Opinion
No. 5:20-CV-053-H
2020-06-26
Raul GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LUBBOCK, TEXAS, et al., Defendants.
Stanley Rafe Foreman, Hutchison & Stoy PLLC, Lubbock, TX, Susan E. Hutchison, Hutchison & Stoy PLLC, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff. Jeff C. Hartsell, City of Lubbock, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant City of Lubbock, Texas. Matt D. Matzner, Morgan Day Vaughan, Crenshaw DuPree & Milam, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant Texas Lubbock County. Nichol L. Bunn, Amber Rochelle Pickett, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Wellpath LLC.
Stanley Rafe Foreman, Hutchison & Stoy PLLC, Lubbock, TX, Susan E. Hutchison, Hutchison & Stoy PLLC, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff.
Jeff C. Hartsell, City of Lubbock, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant City of Lubbock, Texas.
Matt D. Matzner, Morgan Day Vaughan, Crenshaw DuPree & Milam, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant Texas Lubbock County.
Nichol L. Bunn, Amber Rochelle Pickett, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Wellpath LLC.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) AND THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
JAMES WESLEY HENDRIX, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Raul Garcia brings several civil-rights claims, including (1) deliberate-indifference claims against individual employees of the Lubbock County Detention Center (LCDC); (2) failure-to-train claims against supervisors in the Lubbock County Sheriff's Office (LCSO); and (3) deliberate-indifference and false-arrest claims against the arresting police officers. While the Court recognizes the gravity of Garcia's allegations, the Court concludes that Garcia's claims against the individual defendants must be dismissed under binding precedent. First, Garcia fails to allege sufficient facts to state deliberate-indifference claims against any of the individual jail employees, except that the Court declines to rule on whether he has adequately stated a claim against Natalie Ybarra because, in any event, she is entitled to qualified immunity. Second, although Garcia adequately states failure-to-train claims against LCSO supervisors, the supervisors are likewise entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, Garcia has failed to adequately state false-arrest claims or deliberate-indifference claims against the police officers, who are also entitled to qualified immunity, because his allegations are consistent with the officers' position that they arrested Garcia and transported him to jail because they believed Garcia was intoxicated. Thus, the Court grants the individuals' motions to dismiss with prejudice, except that the Court grants Garcia leave to amend as to his deliberate-indifference claim against Ybarra and his failure-to-train claims against Rowe and Hood. This dismissal does not affect Garcia's claims against the City of Lubbock, Lubbock County, or Wellpath, LLC.
1. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Factual Background
The following alleged facts are taken from Garcia's First Amended Complaint, which the Court must accept as true when resolving the motions to dismiss. Dkt. No. 33; Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016). Garcia alleges that he has been diagnosed as a diabetic and underwent chemotherapy for cancer. See id. at 3. According to Garcia, he was wearing two medical bracelets at the time of the incidents in question: one to inform responders of his chemotherapy port and the other to inform responders of his diabetes. Id. at 4. Garcia entered United Supermarket in Lubbock, Texas at approximately 12:45 p.m. on May 18, 2018. Id. While in the store, Garcia began to experience a hyperglycemic episode, which resulted in dizziness, confusion, and difficulty communicating. Id. Because Garcia exhibited those symptoms, the manager of the supermarket escorted Garcia from the store and called the police. Id. at 4–5.
Officers Mark Ellison and Joshua Conklin allegedly arrived at the supermarket at approximately 1:30 p.m. Id. at 5. The officers questioned Garcia, but they became annoyed by his lack of responsiveness and handcuffed him. Id. Garcia alleges that, although the medical bracelets were clearly visible to the officers and Garcia did not smell of alcohol or drugs, the officers did not inquire about Garcia's medical condition. Id. The officers arrested Garcia for public intoxication, placed Garcia in the back of Officer Ellison's patrol car, and transported him to jail. Id.
Per Garcia, he was in and out of consciousness while en route to jail, but the officers yelled at him to remain awake. Id. at 6–7. Ellison labeled Garcia as uncooperative upon their arrival at the jail at approximately 2:02 p.m. Id. at 7. Garcia further alleges that he has not been provided any video of what events transpired between 2:35 p.m. and 5:08 p.m. Id. Ellison indicated on his arrest report that he did not believe that Garcia was at risk due to a medical condition, and he omitted any mention of Garcia's medical bracelets from the report. Id. at 8.
Several individual defendants interacted with Garcia at LCDC. Lauren Maldonado was the "receiving officer" who received and booked Garcia into the jail. Id. at 7. Natalie Ybarra, a jailer, observed Garcia being escorted into the jail, at which time he was still wearing his medical bracelets. Id. at 8. Paul Cartwright and Christopher Mendez, who are also jailers at LCDC, escorted Garcia to a cell. Id. at 8. Christopher Martinez, also a jailer, patted down Garcia and removed his handcuffs. Id. At some point, Garcia's medical bracelets were removed. Id. Maldonado catalogued Garcia's property, but she did not include any mention of the medical bracelets. Id. at 9.
Jail records indicate that Garcia was placed on a "15[-]minute close watch due to his medical screening being incomplete." Id. On May 18, 2018, Cleadon S. Bigham and Monica Lopez were responsible for completing Jail Security Checks and Close Watch Checks at the jail. Id. Garcia alleges that Bigham and Lopez failed to conduct those checks but instead fraudulently entered records indicating that they had done so. See id. at 9–10. Bigham later stated that, at 4:50 p.m., he observed Garcia laying on the floor on his stomach. Id. at 10. Further, Bigham stated that he and Dustin Hood then rolled Garcia onto his side and advised medical staff of the need for assistance via radio. Id.
Ybarra gave a statement in which she indicated that, at 4:40 p.m., she heard that Garcia was unconscious. Id. While Ybarra claims that she contacted emergency personnel for assistance at 5:00 p.m., Garcia alleges that Ybarra's statement is contradicted by the video. Id. Ultimately, EMS transported Garcia by gurney out of the jail at approximately 5:31 p.m. Id. at 11. Garcia alleges that Cartwright and Ybarra then created an incident report, in which they fraudulently labeled him an "uncooperative inmate" and stated that "medical [evaluation or treatment] was offered, but inmate denied." Id.
