Opinion
165871/2006.
Decided October 7, 2008.
Gary Tsirelman PC, Brooklyn, NY, Counsel for Plaintiff.
Votto Cassata, LLP, Staten Island, NY, Counsel for Defendant.
In this action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5101 et seq to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits claimed to be due and owing under a policy of insurance issued by the defendant, defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the action on the ground that plaintiff did not commence the action within the six-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR § 213. Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted admissible proof establishing that it received the underlying claim for first-party no-fault benefits on November 15, 2000, that it had issued a denial of the claim on November 29, 2000 on the ground that plaintiff's assignor failed to attend an examination under oath ("EUO") and that it had mailed a copy of the denial of claim to the plaintiff on the same day it was issued. Plaintiff commenced the action on December 1, 2006. Defendant argues that pursuant to CPLR § 213, plaintiff was required to commence the action within six years from November 29, 2000 and that the commencement of the action on December 1, 2006 was untimely.
It is now fairly well settled that an action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits under a policy of insurance is fundamentally a breach of contract action subject to the six-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR § 213 ( see Mandarino v. Travelers Property Cas. Ins. Co. , 37 AD3d 775 , 831 NYS2d 452 [2nd Dep't 2007]; Benson v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 134 AD2d 214, 215, 521 NYS2d 14 [1st Dep't1987], lv. denied 71 NY2d 801, 527 NYS2d 767, 522 NE2d 1065; Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Glenwood Medical, P.C. , 48 AD3d 319 , 319-320, 853 NYS2d 26, 26 [1st Dep't 2008]). The statute of limitations in a breach of contract action begins to run at the time the contract is breached, which in this case was when benefits become overdue ( see Benson, 134 AD2d at 215; New Era Acupuncture, P.C. v. MVAIC, 18 Misc 3d 139(A), 2008 NY Slip Op. 50353(U) [App Term 2nd 11 Jud Dists]. Benefits became overdue when the defendant failed to pay the claim within 30 days of November 15, 2000, when it received proof of the claim ( see Insurance Law § 5106[a]; NYCRR § 65-3.8; Benson, 134 AD2d at 215; Micha v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Company, 94 AD2d 835, 463 NYS2d 110 [3rd Dep't 1983]). The commencement of the action on December 1, 2000 was therefore timely.
The fact that the defendant may have repudiated the contract on November 29, 2000 when it issued a denial of the claim and mailed a copy of the denial to the defendant does alter this result. Under the doctrine of anticipatory breach, where one party clearly and unequivocally repudiates his contractual obligations under a contract prior to the time performance is required, the non-repudiating party may deem the contract breached and immediately sue for damages (see American List Corp. v. U.S. News World Report, 75 NY2d 38, 550 NYS2d 590, 549 NE2d 1161; De Lorenzo v. Bac Agency Inc., 256 AD2d 906, 908, 681 NYS2d 846, 848 [3rd Dep't 1998]; Long Is. R.R. Co. v. Northville Indus. Corp., 41 NY2d 455, 463, 393 NYS2d 925, 362 NE2d 558).
While the plaintiff may have been entitled to bring the action under the doctrine of anticipatory breach when the defendant denied the claim, even though the 30 day period in which defendant had to pay the claim had yet to expire, plaintiff was well within its rights to elect to keep the contract in force and await the designated time for performance before bringing suit ( Ga Nun v. Palmer, 202 NY 483, 493, 96 N.E. 99; see also, Rachmani Corp. v. 9 East 96th Street Apartment Corp., 211 AD2d 262, 266, 629 NYS2d 382, 384 [1st Dep't 1995]). As the Court of Appeals wrote in Ga Nun: "The man who wrongfully renounces a contract into which he has deliberately entered cannot justly complain if he is immediately sued for a compensation in damages by the man whom he has injured; and it seems reasonable to allow an option to the injured party, either to sue immediately, or to wait until the time when the act was to be done, still holding it as prospectively binding for the exercise of this option, which may be advantageous to the innocent party, and cannot be prejudicial to the wrongdoer" ( Ga Nun, 202 NY at 490-491, 96 N.E. at 101 — 102, citing Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 Ellis Blackburn, 678). For the above reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
Turning to plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, in Dan Medical, P.C. v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2006]) the Appellate Term held that absent a sufficient foundation to demonstrate that the plaintiff's claim forms constituted evidence in admissible form as business records, the "plaintiff failed to tender proof in evidentiary form to establish its prima facie case" (id. at 47). The Dan Medical Court further held that any admissions by the defendant regarding receipt of the plaintiff's claim forms "did not concede the facts asserted in the claim forms and it remained plaintiff's burden to proffer such evidence in admissible form, which it failed to do" ( id.; see also Bajaj v. General Assur., 18 Misc 3d 25 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2007]; Midborough Acupuncture, P.C. v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 13 Misc 3d 132[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51879[U] [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2006]).
Here, plaintiff's submissions are devoid of any admissible proof, such as an affidavit from someone familiar with plaintiff's business practices, establishing the admissibility of the claim form as a business record. Accordingly, plaintiff did not establish its prima facie case of entitlement to summary judgment notwithstanding defendant's admission that it received the claim on November 15, 2000. Plaintiff's failure to make out a prima facie case of entitlement to summary judgment mandates the denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of opposing papers ( Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851, 487 NYS2d 316).
For the above reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment are DENIED.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.