Opinion
A117033
4-17-2008
ARON D. CASTLIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RICHARD J. KIRKLAND et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appellant Aron D. Castlin (Castlin), a state prison inmate proceeding in propria persona, appeals from the summary judgment entered against him in his intentional tort action against respondents Richard Kirkland, Jeanne Woodford, T. Gamboa, C. Culter, S. C. Wheeler, M. D. Castellaw, L. Polk, R. Floto, and N. Grannis (collectively, respondents), employees and officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Castlin contends the trial court erred in concluding that his suit was barred because of his failure to timely present a claim to the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (formerly, Board of Control) (the Board) or seek leave to file a late claim. Castlin also contends the court erred by not staying the proceedings and remanding the case to federal district court for the court to address Castlins request for leave to amend his complaint. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 25, 2004, respondent Gamboa, a correctional officer at Pelican Bay State Prison, conducted an inspection of Castlins cell and confiscated items belonging to him. On April 9, 2004, Castlin filed a first level administrative appeal grieving the March 25 incident. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084.1, 3084.5.) Castlin stated that Gamboa had improperly confiscated "drawings/artwork, writings in English, magazines, etc." from his cell, had failed to record all the items she had confiscated on the cell search slip, and had not permitted Castlin to mail these items out. On August 26, 2004, respondents Wheeler and Castellaw denied Castlins first level appeal on the grounds that the cell search slip dated March 25, 2004, stated that 15 pages containing Swahili and two pornographic magazines were removed from Castlins cell, and these items were properly confiscated as contraband. On October 28, 2004, respondent Polk denied Castlins second level appeal, and on January 31, 2005, respondent Grannis denied Castlins third level appeal. The letter denying Castlins third level appeal stated, "[t]his decision exhausts the administrative remedy available to [Castlin] within [CDCR]. If dissatisfied, [Castlin] may forward this issue to the Victims Compensation and Government Board . . . ."
In late April or early May 2005, Castlin filed a government claim with the Board pursuant to the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.), claiming he suffered damages as a result of the March 5, 2004 incident. On June 8, 2005, the Board denied Castlins claim, stating that it lacked jurisdiction to address the claim because the claim was filed more than one year from the date of the incident giving rise to the claim.
Castlins claim to the Board is dated April 21, 2005, and a stamp on the claim form states, "Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, April 27, 2005, RECEIVED." However, in its letter denying Castlins claim, the Board stated that it received Castlins claim on May 13, 2005. Whether Castlins claim was received by the Board on April 27 or May 13, 2005, is not relevant to our determination of the issues on appeal.
Castlins Complaint
On October 5, 2005, Castlin filed a pro se complaint against respondents, all alleged to be CDCR employees or officials. The complaint alleged that respondents confiscated Castlins "manuscript—artwork, poems, writings, etc." (the manuscript) from his cell and did not provide Castlin with notice or an opportunity to mail home, donate, or dispose of his manuscript, in violation of California regulations. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3151-3152.) Based on these allegations, Castlin alleged causes of action for intentional tort and civil rights violations under title 42 United States Code section 1983.
On January 5, 2006, respondents removed the case to federal court (28 U.S.C. § 1446) and filed a motion requesting that the federal district court conduct a preliminary screening of Castlins complaint under title 28 United States Code section 1915A. On May 17, 2006, the federal district court issued an order concluding that Castlins complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under federal law. The court dismissed Castlins claim for civil rights violations under title 42 United States Code section 1983, and remanded the case to state court for further proceedings on Castlins state law claim for intentional tort.
Section 1915A of title 28 of the United States Code states, in relevant part: "(a) Screening.—The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. [¶] (b) Grounds for dismissal.—On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—[¶] (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or [¶] (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."
Motion for Summary Judgment
On June 28, 2006, respondents moved for summary judgment. Respondents contended Castlins claim for intentional tort was barred because Castlin had not presented a timely claim to the Board as required under the Government Claims Act. Alternatively, respondents contended that summary judgment was appropriate because (1) correctional officer Gamboa had properly confiscated Castlins manuscript as contraband, (2) Castlin failed to allege any personal wrongdoing by respondents Kirkland, Castellaw, Coulter, Wheeler, Polk, Floto, Grannis and Woodford, and those respondents could not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior because there was no evidence they personally participated in or directed confiscation of the manuscript, and (3) respondents were public employees entitled to qualified immunity for their discretionary acts under Government Code section 820.2. Castlin opposed summary judgment and filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Respondents filed a reply in support of the motion for summary judgment and opposed Castlins request for leave to file an amended complaint.