Upon his arrival at University Medical Center in Lubbock, Garcia was diagnosed with diabetic ketoacidosis, a life-threatening complication of diabetes. He alleges that he suffered complications and permanent effects as a result of diabetic ketoacidosis and the delay in receiving treatment. Id. Lab tests at the hospital confirmed that no alcohol or narcotics were present in Garcia's system. Id.
B. Procedural History
Garcia filed his Original Complaint on March 6, 2020. Dkt. No. 1. On April 2, 2020, Lubbock County, Rowe and Hood, and the individual jail employees (except Bigham, Mendez, and Lopez) moved to dismiss the claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. Nos. 22–24. Bigham, Mendez, and Lopez later filed separate motions to dismiss on the same grounds. Dkt. Nos. 28, 39. Officers Conklin and Ellison did not move to dismiss the claims against them, but they asserted qualified immunity in their Answers. Dkt. Nos. 22, 38. The individual jail employees and Lubbock County also asserted qualified immunity and asked the Court to limit discovery. Dkt. No. 30.
While the qualified-immunity issue was pending before the Court on the pleadings, Officers Conklin and Ellison filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity. Dkt. No. 50. The filing of that motion, which appears to have been premature, was apparently motivated by counsel's misunderstanding of the Court's earlier ruling with respect to discovery. See Dkt. Nos. 56–58. Because the summary-judgment motion is not yet ripe, the Court considers the qualified-immunity issue only on the pleadings.
In response to the motions to dismiss, Garcia asked the Court to extend the time period to respond to those motions and to allow Garcia access to discovery. Dkt. No. 27. Garcia then filed his First Amended Complaint on April 23, 2020. Dkt. No. 33. On May 4, 2020, the Court denied Garcia's motion for discovery, ordering him to respond to the motions to dismiss and file Rule 7(a) replies on the qualified-immunity issue. Dkt. No. 37. The Court, however, permitted limited discovery on the issue of qualified immunity to proceed because the parties represented that they had agreed to a period of such limited discovery. See id. at 10. Garcia filed his Rule 7(a) replies on May 22, 2020. Dkt. No. 45. The motions to dismiss and the issue of qualified immunity have been fully briefed, and these issues are ripe for disposition.
2. Legal Standards
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter which, when taken as true, states ‘a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P'ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc. , 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Richardson v. Axion Logistics, L.L.C. , 780 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc. , 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Court does not "accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions." Gentilello v. Rege , 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc. , 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005) ). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Turner v. Pleasant , 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).
When a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim, a court should generally give the plaintiff at least one chance to amend before dismissing the action with prejudice. See Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. , 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ("The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires."). District courts "often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects are incurable or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or unable to amend in a manner that will avoid dismissal." Great Plains Tr. Co. , 313 F.3d at 329 ; see also United States ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. , 363 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Leave to amend should be freely given, and outright refusal to grant leave to amend without a justification ... is considered an abuse of discretion.") (internal citation omitted). However, a plaintiff should be denied leave to amend a complaint if "the proposed change clearly is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally insufficient on its face." 6 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487 (2d ed. 1990).
B. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Kinney v. Weaver , 367 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). "When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense." Club Retro LLC v. Hilton , 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing McClendon v. City of Columbia , 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
The plaintiff meets this burden by satisfying a two-part test: she must claim that (1) the defendants committed a constitutional violation under current law, and (2) the defendants' actions were "objectively unreasonable in light of the law that was clearly established at the time of the actions complained of." Club Retro LLC , 568 F.3d at 194 (internal citations omitted). Only Supreme Court decisions and published, precedential decisions of the Fifth Circuit can clearly establish the law for this analysis, which applies to an area of law that the Fifth Circuit has addressed. See McCoy v. Alamu , 950 F.3d 226, 233 n.6 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that unpublished decisions cannot clearly establish the law); Turner v. Lieutenant Driver , 848 F.3d 678, 686–87 (5th Cir. 2017) (stating that only the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit can clearly establish the law in the Fifth Circuit, except that the clear consensus of other circuits could possibly clearly establish the law where the Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue in question).
Where, as here, defendants assert qualified immunity in their answers, district courts should ordinarily "insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity." Schultea v. Wood , 47 F.3d 1427, 1433–34 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The Court followed that procedure in this case, and Garcia has filed Rule 7(a) replies. Dkt. No. 45. Thus, the Court will first determine whether Garcia has adequately pled claims under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and then assess whether qualified immunity nevertheless bars his claims. See Lincoln v. Turner , 874 F.3d 833, 847 (5th Cir. 2017).
3. Analysis
A. The Court dismisses Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against the jail-employee defendants.
i. Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against most of the jail-employee defendants are barred by Fifth Circuit precedent, but he might adequately state a claim against Ybarra.
"The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials." Dyer v. Houston , 955 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cty., Tex. , 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). A pretrial detainee alleging deliberate indifference must show that "(1) the official was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and (2) the official actually drew that inference." Dyer , 955 F.3d at 506 (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice , 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his First Amended Complaint, Garcia alleges that the jail-employee defendants behaved with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Dkt. No. 33 at 7–11, 23–26. The allegations against Cartwright, Mendez, and Martinez involve those defendants' failure to obtain medical assistance for Garcia upon his arrival at the jail despite their observations of Garcia's medical alert bracelets and his alleged "incoherence, confusion, unsteadiness, rapid pulse, and increased blood pressure." Id. at 23–24. Garcia makes highly similar allegations against Ybarra and Monzingo, except that Garcia also alleges that Ybarra was aware that Garcia was unconscious and unresponsive for at least 30 minutes before she called for emergency assistance. Id. at 24. As to defendants Bigham and Lopez, the First Amended Complaint alleges that they fraudulently entered records stating that they performed "close watch" checks on Garcia when they in fact failed to do so. Id. at 24–25.
The jail-employee defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion correctly states that "[n]egligence and gross negligence are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 4. However, the jail-employee defendants do not offer further analysis.
a. The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Dyer v. Houston bars Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against Cartwright, Mendez, Martinez, and Monzingo.
The Court grants the motion to dismiss Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against Cartwright, Mendez, Martinez, and Monzingo because those claims are, in reality, allegations of negligence, which fall well short of deliberate indifference. The Fifth Circuit recently reached this conclusion under similar circumstances, Dyer , 955 F.3d at 507, and the Court reaches the same result here.
In Dyer , the plaintiff brought deliberate-indifference claims against paramedics, arguing that they should have provided him with additional care after they examined him and observed his injuries and drug-induced behavior. Upholding the dismissal of the deliberate-indifference claims against the paramedics under Rule 12(b)(6), the Fifth Circuit stated that, "[a]t most, these are allegations that the Paramedics acted with negligence in not taking further steps to treat [the plaintiff] after examining him." Id.
Here, too, Garcia's claims against Cartwright, Mendez, Martinez, and Monzingo are effectively allegations that those defendants acted with negligence in not taking further steps to treat Garcia. These defendants' alleged interactions with Garcia appear to have involved only the initial processing of Garcia upon his arrival at the jail, and the sole fact on which Garcia relies in pursuing his claims against these defendants is that they saw his medical alert bracelets. Dkt. No. 33 at 23–24. Thus, even viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, the Court finds that First Amended Complaint provides no basis on which a reasonable factfinder could determine that Cartwright, Mendez, Martinez, or Monzingo actually drew the inference that Garcia faced a substantial risk of serious harm, so the Court dismisses Garcia's claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6).
Further, the Court dismisses the claims against Cartwright, Mendez, Martinez, and Monzingo with prejudice because further amendment would be futile. Garcia has already amended his complaint once in response to the motions to dismiss, and the Court has afforded him an opportunity to further flesh out his claims in his Rule 7(a) replies. It is now clear that Garcia's claims against Cartwright, Mendez, Martinez, and Monzingo are based entirely upon those defendants' alleged awareness of Garcia's medical bracelets. Dyer establishes that such claims are improperly based in negligence, so any further amendment would be futile.
b. Garcia does not adequately state a deliberate-indifference claim against Maldonado.
Garcia rests his deliberate-indifference claim against Maldonado on her alleged removal of Garcia's medical alert bracelets, see id. at 26, but that act alone does not give rise to a claim for deliberate indifference. There are few cases—none of which Garcia cites—involving the application of deliberate-indifference claims to facts involving the removal of medical alert bracelets, and none of the cases permits the Court to indulge Garcia's "unwarranted factual inference" that the alleged presence and removal of Garcia's medical bracelets indicates that Maldonado actually drew the inference that the failure to promptly seek medical treatment for Garcia presented a substantial risk of serious harm to him. Gentilello , 627 F.3d at 544.
Precedent makes clear that Garcia's allegations, on their own, are insufficient to survive dismissal. For example, in Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of the City of Houston , 791 F.2d 1182, 1184 (5th Cir. 1986), the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a complaint alleging that officers were deliberately indifferent to a decedent's risk of suicide in part because the decedent had been wearing medical alert bracelets that warned of a heart condition. But there, the plaintiff alleged additional salient facts to support the contention that the decedent's risk of suicide was clear, including the decedent's alleged violent outburst. See id. at 1184, 1188 ; see also Romero v. Donley Cty., Tex. , 87 F.3d 1311, 1996 WL 335502, at *3 n.16 (5th Cir. 1996) (summarizing the holding in Partridge ). Thus, Partridge is not a proper basis on which Garcia could rely to adequately state a deliberate-indifference claim against Maldonado under Rule 12(b)(6).
Cases from district courts further confirm that a defendant's awareness of a plaintiff's medical bracelets or of the diabetes that Garcia's bracelets indicated cannot—without more—support the conclusion that a defendant actually drew the inference that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Where police arrested a teacher who suffered from epilepsy on suspicion of driving while under the influence, despite the officers' alleged awareness of the teacher's medical alert bracelets, a district court concluded that an officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the officer nevertheless could have reasonably believed that the teacher was driving under the influence. Krueger v. Bell , No. 8-04CV142T-MAP, 2005 WL 2877467, at *1, 3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2005). And another court determined that a suspect's general confusion and his statement to officers that he was a diabetic did not preclude those officers from reasonably believing that the suspect's actions were the result of ingesting drugs and alcohol. Holtgreven v. O'Fallon Police Dep't , No. 408CV00553 ERW, 2009 WL 2032164, at *6, 9 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2009).
Here, the facts that Garcia alleges, if proven, are sufficient to establish that Maldonado was aware of facts from which the inference could have been drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. However, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, the Court determines that those facts are insufficient to show that Maldonado actually drew the inference that Garcia faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Even if Maldonado viewed Garcia's medical bracelets, understood their significance, and removed them without requesting medical attention on his behalf, she nevertheless could have reasonably believed that Garcia's behavior, which he characterizes in his First Amended Complaint as dazed but "cooperative," was attributable to the influence of drugs or alcohol and did not constitute a substantial risk of serious harm. See Dkt. No. 33 at 7–8. Garcia's deliberate-indifference claim against Maldonado is therefore dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Court dismisses Garcia's deliberate-indifference claim against Maldonado with prejudice. As noted above, Garcia has already amended his complaint once, and he has had the opportunity to further develop his claim in his Rule 7(a) replies. Garcia's claim against Maldonado rests only on the fact that, as the receiving officer who booked Garcia into the jail, Maldonado would have participated in the process of removing and cataloguing Garcia's property. See Dkt. No. 45 at 6–7. Because this fact alone cannot give rise to a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the Court dismisses Garcia's claim against Maldonado with prejudice.
c. The Court dismisses Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against Bigham and Lopez.
Garcia rests his deliberate-indifference claims against Bigham and Lopez on their alleged failure to conduct jail-security checks and close-watch checks in accordance with jail policy, see id. at 24–25, but that failure alone does not give rise to a claim for deliberate indifference.
In the Fifth Circuit, a jail employee's failure to abide by a policy requiring fifteen-minute close-watch checks "evinces[,] at best, negligence on the part of" the jail employee. Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't , 228 F.3d 388, 398 (5th Cir. 2000) ; see also Green v. Harris Cty., Tex. , No. CV H-16-893, 2019 WL 2617429, at *15 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2019) ("At most, such a failure reflects negligence, not deliberate indifference."). This conclusion follows from the established principle that "a prison official's failure to follow prison policies or regulations does not establish a violation of a constitutional right." Lewis v. Sec'y of Pub. Safety & Corr. , 870 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017).
Bigham and Lopez's alleged failure to conduct the fifteen-minute close-watch checks on Garcia despite their purported awareness that he suffered from some sort of medical condition was probably negligent, and their alleged behavior could be considered grossly negligent. But an instruction to a jail employee that the employee should keep a close watch on an inmate does not sufficiently alert the employee of the nature of the inmate's risk so as to give rise to a claim for deliberate indifference. See Turney v. Waterbury , 375 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir. 2004). Further, "deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm." Thompson , 245 F.3d at 459. Even viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, the Court finds that no reasonable factfinder could determine that Bigham and Lopez actually drew the inference that Garcia faced a substantial risk of serious harm. The Court therefore dismisses Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against Bigham and Lopez.
Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against Bigham and Lopez are dismissed with prejudice. First, Garcia has already amended his complaint once, and he has had the opportunity to further develop his claim in his Rule 7(a) replies. His claims against Bigham and Lopez appear to rest only on their failure to conduct close-watch checks on him, which does not independently constitute deliberate indifference. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that these defendants' failure to conduct close-watch checks could constitute deliberate indifference under the circumstances, qualified immunity would still shield Bigham and Lopez from liability because the law did not clearly establish that principle at the time of Garcia's detention. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Garcia's claims against Bigham and Lopez with prejudice.
d. The Court need not resolve whether Garcia adequately states a deliberate-indifference claim against Ybarra.
In his First Amended Complaint, Garcia alleges that Ybarra's statement confirms that she was aware that Garcia was unconscious at 4:40 p.m. but that she did nothing to procure any medical care for him or obtain further assessment until EMS transported Garcia out of the jail at approximately 5:31 p.m. Dkt. No. 33 at 10–11. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, the Court must accept his assertion that Ybarra took no action to procure medical care for Garcia for approximately 51 minutes.
Elsewhere in the First Amended Complaint, however, Garcia alleges that he was receiving emergency medical assistance as of 5:04 p.m. See Dkt. No. 33 at 25.
The Fifth Circuit has held that officials' failure to call an ambulance for approximately 102 minutes constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Austin v. Johnson , 328 F.3d 204, 210 (5th Cir. 2003). Subsequent cases have determined that juries could find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference where the delay in providing medical treatment for an unconscious individual was greater than the delay in Austin. See Stewart v. Tilley , No. 6:15-CV-7-RP-JCM, 2017 WL 5665336, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2017) (denying summary judgment to defendants who allegedly waited 14 hours to call an ambulance); Bias v. Woods , 288 F. App'x 158, 160–61 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming the denial of qualified immunity for a prison physician who was aware that a prisoner was semi-conscious or unconscious for more than a day but nevertheless ordered the prisoner to be transported).
Some district courts, applying the two-part inquiry discussed in Dyer , have seemingly interpreted Austin to mean that a plaintiff states a claim for deliberate indifference—regardless of the length of the delay—where a factfinder could reasonably infer that the defendant's awareness of the plaintiff's unconscious state constitutes evidence that the defendant inferred that there was a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. See Frahm v. Refugio Cty., Tex. , No. 6:11-CV-56, 2014 WL 198314, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2014) (characterizing the holding in Bias as resting on the fact that the prison physician "was aware of a prisoner's unconscious state"); cf. also Childers v. Bates , No. CC-08-338, 2010 WL 1268139, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2010) (finding that the risk to a plaintiff's health and safety was obvious and therefore could be inferred where the plaintiff was naked, unconscious, and covered in human waste).
This issue presents a close call. On the one hand, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, the Court could find that Garcia adequately states a deliberate-indifference claim against Ybarra. The risk of serious harm that is associated with the failure to provide medical care for an unconscious individual under the circumstances present here seems obvious. On the other hand, while Ybarra might have been negligent in failing to act sooner based on mistaken assumptions that Garcia was either asleep or inebriated, the allegations do not indicate that Ybarra drew an actual inference of a substantial risk of serious harm. Ultimately, the Court need not resolve this issue because Garcia's claim against Ybarra does not survive Ybarra's assertion of qualified immunity.
ii. Qualified immunity bars Garcia's claims against the jail-employee defendants.
For the reasons discussed above in Sections 3.A.i.a–c of this order, Garcia does not state claims for relief against Cartwright, Mendez, Martinez, Monzingo, Bigham, or Lopez. Even if the Court were to conclude that he stated such claims, however, Garcia could not overcome those defendants' assertions of qualified immunity. The law does not clearly establish that a confused but compliant pretrial detainee has a right to have jail employees promptly seek medical care on his behalf, even where the detainee is wearing medical bracelets and the jail employees are instructed to perform fifteen-minute close-watch checks on the detainee.
As for Ybarra, even assuming that Garcia states a deliberate-indifference claim against her based on the allegation that she failed to call for medical attention despite knowing that Garcia was unconscious in his cell, the Court must consider whether Ybarra's alleged actions were "objectively unreasonable in light of the law that was clearly established" as of May 18, 2018. Club Retro LLC , 568 F.3d at 194. The Court concludes that Ybarra's alleged actions did not violate any clearly established law.
Because only published opinions of the Fifth Circuit—rather than unpublished opinions or the decisions of district courts—can clearly establish the law for this Court's purposes, Austin is the only case, if any, that would allow Garcia to defeat Ybarra's assertion of qualified immunity. But Austin 's holding is limited to its facts—the 102-minute delay there established deliberate indifference because no reasonable person would wait that long after noticing that an individual had lost consciousness before calling an ambulance. 328 F.3d at 210. And qualified immunity "does not operate at a high level of generality." Lincoln , 874 F.3d at 850. Here, the alleged delay was no longer than 51 minutes; the assertion in the First Amended Complaint that Garcia was receiving emergency medical care by 5:04 p.m. would mean that the delay was no longer than 24 minutes. See Dkt. No. 33 at 10. Thus, the Court finds that Austin does not show that Ybarra's alleged actions violated any clearly established law.
In his Rule 7(a) replies, Garcia cites several cases, but none of them clearly establish the law at the proper level of generality. See Dkt. No. 45 at 1–4. First, Garcia relies on a few cases from district courts and other circuits, but the decisions of district courts and other circuits cannot clearly establish the law in the Fifth Circuit where, as here, there is no consensus of other circuits regarding an issue that the Fifth Circuit has simply yet to address. See Lieutenant Driver , 848 F.3d at 686–87 ; Vincent v. City of Sulphur , 805 F.3d 543, 549 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that "two out-of-circuit cases and a state-court intermediate appellate decision hardly constitute persuasive authority adequate to qualify as clearly established law sufficient to defeat qualified immunity in this circuit"); accord Boyd v. Owen , 481 F.3d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that out-of-circuit decisions cannot clearly establish the law in the Seventh Circuit).
The Court also finds that the out-of-circuit cases to which Garcia directs the Court are not sufficiently similar to the alleged conduct here so as to overcome the defense of qualified immunity. For instance, Garcia cites Johnson v. Hardin Cty., Ky. , 908 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that a prison official's denial of plastic wrap and crutches to prisoner with fractures to both legs is sufficient to amount to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. That conduct is not sufficiently similar to the alleged conduct at issue here, which involves a detainee's diabetic ketoacidosis and unconsciousness rather than a prisoner's fractured legs, to overcome the defense of qualified immunity because the doctrine of qualified immunity does not operate at a high level of generality. Lincoln , 874 F.3d at 850. Likewise, Casey v. Lewis , 834 F. Supp. 1569 (D. Ariz. 1993), which concerned a prison's failure to accommodate inmates who were confined to wheelchairs by declining to afford them access to bathrooms and showers, is not applicable to the facts that Garcia alleges.
With respect to published decisions of the Fifth Circuit, Garcia relies on Thompson and Dyer. Dkt. No. 45 at 3–5. But, as the defendants explain, neither case can clearly establish the law at an appropriate level of generality. See generally Dkt. No. 46. The plaintiff in Thompson "was shaking, sweating profusely, and hallucinating." 245 F.3d at 452. He subsequently "began to collide with objects in his cell, sometimes falling and striking his head against the window, floor[,] or concrete bench of his cell," and jail employees observed blood flowing from his ears. Id. at 454. Because one of the jail employees took several actions in response, which indicated that the employee was aware that the detainee was injuring himself in his cell, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to that employee. Id. at 463–464. In contrast, Garcia does not allege that he was injuring himself in his cell or that Ybarra was aware of such injuries. Thus, even viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, the Court finds that Thompson does not dictate that Ybarra's alleged actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.
Likewise, Dyer does not determine that Ybarra's alleged actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law because the detainee's representatives in Dyer sufficiently alleged that the detainee violently injured himself 40 times and that the defendants were aware of his injuries. See 955 F.3d at 511. Where defendants are alleged to have been aware that a detainee was repeatedly inflicting violent injuries on himself but nevertheless have failed to seek medical attention for the detainee, it is clearly established that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants were "either aware or should have been aware, because it was so obvious, of an unjustifiably high risk to [the detainee's] health." Id. But where, as here, a detainee alleges that he merely appeared to be "cooperative," Dkt. No. 33 at 8, jail employees do not act objectively unreasonably in light of clearly established law when they fail to seek medical care for the detainee. Even viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, the Court thus finds that qualified immunity bars Garcia's deliberate-indifference claim against Ybarra and dismisses the claim.
The Court dismisses Garcia's claim against Ybarra without prejudice. Unlike Garcia's other deliberate-indifference claims, the claim against Ybarra fits the framework of a cognizable claim—Garcia alleges that Ybarra failed to procure medical attention for him despite knowing that he was unconscious, and the need to obtain medical attention for someone who is unconscious under the circumstances present here appears obvious. It is possible that Garcia possesses additional evidence showing the extent of Ybarra's awareness of his unconscious condition and the length of her delay in procuring medical care on his behalf, which might allow Garcia's claim against Ybarra to overcome qualified immunity. Thus, the Court will permit Garcia to amend his deliberate-indifference claim against Ybarra if he chooses to persist in his claim against her.
B. The Court dismisses Garcia's failure-to-train claims against Sheriff Rowe and Sergeant Hood because Garcia has not demonstrated that qualified immunity is inapplicable.
i. Garcia sufficiently states failure-to-train claims against Rowe and Hood to survive a motion to dismiss.
To establish Section 1983 liability against a supervisor for a failure to train, the plaintiff must show that "(1) the [supervisor] failed to supervise or train the officer; (2) a causal connection existed between the failure to supervise or train and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to supervise or train amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights." Roberts v. City of Shreveport , 397 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2005). Deliberate indifference can be proved by showing "at least a pattern of similar violations arising from training that is so clearly inadequate as to be obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation." Rodriguez v. Parker , No. 1:15-CV-181-P-BL, 2016 WL 4179798, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2016), report and recommendation adopted , 2016 WL 4184437 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2016) ; Burge v. St. Tammany Parish , 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003). To show a pattern of similar violations, a plaintiff must identify a certain number of prior incidents. Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has specifically stated how many prior incidents are required to show a pattern, but district courts have accepted as few as four prior incidents as numerically sufficient to constitute a pattern. See Edwards v. Oliver , No. 3:17-CV-01208-M-BT, 2019 WL 4603794, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2019), report and recommendation adopted , 2019 WL 4597573 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2019) (collecting cases); Moreno v. City of Dallas , No. 3:13-CV-4106-B, 2015 WL 3890467, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2015) (same). Further, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the prior incidents to which he cites are "fairly similar to what ultimately transpired." Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano , 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010).
Here, Garcia alleges in the First Amended Complaint that Rowe and Hood failed to train jailers and staff regarding "necessary medical screening, responding to medical alert devices, immediacy of medical care when a detainee exhibits symptoms of a diabetic emergency, appropriately responding when a detainee is unable to communicate rational decisions, appropriate monitoring of a detainee with obvious signs of medical needs[,]" and "immediacy of response when a detainee is unconscious." Dkt. No. 33 at 28. Garcia further alleges that these violations resulted in the violation of his constitutional rights when he did not receive medical screening upon his arrival and booking at the jail. Id. Additionally, Garcia lists ten other inmates who allegedly died in the custody of Lubbock County, and he alleges that those deaths resulted from "the failure to screen, monitor[,] and/or provide medical care." Id. at 18. Garcia further claims that the cause of those deaths was "known to the Sheriff, who, as the county policymaker, had the responsibility to correct the ongoing problems." Id. at 18–19.
Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Garcia—as it must when reviewing a motion to dismiss—the Court finds that Garcia has adequately stated Section 1983 failure-to-train claims against Rowe and Hood under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Garcia has alleged that Rowe and Hood failed to train jail employees regarding medical-screening protocols and the monitoring of detainees for medical conditions. In particular, Garcia alleges that Rowe and Hood failed to provide training regarding the proper treatment of detainees' diabetic emergencies. Garcia has also adequately alleged a causal connection between the failure to train and the violation of his rights. Per the First Amended Complaint, the jail employees would have been aware of Garcia's serious medical need and therefore provided him with medical care if they had been trained to recognize the import of medical alert bracelets and the signs of diabetic emergencies. Dkt. No. 33 at 12, 27–28; cf. also Thompson v. Olson , 798 F.2d 552, 556–57 (1st Cir. 1986) (observing, in a case with similar facts, that officers would have procured medical assistance more quickly than they did if they had known that the plaintiff was suffering from diabetic shock rather than drunkenness); Luna v. City of Nyssa, Or. , No. CIV. 99-982-HA, 2000 WL 33201875, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 21, 2000) (noting "the likelihood that if the officers would have discovered plaintiff's condition ... they would not have handled him so roughly").
Additionally, the prior incidents of deaths in Lubbock County custody to which Garcia cites in his First Amended Complaint are sufficiently similar to Garcia's own alleged experience to allow Garcia to plead—at this stage—that the alleged failure to train constituted deliberate indifference. See Dkt. No. 33 at 18–19. Garcia alleges that each of the ten deaths occurred because of a lack of proper medical screening. Id. Further, at least two of the inmates who allegedly died in Lubbock County custody because of insufficient medical screening had diabetes. Id. Thus, Garcia sufficiently alleges that if the jail employees had been trained on the proper conduct of medical screening—and, in particular, how to recognize and treat individuals suffering from diabetic episodes—they would have recognized the need for medical treatment. See Boston v. Suffolk Cty., New York , 326 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment on a failure-to-train claim on a similar basis); M.H. v. Cty. of Alameda , 62 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (same); Jenkins v. Woody , No. 3:15CV355, 2017 WL 342062, at *17–18 (E.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2017) (same).
But cf. Bruner-McMahon v. Hinshaw , 846 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1211 (D. Kan. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Bruner-McMahon v. Jameson , 566 F. App'x 628 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[P]laintiffs have not shown that the alleged failure of officers to use their common sense in summoning medical attention was a highly predictable consequence of not training [the officers] in specific areas.").
The Court has carefully considered whether to make a finding that Garcia has not sufficiently alleged a pattern of similar violations, in part because "none of the [ten] incidents cited by the Plaintiff was actually adjudged to be a constitutional violation." Dotson v. Edmonson , No. CV 16-15371, 2018 WL 501512, at *13 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 2018) ; see also Davidson v. City of Stafford, Tex. , 848 F.3d 384, 396 n.6 (5th Cir. 2017) ("That we would have to consider whether each prior incident constitutes an unconstitutional [instance of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs] further cuts against a finding of a pattern."). Here, however, the Court believes that such considerations are more appropriately resolved on summary-judgment motions rather than motions to dismiss. See Dotson , 2018 WL 501512, at *15 (discussing the application of the summary-judgment standard to the plaintiff's deliberate-indifference claims against the Superintendent of Louisiana State Police); Davidson , 848 F.3d at 398 (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to a police chief on the plaintiff's deliberate-indifference claim against him).
If, for example, the discovery process reveals that none of the alleged incidents were adjudicated to be constitutional violations or would not have been so adjudicated had they been challenged, then summary judgment to Rowe and Hood on the failure-to-train claim would likely be appropriate. See Davidson , 848 F.3d at 396 ; Valle v. City of Houston , 613 F.3d 536, 548 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that, "[a]lthough it is possible to infer that these prior [incidents] may have involved [deliberate indifference], that inference is too tenuous to survive summary judgment" because factual questions about the prior incidents precluded the court from reaching the conclusion that the prior instances were constitutional violations). Viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, however, the Court determines that he has sufficiently alleged a pattern of similar violations so as to adequately state failure-to-train claims against Rowe and Hood under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to survive a motion to dismiss.
ii. Qualified immunity bars Garcia's claims against Rowe and Hood.
