Opinion
24A-JC-879
10-30-2024
In the Matter of: A.H. (Minor Child), v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner Child in Need of Services and P.C. (Mother) and J.H. (Father), Appellants-Respondents
ATTORNEY FOR MOTHER Lisa Johnson Brownsburg, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR FATHER Michael G. Moore Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana David E. Corey Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Adams Circuit Court Trial Court Cause No. 01C01-2311-JC-76 The Honorable Chad E. Kukelhan, Judge
ATTORNEY FOR MOTHER Lisa Johnson Brownsburg, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR FATHER Michael G. Moore Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana David E. Corey Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
May, Judge
[¶1] P.C. ("Mother") and J.H. ("Father") (collectively, "Parents") appeal the adjudication of their son, A.H. ("Child"), as a Child in Need of Services ("CHINS"). Mother and Father filed separate briefs, but some of the raised issues overlap. We restate and reorganize the issues as follows:
1. Whether the evidence supports the challenged Findings:
1.1 Finding 5 regarding Child's behavior and mental health,
1.2 Findings 4, 7, 9, and 10 regarding Parents' strained relationship with Child,
1.3 Finding 6 regarding Parents' willingness to engage Child in services, and
1.4 Finding 8 regarding Parents' willingness to allow Child to return to the family home;
2. Whether the Findings support the challenged Conclusions that:
2.1 Mother's actions or inactions seriously endangered Child,
2.2 Child's needs were unmet, and
2.3 Child's needs will not be met without coercive intervention of the court; and
3. Whether the dispositional order regarding Mother was an abuse of discretion.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Child was born April 6, 2007. Parents served as Child's kinship placement while Child was the subject of a CHINS case involving his biological parents. In 2021, Parents adopted Child following the involuntary termination of his biological parents' parental rights. After he was adopted, Child participated in wraparound services. He was also prescribed Vyvanse for ADHD and Wellbutrin because of "anger issues[.]" (Tr. Vol. II at 25.)
[¶3] In May 2023, Parents, Child, and their extended family moved to Florida. Mother removed Child from wraparound care and was unable to have Child's prescriptions refilled. While in Florida, Mother called "twenty-nine psychiatrists" and "no one would prescribe Vyvanse, no one would prescribe Wellbutrin, they all told [her] to get a medical marijuana card[.]" (Id.) Mother refused to "put [her] kid on weed." (Id.)
Mother testified her daughter was "picking up the prescription [in Indiana] and mailing it to us in Florida" but it is unclear the time frame in which that happened. (Tr. Vol. II at 31.)
[¶4] Parents then "Baker Acted" Child in Florida for five days. (Id.) Police took Child to a facility where a psychiatrist wrote Child a prescription for Wellbutrin. At some point after Child's release under the Baker Act, Child, according to Mother,
According to the Florida Department of Children and Families, "The Florida Mental Health Act, commonly referred to as the Baker Act, focuses on crisis services for individuals with mental illness, much like an emergency department is for individuals experiencing a medical emergency." https://perma.cc/DT7T-ZCZX . An individual may be taken to a receiving facility for involuntary examination under the Baker Act if:
• There is reason to believe he/she has a mental illness and due to the mental illness, the individual has refused or is unable to determine if examination is necessary; and either;
• Without care or treatment, the individual is unlikely to care for themselves which can result in substantial harm to their well-being, and it is not evident that harm can be avoided through familial intervention or other services; or
• It is likely, based on recent behavior, that without treatment, the individual will pose a serious threat to themselves or others.Id.
went on one of his mood things where he just gets destructive. He destroyed things in [the] house. He almost killed his little sister. He bruised her lungs and ribs. Her hip, her pelvis, gave her a concussion. His other sister, he crushed her foot with a freezer. Blood was gushing out of her foot.(Id. at 32.) Child was arrested for two counts of battery and detained by the state of Florida twenty-seven days. On October 15, 2023, one of Mother's biological children in Indiana died. In November 2023, Parents, Child, and other children in Parents' custody returned to Indiana because of the death and because Child was not able to get proper care in Florida.
The status of the Florida proceedings against Child is unclear.
[¶5] On November 20, 2023, Mother called police to report Child a runaway. Police called Stephanie Willett, a Family Case Manager ("FCM") with DCS as part of a "public service request . . . from a deputy that [sic] was requiring our assistance for a situation." (Id. at 61.) One of the deputies who called Willett, Deputy Lanning, told Willett that Child had "potentially [run] away" and when he was returned home, Parents "were refusing to keep him in the home. They said they did not want him there." (Id.) FCM Willett spoke with Parents about the situation and attempted to explore supports or a safety plan with Parents "to see if there was somewhere where [Child] could go to, until things kind of cooled down." (Id. at 62.) Parents "were not open to any supports" and Mother told FCM Willett "that no one in [Mother's] family will take [Child] and no one in [Father's] family wants him either." (Id.)