The court heard argument on the summary judgment motion on September 22, 2006. At the hearing, Castlin raised for the first time the contention that in 2004, the Board policy had required all prisoners to exhaust internal administrative remedies before filing a claim with the Board, and he was not able to file a timely claim with the Board because of delays in these administrative procedures. Noting that Castlin was representing himself, the court permitted both parties to file supplemental briefing on this issue.
On October 18, 2006, Castlin filed a supplemental brief contending that at the time of the March 25, 2004 incident underlying his claim, the Board had required prisoners to exhaust internal administrative remedies before filing a claim. He submitted as evidence an undated, unsigned letter from the Board, which stated that "[p]reviously, inmates were required to complete the internal CDC 602 process and provide a copy of the third-level decision prior to the Boards processing of a Government Claim. The timeliness of the claim was determined by the date the 602 process was completed. [¶] A recent Appeals Court decision (Justin Wright v. State of California, C044302) eliminated the requirement from completion of the 602 process prior to filing a Government Claim. Therefore, claims for inmates received on and after November 1, 2004 must be filed in accordance with the time requirements for all other government claims. The timeliness of the claim will be established by the date of the incident giving rise to the claim and the date the complete claim, including the $25 filing fee or a completed fee waiver request, is presented to the Board." Castlin contended that CDCR had failed to inform inmates of the Boards policy change, and, therefore, he was exempt from the claims-presentation requirements, and respondents were equitably estopped from relying on Castlins failure to comply with the claims-presentation requirements. Respondents filed a reply to Castlins supplemental brief.
The court held a second hearing on the summary judgment motion on November 3, 2006. After hearing argument, the court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents on the ground that Castlin had failed to file a timely claim with the Board or seek leave to file a late claim. The court entered judgment against Castlin on December 11, 2006, and Castlin filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
We review the courts summary judgment ruling de novo to determine whether the moving party has met its burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).) "There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Aguilar, at p. 850, fns. omitted.) When the defendants are the moving party, as here, they must show either (1) that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of a cause of action, or (2) that there is a complete defense thereto. If the defendants meet their burden of production, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of fact with respect to that cause of action or defense. (Ibid.; § 437c, subds. (c), (o) & (p).) The plaintiff cannot rely on "mere allegations or denials," but must "set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto." (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) "All doubts as to whether there are any triable issues of fact are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. [Citation.]" (Ingham v. Luxor Cab Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049.)
B. Castlins Claim Is Barred for Failure to Timely Present His Claim to the Board
Castlin contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to respondents on the ground that Castlin did not timely present a claim to the Board and did not seek leave to present a late claim. We disagree.
Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.), a person seeking to sue the state or a local public entity must first present a claim to either the Board, if against the state, or to the local public entity. (Gov. Code, §§ 905, 905.2, 915, subds. (a) & (b), 945.4.) Ordinarily, the failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity. (Gov. Code, § 945.4; State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.)
A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or personal property must be presented to the public entity no more than six months after "the accrual of the cause of action." (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) If the injured party fails to present a timely claim, the party may make a written application to the public entity for leave to present a late claim. (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (a).) However, the application to present a late claim must be made no later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (b).) If the public entity denies the application for leave to present a late claim, the injured party may then petition the court for relief from the claims-presentation requirements. (Gov. Code, § 946.6.)
In certain circumstances, "[a] public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the tort claims statutes where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act. The required elements for an equitable estoppel are: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) the party to be estopped must intend his or her conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) the other party must rely upon the conduct to his or her injury. [Citation.]" (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1785.) Estoppel ordinarily results from "misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim; actual fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential." (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 445.) Courts have rejected claims of estoppel, however, "where the plaintiff cannot show calculated conduct or representations by the public entity or its agents that induced the plaintiff to remain inactive and not to comply with the claims-presentation requirements." (Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1045 [collecting cases].)
In addition to the requirements of the Government Claims Act, state and federal law requires prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. (Wright v. State of California (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659, 664.) California regulations provide prisoners with an internal administrative remedy: prisoners may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy adversely affecting the inmates welfare. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.1, subd. (a).) The administrative appeals process ordinarily consists of an initial informal review followed by three levels of formal appeals. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.5, subds. (a)-(e).)
Castlin first contends that for purposes of the claims-presentation requirement, the date his cause of action for intentional tort "accrued" was not the date on which Gamboa confiscated his manuscript, March 25, 2004, but rather the date on which his third level administrative appeal was denied, January 31, 2005. Castlin thus reasons that his claim to the Board in late April or early May 2005 was timely, because it was presented less than six months after the accrual of his cause of action on January 31, 2005.