Finding that Garcia has adequately pled failure-to-train claims against Rowe and Hood, the Court next considers whether Rowe and Hood are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity. The inquiry is thus whether the supervisory defendants' alleged failure to train was "objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established law" that pretrial detainees have a "right not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials." Porter v. Epps , 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) ; Dyer , 955 F.3d at 506.
Given Garcia's current allegations, the Court finds that Rowe and Hood are entitled to qualified immunity because, even if Rowe and Hood were aware of facts from which they could have drawn the inference that the lack of training regarding medical screening at the jail presented a substantial risk of serious harm to detainees, they did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner in light of clearly established law by failing to draw that inference. See Dyer , 955 F.3d at 506. Where the prior instances of alleged misconduct to which a deliberate-indifference plaintiff points have never been adjudicated to be constitutional violations, a supervisor is not sufficiently on notice that his failure to train subordinates is likely to violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and the supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity. See Dotson , 2018 WL 501512, at *13 ; El-Amin v. Flores , No. CV H-17-1268, 2018 WL 8733162, at *10–11 & nn.65, 68 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2018) (granting summary judgment to a Sheriff on a failure-to-train claim because the court determined that reports regarding previous incidents that the plaintiff alleged to be constitutional violations "do not indicate that any constitutional violations occurred, much less that the Deputies were substantially certain to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights or that [the Sheriff] drew the inference that a substantial risk of a constitutional violation existed, as is required to establish deliberate indifference"); Baughman v. Garcia , 254 F. Supp. 3d 848, 881–83 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Baughman v. Seale , 761 F. App'x 371 (5th Cir. 2019).
Multiple cases make this conclusion clear. In Baughman , for example, the district court held that medical directors at a jail were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff's failure-to-train claim because, although the directors reviewed a report from which they could have inferred that their subordinates were not complying with the jail's written policies, there was no evidence that the directors knew that deviations from that policy amounted to constitutional violations in specific instances. 254 F. Supp. 3d at 882–83. And in El-Amin , the court rested its grant of summary judgment in part on its finding that, while the plaintiff cited to hundreds of investigations of potential policy violations, he produced "no evidence that any of these investigations were completed with findings that deputies had engaged in misconduct ... such as to put [the Sheriff] on notice of a deficiency in the County's training or supervision of its deputies." 2018 WL 8733162, at *10. Garcia has not cited, and the Court has not located, any published authority of the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court permitting supervisor liability absent prior adjudications of constitutional violations or the findings of an internal investigation that such violations occurred, nor has he alleged that any of the prior instances of alleged misconduct to which he cites have been adjudicated to be constitutional violations or determined to have been constitutional violations by an internal report. See Dkt. No. 33 at 17–19; Dkt. No. 45 at 9–14.
Thus, Fifth Circuit precedent appears to entitle Rowe and Hood to qualified immunity on these claims because there is no allegation or indication that the prior instances of alleged misconduct to which Garcia points have been adjudicated to be constitutional violations or that the results of an internal investigation otherwise placed Rowe and Hood on notice of the alleged deficiencies in training within the LCSO. See El-Amin , 2018 WL 8733162, at *10 ; Porter , 659 F.3d at 447 (describing the requirement that a policymaker have "actual or constructive notice" of a deficiency in its training program); Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (same). However, the Court recognizes the possibility that Garcia may uncover such evidence while engaging in discovery with the defendants who have not moved to dismiss the claims against them and then be able to assert the requisite allegations. See Doe on behalf of M.F. v. Harris Cty. Precinct Six Constable Sylvia Trevino , 452 F.Supp.3d 548, 558–61(S.D. Tex. 2020) (dismissing without prejudice a failure-to-train claim against a supervisor in light of the possibility that the plaintiff would unearth evidence of a pattern during the discovery process). As such, Garcia's failure-to-train claims are dismissed without prejudice. See id. ; Skinner v. Ard , No. CV 19-66-JWD-EWD, 2020 WL 699740, at *9, 11–12 (M.D. La. Feb. 11, 2020) (granting leave to amend a failure-to-train claim); Drewery obo Felder v. Gautreaux , No. CV 18-376-JWD-RLB, 2019 WL 507483, at *12–13, 16–17 (M.D. La. Feb. 8, 2019) (same).
C. The Court dismisses Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against the police-officer defendants because Garcia has not demonstrated that qualified immunity is not applicable.
The police-officer defendants, Conklin and Ellison, do not move to dismiss Garcia's claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6), but they assert qualified immunity in their jointly filed Amended Answer. See Dkt. No. 38 at 11. Because Garcia has not met his burden to show that qualified immunity does not shield Conklin and Ellison from liability on Garcia's false-arrest and deliberate-indifference claims, the Court dismisses both sets of claims.
i. At the time of Garcia's arrest, the law did not clearly establish that arresting an individual in Garcia's alleged condition for public intoxication constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
"The constitutional claim of false arrest requires a showing of no probable cause." Club Retro LLC , 568 F.3d at 204. And the Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established at the time of Garcia's arrest. See id. at 206. But "[e]ven law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, Garcia must "allege facts permitting an inference that defendants lacked arguable (that is, reasonable but mistaken) probable cause for the arrests." Id. at 207.
Garcia's First Amended Complaint falls short of what is required to divest police officers of qualified immunity for a false-arrest claim. As Garcia notes, a person commits the offense of public intoxication under Texas law "if the person appears in a public place while intoxicated to the degree that the person may endanger the person or another." Tex. Penal Code § 49.02 ; Dkt. No. 33 at 6. Further, the First Amended Complaint acknowledges that the "symptoms of diabetic complications frequently mimic those of alcohol or drug ingestion—confusion, incoherence, and even unconsciousness." Dkt. No. 33 at 12.
