Opinion
1:20-cv-49
07-20-2022
ANSON CHI, Petitioner v. WARDEN B. TRATE, Respondent
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by federal prisoner Anson Chi (Petitioner) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
II. Report
A. Background
The procedural and factual history underlying Petitioner's conviction were recently summarized by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (the “sentencing court”):
In June 2012, Movant detonated an improvised explosive device at a natural gas pipeline. Movant's suspected conduct led to his prosecution in the Sherman Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. On July 11, 2012, a grand jury returned a one-count Indictment against Movant for possession of a firearm (i.e., the explosive device) not registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845, 5861(d), and 5871 (Count One).
On August 27, 2012, Counsel for Movant filed a motion for the determination of Movant's competency. The motion was granted, and a psychological evaluation was completed and submitted to the Court on
January 31, 2013. A competency hearing was held on March 4, 2013. The evaluation, which found Movant competent to stand trial, was not contested by either party, and the Court found Movant competent to stand trial.
On February 14, 2013, a grand jury returned a three-count Superseding Indictment, which charged Movant with two additional offenses based on his June 2012 detonation of an improvised explosive device: (1) malicious use of explosive materials in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (Count Two); and (2) using or carrying a destructive device during a crime of violence (i.e., malicious use of explosive materials), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Count Three). Count One of the Superseding Indictment did not change from the original Indictment.
On June 3, 2013, before United States District Judge Richard A. Schell and alongside counsel Brook Busbee and Sminu Peter, Movant pled guilty to Counts One and Two of the Superseding Indictment. In February 2014, Movant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On February 26, 2014, Movant appeared before the Court for a hearing on the motion. After hearing testimony from Movant, the Court granted Movant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court also granted Movant's motion to represent himself. In addition, on March 31, 2014, the Court issued an order granting the agreed motion by counsel Busbee and Peter to withdraw, and appointed Garland Cardwell as Standby Counsel.
On May 14, 2014, a grand jury returned a four-count Second Superseding Indictment, which charged Movant with an additional offense of knowingly making a false declaration before a court in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1623 (Count Four). Counts One, Two, and Three of the Second Superseding Indictment did not change from the Superseding Indictment. Movant pled not guilty on all counts.
On June 30, 2014, Movant proceeded to trial. Later that day, after the jury had been selected, Movant pled guilty to Counts One and Two of the Superseding Indictment pursuant to a written plea agreement. On February 25, 2015, Movant filed a “Motion to Withdraw Involuntary Guilty Plea-The 5-Year Sentence,” alleging that “[n]umerous parties conspired to make him sign in order to cover up all of the misconduct in this case: the police torture of [Movant] for a forced confession, the doctoring of his medical records to conceal everything, etc.” Crim. ECF (Dkt. #176, p. 1). The Court granted a hearing on the motion to be held immediately before the sentencing hearing.
The sentencing hearings were held in May and June of 2015. The District Court denied Movant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
finding that all seven factors set forth in United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 344-45 (5th Cir. 1984), counted against Movant and that Movant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. The District Court granted the Government's request for an upward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) and (D) and imposed a 240-month above Guidelines-range sentence.
On direct appeal, Movant, proceeding pro se, argued that (1) he was forced to sign two involuntary plea agreements and that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) the District Court plainly erred when it used statements from his “involuntary/tortured confession” to enhance his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a) and to upwardly vary from the Guidelines. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Movant's contentions on the merits. United States v. Chi, 708 Fed.Appx. 184, 184-85 (5th Cir. 2017). The Fifth Circuit also determined that the record was not sufficiently developed to consider any ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised by Movant. Id. at 184. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit found that Movant's assertion that the District Court failed to rule on his three petitions for a writ of mandamus ordering an independent medical examination was not supported by the record. Id. at 185. The United States Supreme Court denied Movant's petition for writ of certiorari.Chi v. United States, 2021 WL 5260289, at *1-2 (E.D. Tx. Sept. 1, 2021).
On October 28, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court. Id. The sentencing court denied Petitioner's motion on November 6, 2021. See Chi v. United States, 2021 WL 5239600 (E.D. Tx. Nov. 6, 2021).
