Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG04185906
Haerle, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises out of a settlement agreement the parties entered into to resolve, on a classwide basis but prior to class certification, five class action lawsuits that were pending in the same court alleging violations of wage and hour law in respondent T-Mobile U.S.A., Inc.’s (T-Mobile) California-based retail stores. The superior court denied a motion by appellants to enforce payment of several claims found by the third party claims administrator to be invalid. Appellants contend that the court applied the wrong legal standard in refusing to order T-Mobile to pay the claims and that the claims should have been paid because the claimants established good cause and/or excusable neglect. We will affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 18, 2004, in Alameda County Superior Court, Richard Castro and two other individually named plaintiffs filed a purported class action lawsuit against T-Mobile and several individually named defendants (collectively T-Mobile), alleging various wage and hour law violations. Four other class action suits subsequently were filed against T-Mobile in the same court alleging similar claims.
On March 27, 2006, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims intended to fully and finally resolve the claims brought in all five cases, with no admission of liability by T-Mobile. Under the $7,500,000 settlement, each eligible class member who submitted “a valid and timely claim” would receive payment to be calculated as specified in the agreement. The agreement provided for the manner and method of notice to be given to the class members, the method of computation of settlement payments, the procedure for submitting claims, designated a third-party claims administrator chosen by the parties, and specified the deadlines and procedures for various steps in the settlement administration process.
By motion filed on April 10, 2006, appellants sought the trial court’s approval of the settlement. On June 9, 2006, the court granted preliminary approval and ordered that notice, in the form agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court, be sent by the claims administrator to all potential class members.
Accordingly, on June 16, 2006, the claims administrator mailed the notice of settlement and the claim form to 2,930 potential settlement class members. The deadline for postmarking and/or returning the claim forms was set for July 17, 2006. The parties agreed to extend the deadline to August 1, 2006, and then agreed to another extension to a date on or around August 29, 2006, which was the date set for a hearing on appellants’ application for final approval of the settlement. As of August 17, 2006, the claims administrator had received 1,138 claim forms.
The parties’ briefs and citations to the record variously state that the deadline for submitting claim forms was extended to August 22, August 26, August 28, and August 29, 2006. For present purposes, it suffices to establish that the claims filing deadline was understood by the parties and the court to be on or shortly before August 29, 2006.
At the hearing on August 29, 2006, the court granted final approval of the settlement. On the same date, the court entered its Order of Final Approval and Final Judgment of Dismissal. On October 3, 2006, payments of over $6.3 million were distributed by the claims administrator.
The Disputed Claims
Following the initial mailing on June 16, 2006, of the notice of settlement and the claim form to potential class members pursuant to the court’s order granting preliminary approval, the third-party claims administrator reported that a total of 37 individuals had returned their claim forms without having signed them. The parties agreed, and directed the claims administrator, to mail “cure letters” to those individuals, allowing them 21 days in which to sign and return their claim forms. The cure letters were mailed by first-class mail to the same address to which the original class notice and claim form had been sent. None of the cure letters was returned as undeliverable. The claims administrator reported that 28 of the 37 individuals who received cure letters signed and timely returned their claim forms.
In an email message sent to counsel for the parties on September 15, 2006, the claims administrator stated that final calculations for the settlement had been made and that payments would be made on 1139 valid claim forms. The claims administrator also stated that 11 claim forms were considered invalid: nine forms were not signed and there had been no response to the cure letters, and two were untimely, having been postmarked on August 31, 2006, and September 5, 2006. On October 2, 2006, the claims administrator provided documentation to counsel for the parties on the claims it had rejected.
Subsequently, a response was received from one of the nine (Groskreutz) with a postmark of September 25, 2006. (See post at p. 3.)
On December 4, 2006, appellants filed a motion to enforce payment of the disputed claims under the class settlement.
