendment, summarized the then current law and the effect of the amendment by stating: "In Connecticut today, you can raise that defense of failure to wear a seatbelt. Under this bill, you could not raise that defense." 28 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 8354.
The legislative history further shows that a proponent of the amendment to the bill to include the evidentiary exclusion was concerned with the risk that such a defense could be used unfairly, for example, if a plaintiff who is involved in an accident caused by a defendant removes the safety belt after the accident, but loses consciousness and is found without the safety belt fastened. See 28 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 8343, remarks of Representative Wollenberg ("this is a fair amendment, precluding some of the arguments . . . that somebody may have got in an accident, pulled the belt, it was off when found unconscious, the belt was off, therefore he would be held, not be able to collect and so on. This takes care of those kinds of things and I think it's in the spirit of the law we know now and I think it should be adopted"). As a result of this amendment, and the ultimate passage of Public Acts 1985, P.A. 85-429, the statute now provides, in relevant part: "Failure to wear a safety seat belt shall not be considered as contributory negligence nor shall such failure be admissible evidence in any civil action." General Statutes § 14-100a(c)(3). "With this particular added amendment to the bill . . . it will be made crystal clear that this cannot be used because in the statutes it will specifically state that the seatbelt defense is not applicable." (Emphasis added.) 28 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 8367, Remarks of Representative Antonetti. Thus, the legislative history of § 14-100a(c)(3) clearly shows that the sole purpose of this evidentiary exclusion was to benefit plaintiffs by preventing defendants from using the seatbelt defense to reduce damage awards in civil cases. It was not intended to benefit defendants by preventing plaintiffs from proving that defendants' violations of § 14-100a(c)(1) caused or contributed to plaintiffs' injuries.
Discussions of these statutory provisions by the courts of this state also support this interpretation. "By making evidence of the failure to wear a safety belt inadmissible, the legislature endorsed a policy that, despite the duty to wear a safety belt, a driver or passenger who was injured (while not wearing a safety belt) through the negligence of another should not have his or her recovery reduced." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Partman v. Budget Rent-a-Car of Westchester, Inc., 43 Conn.Sup. 239, 242-43, 649 A.2d 275 (1994) ( 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 247). "During the legislative debates, the possibility was discussed that a passenger could suffer an injury that he would not have suffered but for the failure to wear a seat belt . . . It was made clear that the seat belt defense could not be raised in such a case . . . Clearly the legislature has decided not to allow arguments [that the plaintiff's failure to wear her seatbelt caused her injuries] to prevent redress for injured plaintiffs." (Citations omitted.) Bower v. D'Onfro, 38 Conn.App. 685, 691, 663 A.2d 1061, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 911, 665 A.2d 606 (1995).
The legislative history of § 14-100a, therefore, indicates that subsection (c)(3) was enacted to prevent defendants from raising a plaintiff's failure to wear a seatbelt as a special defense to reduce a damage award. In the present case, the defendants are attempting to misuse § 14-100a(c)(3) to preclude allegations of a defendant's negligence based on his failure to adhere to the statute. The defendants' use of § 14-100a(c)(3) is not consistent with the legislative intent discussed above. Allowing the defendant to use § 14-100a(c)(3) to defeat the plaintiff's cause of action would be directly contrary to the purpose of the rule, which is to prevent defendants from using a plaintiff's failure to wear a safety belt to assert a special defense of contributory negligence.
Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied.