Opinion
No. 3:02-CV-2534-M
November 13, 2003
AMENDED FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS. AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The District Court referred this case to the United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial management and for the Court's recommendation with respect to dispositive motions. The case came on for consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed May 6, 2003. Treating Plaintiffs complaint liberally, this Court construed the action as one for violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court entered findings, conclusions, and a recommendation. On October 16, 2003, Plaintiff filed his ". . . Objection to Motion to Dismiss and Clarification of Facts." The District Court re-referred the Motion to Dismiss for reconsideration in light of Plaintiff s objections and clarification. Plaintiff states he is bringing this action solely to enforce the judgment in Chalmers v. Gavin, No. 3:01-CV-528-H (N.D.Tex. April 2, 2002). The Court hereby vacates its September 24, 2003, Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation and enters its Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation.
Background
Plaintiff pled guilty to sexual assault in State v. Chalmers, No. F96-75174-J (Crim. Dist. Court No. 3, Dallas County, Tex. Sept. 27, 1996). The trial court sentenced him to ten years, probated for five years, and a $1,000 fine. Id. At the time of his conviction, Plaintiff was notified that, as of October 10, 1996, he had a duty to register as a sex offender under TEXAS CIVIL STATUTES art 6252-13c. 1, § (5), redesignated as TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 62.01(5)(A). Later, the trial court granted Plaintiff early discharge from community supervision and dismissed the indictment in his case. The state court did not relieve Plaintiff of his duty to register as a sex offender. Plaintiff challenged his guilty plea in a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on July 21, 1999. Chalmers v. Goethals, et al, No. 3:99-CV-1641-M (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2000). The District Court denied the habeas corpus petition on the merits. Id.Plaintiff also brought a civil rights action in this court. Chalmers v. Gavin, No. 3:01-CV-528-H (N.D.Tex. April 2, 2002). Plaintiff claimed his being required to register as a sex offender violated his civil rights because the trial court had dismissed the indictment and discharged him from "all penalties and disabilities" when he completed his probation. According to Plaintiff, he no longer had a "reportable conviction." The United States Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Id. The District Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Id. That is the judgment Plaintiff now seeks to enforce.
Defendants' "Motion to Dismiss"
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the court's dismissal of a complaint when a defendant shows that the plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowrey v. Texas A M University System, 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and all facts pleaded must be taken as true. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Dismissal is warranted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitled him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiffs Objections and Clarification
Plaintiff s October 16, 2003, pleading amended his complaint. Plaintiff admits he is required to register as a sex offender. He claims that this is a suit to enforce the decision of the United States Magistrate Judge in Chalmers v. Gavin, No. 3:01-CV-528-H. Plaintiff claims that United States Magistrate Judge Sanderson held in his Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation in Case No. 3:01-CV-528-H that Plaintiff is only required to register, not to have his address made public. Plaintiff seeks to enforce what he describes as Judge Sanderson's order. Judge Sanderson discussed the registration law to determine if, under the facts alleged, Plaintiff could state a claim for violation of his civil rights. Judge Sanderson concluded that Plaintiff could not state a claim and recommended that the case be dismissed for that reason. The Honorable Barefoot Sanders, Senior United States District Judge, agreed and dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted the action Plaintiff now seeks to enforce. Neither Judge Sanderson nor Judge Sanders entered an enforceable order that would exempt Plaintiff from complying with Texas's current registration and disclosure requirements. The previous civil rights action, Chalmers v. Gavin, No. 3:01-CV-528-H, did not result in an enforceable judgment regarding Plaintiffs duties under Texas's sex offender registration laws.
Additionally, after Plaintiffs civil rights action was dismissed, the United States Supreme Court decided Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 123 S.Ct. 1160 (2003). Connecticut's compulsory registration requirement mandates that a sex offender convicted of a particular crime register. Id. The risk the sex offender poses to the public does not impact a sex offender's requirement to register under the Connecticut statute because a sex offender must register under the statute regardless of whether or not he or she is a current danger to society. Id. In other words, Connecticut's sex offender registration requirements, like those of Texas, hinge upon the sex offender's conviction alone, not an assessment of his current dangerousness. The United States Supreme Court determined that, under the Connecticut law, registrants are not entitled to notice and a hearing to determine their current dangerousness because procedural due process does not mandate that a person be afforded a hearing to establish a fact that "is not material under the Connecticut statute." Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 S.Ct. at 1164. The Supreme Court concluded that Connecticut's statute does not violate procedural due process because the sex offender had previously had opportunities — at trial and on appeal — to contest his conviction. Id.
Texas's sex offender registration law is similar to the registration law in Connecticut in all material respects. In Texas, the prerequisite for registration is the commission of the crime, not someone's assessment of an offender's current dangerousness. Any claim that Texas's sex offender registration laws violate Plaintiffs civil rights is foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe. See Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 S.Ct. at 1164. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against Defendants for violation of his civil rights for enforcing the current sex offender registration law based upon his commission of sexual assault.
The terms of TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 62.02 require a person who has a reportable conviction or adjudication to register as a sex offender. Plaintiff pled guilty to sexual assault, a reportable offense. State v. Chalmers, No. F96-75174-J (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3, Dallas County, Tex. Sept. 27, 1996). The terms of Art. 62.08 provide for public disclosure of an offender's name, address, date of birth, race, physical characteristics, conviction and photograph. Texas law makes this registrant information available publicly, but it specifically exempts from disclosure: (1) the registrant's social security number, driver's licence number, or telephone number; or (2) any information that would identify the victim of the offense. Id. Additionally the Texas statute does not provide for public disclosure of the registrant's employer's address. Id. An adult offender's duty to register ends when the offender dies. Art. 62.12. Except in cases of certain juvenile offenders, the law's requirements now turn on an offender's conviction alone, not his future dangerousness. Id.
For purposes of a FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must take as true Plaintiffs allegations. Plaintiff clarified on October 16, 2003, that this is a lawsuit to enforce the judgment in Chalmers v. Gavin, No. 3:01-CV-528-H. Inasmuch as that case was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, there is no order or judgment in favor of Plaintiff to enforce. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 123 S.Ct. 1160 (2003), decided after Judge Sanders's decision in Chalmers v. Gavin, No. 3:01-CV-528-H, forecloses any claim that Plaintiffs civil rights were violated. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED and this case dismissed with prejudice pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
RECOMMENDATION
This action to enforce the judgment in Chalmers v. Gavin, No. 3:01-CV-528-H (N.D. Tex. April 2, 2002), should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed May 6, 2003, should be GRANTED. All other pending motions should be DENIED AS MOOT.