Opinion
No. C 02-02004 WHA
September 12, 2003
JUDGMENT
For the reasons stated in the Court's summary-judgment order dated September 12, 2003, judgement is hereby entered in favor of defendant Ramada Plaza Hotel and against plaintiff Ian Chan.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION
In this action for employment discrimination, defendant Ramada Plaza Hotel moves for summary judgment on the ground that pro se plaintiff Ian Chan cannot make a prima facie showing of race discrimination under Title VII. On several occasions, the Court admonished plaintiff that he needed to raise a triable issue of fact to withstand summary judgment. He failed to do so. This order grants defendant's motion for summary judgment.STATEMENT
Plaintiff began working for defendant as a full-time bellman in May 1993. By mid-1999, plaintiff was the most senior bellman and worked only two days per week. Plaintiff worked part-time until late August 2001, when defendant implemented a new method of assigning shifts and plaintiff's work status was changed from part-time to on-call. Plaintiff is an African American.
The complaint alleges that in August 2001 plaintiff was deprived of his seniority rights with respect to work schedules on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff states that "I feel I have been discriminated and have been forced out of my seniority rights. When it comes to scheduling employees in my department, there has been favoritism and arrangement made for other employees hired after me to meet their needs in scheduling their hours" (Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff claims that bellman Justin Green, who is Caucasian, was treated better because of his race and that Mark Matthieu, defendant's front desk manager, made revisions to the work schedule to accommodate Mr. Green but refused a similar request made by plaintiff. Mr. Matthieu is also Caucasian.
There is no dispute that in the summer of 2001 defendant changed the way shifts were assigned to its bellmen. Apparently, too many bellmen were working part-time shifts but still receiving a full contribution by defendant to the cost of their union-administered employee health and welfare benefits. To cut costs and boost employee morale, defendant instituted a bid schedule that limited the number of part-time shifts in favor of full-time and on-call shifts (Matthieu Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Lee Decl. ¶¶ 8-9).
When the new bid schedule was offered, plaintiff purportedly resisted because he wanted to work the more lucrative shifts but on a part-time basis (Matthieu Decl. ¶ 4). Plaintiff complained to his manager, Ralph Lee, who instructed plaintiff to draft a proposed bid schedule for Mr. Matthieu's consideration ( id. at ¶ 5). Mr. Matthieu told plaintiff that his preferences would be accommodated so long as they did not compromise defendant's new scheduling policy (ibid.). Plaintiff submitted two proposed bid schedules (DeSouza Decl. Exh. D), but neither met defendant's requirement that the bellmen work primarily full-time shifts (Lee Decl. ¶ 6). When his scheduling requests were rejected, plaintiff failed to submit a bid and was assigned a remaining on-call shift ( id. ¶ 13).
Defendant does not deny that it modified the bid schedule to accommodate the requests of two other employees, Justin Green, who is Caucasian, and Sam Morse, an African American (Matthieu Decl. ¶ 6). Defendant, however, did so because the proposed modifications caused by accommodating these employees did not change the overall number of shifts to be worked by the bellmen ( ibid.).
In September 2001. plaintiff filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging race discrimination, and a notice-of-right-to-sue letter was issued January 24, 2002. The instant action was filed April 24, 2002.
ANALYSIS
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In the absence of such facts, "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
In a Title VII employment-discrimination case like this one, courts apply the "shifting burdens" analytical framework at the summary-judgment stage. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-04 (1973). The employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision. Ibid. If the employer does so, the plaintiff must show that the articulated reason is pre-textual "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). The employee bears the ultimate burden of proof throughout to establish intentional discrimination by the employer. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993).
Because plaintiff did not properly oppose defendant's summary-judgment motion, the record consists of facts as presented by defendant. The resulting void is significant because a party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings. Indeed, where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, Rule 56(e) requires that it go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Absent such a showing, a properly supported motion for summary judgment may be granted if the court finds it appropriate. Nilsson, Robbins et al v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988).
Although the mere fact that no opposition is filed does not excuse the moving party from meeting its burden on the summary-judgment motion, if no factual showing is made in opposition, the district court is not required to search the record sua sponte for some genuine issue of material fact. It may rely entirely on the evidence designated by the moving party showing no such triable issue. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2001).