The record does not indicate Deputy Lanning's first name.
[¶6] FCM Willett then interviewed Child. After the interview, FCM Willett's "biggest concern [was Child] sharing thoughts of feeling suicidal and wanting to end his life." (Id.) Deputy Lanning then made an emergency intake call to Parkview Behavioral Health. While on speakerphone, Parents spoke to Parkview intake staff, who attempted to make a "safety plan with the family for kind of what [to] do in the home with [Child] being there as far as like locking up knives and sharp objects[.]" (Id. at 63.) Mother "refused to do that . . . [and] said she's not going to live like that[.]" (Id.) Intake staff recommended Child be admitted to Parkview.
[¶7] Mother then "got very upset" and "said she wasn't taking [Child] [to Parkview]." (Id.) Mother starting packing bags and said she was leaving the house. She then "started making a lot of negative comments towards Child" such as "success asshole, you've ruined, you've destroyed my life." (Id. at 64.) FCM Willett attempted to intervene, and Mother told FCM Willett, "fuck you and fuck that bastard for ruining my family." (Id.)
[¶8] Father agreed to take Child to Parkview for further assessment, and Child was later admitted to Parkview and began medication to reduce "depressive symptoms[.]" (Ex. Vol. I at 8.) FCM Willett discussed with Parents "the possibility of a substantiated allegation of neglect." (Tr. Vol. II at 65.) Deputy Lanning also discussed with Parents the possibility that abandonment charges could be levied against them.
[¶9] The next day, November 21, 2023, FCM Lauren Thornsberry met with Parents regarding a report of physical abuse involving Child. Parents denied the allegations. Mother said "she did not ever physically abuse [Child], however, it took everything in her not to do it." (Id. at 68.) Mother told FCM Thornsberry that Child was "not welcome in her home[.]" (Id. at 69.) Mother also told FCM Thornsberry that she had contacted the "Indiana child abuse and neglect" hotline and someone there told her they would "help her un-do the adoption." (Id.)
[¶10] On November 29, 2023, DCS filed a petition that alleged Child was a CHINS based on the following allegations:
c. That on November 20, 2023 [Child] was transported to Parkview Behavioral Health due to suicidal ideations.
d. There are allegations of physical abuse of [Child] perpetrated by Mother and Father.
e. That when discussing [Child], Mother spoke extremely negatively regarding the [Child] and stated she does not want [Child] to return home.
f. [Parents] have not provided [Child] with his mental health medications for his ADHD and fetal alcohol syndrome for several months.
g. [Child] is not currently enrolled in school.(App. Vol. II at 45.) Parents attended an initial hearing on the matter on November 30, 2023.
[¶11] On December 19, 2023, FCM Thornsberry referred Child for an intake assessment at Park Center, another inpatient therapy provider. During that intake, Child told intake therapist Rashad Slate "I get down, and I want my own space when I am depressed. Depression has been a problem for years. Sometimes I feel hopeless. I will isolate. I tried to die by hanging a few years ago." (Ex. Vol. I at 6.) Slate diagnosed Child with Major Depressive Disorder with Anxious Distress. Slate recommended a treatment plan of therapy and medication.
It is unclear from the record when Child left Parkview.
[¶12] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on February 27, 2024. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Child was in residential placement with Lutherwood Residential Treatment. During her testimony Mother acknowledged she called Child "an asshole over and over again." (Tr. Vol. II at 29.) She also acknowledged she refused participation in the safety plan that required her to lock up knives and sharp objects saying she's "not gonna have to unlock knives to cook." (Id. at 26-7.) Finally, she confirmed that on November 21, 2023, she told FCM Thornsberry that she "wanted to relinquish [her] parental rights" to Child. (Id. at 35.)
The record does not indicate whether Child began services with Park Center or when his time with Lutherwood Residential Treatment began.
[¶13] Regarding Child's placement, Mother indicated she would not let Child back in her home "until he was stable enough to be at home and not hurt anyone." (Id. at 33.) Mother was not sure she could afford to pay the daily fee for Child to remain at Lutherwood. She stated that if she could not afford Child's placement at Lutherwood, she would "[p]ossibly . . . look into if there was another facility or if there was a facility that took his Medicaid[.]" (Id. at 34.) Mother also had spoken with two providers and wanted Child to be seen by a psychiatrist at Park Center. Mother told the trial court, "we are more than ready to have our son back and do what's best for [Child] just like we always have." (Id. at 37.)
[¶14] Father told the trial court that he agreed and supported Mother's testimony. He testified he believed Child's behavior on November 20, 2023, was a "stunt" because "[h]e got into trouble so he's just playing along so he could get out of the house so he wouldn't get punished for it because we caught him stealing [a cell phone] . . . he was just looking for an easy way to get out is all." (Id. at 86.) Father claimed he and Mother were not aware of the emotional abuse or trauma Child experienced prior to being placed with them.
[¶15] Regarding the services Child needed, FCM Thornsberry indicated the issues resulting in Child's removal from Parents home had not been remedied "as well as the underlying needs that were present there are still present today." (Id. at 77.) Child would "need to have some level of trauma informed care" and Parents would need "education on trauma and how that impacts [Child]." (Id.) FCM Thornsberry also recommended that Parents and Child engage in family therapy and that Parents complete mental health assessments. FCM Thornsberry told the trial court that Father had so far had "minimal engagement" with Child. (Id. at 82.) She stated Father "said the only reason why he would take [Child] somewhere else is so he didn't go to jail." (Id.) (footnote added). Finally, FCM Thornsberry testified, "[Mother] had stated that [Father] feels the same way about [Child] as she does in reference to not wanting him in the home and not being a part of the family anymore but she said he's . . . too much of a pussy to say it." (Id.)
It is unclear whether the "he" in this statement is Father or Child.
[¶16] On March 13, 2024, the trial court entered its order adjudicating Child a CHINS. On April 2, 2024, DCS submitted its predispositional report indicating Child was at Lutherwood and was engaging in therapy to work on "target skills, coping, [and] accountability." (App. Vol. II at 97.) Child was also working in "group therapy to address grief and the stages of grief." (Id.) Child was attending "Lutherwood Academy, an accredited satellite program of IPS schools" but "struggle[ed] in social settings and was being expelled from school due to his aggressive behaviors." (Id.) On April 11, 2024, Mother and Father separately requested appellate counsel. Mother and Father filed notices of appeal the same day.
[¶17] On April 29, 2024, the trial court held its dispositional hearing. DCS reported on Child's diagnostic evaluation and his Qualified Residential Treatment Program assessment from Lutherwood. During his diagnostic evaluation, Child disclosed a history of alcohol and illegal substance use. The diagnostic 7 evaluation included multiple mental health related diagnoses such as: posttraumatic stress disorder; oppositional defiant disorder; alcohol use disorder, mild; cannabis use disorder, mild; "Parent-Child Relational Problem[;]" personal history of childhood neglect based on situations involving Child's biological parents; "Upbringing Away From Parents[;]" other personal history of psychological trauma; "Problems Related to Other Legal Circumstances[;]" academic and educational problems, ADHD; and possible "Fetal Alcohol Syndrome/ Failure to Thrive[.]" (Id. at 141.) Lutherwood recommended Child "continue with residential placement in a placement specializing in trauma treatment[,]" continue individual therapy, participate in group therapy and "skills sessions to improve his day-to-day functioning[,]" engage in family therapy with Parents before returning home, have assistance with medication management, and access mentor services. (Id. at 141-3.)
[¶18] The trial court issued its dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things, maintain contact with the FCM; engage in programs recommended by the FCM or other service provider; refrain from consuming, manufacturing, trading, distributing, or selling any illegal controlled substances; ensure Child engages in home-based counseling; complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations; complete a psychological assessment and follow all recommendations; refrain from committing domestic violence; and attend visitation with Child. Regarding the psychological evaluation, the trial court stated "[i]f a release of information is provided by [Mother's] current therapist then the psychological evaluation is not necessary." (Id. at 169.) The trial court ordered Father to do the same things, except he was not required to complete a psychological assessment.
Discussion and Decision
[¶19] Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil action, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code. Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024). DCS alleged Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which states:
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
A CHINS adjudication focuses on the needs and condition of the child, rather than the culpability of the parent. N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 476. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parent but to provide proper services for the benefit of the child. Id. at 475. "[T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention." Id. at 476.
While we acknowledge a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that - a determination that a child is in need of services. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular parent. Only when the State moves to terminate a particular parent's rights does an allegation of fault attach. We have previously made it clear that CHINS proceedings are "distinct from" involuntary termination proceedings. The termination of the parent-child relationship is not merely a continuing stage of the CHINS proceeding. In fact, a CHINS intervention in no way challenges the general competency of a parent to continue a relationship with the child.Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied.
[¶20] When a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law in a CHINS decision, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). We consider first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id. We give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess witness credibility and do not reweigh the evidence; we instead consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. Id. We defer substantially to findings of fact but not to conclusions of law. Id. We accept unchallenged findings as true. Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019).
1. Whether the evidence supports the challenged Findings
[¶21] Mother and Father separately challenge seven of the trial court's eleven findings.
1.1 Finding 5 regarding Child's behavior and mental health
[¶22] The trial court made one finding regarding Child's behavior and mental health, and Mother and Father each challenge this finding. Finding 5 of the trial court's order states: "That [Child] has behavioral and mental health needs that require treatment. That Mother testified she called 29 psychiatrists in Florida and was unable to meet [Child's] needs. [Child] was not receiving wrap around services or medication at the time of DCS involvement in November 2023." (App. Vol. II at 89.)