For purposes of computing the time limits under the claims-presentation statutes, the "date of the accrual of a cause of action" is "the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable" if claims-presentation were not required. (Gov. Code, § 901.) "The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time `when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done, or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent `liability arises . . . . [Citation.]" (Nogart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397.) Castlin alleged that on March 25, 2004, Gamboa improperly confiscated his manuscript and failed to provide Castlin with notice or an opportunity to mail home, donate, or dispose of his manuscript. The alleged wrongful act is Gamboas confiscation of Castlins manuscript on March 25, 2004, not the subsequent denials of Castlins internal administrative appeals. Thus, Castlins cause of action accrued on March 25, 2004.
Next, Castlin contends that respondents are equitably estopped from asserting that his claim is barred for failure to comply with the claims-presentation requirements, because respondents took no positive steps to inform prisoners of the Boards change in its policy on processing claims from inmates. We disagree.
It is undisputed that Castlin did not present his claim to the Board until late April or early May 2005, more than a year after the underlying March 25, 2004 incident. Thus, by the time Castlin presented his claim to the Board, he had missed the six-month deadline for claims-presentation (Gov. Code, § 911.2), and had also missed the one-year deadline for filing an application with the Board for leave to present a late claim (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (b)). Therefore, Castlins claims are barred unless he can show grounds for equitable estoppel.
We conclude that Castlin has failed to show the existence of a triable issue of fact as to equitable estoppel. Castlin relies on an undated, unsigned letter from the Board explaining a change in the Boards methodology for processing claims from inmates. The letter states that before November 1, 2004, the Board required inmates to exhaust internal administrative remedies before presenting a claim to the Board, and assessed the timeliness of the claim "by the date the [administrative] process was completed." However, beginning with claims filed on and after November 1, 2004, the Board no longer required exhaustion of internal administrative remedies prior to filing of a claim, and instead measured the timeliness of the claim "by the date of the incident giving rise to the claim." Castlin contends that CDCR was aware that the Board changed its policy in November 2004, but "took no positive steps to inform prisoners of the change in policy . . . ." However, Castlin makes no allegations and provides no evidence of any affirmative acts or representations to him by CDCR. Castlin does not allege that CDCR actively misled or misinformed him about the Boards policy, or that such affirmative misrepresentations by CDCR induced him to file his claim late. In order to support a claim of estoppel, Castlin must show that CDCR agents or employees "prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act." (Munoz v. State of California, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1785.) CDCRs mere failure to keep inmates informed of the Boards change in policy is insufficient, as a matter of law, to estop respondents from relying on the Government Claims Act requirements.
II. Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
Castlin also contends that the trial court erred "by not postponing the proceedings and remanding the case to the District Court in order to address the question of leave to amend." We disagree.
Castlin filed his complaint in state court, alleging a state law claim for intentional tort and a federal law claim for civil rights violations under title 42 United States Code section 1983. Respondents removed the case to federal district court and requested that the court screen Castlins complaint pursuant to title 42 United States Code section 1915A. The federal district court concluded that Castlins complaint failed to state a cognizable claim under federal law and dismissed his title 42 United States Code section 1983 claim. Following remand to state court, Castlin filed a motion in state court for leave to file an amended complaint. The court noted that "for the life of me I cant see what an amended complaint is going to do and how that goes to solve that issue [of Castlins failure to timely present his claim to the Board]," and denied Castlins motion for leave to amend.
The trial court did not err by not staying the proceedings and remanding the case to the district court to address Castlins request for leave to amend. If Castlin had sought to challenge the district courts order dismissing his federal claim and remanding the matter to state court, he could have appealed that order. (See, e.g., Resnick v. Hayes (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 443, 447 [court of appeal reviews de novo a district courts dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted].) However, Castlin apparently did not appeal the district courts order, and did not request a stay of the state court proceedings. Instead, after the state law claims were remanded to state court, Castlin filed a request for leave to amend in state court. Castlin cannot now fault the trial court for not staying proceedings and remanding the case to the district court to address his request for leave to amend.
Furthermore, on the merits, the court did not err in denying Castlins motion for leave to amend his complaint. The trial court may, in its discretion, allow amendments "in furtherance of justice" pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1). (Congleton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 51, 62.) " `It is of course proper to deny leave when the proposed amendment or amended pleading is insufficient to state a cause of action or defense. [Citations.] . . . [Citation.]." (Ibid.) As the trial court noted, amendment of Castlins complaint could not cure the defect of Castlins failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; thus, even an amended complaint would fail to state a cause of action. The courts denial of Castlins motion to amend his complaint was not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, each side shall bear its own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
We concur.
NEEDHAM, J.
STEVENS, J.