Opinion
A-13682 7124
07-31-2024
NICHOLAS CHAMBERLAIN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Barbara Dunham, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Trial Court No. 3AN-15-06398 CI Michael L. Wolverton, Judge.
Barbara Dunham, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WOLLENBERG, JUDGE
Nicholas Chamberlain pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree murder and a consolidated count of third-degree assault after he stabbed his ex-girlfriend multiple times and then used the knife to threaten bystanders who tried to intervene. The court imposed a composite sentence of 62 years with 20 years suspended (42 years to serve). This Court affirmed Chamberlain's sentence on direct appeal.
AS 11.41.100 & AS 11.31.100(a), and AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A), respectively. The underlying judgment in Chamberlain's criminal case indicates that he pleaded no contest to these charges, even though the log notes of the change of plea hearing indicate that he pleaded guilty. Our opinion on Chamberlain's direct appeal similarly refers inconsistently to two different pleas. Chamberlain v. State, 2014 WL 5307844, at *1 (Alaska App. Oct. 15, 2014) (unpublished). We have listened to the audio recording of the change of plea hearing, and it is clear from that hearing that Chamberlain pleaded guilty.
Chamberlain, 2014 WL 5307844, at *1.
Chamberlain subsequently filed an application for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from the two attorneys who represented him in the trial court. The State filed a motion to dismiss Chamberlain's application for failure to state a prima facie case for relief, and the superior court granted the State's motion. Chamberlain now appeals the superior court's order dismissing his post-conviction relief application.
For the reasons explained in this decision, we reject Chamberlain's claims and affirm the superior court's dismissal of his post-conviction relief application.
Underlying facts and procedural history
Nicholas Chamberlain and Lori Miebs, both high school students, dated for about nine months until Miebs broke up with Chamberlain. About three months after they broke up, Chamberlain asked Miebs to come with him into the woods near their high school so he could give her a ring as a "peace offering." Once they were in the woods, Chamberlain told Miebs to tilt her head back and close her eyes so he could show her a magic trick. When Miebs complied, Chamberlain stabbed her in the neck with a knife. Miebs tried to escape and run toward the school but Chamberlain caught up with her and continued his attack.
These facts are taken from our opinion resolving Chamberlain's direct appeal. See id.
Several bystanders tried to intervene. One bystander called 911 and managed to knock Chamberlain off Miebs, but was forced to retreat when Chamberlain threatened him with the knife. Chamberlain ended the attack after stabbing Miebs a total of seventy-six times. He then walked off on a nearby trail and hid the knife and his coat under foliage.
As a result of this incident, Chamberlain was charged with attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault, tampering with physical evidence, and three counts of third-degree assault (for threatening the bystanders with the knife). Chamberlain was arraigned in December 2009, and the court appointed the Public Defender Agency to represent him. The following month, the Public Defender Agency withdrew due to a conflict of interest, and the court appointed the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) to represent Chamberlain.
AS 11.41.100 & AS 11.31.100, AS 11.41.200(a)(1), AS 11.56.610(a)(1), and AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A), respectively. Although Chamberlain was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses, his case was automatically waived into adult court due to the nature of the charges. See AS 47.12.030(a)(1) (providing that the delinquency rules do not apply when a juvenile who is at least sixteen years old at the time of the offense is charged with an unclassified felony).
An OPA attorney entered an appearance on behalf of Chamberlain and represented Chamberlain until the attorney left OPA in August 2010. At that point, another attorney from OPA was assigned to Chamberlain's case. On numerous occasions over the course of their representation, both attorneys waived, on Chamberlain's behalf, his speedy trial time under Alaska Criminal Rule 45.
In this opinion, we will refer to Chamberlain's attorneys from OPA as his "first" and "second" trial attorneys, even though Chamberlain was briefly represented by the Public Defender Agency at the outset of his case.
Eventually, in September 2012, Chamberlain pleaded guilty to one count of attempted murder and a consolidated count of third-degree assault, and the court imposed a composite sentence of 62 years with 20 years suspended (42 years to serve). We affirmed Chamberlain's sentence on direct appeal.