[¶23] Regarding this finding, Father contends "[t]here is no doubt that [Child] has significant mental health and behavioral needs. No one knows this more than [Parents] who consistently ensured he had the needed medications and services." (Father's Br. at 15.) He contends that he and Mother "ensured [Child's] Indiana-prescribed medications were filled and sent to them" when they moved to Florida (id. at 14), and that "[Child] had sufficient medication to last until November 16, 2023, coinciding with their return to Indiana." (Id. at 15.) He argues that, after discovering Child could not receive wraparound services like those in Indiana, Parents "pursued alternative solutions" such as "a short-term involuntary commitment" under Florida's Baker Act, which, after an inpatient stay, resulted in a new prescription for Wellbutrin. (Id. at 14.) Finally, he states Parents were cooperative with obtaining services for Child following the November 20, 2023, incident.
[¶24] Similarly, Mother points to testimony suggesting that when Child exhibited mental health and behavioral issues prior to the family's move to Florida, Parents "worked diligently to make sure [Child] had appropriate mental health care" including medications and wraparound care. (Mother's Br. at 14.) Mother acknowledges she "encountered difficulties" with Child's mental health and behavior after the family's move to Florida but claims that she did "everything humanly possible" to address those issues. (Id.) She asserts Child was only without his medication in Florida for the twenty-seven days he was in detention following his alleged attack of his sisters, and for four days when they returned to Indiana on November 16, 2023.
[¶25] Contrary to the arguments of both Father and Mother, DCS presented evidence Child was without his Vyvanse prescription for a portion of the time the family was in Florida from May 2023 to November 2023. Mother testified she did not fill the Vyvanse prescription in "September or October of 2023" while the family was in Florida. (Tr. Vol. II at 53.) Mother told the trial court that Child received a prescription for Wellbutrin only after he was involuntarily committed under Florida's Baker Act. In DCS's initial intake report, Mother "reported that [Child] does not take his medications." (App. Vol. II at 52.) FCM Thornsberry testified that, as of November 20, 2023, "[Child] has not had his medication . . . [he] has not been in any services for several months[.]" (Tr. Vol. II at 8.)
[¶26] Regarding wraparound services, Mother admitted Child did not receive those services while in Florida except when he was involuntarily committed under Florida's Baker Act. Mother also acknowledged she had not secured wraparound services for Child prior to their return to Indiana. Additionally, DCS presented evidence that Mother refused to address Child's behavioral and/or mental health issues by removing or locking up all of the knives in the house as part of a safety plan after Child expressed a desire to commit suicide. The arguments from Mother and Father are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). The evidence presented by DCS supports the trial court's Finding 5.
1.2 Findings 4, 7, 9, and 10 regarding Parents' strained relationship With Child
[¶27] The trial court made four findings regarding the strained relationship between Parents and Child, and Mother and Father each challenge these findings. Finding 4 of the trial court's order states: "[O]n November 20, 2023 [Child] was transported to Parkview Behavioral Health due to suicidal ideations. Mother and Father do not believe [Child] is truly suicidal. It was identified that [Child] attempted to hang himself at some point in the past." (App. Vol. II at 89.) Finding 7 of the trial court's order states:
Mother, Father and [Child] identify a strained relationship in the home. Mother identifies [Child] to have been insensitive to her son's death and that he has been violent toward other children in the home. [Child] identifies that he is not welcome in the home and the name calling impacts his mental health. Mother admitted to calling [Child] an "asshole" repeatedly when DCS was present at the home. Mother identified [sic] comparing [Child] to a caged animal but denies referring to him as a caged animal during a family therapy session.(Id. at 90.) Finding 9 of the trial court's order states: "Mother and Father minimize the negative impact they have had on [Child's] emotional well-being and lack education as to [Child's] past trauma." (Id.) Finding 10 of the trial court's order states: "Mother has struggled with significant grief and has responded to [Child's] behaviors in a detrimental way." (Id.)
[¶28] Father contends the Findings 4, 7, 9, and 10 are not supported by the evidence because:
This was an extraordinary time for [Parents]. They had just lost their [biological] son and were living in another state for a short time, during which [Child] had to be involuntarily admitted into a facility, attacked a sibling, and went to jail. Moving back to Indiana added to the stress the family was already under. The combination of grief, relocation, and managing [Child's] complex needs undoubtedly strained their relationship. Not to mention [Child's] insensitive comments about the death of [Parents' biological son]. It caused everyone to say and do things they would not likely have said.(Father's Br. at 16.) However, Father testified that he "concluded that [Child] would not harm himself" and
[Child] just pulled this stunt just to see what (inaudible). He got into trouble so he's just playing us along so he could get out of the house so he wouldn't get punished for it because we caught him stealing . . . he was just looking for an easy way out.(Tr. Vol. II at 86.) Father admitted the incident on November 20, 2023, was "hostile" and Mother was "grieving and this just made matters worse." (Id. at 88.) He claimed Child's behavior was "just making the situation more impossible." (Id.)