In the meantime, Petitioner, citing the sentencing court's lengthy delay in resolving his § 2255 motion, initiated the instant § 2241 petition in this Court on April 3, 2020. ECF No. 7. Petitioner explained that the sentencing court “intentionally delayed the filing of Chi's § 2255 Motion until October 28, 2019 by deliberately throwing away 208 pages in order to stall (dilatory tactic).” Id. at 2. The sentencing court then “vehemently refuse[d] to consider Chi's § 2255 Motion” and “unreasonably delay[ed] its consideration” for several months. Id. at 3-4. According to Chi, the sentencing court's refusal to issue a prompt ruling rendered his remedy under § 2255 inadequate and ineffective, prompting him to request that the undersigned “override the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas” and “permit this habeas corpus petition/application” to proceed. Id. at 4.
Because Petitioner's prior filed § 2255 motion was pending in the sentencing court at the time that he initiated this action, the undersigned, in the interests of judicial economy, held this matter in abeyance while awaiting the sentencing court's decision. As noted above, the sentencing court ultimately denied Petitioner's motion on November 6, 2021.
Notably, Petitioner's underlying claims in this action are, in his own words, taken directly from the § 2255 motion that he filed in the sentencing court. As explained by Petitioner, “[i]n point of fact, page 7 to page 34 [of his § 2241 petition] are exact copies of Chi's § 2255 motion, as is the brief, etc.” Id. at 6. Petitioner also directs the Court to the docket of his § 2255 action for several supporting exhibits and other filings. Id. In each case, Petitioner raised the following claims: (1) he was denied counsel for his petition for certiorari; (2) the Government violated his rights by not mailing its response brief in the direct appeal to his correct address; (3) the District Court violated his right to due process; (4) the District Judge should have recused himself; (5) the Government breached the plea agreement; (6) he received ineffective assistance from his Appellate Counsel; (7) he received ineffective assistance from his Standby Counsel; (8) he received ineffective assistance from his Trial Counsel; (9) his plea of guilty was unconstitutional; (10) the Government might kill him; (11) the District Court violated his right to investigate the facts of the case; (12) the Government illegally used his confession; and (13) cumulative errors require reversal of his conviction. See ECF No. 7 at 7-34.
In response, Respondent maintains that Petitioner's petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner's claims do not fall within the Third Circuit's narrow interpretation of § 2255's savings clause. ECF No. 27. Petitioner having filed a reply, see ECF No. 32, this matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
B. Discussion
For federal prisoners, “[t]he ‘core' habeas corpus action is a prisoner challenging the authority of the entity detaining him to do so, usually on the ground that his predicate sentence or conviction is improper or invalid.” McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 935 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535-38 (3d Cir. 2012). “Two federal statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 & 2255, confer federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by federal inmates.” Cardona, 681 F.3d at 535. Section 2255 motions must be filed in the federal district court that imposed the conviction and sentence the prisoner is challenging. 28 U.SC. § 2255(a). In contrast, a habeas corpus action pursuant to § 2241 must be brought in the custodial court - i.e., the federal district court in the district in which the prisoner is incarcerated. Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2017).
Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners may challenge the validity of their conviction or sentence on collateral review. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). By enacting § 2255, Congress provided “[a] new remedial mechanism” to “replace[] traditional habeas corpus for federal prisoners (at least in the first instance) with a process that allowed the prisoner to file a motion with the sentencing court on the ground that his sentence was, inter alia, imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute's “sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in [traditional] habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum.” Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219; see also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427, 428 n.5 (1962). Thus, “a federal prisoner's first (and most often only) route for collateral review of his conviction or sentence is under § 2255.” Bruce, 868 F.3d at 178.
As for § 2241, that statute “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence.” Cardona, 681 F.3d at 535 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added); Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2005) (defining “execution of” the sentence to mean the manner in which it is “put into effect” or “carr[ied] out”). Two types of claims may ordinarily be litigated in a § 2241 proceeding. First, a prisoner may challenge conduct undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (the “BOP”) that affects the duration of his custody. For example, a prisoner can challenge the manner in which the BOP is computing his federal sentence, see, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990), or the constitutionality of a BOP disciplinary action that resulted in the loss of good conduct sentencing credits, Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). Secondly, a prisoner can challenge BOP conduct that “conflict[s] with express statements in the applicable sentencing judgment.” Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243. The prisoner must “allege that [the] BOP's conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment.” Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536-37 (noting that the phrase “execution of the sentence” includes claims “that the BOP was not properly ‘putting into effect' or ‘carrying out' the directives of the sentencing judgment.”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
Petitioner's claims in the instant § 2241 action do not fall into either of these categories. Rather than attacking the execution of his sentence, Petitioner contends that his conviction should be invalidated due to judicial and governmental misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019). As recounted above, § 2255 ordinarily prohibits a court from entertaining a § 2241 petition filed by a federal prisoner challenging the validity of his underlying conviction or sentence. There is, however, one important statutory exception: where it “appears that the remedy by [§ 2255 motion] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Petitioner relies on this provision, commonly referred to as § 2255's “savings clause,” in the instant action. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 174, 178-79.