Chamberlain, 2014 WL 5307844, at *1.
Chamberlain then filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief, and the court appointed an attorney to represent him. The attorney filed an amended application, raising three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Chamberlain's amended post-conviction relief application also incorporated his original pro se application, which raised several additional claims.
First, Chamberlain's post-conviction attorney contended that Chamberlain's trial attorneys "did not adequately discuss the case with [Chamberlain] to evaluate his defense or to determine whether or not he wanted to go to trial." According to the amended application, neither of Chamberlain's trial attorneys ever consulted with Chamberlain about "the specific facts of his case," and as a result, the attorneys "were not able to develop [Chamberlain's] theory of his case," which was that he "did not act with intent because there was no connection between his mind and body and he was unable to control his actions."
Second, Chamberlain's post-conviction attorney claimed that both of Chamberlain's trial attorneys waived Chamberlain's speedy trial time under Alaska Criminal Rule 45 when "he was not present, without his consent, and despite his requests that his Rule 45 rights not be waived." The attorney also argued that, even assuming Chamberlain's trial attorneys did discuss Rule 45 with him, they did not adequately explain the rule to him, given that he was a juvenile.
Third, Chamberlain's post-conviction attorney claimed that the trial attorney who took over Chamberlain's case in August 2010 "threatened [Chamberlain] to enter a guilty plea." Chamberlain argued that, as a result, he did not voluntarily plead guilty.
In support of his request for post-conviction relief, Chamberlain submitted his own affidavit. In his affidavit, Chamberlain acknowledged attacking Miebs but asserted that he was operating "outside [his] body" and lacked the intent to hurt Miebs - statements he shared with his second trial attorney. He contended that his attorneys did not explain his constitutional rights to him and had waived his Rule 45 speedy trial time without his permission. He also stated that his second attorney "threaten[ed him] with 99 years in prison if [he] did not take the deal," and that, after nineteen months, the attorney "wore [him] down," and he agreed to plead guilty.
Chamberlain's post-conviction attorney also submitted an affidavit from the second of Chamberlain's two trial attorneys. In the affidavit, the attorney briefly recounted his memory of Chamberlain's case, stating in relevant part:
I know that I waived time during the pendency of the case.... I remember discussing Rule 45 with Nicholas Chamberlain and I believe I sent him letters discussing it....
I don't remember threatening Nicholas Chamberlain.... I remember driving down to Spring Creek [Correctional Center] to discuss the case and pleas with Nicholas Chamberlain.
The State then filed a motion to dismiss Chamberlain's post-conviction relief application for failure to state a prima facie case for relief. The State also argued that Chamberlain had failed to support his claims with an affidavit from both of his trial attorneys.
Chamberlain's post-conviction attorney opposed the State's motion to dismiss and included an affidavit from Chamberlain's other trial attorney. This attorney, who represented Chamberlain from January to August 2010, only addressed Chamberlain's Rule 45 claim. The attorney explained that he had discussed Rule 45 with Chamberlain over several conversations and that Chamberlain had agreed to waive his Rule 45 time in order to enter a beneficial youth program within the correctional center. The attorney stated that he "took extra care with Mr. Chamberlain when explaining his rights and the progress of the case due to his young age, his unfamiliarity with the criminal justice system, and the serious nature of the charges."
The parties then filed additional motion work. The State again asked the court to dismiss Chamberlain's application and argued that the filing of a second trial attorney affidavit had not cured the substantive deficiencies of his claims. Chamberlain's post-conviction attorney again opposed the State's motion and reiterated his prior arguments. And the State filed a reply to Chamberlain's second opposition, again advocating for dismissal of the application.
Seven months later, the superior court held a telephonic hearing. As the parties on appeal both acknowledge, the purpose of this hearing is not clear from the record.
At the outset of the hearing, the superior court stated that it had reviewed the parties' briefing and then asked Chamberlain's attorney if he was going to present any witnesses. The attorney responded that he could have Chamberlain "testify in support of the things that we have laid out in the amended application for postconviction relief." The court agreed, and Chamberlain was placed under oath.