It is here noted that plaintiff was given every opportunity to meet his burden on summary judgment. He was also notified of the consequences of failing to do so. Compare Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting pro se non-prisoner plaintiff's argument that district court had duty to advise him of the measures he should take to oppose defendant's summary-judgment motion), with Vital v. Interfaith Med, Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620 (2nd Cir. 1999) (failure to apprise pro se litigants of consequences of failing to respond to summary-judgment motion is ground for reversal). This Court informed plaintiff at the initial case management conference that defendant intended to move for summary judgment and that plaintiff needed to review Rule 56 and timely respond to the motion. Plaintiff also was instructed as to where he could obtain copies of the applicable federal and local rules. He failed, however, to file an opposition.
Nevertheless, at the summary-judgment hearing on September 24, 2003, the Court gave plaintiff one last chance to demonstrate why a ruling should not be entered in defendant's favor. Plaintiff was given one more week to file with the clerk an opposition, in proper format and with declarations or affidavits, setting forth facts to support his claims of racial discrimination. Instead, plaintiff sent the Court a letter dated September 10, 2003, which stated the following:
(1) I have reviewed their records accordance to my own and still feel I have a strong case with evidence, along with witnesses whom are willing to stand before the court and defend my allegations of racial discrimination conduct. (2) per my records and witnesses I can prove that there had been continuous favoritism against me in the scheduling and with other issues, also in regards to my termination, with witnesses I can prove it was done in a discriminatory manner (3) due to continuous changes with new Management Procedures which caused continuous conflicts, intimidation and harassments. I feel strongly that the Defendant are strongly trying to get this case dropped from going to trial because they do not want disclosed the true facts of my claims. (4) I Ian Chan have personal knowledge, have experienced and under oath with my facts and witnesses can prove this to be true facts.
These additional allegations do nothing for plaintiff's case.
On this record, this order finds that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To overcome this first hurdle in the burden-shifting analysis, a Title VII plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for an employment position; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly-situated employees not in plaintiff's protected class were treated more favorably. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2002). The evidence in this regard need only give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff's complaint for race discrimination revolves around the accommodations given Justin Green, a Caucasian bellman, during the bid-scheduling process of August 2001, which relegated plaintiff from part-time to on-call status. According to plaintiff, Mr. Matthieu, who is also Caucasian, made revisions to the bid schedule to accommodate Mr. Green but refused a similar request made by plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, submits no evidence to support his allegation that Mr. Green was treated any differently in the bidding process because of his race.
Plaintiff's complaint is a standard-form employment-discrimination complaint for pro se plaintiff's and does not clearly set forth plaintiff's claims. Defendant, however, scoured through the record, including plaintiff's deposition testimony, for conduct that plaintiff could potentially allege as discriminatory. For example, defendant's motion also addresses two verbal confrontations that plaintiff allegedly had with a bell captain and a chef employed by defendant (Br. 7-8), plaintiff's complaint, as well as the materials he submitted to the EEOC, refer to defendant's implementation of the bid schedule as the source of alleged discrimination. Since plaintiff did not properly allege any additional instances of discrimination, this order need not address them.
The facts show that although defendant did modify the bid schedule to accommodate Mr. Green, a similar revision was made to accommodate Sam Morse, an African American bellman (Matthieu Decl. ¶ 6). The proposed modifications were approved in both instances because the accommodations did not change the overall number of shifts to be worked by the bellmen ( ibid.). Plaintiff, like Mr. Green and Mr. Morse, was told that revisions to the bid schedule would be made to accommodate personal preferences so long as the modifications did not interfere with defendant's goal of reducing the costs associated with paying full-time benefits to part-time employees. Neither of plaintiff's proposals met defendant's requirements ( ibid.). Plaintiff thereafter failed to bid for work and he was assigned a remaining on-call shift (Lee Decl. ¶ 13). Plaintiff has put nothing before the Court to dispute these facts.
Plaintiff's allegations, on their own, are not enough at summary judgment to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. As a matter of law, this order holds that no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff was relegated to on-call status because of his race.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall CLOSE the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.