Appellants’ motion originally sought to enforce payment of 12 claims, including that of Jeremy Avila, which was received late. However, T-Mobile had agreed in October to pay that claim, which had been received along with a written statement from a representative of the U.S. Postal Service taking full responsibility for its late postmark.
In a declaration dated December 19, 2006, the claims administrator stated that the claims of the 28 people who received cure letters and timely returned their signed claim forms were paid. The claims administrator had never received signed claim forms from eight of the remaining nine people (Cordoba, Duong, Herbert, Levingston, Malik, Serrano, Spivey, and Uy). The ninth person (Groskreutz) had sent in his signed claim form with a postmark of September 25, 2006, which was more than three weeks after the date specified in the cure letter (August 31, 2006), and after final payments to his subclass were calculated and submitted to the parties on September 15, 2006. This cured claim was considered untimely. The claims administrator stated that the claim could not have been paid for the additional reason that “T-Mobile has paid out the ‘Maximum Distributable Amount’ allocated to [the subclass under which Groskreutz’s claim would have been processed].”
Different co-counsel for the class filed a supplemental memorandum to the motion, seeking enforcement of two additional claims (Persson and Armenta).
The hearing on the motion to enforce the settlement was held on December 27, 2006. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the motion as to the two claims brought in the separate memorandum (Persson and Armenta) and denied the 11 claims that are the subject of this appeal. In issuing its ruling, the court stated, “I will grant relief as to [the two additional claimants] based upon the unique circumstances of their declarations and supporting information. And I know that is disappointing to the plaintiffs not to have further relief. I am troubled by the fact that people that have legitimate claims don’t get a benefit, but there is also some measure of certainty that has to attend these kinds of settlements. It’s a bargain for resolution of this on behalf of plaintiffs and defendants. [¶] If there had not been any extensions of the deadlines and efforts made -- I think with regard to 37 of the people who received supplemental notices, 29 of them responded. And people -- I think the risk does not always fall on the defendants’ side of the line on these things, particularly in light of the extensions that were accorded in this claims process. This is harsh with regard to the people who have legitimate claims and I recognize that.”
The court’s minute order denying the motion as to the 11 claims was entered on December 28, 2006.
On February 23, 2007, appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
Appellants contend the superior court erred in taking a rigid, formulaic approach to the question of whether the claims should have been allowed, in contravention of its duty to protect the interests of the class members. According to appellants, the court was required to consider the facts and circumstances of each claim to “determine whether good cause exist[ed] to waive the deadline or whether any failure to comply with established requirements resulted from excusable neglect.” We find no abrogation of the court’s duty or error in its decision.
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.769, the court here conducted a hearing and granted final approval of the settlement, entered judgment pursuant to its terms, and retained jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the terms of the settlement. “ ‘Although a judge hearing a section 664.6 motion may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment [citations], nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.’ [Citation.]” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.) Our review of the trial court’s factual findings on a motion to enforce a settlement is on the substantial evidence standard, and thus we resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all inferences in favor of the trial court’s order. (Ibid.)
Article X of the settlement agreement provides: “To qualify to receive a Settlement Share, each Final Settlement Class member must complete and sign under penalty of perjury the Claim Form included with his or her Class Notice and must return the completed form to the Class Administrator by first-class mail or the equivalent, postmarked no later than the last day of the Exclusion Period. Each claimant must declare under penalty of perjury that he or she is entitled to the settlement payment and that no other person and/or entity has a claim to any settlement monies that he or she will receive. In addition, by submitting the Claim Form, each Final Settlement Class member will consent to becoming a party plaintiff in the Litigation and to have ‘opted in’ to the claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).” The Exclusion Period was defined as 30 days from the date notice was mailed to the class members.
The notice of the class action, which was drafted by the parties and approved by the court, stated, under the heading, “What Are the Procedures For Participating In the Settlement?”: “In order to receive a payment under the Settlement, you must complete, sign and mail the enclosed Claim Form to the Claims Administrator at the address listed below. . . . Late or incomplete Claim Forms will not be honored.”
