Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11579 No. 6101
10-15-2014
NICHOLAS DARION CHAMBERLAIN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Carole Waters, Assistant Public Advocate, Office of Public Advocacy, and Richard Allen, Public Advocate, for the Appellant. Clinton M. Campion, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3AN-09-14049 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael Wolverton, Judge. Appearances: Carole Waters, Assistant Public Advocate, Office of Public Advocacy, and Richard Allen, Public Advocate, for the Appellant. Clinton M. Campion, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard, and Kossler, Judges. PER CURIAM.
Nicholas Darion Chamberlain pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree murder and third-degree assault after he lured his ex-girlfriend into the woods, stabbed her multiple times, and threatened the witnesses who tried to intervene. For these crimes, Superior Court Judge Michael Wolverton sentenced Chamberlain to 62 years with 20 years suspended, 42 years to serve. Chamberlain argues that this sentence is excessive and that the court did not take full account of his youth and his potential for rehabilitation. For the reasons explained here, we conclude that the superior court gave reasonable consideration to these factors and that Chamberlain's sentence is not clearly mistaken.
Factual background and prior proceedings
Nicholas Chamberlain and Lori Miebs were both students at Service High School. They dated for about nine months, until Miebs ended the relationship because she felt Chamberlain had become overly possessive.
About three months after the break up, Chamberlain asked Miebs to follow him into the woods near school so he could give her a silver ring as a "peace offering." Miebs initially refused, but she agreed after Chamberlain began to cry and beg. Once they were in the woods, Chamberlain told Miebs to tilt her head back and close her eyes so he could show her a magic trick. When Miebs complied, Chamberlain stabbed her in the neck. Miebs tried to escape and run toward the school but Chamberlain caught up with her and continued his attack. When Miebs asked Chamberlain why he would do this to her, he responded: "Hold still." Chamberlain ultimately stabbed Miebs seventy-six times.
Several bystanders tried to intervene, but Chamberlain told them to "fuck off" and threatened them with his knife. One of the bystanders, Kenneth Schulz, called 911 and at one point managed to knock Chamberlain off Miebs, but Schulz was forced to retreat when Chamberlain came after him with the knife. Chamberlain then renewed his attack on Miebs. Eventually Chamberlain ended the attack and walked off on a nearby trail. He hid his knife and his coat under some foliage.
Chamberlain was charged with attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault, tampering with physical evidence, and three counts of third-degree assault (for threatening the bystanders with a knife). These charges were ultimately resolved with a plea agreement: Chamberlain pleaded no contest to one count of attempted first-degree murder (against Miebs) and a consolidated count of third-degree assault (against the bystanders who tried to intervene).
AS 11.41.100; AS 11.31.100.
AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A).
At sentencing, Chamberlain presented the testimony of Dr. Marty Beyer, an expert in clinical psychology. Beyer testified that, at the time of the offense, Chamberlain suffered from "transient immaturity exacerbated by developmental disorder and trauma." Beyer explained that because the frontal part of the brain develops gradually during adolescence, teenagers exhibit more immature thinking, poorer impulse control, and more emotion-driven behavior than adults.
Beyer testified that in Chamberlain's case this immature brain development was exacerbated by other factors that led Chamberlain to overreact to Miebs's rejection. These included childhood trauma caused by a violent, alcoholic stepfather; an absent father; and bullying at school. Beyer also diagnosed Chamberlain with Asperger's syndrome, a developmental disorder that affected Chamberlain's ability to fit in and socially interact with his peers. Beyer testified that these conditions were all treatable, and that Chamberlain had shown good potential for rehabilitation in the three years he had been incarcerated since the offense.
Chamberlain also presented several character witnesses, including Gary Blount, a teacher at the Spring Creek prison. Blount testified that Chamberlain had matured considerably during his incarceration and had learned to get along well with his peers and to take criticism. Blount indicated that he did not consider Chamberlain to be a continuing danger.
Chamberlain's attorney asked the judge to impose a composite sentence of 30 years with 19 years suspended, 11 years to serve. The State recommended a substantially higher composite sentence of 62 years with 20 years suspended, 42 years to serve.
The court imposed a sentence in line with the State's recommendation, imposing 60 years with 20 years suspended for the attempted murder conviction and a consecutive 2 years to serve for the consolidated assault conviction.
In imposing this sentence, the sentencing judge observed that "[t]his was just a flat-out horrific crime," and that it was "simply miraculous" that Miebs survived. Given the nature of the crime, the judge placed the most weight on the Chaney sentencing goals of community condemnation, reaffirmation of social norms, and isolation. The judge concluded that significant isolation and a structured prison setting was needed, although he noted that he was "hopeful for rehabilitation" and that he was not going to limit Chamberlain's eligibility for discretionary parole.
See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970). The Chaney sentencing criteria are now codified in AS 12.55.005.
Chamberlain's challenge to his sentence on appeal
Chamberlain argues that the sentencing judge did not put sufficient weight on his youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation in sentencing him, and that his sentence is excessive.
In Rudden v. State, we noted that there is a broad range of conduct encompassed within the definition of attempted first-degree murder:
881 P.2d 328 (Alaska App. 1994).
At one extreme, an attempted first-degree murder might cause no injury at all to the victim and might involve conduct falling far short of any immediate threat of deadly harm[.] ... By contrast, at the opposite extreme, an attempted first-degree murder might consist of a completed act of calculated deadly force that, through no lack of effort or intent by the offender, happens to fall slightly short of the mark, causing lasting and near-fatal injuries instead of death.We further observed that "[a]s the gap between attempt and completion narrows, the justification for disparate treatment of an offender convicted of attempted murder, on the one hand, and an offender convicted of the completed crime, on the other, diminishes commensurately[.]"
Id. at 330.
Id.
Here, the superior court reasonably concluded that Chamberlain's conduct fell decisively towards the more serious extreme for attempted first-degree murder. As the superior court found, this was a "horrific crime" and it was "miraculous" that Miebs survived the attack. At the time of sentencing, three years after the event, Miebs had enduring scars on her face and her neck, and still experienced intense pain in her shoulder and hand when engaged in certain fine motor activities such as playing her guitar.
Given the sentencing judge's assessment of the nature of the crime, we disagree with Chamberlain's assertion that the sentencing judge did not adequately consider the expert testimony on brain development and Chamberlain's potential for rehabilitation. To the contrary, it appears that the court did consider Chamberlain's youth and potential for rehabilitation, but that this factor did not weigh as heavily as the other sentencing factors given the seriousness of Chamberlain's conduct.
The sentencing judge's comments indicate that he considered that the teenage brain "develops differently and slowly," and that the court remained "hopeful" regarding Chamberlain's prospects for rehabilitation as a result. In addition, while the judge imposed a lengthy sentence on Chamberlain, he specifically rejected the presentence report's recommendation to limit Chamberlain's eligibility for parole.
Because the record reflects that the sentencing judge considered the relevant sentencing factors under Chaney, our review is limited to whether the sentence is clearly mistaken — that is, whether the sentence falls within the "permissible range of reasonable sentences" given the facts and circumstances of the offense and the offender. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude that the sentence the superior court imposed in Chamberlain's case was not clearly mistaken.
See State v. Hodari, 996 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Alaska 2000) (quoting McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska 2000)).
Id.
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Conclusion
We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.