Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court No. BC336626 of Los Angeles County, Tricia Ann Bigelow, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Stephen Glick and Stephen Glick for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
In a wage and hour case, plaintiff Israel Castaneda prevailed at trial. Plaintiff sought $29,605 in attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded the amount of $16,964. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded was arbitrary and must be reversed. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
Plaintiff purports to appeal from both the judgment, which includes the award of attorney’s fees, and the interlocutory order awarding attorney’s fees. That order is not appealable but is reviewable on appeal from the final judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); see P R Burke Corp. v. Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1047.)
FACTS
Plaintiff filed his complaint against defendant containing causes of action for unlawful nonpayment of overtime compensation, failure to pay minimum wage by failing to compensate for all overtime hours worked, failure to maintain adequate records, failure to provide required rest and meal periods, failure to pay earned wages upon discharge and unfair business practices.
Plaintiff prevailed at trial and recovered $25,450 in damages. As part of the judgment, the trial court found that defendant had violated Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a), by failing to pay plaintiff overtime pay, and section 226, subdivision (a), by failing to maintain proper records. Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a), provides: “Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than . . . the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this . . . overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.”
In plaintiff’ motion for attorney’s fees, he sought the sum of $29,605.00, computed as follows:
| Attorney | Billing Rate | Hours Billed | Lodestar |
| Stephen Glick | $500.00 | 28.84 | $14,420.00 |
| Stephen Glick | $450.00 | 7.38 | $3,321.00 |
| Lorena Garcia | $250.00 | 34.84 | $8,710.00 |
| Lorena Garcia | $200.00 | 15.77 | $3,154.00 |
| Total | 86.83 | $29,605.00 |
In fixing the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded, the trial court expressly stated that the hours spent by plaintiff’s counsel were reasonable. It then added: “With regards to fees, the amount of $500 an hour, I know Glick has worked for a long time and he may charge that but I don’t think that this court can give him $500 per hour. It’s an unreasonable premium rate, with all due respect, as counsel loves to say to the court, to his experience. I think that 86 hours—86.83 hours is reasonable. And even if I adjust his rate to like 375 an hour, it comes up with attorney’s fees figures of $25,466.50. And I can’t imagine where there is a recovery of $25,000 that Glick would have requested—excuse me, that you would have requested an amount that’s either more than or greater than the amount of the recovery in this case. [¶] And I think what I’m going to do is grant a figure that’s 1/3 less than that. So I’m going to grant attorney’s fees in the amount of $16,964.”
DISCUSSION
In fixing attorney’s fees, the court “ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ‘California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.’” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The court may then adjust the lodestar figure based upon factors specific to the case before it, including “‘the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.’” (Id. at p. 1096.)
The trial court has wide discretion in fixing any award of attorney’s fees, and the award will be reversed only when there is an abuse of discretion. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong”’—meaning that it has abused its discretion.” (Ibid.)
It is well established that attorney’s fee awards are not limited by the amount of damages recovered in the case. (See, e.g., Riverside v. Rivera (1986) 477 U.S. 561 [$33,350 recovery and $245,456.25 attorney’s fee award in a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 case involving police brutality]; Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440 [$37,500 recovery and $470,000 attorney’s fee award].) As stated above, however, the amount of damages awarded may be considered, as well as the other circumstances in the case. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096; see also Vo, supra, at pp. 446-447.)
Here, it is clear that the trial court considered the relevant factors before making its award: the time spent on the case, the amount of the recovery, and the value of the attorney’s services. We cannot say the award was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd in light of the relevant factors. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reduction of the lodestar figure to an amount it found appropriate under the circumstances. (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 71; Ohton v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 749, 766.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: VOGEL, Acting P. J., ROTHSCHILD, J.