Chamberlain testified that he met with his first trial attorney two or three times, but that they never discussed the allegations, evidence, or possible defenses. He testified that he was able to talk to his second trial attorney about the case and that they discussed his defense to the charges "several times." Chamberlain claimed, however, that these discussions did not provide him with a sufficient opportunity to discuss his case because the attorney would always bring up the risks of proceeding to trial, the amount of jail time Chamberlain was facing, and the additional harm a trial might cause to the victim.
Chamberlain testified that he was "aware" that his trial attorneys were waiving Rule 45, but that he did not give them permission to do so because he did not understand what the rule meant. He testified that neither attorney explained the details of Rule 45 to him, nor how the rule operated. At the same time, Chamberlain testified that he "always objected and said [he] did not want to waive Rule 45." Instead, he wanted to proceed to trial to present his explanation of what happened; he pleaded guilty because he "felt that it was the only way to put . . . [the] case behind us."
Finally, Chamberlain testified that he felt threatened by his second attorney to plead guilty because of all the conversations they had about the downsides and risks of going to trial. He stated that he felt intimidated by his attorney at the change of plea hearing, and that when he initially told the court he was not satisfied by his representation, the attorney "glared" at him - which caused him to change his answer and tell the court that he was satisfied and wanted to plead guilty.
Following Chamberlain's testimony, the attorneys presented additional arguments. Chamberlain's post-conviction attorney argued that the amended application presented a prima facie case for relief and that there were genuine issues of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. The State argued that Chamberlain had not presented a basis for post-conviction relief.
Three days after the telephonic hearing, the superior court issued an order granting the State's motion to dismiss. The entirety of the order stated:
On April 14, 2015, Nicholas Chamberlain filed an application for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel by inadequately discussing the case and Rule 45 with him and by threatening him into a plea deal because they explained that if he were to proceed to trial, he would face 99 years in jail. An evidentiary hearing was held on 5/11/2020. To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the applicant must demonstrate that his attorneys' performances were deficient and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Chamberlain has not met those thresholds, and therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the application for post-conviction relief is DISMISSED.
Chamberlain now appeals the superior court's order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief.
Chamberlain's application was in the first phase of litigation at the time of dismissal
When a defendant files an application for post-conviction relief, there are generally three phases to the litigation. At the first phase, the application and supporting documents must set out facts which, if true, would entitle the applicant to relief. The State must respond on the merits or, in lieu of doing so, may file a motion to dismiss on the basis that the application has not set out a prima facie case for relief.If the State files a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the court must then determine whether the application sets out a prima facie case.
See Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1 (c)-(d), (f)-(g); State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 565 (Alaska App. 1988).
Jones, 759 P.2d at 565.
Id.; see also Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(f).
Jones, 759 P.2d at 565.
The second phase begins when the State files its response on the merits.During this phase, the parties have "the full range of discovery mechanisms" available to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists. Either party may move for summary disposition, and the court will grant summary disposition when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
Id. at 566.
Id.
The third phase - an evidentiary hearing - is "required when, upon completion of the discovery and summary disposition phase, genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved." Following the evidentiary hearing, "the court is required to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law disposing of all issues raised."
Id.
Id.
In this case, the court employed an ad hoc process that blurred some of the lines separating these three phases of post-conviction relief litigation. At the telephonic proceeding, Chamberlain's attorney seemed to argue both that Chamberlain had established a prima facie case for relief (the standard to survive a motion to dismiss in the first phase of post-conviction relief litigation) and that Chamberlain had demonstrated there were genuine issues of material fact (the standard to survive a motion for summary disposition in the second phase of the litigation). Indeed, even though the State had not yet responded to Chamberlain's claims on the merits, the court nonetheless heard testimony from Chamberlain regarding his claims. And in its order, the superior court granted the State's motion to dismiss (on the pleadings), but referred to the telephonic proceeding as an "evidentiary hearing."