Critically, however, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has only recognized one circumstance in which § 2255's remedy has been deemed “inadequate or ineffective”: when a prisoner “had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law may negate.” In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). In its recent decision in Bruce, the Court set forth the two conditions that a federal prisoner must satisfy to take advantage of § 2255's savings clause under Dorsainvil. “First, a prisoner must assert a claim of actual innocence on the theory that he is being detained for conduct that has subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening Supreme Court decision and our own precedent construing an intervening Supreme Court decision - in other words, when there is a change in statutory caselaw that applies retroactively in cases on collateral review.” Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180 (internal quotations omitted). “[S]econd, the prisoner must be ‘otherwise barred from challenging the legality of the conviction under § 2255.'” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2013)).
Appling these principles to the instant case, the Court finds that Petitioner's motion should be dismissed for several reasons. First, Petitioner has already filed a § 2255 petition asserting the precise same issues raised in the instant § 2241 motion. “The Supreme Court has held that the abuse of writ doctrine precludes inmates from relitigating the same issues . . . in subsequent petitions” that have already been rejected. Boardley v. Grondolsky, 343 Fed.Appx. 837, 839-40 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991)). Petitioner's claims in the present case “should therefore be dismissed for abuse of the writ because [they were] dismissed in a previous habeas corpus case.” Sandstrom v. Ebbert, 2019 WL 4127321, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 29, 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)) (“No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus, except as provided in section 2255.”).
The fact that the sentencing court adjudicated Petitioner's § 2255 motion on the merits also prevents him from satisfying the second Bruce condition: that he has been denied an “earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law may negate.” In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. As courts have widely acknowledged, the statutory remedy afforded under § 2241 “is not an additional, alternative, or supplemental remedy to that prescribed under § 2255,” Davis v. Howard, 2021 WL 2786551 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2021), and is not available “merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief” on a petitioner's § 2255 motion. Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255.”). Rather, it is available only when a petitioner has somehow been “barred from challenging the legality of the conviction under § 2255.” Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180. Petitioner plainly faced no such impediment.
To the extent that Petitioner maintained that the sentencing court's unreasonable delay in resolving his § 2255 motion prevented him from challenging the legality of his conviction under § 2255, that argument has been rendered moot by the sentencing court's subsequent decision.
Nor has Petitioner alleged that he is “being detained for conduct that has subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening Supreme Court decision and [Third Circuit] precedent construing an intervening Supreme Court decision.” Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180. Aside from his reference to United States v. Davis, Petitioner primarily attacks the validity of his conviction based on alleged errors and misconduct that occurred during his criminal proceedings and direct appeal rather than because the conduct underlying his conviction has been decriminalized by a subsequent decision from the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 456 Fed.Appx. 79, 81 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We have held that § 2255's ‘safety valve' applies only in rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was convicted renders the petitioner's conduct non-criminal.”). And, while Davis does constitute an intervening Supreme Court decision, Davis established a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law. As such, claims based on Davis are properly asserted in a § 2255 motion rather than a § 2241 petition. Luster v. Warden McKean FCI, 836 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that Davis claims are “precisely the type of constitutional claim that can be pursued in a second or successive § 2255 motion); Torres v. Trate, 2021 WL 6065821, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2021) (rejecting Davis claim in a § 2241 action because “Section 2255 provide[d] a direct avenue for [petitioner] to seek relief”). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). Indeed, Petitioner took advantage of this direct avenue for relief by raising his Davis claim in his unsuccessful § 2255 motion in the sentencing court.
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the definition of a “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague.
In short, the Court lacks jurisdiction over any of Petitioner's claims. This deficiency is fatal to his § 2241 petition.
Further, even if the Court did have jurisdiction over any of Petitioner's claims, it would recommend denial based on the persuasive reasoning of the sentencing court's opinion rejecting those claims on collateral review. See Chi, 2021 WL 5260289.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's § 2241 petition. As such, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed, with prejudice.
Because “[f]ederal prisoner appeals from the denial of a habeas corpus proceeding are not governed by the certificate of appealability requirement,” the Court need not make a certificate of appealability determination in this matter. Williams v. McKean, 2019 WL 1118057, at *5 n. 6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2019) (citing United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012)); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B).
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).