The claim form, which was also drafted by the parties and approved by the court, stated, in the first line: “TO RECEIVE A RECOVERY, YOU MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND MAIL THIS CLAIM FORM BY REGULAR U.S. MAIL, POSTMARKED NO LATER THAN JULY 17, 2006.” A separate line at the end of the form stated, “You must sign and return this Claim Form in order to receive a payment under this settlement.”
Of the 11 claims at issue here, two (Mufarreh and Rocha) were denied by the claims administrator because they were postmarked after the claims filing deadline and final settlement approval hearing. Copies of their claim forms and the postmarked envelopes in which they had been mailed were submitted to the court. Mufarreh’s claim form was postmarked on August 31, 2006, and stamped as received by the claims administrator on September 5, 2006. Rocha’s claim form was postmarked on September 5, 2006, and stamped as received on September 8, 2006.
The other nine claims were denied by the claims administrator because they were unsigned. Copies of the nine unsigned claim forms were submitted to the court with appellants’ moving papers. On reply, appellants submitted declarations from seven of the nine claimants, all except Cordoba and Uy. One, Serrano, stated that she sent in the original claim form, received notification that she had failed to sign it, but did not submit the replacement claim form because “the time period within which to submit my claim had already lapsed . . . .” Four claimants, Spivey, Groskreutz, Herbert and Levingston, declared that they signed and sent in the original claim forms, received notification that they had failed to sign the forms, and then signed and returned the replacement claim forms. Finally, two claimants, Malik and Duong, averred that they had signed and mailed the original claim forms, and were not contacted again until being advised that their claims were being denied for failure to sign the claim forms.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s ruling denying payment of these claims under the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement. The parties agreed that class members would receive payments on a “claims made” basis, and that claims had to be signed and postmarked before the claims filing deadline in order to be valid. The only evidence submitted regarding Mufarreh and Rocha showed that their claims were postmarked after the claims filing deadline. The only evidence submitted regarding Cordoba and Uy demonstrated that their claims were unsigned. The evidence regarding the other seven claimants was conflicting, and under the applicable standard of review, we uphold the trial court’s resolution of those conflicts.
We turn now to the argument appellants raise in this appeal, i.e., whether the trial court’s decision was based on an incorrect belief that it had no authority to order the disputed claims be paid. We reject the argument for two reasons. First, it clearly was not the case that the trial court believed its hands were tied. Our review of the transcript of the hearing reveals that, at the outset, the trial court apprised the parties of its views, including its tentative ruling that relief should be denied. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the court changed its tentative ruling to grant relief as to the Persson and Armenta claims, “based upon the unique circumstances of their declarations and supporting information,” but denied relief as to the other claims. The court explained that, although it was troubled that individuals with legitimate claims would not get a benefit, there had to be a measure of certainty attending such settlements. The court observed that there had been extensions of the claims-filing deadline and that efforts to contact 37 claimants who had not signed their claim forms resulted in 29 additional valid claims.
T-Mobile does not appeal the trial court’s grant of relief as to the claims of Persson and Armenta.
Second, because the trial court did not in fact modify any terms of the settlement agreement, we need not consider whether, and to what extent, the trial court was authorized to do so. Appellants argue at length that where, as here, a class action is being settled, the trial court is required to consider waiving terms such as the claims filing deadline and/or the signature requirement for good cause or excusable neglect. Respondents counter that the court had no such authority because the settlement agreement was the result of extensive arms-length negotiations and was approved by the court. Even were we to address this issue, it would make no difference to our holding in this case. Put another way, if the trial court had no authority to waive or modify terms of the agreement, then the court reasonably could conclude that the late and unsigned claims were invalid. Conversely, if the trial court was authorized to exercise its equitable power to waive these requirements, then the court reasonably could conclude that the evidence with respect to each of the disputed claims was insufficient to establish good cause or excusable neglect.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Lambden, J.