On appeal, the parties agree that, despite the irregular procedure followed in this case, Chamberlain's application was still in the first phase of the post-conviction relief litigation and Chamberlain's testimony was simply a supplement to his application. Thus, to survive the State's motion to dismiss, Chamberlain only had to present a prima facie case for relief - i.e., the application needed to set out facts which, if true, would entitle Chamberlain to relief.
We have recognized that there is "a need for flexibility in implementing and administering the procedural requirements of Criminal Rule 35.1," and that in some instances, "the most efficient and desirable means of resolving a claim may be to hold an evidentiary hearing relatively early on, with little attendant formality." Id. But when the court deviates from the standard procedures in a post-conviction case, the court must make clear for the parties the procedural posture of the case - in particular, the nature and purpose of the hearing. See id.
See Jones, 759 P.2d at 565.
The parties dispute, however, whether the superior court applied the proper standard to evaluate whether Chamberlain's post-conviction relief application established such a prima facie case.
As Chamberlain points out, the language used in the superior court's order does appear to reflect the application of a higher standard than that required to evaluate whether Chamberlain's application could survive the State's motion to dismiss. At this first stage in the proceedings, the court was required to treat all well-pleaded assertions of fact in Chamberlain's application (as supplemented by his testimony) as true, and then decide whether these assertions of fact (if ultimately proved) would entitle Chamberlain to post-conviction relief. But the court's order tended to suggest that it was evaluating Chamberlain's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the merits, which would have been improper given that this was the first phase of the litigation and the parties had not been afforded the opportunity to complete discovery or conduct a full evidentiary hearing.
See LaBrake v. State, 152 P.3d 474, 480 (Alaska App. 2007).
Nevertheless, we need not definitively resolve this issue because we review de novo the superior court's decision to dismiss Chamberlain's application for failure to state a prima facie case.
See David v. State, 372 P.3d 265, 269 (Alaska App. 2016) (recognizing that this Court reviews de novo the legal question of whether a post-conviction relief applicant has set forth a prima facie case for relief).
Why we conclude that Chamberlain did not plead a prima facie case for relief
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Chamberlain failed to establish a prima facie case for relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Chamberlain first argued that his trial attorneys did not "adequately discuss the case with him to evaluate his defense or to determine whether or not he wanted to go to trial." But Chamberlain's assertions were conclusory in nature, and the factual support he did provide directly undermined his claims.
See LaBrake, 152 P.3d at 481, 488 (explaining that a court is not obliged to accept an applicant's conclusory assertions as true and noting that the applicant had "provided no facts to support [his] assertion of attorney incompetence" and that the record actually supported the opposite conclusion).
In Chamberlain's amended application, Chamberlain's post-conviction attorney asserted that neither of Chamberlain's trial attorneys ever consulted with him about the specific facts of his case. Chamberlain's first attorney did not precisely address this point in his affidavit, but he did state that he "took extra care with Mr. Chamberlain when explaining his rights and the progress of the case due to his young age, his unfamiliarity with the criminal justice system, and the serious nature of the charges." This attorney also only represented Chamberlain for roughly the first eight months of the proceedings, during which time Chamberlain entered into a special youth program within the correctional facility.
Chamberlain's second attorney, who represented him for the majority of his case and who advised him on the State's plea offer, did respond to Chamberlain's assertion that they had never discussed the facts of the case. The attorney stated that he remembered "driving down to Spring Creek [Correctional Center] to discuss the case and pleas with Nicholas Chamberlain."
In his personal affidavit and his testimony, Chamberlain corroborated his second attorney's account. In his affidavit, Chamberlain stated that in November 2010, his attorney called him while he was incarcerated and asked him to explain his version of the events which led up to the underlying incident. According to Chamberlain, the attorney then came to visit him in person, asked him again to describe his version of events, and also sent a forensic psychologist to interview Chamberlain - during which Chamberlain once again stated his version of the events that led up to the incident.