[¶29] Father's arguments regarding Findings 4, 7, 9, and 10 actually support the findings. His attempt to explain away and diminish the facts by noting the stressful situation the family was going through at the time does not disprove the underlying evidence that Father did not take Child's suicidal ideations seriously, that Father has a strained relationship with Child, that Mother's grief over the loss of her biological son affected the family, and that the incident on November 20, 2023, was hostile. As he does not challenge the evidence used to support the findings, we conclude the evidence supports Findings 4, 7, 9, and 10 as to Father. Father's arguments regarding Findings 4, 7, 9, and 10 are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
[¶30] Mother's arguments address each finding individually. Regarding Finding 4, Mother acknowledges her testimony that it was "typical" for Child to threaten suicide and "just says things" when agitated. (Tr. Vol. II at 28.) Mother also testified "[Child] never attempted suicide before and that he just says it to get attention[.]" (Id. at 50.) She also acknowledges that she refused to lock up the knives in the house as part of a safety plan to address Child's suicidal ideation. However, she claims she did not need to lock up the knives because Child had never tried to harm himself or others with a knife. Further, she contends Parents "never stated that they did not take [Child's] condition seriously" (Mother's Br. at 13), pointing to her testimony that Child was "obviously, at this point, not very stable" (Tr. Vol. II at 28), and her willingness at the time of the CHINS fact-finding hearing to "possibly" lock up knives as part of a safety plan. (Id.)
[¶31] However, DCS presented evidence through Exhibit 1, the Parkview intake assessment, that Mother made several derogatory comments about Child, including calling him names and indicating he ruined her life and her family. Further, Mother admits she characterized Child's suicidal ideations as typical and refused to follow a safety plan to address his needs by locking up knives. One reason she stated she would not lock up knives was because Child had never tried to use knives to harm himself, but instead had "tried with a saw and shovel before." (Id.) Mother's arguments regarding Finding 4 are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Mother's excuses do not change the fact that she would not follow a safety plan and that she characterized Child's indication that he wanted to commit suicide as typical and thus the evidence was sufficient to support Finding 4 as to Mother.
[¶32] Regarding Finding 7, which addresses Mother's feelings about and statements to Child, Mother does not dispute she had a strained relationship with Child.She claims Child was insensitive to the recent death of Mother's biological son and Mother said some of the things in the finding "in the heat of the moment." (Tr. Vol. II at 89.) She argues the family "was under a tremendous amount of stress due to a recent move and the death of Parents' other son." (Mother's Br. at 19.) She claims "[v]irtually any parent would have been challenged by this situation." (Id.) Finally, regarding Child's violence toward his siblings, Mother states, "Parents are not the cause of [Child's] violent behavior[.]" (Id. at 20.) Like Father, Mother does not challenge any of the evidence used to support Finding 7, and instead tries to excuse her behavior. Mother's arguments regarding Finding 7 are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Finding 7 was supported by the evidence as to Mother.
Mother also argues that all derogatory statements Mother made regarding Child were hearsay, which the trial court indicated it would not consider. (See Tr. Vol. II at 48-9.) However, the trial court made that statement regarding whether Child stated he had been punished for taking food in the family home, not regarding any other statement Mother made about Child, all of which were also included in properly admitted exhibits.
[¶33] Regarding Finding 9, Mother contends she and Father did not know Child had trauma from the circumstances that led to termination of the parental rights of his biological parents and thus cannot be held accountable for their lack of knowledge or education regarding how to deal with that trauma. Father testified he and Mother were "asked to take [Child] because no one would, no one else would take him so with my wife being as big hearted as she is, she accepted all of them . . . [but] as far as being mentally abused, physically abuse[d] before us, I'm unaware of it." (Tr. Vol. II at 87.) Mother claims no one told Parents they needed trauma-informed care to help Child and Parents had "always taken appropriate steps to obtain mental health treatment for their son." (Mother's Br. at 22-3.)
