Opinion
Civil Action 6:23cv448
11-30-2023
HENRY CATO, Jr. #2214123 v. O. PEDRO, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JOHN D. LOVE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil rights in prison. The case was referred to the undersigned for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case.
I. Allegations
Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that Sergeant O. Pedro subjected him to an unwarranted and excessive use of force on an unspecified date in the Coffield Unit, inflicting injuries including a concussion. By separate order, the Court is requiring service and a response from Defendant Pedro on the claims against him.
Plaintiff also sues Captain Cori Brown and Major Kelli McNeil. He alleges that Captain Brown saw him after the incident and told him it would be investigated and “cleared up.” (Dkt. #8 at 3-4.) And he says Major McNeil said to him “it's hard right now” and either did or should have looked at “digital evidence” about the incident. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that “numerous important people . . . ignored [his] pleas for innocence” after the use of force. (Id. at 6.)
II. Legal Standards and Preliminary Screening
Plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2). Those statutes provide for sua sponte dismissal of a prisoner's complaint, or any part of it, if the Court finds it frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has held that a complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact when “the facts alleged are fantastic or delusional scenarios or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is indisputably meritless.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, during the initial screening under section 1915A, a court may determine that a prisoner's complaint is frivolous if it rests upon delusional scenarios or baseless facts-and dismiss the complaint. See Henry v. Kerr County, Texas, 2016 WL 2344231 *3 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2016) (“A court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, delusional, or otherwise rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, regardless of whether there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)).
Moreover, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does not allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, state a claim which is plausible on its face and thus does not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Montoya v. FedEx Ground Packaging Sys. Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim has factual plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not akin to a probability standard; rather, the plausibility standard requires more than the mere possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
All well-pleaded facts are taken as true, but the district court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions. See Whatley v. Coffin, 496 Fed.Appx. 414 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Crucially, while the federal pleading rules do not require “detailed factual allegations,” the rule does “demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading offering “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice, nor does a complaint which provides only naked assertions that are devoid of further factual enhancement. Id.
III. Discussion and Analysis
As mentioned above, the Court is requiring Defendant Pedro to respond to Plaintiff's claims against him. The claims against Defendants Brown and McNeill, however, require separate consideration.
Plaintiff does not allege that Brown and McNeill were involved in, present for, or in any way condoned or ratified Defendant Pedro's alleged assault. To the extent Plaintiff sues Brown and McNeill simply because of their supervisory roles in the prison, he fails to state a claim against them under Section 1983. Lawsuits against supervisory personnel based on their positions of authority are claims of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, which does not generally apply in Section 1983 cases. Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1990). A supervisor may be held liable only if he is personally involved in a constitutional deprivation, a causal connection exists between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and a constitutional deprivation, or if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force behind a constitutional deprivation. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff here does not allege any facts that would satisfy that standard for either Brown or McNeill. The Defendants' awareness of an alleged misdeed after the fact is insufficient to make them liable for it. See Blakely v. Andrade, 360 F.Supp.3d 453, 489 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (receiving letters and grievances about alleged violation “does not rise to the required level of personal involvement for liability”).
Plaintiff's amended complaint might be read to assert that Brown and McNeill are liable for failing to investigate or punish Pedro for his actions. But there is no constitutional right to have another individual investigated, disciplined, or prosecuted, even when the parties involved are inmates and correctional officers. Oliver v. Jackson Corr. Ctr., No. 3:12-CV-2660, 2013 WL 596155, at *3 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-CV-2660, 2013 WL 596153 (W.D. La. Feb. 15, 2013) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), and United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979)); see also Williams v. Washington, No. 96 C 0704, 1997 WL 201579, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 1997) (“Williams had no legal right to have the correctional officers punished, or to have an investigation conducted.”). Accordingly, any claim premised on the failure to take some action necessary to facilitate such discipline or prosecution fails to state a claim for a constitutional violation.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Brown and McNeill. Dismissal is appropriate where Plaintiff has already been given a chance to cure his deficiencies but still fails to state a viable claim. See Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that “once given adequate opportunity, even a pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions”); Garcia v. City of Lubbock, Texas, 487 F.Supp.3d 555, 566 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (dismissing where inmate had “already amended his complaint once” and been afforded “an opportunity to further flesh out his claims”).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that all claims against Defendants Brown and McNeill be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2).
Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Magistrate Judge's Report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the Report.
A party's failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen days after being served with a copy shall bar that party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
So ORDERED and SIGNED.