Garcia alleges that he appeared confused and incoherent and that he exhibited symptoms mimicking those of alcohol or drug ingestion. See id. at 5. Thus, even viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, the Court concludes that the officers had probable cause to arrest him for public intoxication under the Texas Penal Code because they could have reasonably believed that he was heavily intoxicated and potentially dangerous to himself and others. See Miller v. SS Hosp. Grp., LLC , No. 4:17-CV-00847-O, 2018 WL 3054691, at *6 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2018), report and recommendation adopted , 2018 WL 3046260 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2018) ; Sarabia v. Hockenberry , No. 5:10-CV-006-C, 2010 WL 11561761, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2010) ; accord Krueger v. Bell , 2005 WL 2877467, at *3 (finding that an officer had probable cause to arrest the epileptic plaintiff on suspicion of driving under the influence under Florida law, despite the alleged presence of the plaintiff's medical alert bracelets, because her symptoms were consistent with those of intoxication). The Court therefore determines that qualified immunity bars Garcia's false-arrest claims against Conklin and Ellison.
Additionally, the Court dismisses Garcia's false-arrest claims against Conklin and Ellison with prejudice. Garcia has already amended his complaint once, and the facts underlying the false-arrest claims are clear: Garcia exhibited symptoms mimicking intoxication, and the officers arrested Garcia despite the presence of his medical alert bracelets. The Court accepts the factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to Garcia. Yet those allegations do not indicate that Garcia has any evidence to show that the officers understood that the medical alert bracelets meant Garcia was suffering only from a severe diabetic episode—and not from any drug or alcohol ingestion—and that the officers nevertheless arrested Garcia without probable cause to believe he was intoxicated in public. As such, Garcia's false-arrest claims are dismissed with prejudice.
ii. The law did not clearly establish that the police-officer defendants' alleged actions towards Garcia constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
Qualified immunity bars Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against Conklin and Ellison for substantially the same reasons that the doctrine shields the officers from liability on Garcia's false-arrest claims. Because the First Amended Complaint's allegations are not inconsistent with the officers' position that they reasonably believed that Garcia was intoxicated and not suffering a diabetic emergency that presented a substantial risk of serious harm, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects an arrestee's right not to have his serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of arresting officers. McIntosh v. Smith , 690 F. Supp. 2d 515, 527 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Hill v. Carroll Cty., Miss. , 587 F.3d 230, 237 (5th Cir. 2009) ). This right was clearly established at the time of Garcia's arrest. Hill , 587 F.3d at 237 ; see also Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep't , 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996) ("After the initial incidents of a seizure have concluded and an individual is being detained by police officials but has yet to be booked, an arrestee's right to medical attention, like that of a pre-trial detainee, derives from the Fourteenth Amendment.").
However, to prevail on his claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against the police officers, Garcia must "establish more than the typical quantum of evidence necessary to overcome a qualified immunity defense." Wagner v. Bay City, Tex. , 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2000). That is, he must show "not only that [Conklin and Ellison's] actions in failing to provide [him] medical attention before he arrived at the jail were objectively unreasonable, but also that [those] defendants intended the consequence of those actions." Id. ; see also Tamez v. Manthey , 589 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that a deliberate-indifference plaintiff must show that "each defendant's response to the risk indicates that the [defendant] subjectively intended that harm occur"); accord Arreola as Next Friend of Vallejo v. City of Fort Worth , No. 4:17-CV-00629-P, 2020 WL 3404120, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2020) (same). Even viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Garcia, the Court finds that he does not plead facts that, if proven, would be sufficient to make this showing.
As discussed above in Section 3.C.i, Garcia alleges that he appeared confused and incoherent and that he exhibited symptoms mimicking those of alcohol or drug ingestion. See Dkt. No. 33 at 5, 12. Thus, although the Court accepts his factual allegations as true and views those facts in the light most favorable to him, the Court finds that he cannot show that the officers' failure to provide him medical attention for a diabetic emergency before he arrived at the jail was objectively unreasonable. See Wagner , 227 F.3d at 325. And even if Garcia could show that the officers' actions were objectively unreasonable, his own allegations that he exhibited symptoms mimicking alcohol or drug ingestion preclude him from demonstrating the officers intended to disregard a substantial risk of serious medical harm. Id. ; Thompson , 245 F.3d at 458–59 ; see also Romero v. City of Grapevine , No. 3:15-CV-03101-N, 2016 WL 11474100, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 2, 2016), aff'd sub nom. Romero v. City of Grapevine, Tex. , 888 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 2018) (dismissing a deliberate-indifference claim because the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint failed to make sufficient allegations with respect to the officer's intent, which entitled the officer to qualified immunity). The Court therefore dismisses Garcia's deliberate-indifference claims against Conklin and Ellison.
Like Garcia's false-arrest claims against the officers, the deliberate-indifference claims against Conklin and Ellison are dismissed with prejudice. Garcia has had the opportunity to amend his complaint once and develop his theory of liability against the officers in his Rule 7(a) replies. The thrust of Garcia's allegations against Conklin and Ellison is that Garcia appeared confused and incoherent—consistent with the symptoms of intoxication—and that the officers did not seek medical attention to alleviate the diabetic episode that Garcia experienced. Although the Court accepts Garcia's factual assertions as true and views the alleged facts in the light most favorable to him, such allegations do not state claims for deliberate indifference under Fifth Circuit law. Any further amendment would thus be futile as to Garcia's claims against Conklin and Ellison, and the deliberate-indifference claims against the officers are therefore dismissed with prejudice.
4. Conclusion
Although Garcia's allegations are serious and the Court treats them accordingly, he does not allege sufficient facts to adequately state deliberate-indifference claims against the individual defendants except possibly Ybarra, who is entitled to qualified immunity. Likewise, the supervisors in the LCSO and the police officers who allegedly arrested Garcia are entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, the Court dismisses Garcia's claims against the individual defendants. The dismissal of the individual claims is with prejudice, except that the Court grants Garcia leave to amend as to his deliberate-indifference claim against Ybarra and his failure-to-train claims against Rowe and Hood. This dismissal does not affect Garcia's claims against the City of Lubbock, Lubbock County, or Wellpath, LLC.
So ordered on June 26, 2020.