[¶34] However, FCM Thornsberry testified Child had been declared a CHINS three times prior to being adopted by Parents and endured trauma "like his basic needs not being met, exposure to illegal activity, gangs, caregiver impairment, being left home alone, things of that nature that he endured while with his biological parents[.]" (Tr. Vol. II at 76.) Both Mother and Father denied knowing this, but that does not change the fact that Child endured that trauma and that Parents need education regarding those incidents and ways to help Child deal with them. Based on the testimony presented during the fact-finding hearing, we conclude there existed evidence to support Finding 9. Mother's arguments regarding Finding 9 are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
[¶35] Regarding Finding 10, Mother acknowledges that she has struggled with significant grief since the passing of her biological son. At the fact-finding hearing she testified she had joined a grief support group and attends "every day, sometimes several times a day." (Tr. Vol. II at 43.) She contends her behavior on November 20, 2023, was an isolated incident and there was no evidence of a habitual pattern of that conduct. However, DCS presented evidence that Child reported as part of his intake at Parkview, which occurred after the November 20, 2023, incident that "there [was] a lot of name calling and bickering with adoptive mom[.]" (Ex. Vol. I at 10.) Based on the testimony before the trial court, including Mother's admission that she called Child names and evidence that such behavior was not an isolated incident, we conclude the evidence supports Finding 10. Mother's arguments regarding Finding 10 are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
1.3 Finding 6 regarding Parents' willingness to engage Child in services
[¶36] The trial court made one finding regarding Parents' willingness to engage child in services. While making separate arguments, Mother and Father each challenge Finding 6, which states: "[Child] is currently receiving evaluation through a Diagnostic Evaluation at Lutherwood that costs over $1200 per day. Mother identified she would be willing to seek inpatient treatment for [Child] but has not secured a place for treatment." (App. Vol. II at 90.)
[¶37] Father argues the trial court's finding is "critical of [Parents] for not presenting a fully developed plan for [Child's] care at the fact-finding hearing and securing a placement while he was not in their care." (Father's Br. at 22.) He contends he and Mother proactively reached out to several facilities that could provide Child with inpatient care and accepted Child's Medicaid coverage. He also asserts Parents were willing to work with Child's current placement, Lutherwood, "if arrangements could be made." (Id.) Similarly, Mother contends she and Father were working hard to secure a facility for residential placement for Child.
[¶38] Parents testified they had researched multiple facilities for Child's placement, but they had yet to secure one. Mother testified she "can't get [Child] into a facility when I don't have him for an assessment" and thus had not found a facility that Child could go to if Child were released into her care following the fact-finding hearing. (Tr. Vol. II at 35.) At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Child was placed at Lutherwood, and the State was paying $1,200.00 a day for that placement. When asked if she would be able to pay for Child to continue staying at Lutherwood, Mother stated she was not sure if that facility took Medicaid and, if it did not, she would look for a facility that took Medicaid. While it would seem Parents were looking into residential placement for Child, they did not have a plan for his placement at the time of the fact-finding hearing, and thus there was evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mother had not secured a place for Child's treatment should Child be released to her care following the fact-finding hearing. Parents' arguments regarding Finding 6 are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
1.4 Finding 8 regarding Parents' willingness to allow Child to return to the family home
[¶39] Finding 8 of the trial court's order states: "Mother stated to DCS and Law Enforcement that [Child] could not return to the home in November 2023. There is a need for treatment for [Child] and therapy for the family for [Child] to safely return home." (App. Vol. II at 90.)
Parents also challenge Finding 11, which states, "That [Child] requires treatment and the family requires family counseling that was not being received and is unlikely to be received without the intervention of the Court." (App. Vol. II at 90.) This finding seems to be more akin to the conclusion that court intervention is required to ensure the family receives proper services, and thus we will discuss Parents' arguments regarding that issue with Parents' challenges to the trial court's conclusions.
[¶40] Father argues the evidence does not support Finding 8 because Parents never sought to abandon Child and because the police and DCS intervention during the incident on November 20, 2023, exacerbated the situation by telling Parents they would be arrested for neglect and by removing Child from the home. Father claims "[g]iven these circumstances, it is understandable that [Parents] responded as they did, swiftly making plans for divorce and for [Father] to relocate with [Child] in an attempt to comply with the confusing and unreasonable expectations placed upon them." (Father's Br. at 17.) He contends Parents want Child in their home, but only when he is safe and stable.
[¶41] Mother asserts Finding 8, while "technically accurate" is "highly misleading." (Mother's Br. at 21.) She contends she wanted Child to return home but only when he is mentally stable. However, DCS presented evidence that Mother stated she did not want Child to return home in November 2023 and she intended to find a way to reverse the adoption and terminate her parental rights to Child. Mother also refused to lock up the knives in the family home to comply with a safety plan designed to provide a safe and stable environment so Child could return home. Further, DCS presented evidence that while Child was in residential placement at Lutherwood at the time of the fact-finding hearing, the family had not yet engaged in family therapy except for a short session during which Child left the room. Parents did not indicate they had plans for future family therapy. Parents' attempt to justify their behavior does not change the facts. Thus the evidence supports the findings, and Parents' arguments regarding Finding 8 are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
2. Whether the Findings support the challenged Conclusions 2.1 Mother's actions or inactions seriously endangered Child
[¶42] Mother argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that Parents' actions and inaction have seriously impaired or endangered Child. She characterizes Child's "serious mental health and behavioral issues" as "problems" and contends "there is no evidence that these issues are the result of Parents' actions or inactions." (Mother's Br. at 24.) Further, she asserts Parents "have been proactive in seeking appropriate care for [Child]." (Id.) She also argues Child is not actually and seriously endangered because Child was in placement at Lutherwood and Parents intended to continue treatment there or pursue other residential treatment.