At the telephonic hearing, Chamberlain testified that he talked with his second attorney about his theory of defense "several times." And he described what the attorney said in response - that it would not be possible to make a "crime of passion plea." Chamberlain also testified that the attorney made a "pros and cons list" with him outlining the benefits and drawbacks of going to trial. Although Chamberlain testified that he did not feel he had received a sufficient opportunity to discuss his defense with the attorney, he provided no detail to support this assertion in light of the multiple conversations they apparently had about his case and defenses.
To plead a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must, inter alia, set out facts that, if true, would demonstrate their attorney's performance fell below the standard of minimum competence required of criminal law practitioners. Given the record in this case, we conclude that Chamberlain did not present a prima facie case that his trial attorneys were incompetent in their evaluation and discussion of his defense case.
See Jones, 759 P.2d at 565, 568 (citing Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 424 (Alaska 1974)).
With respect to Chamberlain's second claim - that his second trial attorney threatened and intimidated him into pleading guilty - we have previously stated that a defendant's claim that they were "'tricked' into accepting [a] plea agreement is a conclusory allegation of implicit coercion rather than an assertion of specific facts that, if true, would overcome the presumption of competence that attaches to a trial attorney's tactical choices." And the specific facts set forth by Chamberlain do not support a conclusion that his attorney acted incompetently.
Serradell v. State, 129 P.3d 461, 463 (Alaska App. 2006); see also LaBrake, 152 P.3d at 481 ("LaBrake asserted in his affidavit that [his attorney] coerced him into accepting the State's proposed plea bargain. The superior court was not obliged to presume the truth of this conclusory assertion about the legal effect of [the attorney's] conduct on LaBrake's state of mind.").
In his affidavit, Chamberlain attested that whenever he told his second trial attorney that he wanted to go to trial, the attorney would advise him of the potential consequences - that he faced a maximum sentence of 99 years in jail if convicted. The attorney would further express his opinion that, if Miebs were to testify at a trial, Chamberlain would most likely be convicted and the judge would impose the maximum sentence. This alleged conduct does not constitute an improper, coercive tactic; rather, it reflects the attorney's professional duty to inform Chamberlain of the realities of going to trial and his prospects for success.
See Evenson v. State, 2009 WL 3233723, at *2 (Alaska App. Oct. 7, 2009) (unpublished) (concluding that an attorney's letter to the defendant - which "outlined the evidence against [the defendant], evaluated the difficult choice that he faced, and strongly urged [the defendant] to accept the State's offer" - was not inherently coercive); Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(a) & cmt. para. 5.
At the telephonic hearing, Chamberlain also testified that he felt threatened during his change of plea hearing because his attorney "glared" at him when he was asked by the court if he was satisfied by his counsel's representation. But this conduct, even if true, similarly does not rise to the level of being inherently coercive, and Chamberlain provided no further explanation for why his attorney's actions at the change of plea hearing induced him to plead guilty.
See, e.g., Alpiak v. State, 2019 WL 5061380, at *2 (Alaska App. Oct. 9, 2019) (unpublished) ("Alpiak claimed that his trial attorney coerced him into accepting the State's plea offer. But Alpiak provided no further detail as to what actions his attorney allegedly took to coerce him. We have rejected similar conclusory allegations in a number of cases.").
For these reasons, we conclude that Chamberlain has failed to establish a prima facie case that his guilty plea was involuntary due to ineffective representation by his second trial attorney.
Finally, Chamberlain argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective because they did not adequately explain Criminal Rule 45 to him given his youth, and because they waived his speedy trial time under Rule 45 without his consent.
The contours of this claim are vague and ill-defined. Chamberlain has not alleged that he would have prevailed on a Rule 45 motion, or that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file such a motion. In fact, he does not provide a Rule 45 accounting.
See State v. Steffensen, 902 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska App. 1995) (holding that a criminal defendant who sought to withdraw his plea on the ground that his attorney incompetently failed to file a motion had to show both that the motion would have been granted and that there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial court proceedings would have been different).
