Opinion
No. CV 07-5009030
November 9, 2007
RULING ON OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND #115
Docket No. 115 is a faxed objection file stamped August 10, 2007. Docket No. 117 is a duplicate objection file stamped August 13, 2007.
This action arises out of injuries and damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiff, Alexander Chen, as a result of an automobile collision on February 23, 2005. On February 22, 2007, the plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against the defendants, Santiago Gutierrez, Luis Ruiz-Rosas and Camrac, Inc., alleging that Gutierrez's vehicle rear-ended Ruiz-Rosas' vehicle thereby causing it to collide with Chen's vehicle on Interstate 84 in East Hartford. In counts one and two, the plaintiff alleges negligence and carelessness on the part of Gutierrez and Ruiz-Rosas, respectively. Count three alleges vicarious liability pursuant to § 14-154a, § 52-182, and § 52-183 against Camrac, who owned and rented the vehicle to Ruiz-Rosas.
On March 23, 2007, Camrac filed a motion to strike count three on the basis that § 14-154a is preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 30106, also known as the Graves Amendment, which prohibits states from imposing liability on a non-negligent owner for damages caused by a rented motor vehicle. In its memorandum in support of its motion to strike, Camrac quotes the language of 49 U.S.C. § 30106, which requires that a plaintiff allege negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner of the vehicle in order to maintain a claim for vicarious liability.
49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) states "An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person . . . shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle . . . for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)."
On August 3, 2007, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend his complaint by adding specific acts of negligence as to the defendant Camrac in the third count, and by clarifying the exact location of the motor vehicle accident. Ruiz-Rosas and Camrac have objected to the plaintiff's request for leave to amend, on the ground that the plaintiff is attempting to assert a new cause of action which is barred by General Statutes § 52-584, a two-year statute of limitations. They argue that the plaintiff is attempting to preserve his claim against Camrac, in light of the motion to strike which has yet to be acted upon.
In his request for leave to amend, the plaintiff also requested to clarify the exact location of the subject motor vehicle accident in counts one and two. The proposed amendment, in paragraphs one and two of count one, paragraph one of count two, and incorporated into count three, simply explain in greater detail where the accident occurred. Although Camrac and Ruiz-Rosas generally objected to the request for leave to amend, they did not specifically object to or argue against the request to clarify the exact location of the accident in their memorandum of law in support of their objection. Rather, their objection and argument solely concerned the allegations of negligence against Camrac. The request for leave to amend insofar as it seeks to clarify the exact location of the motor vehicle accident is deemed to have been consented to. Practice Book § 10-60(a)(3).
In amending a complaint, it is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same. Giglio v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 239 (1980). "An amendment to a complaint that sets up a new and different cause of action speaks as of the date when it is filed." Felsted v. Kimberly Auto Services, Inc., 25 Conn.App. 665, 667, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 922 (1991). A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief . . . It is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same, but where an entirely new and different factual situation is presented, a new and different cause of action is stated . . . Our relation back doctrine provides that an amendment relates back when the original complaint has given the party fair notice that a claim is being asserted stemming from a particular transaction or occurrence, thereby serving the objectives of our statute of limitations, namely, to protect parties from having to defend against stale claims." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 775 (2006).
The plaintiff cannot argue that he is simply amplifying and expanding what is already in the original complaint, because a cause of action in negligence results in Camrac's having to "gather different facts, evidence and witnesses to defend the amended claim." Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 549 (1991). See also Mastroanni v. Frankson Fence Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 04 4000598 (July 25, 2007, Jones, J.). Further, negligence has been found to be a separate cause of action, distinct from an action for vicarious liability. Miller v. Natchaug Hospital, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. CV 126723 (September 3, 2004, Hurley, J.T.R.); Kolek v. Welch Enterprises, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CT 98 0584406 (June 18, 2002, Beach, J.) [32 Conn. L. Rptr. 459].
The plaintiff's requested amendment concerns a vehicular accident that occurred on February 23, 2005. The negligence allegations against Camrac in the proposed amendment do not relate back to the original complaint filed February 22, 2007 because they involve different facts. Thus, the amendment is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584.
The defendants' objection to the request for leave to amend is sustained as to the allegations of negligence against Camrac. The request for leave to amend insofar as it seeks to clarify the exact location of the motor vehicle accident is deemed to have been consented to. Practice Book § 10-60(a)(3).