Father does not challenge this conclusion.
[¶43] However, the trial court found that Mother engaged in verbally abusive behavior not only during the November 2023 incident, but as a regular pattern. Further, the trial court found Child has serious mental health and behavioral issues and Mother had removed Child from wraparound treatment when the family moved to Florida, was unable to secure treatment for Child while in Florida, and had not consistently provided Child with psychiatric medication as prescribed. Finally, Mother did not have a plan for Child's placement at a residential facility, which was crucial to Child's care. Based on the trial court's findings regarding Mother's inability to consistently provide Child with the proper mental health and behavioral care, as well as her behavior that exacerbated those issues, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that Mother's actions or inactions seriously endangered Child. See In re V.C., 867 N.E.2d 167, 182 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (affirming adjudication of child as a CHINS based on mother's pattern of harmful behavior).
2.2 Child's needs were unmet
[¶44] Similar to her arguments regarding the trial court's findings about Parents' lack of residential treatment plan for Child if Child were not to be declared a CHINS, Mother contends the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that Child is not receiving the care required to address his mental health and behavioral issues. Mother contends she has communicated with multiple facilities for placement of Child. However, at the time of the factfinding hearing, she had yet to secure placement or an assessment to determine if any placement was acceptable and the trial court made a finding as to that evidence. The trial court also found that, while Child was receiving care at Lutherwood, there is no evidence that Parents had taken any steps to educate themselves about Child's trauma and how to help him through that, which the trial court noted was needed in order to assist with the strained relationship. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that Child needed care he was not receiving from Mother. See Matter of L.T., 145 N.E.3d 864, 872 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (child endangered and needs unmet based on history of domestic violence and physical abuse of child and older siblings).
Father does not challenge this conclusion.
2.3 Child's needs will not be met without coercive intervention of the court
[¶45] Mother and Father each argue the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court is required to provide Child proper care for his mental health and behavioral issues. As we recently stated in In re N.E.
Relatedly the trial court also found "That [Child] requires treatment and the family requires family counseling that was not being received and is unlikely to be received without the intervention of the Court." (App. Vol. II at 90.) As noted above, this finding is more like a conclusion and we will discuss it here.
When determining whether coercive intervention is necessary, "the question is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child." Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). The same evidence used by the court to determine that a parent's acts or omissions injured or endangered a child may also support that coercive intervention is necessary to safeguard the child. See, e.g., In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (same evidence used to establish more than one element of the parental rights intervention statute), trans. denied; In re V.C., 867 N.E.2d 167, 179 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (same evidence supported CHINS and custody modification).198 N.E.3d 384, 390 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). As we noted above regarding whether Parents' action or inaction seriously endangered Child, the trial court found Parents had not secured residential placement for Child at the time of the fact-finding hearing. Additionally, the trial court found there were times prior to the CHINS petition during which Parents did not provide Child with proper mental health care or medication, specifically when the family was in Florida. Additionally, the trial court found that, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, Parents needed education regarding Child's trauma. Finally, in Finding 11, the trial court found the family needed family counseling that had not yet been received.Therefore, we hold the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court is needed to ensure Child receives the care he needs. Contra Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (reversing CHINS adjudication because DCS did not prove coercive intervention of the court was necessary when parents had made great strides in addressing the issues that resulted in CHINS investigation, retained custody of their children, and were actively participating in treatment), trans. denied.
This finding is supported by the evidence, as there is no evidence Parents had sought family therapy at the time of the fact-finding hearing. Specifically, Mother testified Parkview "never called [them] for one." (Tr. Vol. II at 30.)
3. Whether the dispositional order regarding Mother was an abuse of discretion
[¶46] Mother argues several requirements of the trial court's dispositional order are not related to the CHINS adjudication and thus she should not be required to comply with them. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-19-10, after a child is adjudicated a CHINS,
Father does not make an argument regarding the terms of the dispositional order that apply to him, and Mother cannot assert any objection to the terms that apply to Father. See In re Z.C., 13 N.E.3d 464, 470 (Ind. Ct, App. 2014) (mother could not assert argument regarding error as to father to support her argument), trans. denied.
(a) The juvenile court shall accompany the court's dispositional decree with written findings and conclusions upon the record concerning the following:
(1) The needs of the child for care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement.
(2) The need for participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian in the plan of care for the child.
(3) Efforts made, if the child is a child in need of services, to:
(A) prevent the child's removal from; or
(B) reunite the child with;
the child's parent, guardian, or custodian in accordance with federal law.
(4) Family services that were offered and provided to:
(A) a child in need of services; or
(B) the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; in accordance with federal law.
