Opinion
2014-02-7
In the Matter of ALEX C., JR. Cattaraugus County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Respondent; Alex C., Sr., Respondent–Appellant.
Charles J. Greenberg, Amherst, for Respondent–Appellant. Stephen J. Riley, Olean, for Petitioner–Respondent.
Charles J. Greenberg, Amherst, for Respondent–Appellant. Stephen J. Riley, Olean, for Petitioner–Respondent.
Gerald M. Driscoll, Attorney for the Child, Olean.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, and VALENTINO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
In this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b, respondent father appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated his parental rights with respect to the subject child on the ground of permanent neglect and freed the child for adoption. Contrary to the father's contention, petitioner established “by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the relationship between [the father] and the child” (Matter of Ja–Nathan F., 309 A.D.2d 1152, 1152, 764 N.Y.S.2d 894;see§ 384–b [3][g][i]; [7][a] ). Among other things, petitioner arranged for a psychological evaluation of the father, facilitated supervised visitation between the child and the father both before and during the father's incarceration, recommended various services, and followed up with the father to remind him of those services.
Contrary to the further contention of the father, Family Court properly determined that he failed to plan for the future of the child ( see Matter of Serenity G. [Orena G.], 101 A.D.3d 1639, 1640, 956 N.Y.S.2d 729;see alsoSocial Services Law § 384–b [7][a] ). Although the father claimed that he took parenting classes while in prison, he told his caseworker that the classes were “stupid” and that he did not believe that he had learned anything in them. The father did not engage in mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, or a domestic violence program as recommended by petitioner and the psychologist who evaluated him. Further, the record establishes that the father's only “plan” for the child was that the child remain in foster care until the end of the father's term of incarceration. “The failure of an incarcerated parent to provide any ‘realistic and feasible’ alternative to having the child[ ] remain in foster care until the parent's release from prison ... supports a finding of permanent neglect” (Matter of Gena S. [Karen M.], 101 A.D.3d 1593, 1594, 958 N.Y.S.2d 546,lv. dismissed21 N.Y.3d 975, 970 N.Y.S.2d 744, 992 N.E.2d 1087;see Matter of Jaylysia S.–W., 28 A.D.3d 1228, 1229, 813 N.Y.S.2d 622).
The father failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the court should have issued a suspended judgment instead of terminating his parental rights ( see Matter of Nestor H.O. [Nestor H.], 68 A.D.3d 1733, 1733, 891 N.Y.S.2d 819;Matter of Shadazia W., 48 A.D.3d 1058, 1058, 849 N.Y.S.2d 827). In any event, the evidence supports the court's determination that termination of the father's parental rights is in the best interests of the child, and that the father's “negligible progress” in addressing the issues that initially necessitated the child's removal from his custody was “ ‘not sufficient to warrant any further prolongation of the child's unsettled familial status' ” (Matter of Alexander M. [Michael A.M.], 106 A.D.3d 1524, 1525, 964 N.Y.S.2d 445;see Matter of Joanna P. [Patricia M.], 101 A.D.3d 1751, 1752, 957 N.Y.S.2d 552,lv. denied20 N.Y.3d 863, 2013 WL 1235506;Matter of Keegan JJ. [Amanda JJ.], 72 A.D.3d 1159, 1161–1162, 898 N.Y.S.2d 312). Moreover, petitioner established that the child was thriving in his foster placement and that the child's foster parents, i.e., his maternal great aunt and great uncle, intended to adopt him.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.