Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2019-0097
11-29-2019
CHRISTOPHER F., Appellant, v. DIANE F. AND A.F., Appellees.
COUNSEL Cochise County Office of the Legal Advocate, Bisbee By Xochitl Orozco, Legal Advocate Counsel for Appellant Bays Law PC, Sierra Vista By P. Randall Bays Counsel for Appellee Diane F. Joel Larson, Cochise County Legal Defender By Benna R. Troup, Assistant Legal Defender, Bisbee Guardian ad Litem for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County
No. SV201900002
The Honorable Terry Bannon, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Cochise County Office of the Legal Advocate, Bisbee
By Xochitl Orozco, Legal Advocate
Counsel for Appellant Bays Law PC, Sierra Vista
By P. Randall Bays
Counsel for Appellee Diane F. Joel Larson, Cochise County Legal Defender
By Benna R. Troup, Assistant Legal Defender, Bisbee
Guardian ad Litem for Minor
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Eckerstrom concurred. EPPICH, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Christopher F. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his rights to his daughter, A.F. (born July 2014), on abandonment grounds, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), pursuant to a termination petition filed by his mother, Diane F. He argues insufficient evidence supported the court's abandonment finding because Diane prevented him from maintaining a relationship with A.F. He also argues the court erred by denying his request to continue the contested severance hearing to allow him more time to consider whether to enter a communications agreement with Diane. We affirm.
¶2 To sever a parent's rights, the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence establishing at least one statutory ground for termination and a preponderance of the evidence that terminating the parent's rights is in the child's best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶¶ 32, 41 (2005); see also A.R.S. § 8-863(B). We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal; rather, we defer to the juvenile court with respect to its factual findings because it "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶¶ 4, 14 (App. 2004). We will affirm the order if the findings upon which it is based are supported by reasonable evidence. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We view that evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, ¶ 12 (App. 2007).
¶3 In December 2014, A.F. was removed from her mother's care and placed with Christopher, who lived with Diane. Diane took primary responsibility for caring for A.F. In March 2018, Christopher moved out of the home, taking A.F. with him. However, Christopher returned A.F. to Diane's care about two weeks later. Diane sought and was awarded sole legal decision-making authority and primary residential custody of A.F. in April 2018. Over the following months, Christopher visited A.F. only a few times, did not call, and provided no gifts or financial support. In January 2019, Diane filed a petition to terminate Christopher's parental rights on abandonment grounds. The juvenile court granted that petition after a contested hearing. This appeal followed.
A.F.'s mother's rights were terminated in May 2019. She is not a party to this appeal. --------
¶4 A parent abandons a child when that parent fails "to provide reasonable support and . . . maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal supervision." A.R.S. § 8-531(1). "Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child." Id. Christopher argues, however, that a finding of abandonment was precluded because Diane interfered with his ability to maintain a relationship with A.F. See Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, ¶ 21 (App. 2013) ("A parent may not restrict the other parent from interacting with their child and then petition to terminate the latter's rights for abandonment."). But the sole evidence of such interference was Christopher's testimony, which the juvenile court was free to reject. See Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4.
¶5 Christopher next asserts the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to continue. We review that ruling for an abuse of discretion. In re Yavapai Cty. Juv. Action No. J-9365, 157 Ariz. 497, 499 (App. 1988). A motion to continue may "be granted only upon a showing of good cause." Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 46(F).
¶6 On the day of the contested severance hearing, after a conference to see if the parties would enter a communications agreement, Christopher asked the juvenile court to continue the hearing so he could "give this matter further thought." The court denied the motion, noting "[t]hese cases are about children and the best interest of children." Christopher argues the court abused its discretion because its rationale was insufficient and no party objected to his motion. But, he has not argued nor cited authority that his reason for seeking the continuance constitutes good cause in these circumstances. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 46(F). We therefore need not address this argument further. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (claims unsupported by "proper and meaningful argument" warrant summary rejection); see also City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 88 (App. 2008) (argument on appeal waived by party's failure to adequately develop it).
¶7 Diane has requested attorney fees on appeal, citing Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., and A.R.S. § 12-349. We note first that Rule 21 is not among the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure that Rule 103(G), Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct., makes applicable to appeals in juvenile cases. Additionally, Diane has not identified any reason that Christopher's appeal warrants an award of fees under § 12-349. We thus deny her request.
¶8 The juvenile court's order terminating Christopher's parental rights to A.F. is affirmed.