(5) The court's reasons for the disposition.
Although the juvenile court has broad discretion to determine the programs and services in which a parent must participate, "the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was revealed by the evidence." A.C. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009).
[¶47] The trial court ordered Mother to do several things under the dispositional decree, as noted in the facts of this opinion. The requirements Mother challenges are:
e. Allow the Family Case Manager or other service providers to make announced or unannounced visits to your home, and permit entrance to the home to monitor progress toward compliance with any court order(s).
* * * * *
i. Maintain suitable, safe and stable housing . . .
j. Secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income . . .
* * * * *
l. Ensure that the child is properly clothed, fed and supervised.
m. Not use, consume, manufacture, trade, distribute or sell any illegal controlled substances, and will only take prescription medications for which a valid and current prescription exists and then only in the doses and frequencies specified in the prescription. Not permit the possession, use or consumption of any illegal controlled substances in the home or in the presence of the child.
* * * * *
p. Complete a psychological evaluation(s) as referred and approved by DCS and successfully complete any recommendations that result from the evaluation(s).
q. Meet with medical/psychiatric personnel, as directed by the medical/psychiatric personnel and take all prescribed medications as [sic] in the doses and frequencies specified by the prescriptions.
* * * * *
t. Not commit any actions of domestic violence on anyone including the child . . .(App. Vol. II at 176-8.) Mother contends these requirements are "boilerplate requirements" that are "unrelated to the CHINS adjudication and not supported by the evidence." (Mother's Br. at 26.)
[¶48] For instance, Mother contends the requirement that she permit a Family Case Manager to make announced and unannounced visits to the family home is not relevant to the CHINS matter because "DCS reported that the home was clean, it had working utilities, and no safety hazards were observed." (Id. at 27.) Relatedly, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when it required her to obtain and maintain stable and suitable housing because the trial court's order does not indicate the home is somehow unsuitable. However, it is completely reasonable for the court to order the visits so that DCS can monitor compliance with the trial court's order and ensure the family's housing situation is suitable when Child is ready to return.
[¶49] Additionally, Mother argues the requirement that she keep Child properly clothed, fed, and supervised as well as ensuring he attends school is not needed because there is no evidence that she has failed to provide those things for Child. However, at the time of Child's removal from Mother's care, he was not attending school and Child reported he was only allowed to eat one meal a day. Thus, the record supports the order for this requirement.
[¶50] Mother also challenges the trial court's requirement that she refrain from using illegal substances and prevent Child from using illegal substances. Mother contends there is no evidence Mother or Child used illegal substances. DCS concedes there is no evidence that Mother used illegal substances. However, Child reported to DCS that he drank alcohol and used marijuana. Maintaining a home free of illegal substances will keep those substances away from Child, and thus this requirement is not an abuse of discretion.
[¶51] Mother also argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to not commit any acts of domestic violence toward Father or Child because she had never committed an act of domestic violence against either of them. However, Mother testified that while she had never physically abused Child, "it took everything in her not to do it." (Tr. Vol. II at 68.) Thus, this order was not unreasonable.
[¶52] Additionally, the trial court ordered Mother to obtain and maintain a stable source of income. Mother contends "there is no evidence that Parents have ever lacked a legal and stable source of income." (Mother's Br. at 27.) However, during the initial CHINS hearing on November 30, 2023, Mother testified she was unemployed and did not receive disability benefits. According to the DCS pre-dispositional report, Mother was also unemployed at the time of the dispositional hearing. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it directed her to obtain and maintain employment, because she had not done so by the time of the dispositional hearing.
[¶53] Finally, Mother challenges the trial court's order that she complete a psychological examination, follow all recommendations therefrom, meet with medical/psychiatric personnel, and take all medications as prescribed. She asserts there is no evidence she needs mental health treatment or that she is not taking medication as prescribed. She acknowledges she is grieving the loss of her son and "is dealing with that loss by attending a support group." (Id. at 28.) During the dispositional hearing, DCS told the trial court that if Mother could sign a release indicating she was already engaging in therapy, that provision would not be necessary. It is unclear whether Mother provided that release. As Mother indicated she was already receiving mental health services, she seemingly understood the importance of those services. Thus, as the trial court stated, until she could provide documentation of the services in which she was engaging, the trial court's intervention was needed to help her secure those.
[¶54] In summary, all of the challenged requirements are related to the reasons for Child's removal or to facilitating an environment suitable for Child's return to the home. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Mother to engage in the reunification services she challenges. Contra In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d at 464 (trial court abused its discretion when it ordered mother to participate in "boilerplate" services unrelated to the CHINS adjudication).
Conclusion
[¶55] The trial court's findings were supported by the evidence, and the trial court's conclusions were supported by the trial court's findings. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Mother to participate in certain services as part of its dispositional decree. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶56] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.