Instead, Chamberlain argues that the repeated waiver of his speedy trial clock under Rule 45 by his attorneys "wore [him] down" and resigned him to the idea that he would not receive a trial, thus contributing to the involuntariness of his plea. But we have already affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Chamberlain's claim that his attorney threatened or coerced him into pleading guilty.
Moreover, in the post-conviction relief proceedings, Chamberlain's attorney focused on only three hearings at which he alleged that Chamberlain's trial lawyers waived Rule 45 even though Chamberlain was not present (May 5, 2010, July 28, 2010, and September 8, 2010). These hearings all occurred nearly two years or more before Chamberlain entered his guilty plea. Chamberlain has failed to explain how his attorneys' conduct at these early hearings impacted his decision to ultimately plead guilty.
As to Chamberlain's claim that he was unaware of, or did not understand, his right to a speedy trial under Rule 45, the record belies this claim. Chamberlain himself filed a pro se motion to dismiss under Rule 45(g) in 2010, during the early life of his case - following the three hearings that were the focus of the amended postconviction relief application. The superior court ultimately held a representation hearing on this motion. Following this hearing, it appears that Rule 45 continued to toll, although Chamberlain does not present an accounting of each later hearing, the basis for the tolling, or whether Chamberlain clearly objected to each waiver.
See Alaska Pub. Def. Agency v. Superior Ct., 530 P.3d 604, 615-16 (Alaska App. 2023) (requiring a defendant's personal consent to waive Rule 45 under subsection (d)(2), though noting that such consent may be implicit). Chamberlain's testimony in the post-conviction relief proceedings was a bit contradictory as to the nature of his objection. For example, Chamberlain testified that he was aware that his attorney was waiving Rule 45 on his behalf, but that "[a]wareness was not permission." Chamberlain also testified that he actively "objected to waiving Rule 45."
Furthermore, Chamberlain does not address the fact that he participated in the Youth Offender Program at Spring Creek Correctional Center for a significant portion of the life of his case - from April 2010 until he graduated from the program in May 2012 (four months before he entered into the plea agreement). In his affidavit, Chamberlain's first trial attorney stated that Chamberlain was required to waive the Rule 45 speedy trial clock in order to enter this program, which does not typically accept pretrial detainees because of the disruptions caused by court hearings and a possible trial. Chamberlain has not explained how his attorney's recommendation that he participate in this program - which the attorney believed would help with later mitigation arguments should Chamberlain be convicted - was incompetent, nor did Chamberlain present a prima facie case that he would not have ultimately entered into a plea agreement had Rule 45 time not been tolled during this time.
See Ferguson v. State, 242 P.3d 1042, 1054 (Alaska App. 2010) ("[I]n cases that were resolved by a plea agreement, the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that they would not have agreed to the negotiated settlement of the case if they had received competent assistance from their attorney."); cf. Pete v. State, 2009 WL 3402381, at *2 (Alaska App. Oct. 21, 2009) (unpublished) (concluding that even though the defendant established that he did not understand his right to testify or the concept of jury unanimity, the defendant failed to "show that he relied on either of these misunderstandings when he pleaded no contest" and therefore "even if [he] met his burden of showing his attorney was ineffective, he failed to prove that this incompetence affected his decision to accept the plea agreement").
For all these reasons, Chamberlain has not established a prima facie case for relief in his application for post-conviction relief. We therefore reject Chamberlain's challenges to the superior court's order dismissing his application.
As we noted previously, in addition to the three claims raised by Chamberlain's attorney in the amended application for post-conviction relief, the attorney incorporated by reference the remainder of the claims made by Chamberlain in his initial pro se application for post-conviction relief. The attorney did not elaborate on these claims, and instead directed the court to inquire about them at the hearing - something Chamberlain was unprepared to do at the hearing. On appeal, Chamberlain argues that the superior court erred in failing to address these additional claims in its order. But Chamberlain does not argue that he established a prima facie case for relief on these claims, and the record before us is conclusory and does not appear to support such a finding. We therefore reject Chamberlain's request that we remand for a ruling on these claims.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.