Opinion
No. 05-03-00724-CV
Opinion Filed October 13, 2004.
On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02-05541-I.
Affirm.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sonya L. Chapman, acting pro se, appeals the take-nothing summary judgments granted in favor of ExxonMobil Corporation. Chapman sued ExxonMobil alleging race and sex discrimination, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, retaliation, and negligence. In six issues, Chapman contends generally that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment and by allowing ExxonMobil to rely on certain summary judgment evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Chapman was employed by ExxonMobil for approximately six weeks as a cashier at one of its retail stores. After an altercation with a co-worker, Chapman was arrested for assault. The same day, Chapman was fired for damaging company property, inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily injury on company time or on company property, and using profane or abusive language on company property. Thereafter, Chapman filed suit against ExxonMobil alleging race and sex discrimination, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, retaliation, and negligence.
ExxonMobil filed a traditional motion for summary judgment as to all of Chapman's claims and a no evidence motion as to four of the claims. The trial court determined the negligence claim was barred by the Texas Worker's Compensation Act, and granted the traditional summary judgment motion on that claim, denying summary judgment on Chapman's remaining claims. ExxonMobil later filed a second motion for summary judgment, contending there is no evidence to support Chapman's claims; Chapman failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit; and certain claims were barred by limitations. The trial court found that Chapman had failed to (1) establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, race discrimination, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, and retaliation; (2) failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her claims of sexual harassment, hostile work environment, retaliation, and race discrimination; and (3) her claims were barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal followed.
We begin by noting that a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Clemens v. Allen, 47 S.W.3d 26, 28 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.). While it is true that pro se pleadings and briefs are to be liberally construed, this does not mean that a pro se litigant is not required to comply with applicable rules. To do otherwise would be to give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
The rules of appellate procedure require an appellant's brief to contain "a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). An issue on appeal unsupported by argument or citation to any legal authority presents nothing for this Court to review. Birnhaum v. Law Offices of G. David Westfall, 120 S.W.3d 470, 477 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied). Similarly, we cannot speculate as to the substance of the specific issues appellant claims we must address. Strange v. Con'l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied). This Court has no duty to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether the error complained of occurred. Id.
Here, Chapman lists six issues in her brief contending the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of ExxonMobil. Her argument for all six issues is contained in a two and one-half page single-spaced discussion. Chapman does not identify how the trial court's summary judgment consideration and ruling were erroneous, other than to present argument, without authority or citation to the record, that the reason stated by ExxonMobil for her termination was "pretextual as defendants showed preferential treatment towards [her coworker]." In her argument under these six issues, Chapman does not at any point reference a specific page or specific summary judgment evidence contained in mulit-volume record. Further, although Chapman contends the trial court erred by allowing ExxonMobil to "use their interrogatory answers offensively as competent summary judgment evidence" she does not cite this Court to the specific evidence she is complaining of, nor to where she objected to or obtained a ruling on the complained-of evidence. Although her discussion contains citations, they are to the general law applicable to summary judgment and sex discrimination and she fails to explain how those authorities are applicable to the facts in this case. Because Chapman has failed to provide any meaningful analysis or discussion of the specific findings by the trial court on her claims, we cannot conclude that Chapman's briefing is adequate to present error for this Court's review.
On November 26, 2003, the Court informed Chapman by letter that her original brief in this case was deficient. On January 30, 2004, the Court struck that brief. The brief referenced in this discussion is Chapman's amended brief.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.