Opinion
15–P–1421
01-17-2017
Anna CASS v. Courtney M. COLLINS& another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Anna Cass, appeals from Superior Court judgments following jury verdicts in favor of defendant Robert Dandridge, who was driving a vehicle that collided with a vehicle in which Cass was a passenger, and against Courtney M. Collins, the driver of the vehicle in which Cass was a passenger. Cass also appeals from the order denying her motion for a new trial. She argues that the judge's limitation on attorney-conducted voir dire and certain of his evidentiary rulings were erroneous. She also argues that the verdict in favor of Dandridge was against the weight of the evidence. We affirm.
Background . Based upon the evidence at trial, a jury could have found the following facts. Just past midnight on April 15, 2013, Dandridge was driving westbound on Route 20 in Worcester. Route 20 is a divided highway with two travel lanes in each direction. Dandridge was in the left-hand westbound lane going slower than the speed limit. As far as he could see, he was the only car on the road. Dandridge had a green light as he proceeded through the intersection of Route 20 and Greenwood Street.
Meanwhile, Cass, Courtney Collins, and Josephine Burgeson–Lewis had been visiting a friend who lived on Greenwood Street. Collins drank some tequila during the visit. A few minutes past midnight, the four got into Collins's Honda Civic in order to go to a McDonald's. Collins was driving and Cass was seated in the passenger seat behind her. Collins headed down Greenwood Street toward Route 20. The intersection is controlled by a traffic light, although a right turn-only lane which allows drivers to merge onto Route 20 westbound is not governed by the light. Collins entered the right turn-only lane and merged into the right travel lane of Route 20 westbound. It was her intention to enter the left travel lane, cross the two eastbound lanes, and enter the McDonald's parking lot that is diagonal to the intersection of Route 20 and Greenwood Street. Collins looked to her left and saw Dandridge's headlights, but she thought that the lights "looked far enough in the distance, and it seemed that [they] had been stopped." Collins proceeded and Dandridge hit the Civic when it crossed in front of him. The Civic spun around two times and Cass was ejected, suffering serious and permanent injuries as a result.
Cass brought suit against Collins and Dandridge, among others, alleging that their negligent operation was the proximate cause of her injuries. After a three-week trial, the jury found Dandridge not negligent. The jury found that Collins's negligence was a substantial cause of Cass's injuries and judgment entered in favor of Cass and against Collins. A separate judgment entered dismissing Cass's complaint against Dandridge and awarding him costs. Cass moved pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 59(a), 365 Mass. 827 (1974), for a new trial, arguing that several of the judge's evidentiary rulings were erroneous and that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The motion was denied by the trial judge, and Cass appeals from that order and the two judgments.
Discussion . 1. Empanelment . Before trial, both sides asked for, and were allowed, thirty minutes for attorney-conducted voir dire. There were no objections. After seven jurors were seated on the first day of empanelment, each side had only a few of their thirty minutes remaining. Instead of confining the attorneys to those few minutes for the entire next day of empanelment, the judge stated that he would allow each party to ask one question of every potential juror with follow-up questions if necessary. The parties agreed, and they proceeded without objection on the next day of empanelment. In her motion for a new trial and on appeal, Cass argues that the judge unreasonably limited attorney-conducted voir dire. We disagree.
Counsel for Cass thought "that was an easy [choice]."
"The scope of a voir dire is in the sound discretion of the trial judge and will be upheld absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Garuti , 454 Mass. 48, 52 (2009). Here, "[t]he acquiescence of defense counsel to actions taken by the trial judge ... constitute[d] a waiver of any objection to the judge's actions." Commonwealth v. Vickery , 82 Mass. App. Ct. 234, 235 (2012). Cass suffered no prejudice from the judge's limits because she often was allowed to ask as many as five or six questions of potential jurors. "[T]he trial judge properly exercised his discretion by conducting juror voir dire in the manner to which both counsel agreed, and because [Cass] has failed to demonstrate that the agreed upon procedure ... constituted an abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Gilman , 89 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 763 (2016). "[W]e discern no error and, accordingly, no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice." Ibid.
2. Evidentiary rulings . Before trial, Cass moved in limine to exclude evidence that Collins drank tequila on the night of the accident. The judge agreed with Dandridge that evidence of Collins's alcohol consumption was relevant "in the context of reckless operation," and he denied the motion in limine. Cass argues that this ruling was erroneous.
Cass also moved to exclude evidence that Collins ingested other substances that evening. The judge allowed the motion with respect to these substances, and Cass does not appeal from that ruling.
"We decline to address [Cass's] cursory and unsubstantiated argument" that she was prejudiced by the judge's failure to rule on the motion before jury selection. Cameron v. Carelli , 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 86 (1995). The argument is made in one paragraph of her brief without citation to authority as required by Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).
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"We do not disturb a judge's decision to admit evidence absent an abuse of discretion or other legal error." Zucco v. Kane , 439 Mass. 503, 507 (2003). There was no abuse of discretion or error of law here, where "[e]vidence that [Collins] was consuming alcohol prior to driving with passengers late at night is patently relevant to whether [she] exercised reasonable care while driving." Commonwealth v. Woods , 414 Mass. 343, 350 (1993).
Next, Cass argues error in the judge's rejection of Collins's attempt to stipulate "that her negligence was a substantial cause of this accident." Collins stipulated before trial that she was negligent and that her negligence was a cause of the accident. Upon questioning by the judge, Collins clarified her position that both she and Dandridge were substantial causes of the accident. The judge found that the stipulation was not knowingly and intelligently entered into by Collins "with a full understanding of the legal requirements to prove a case against her," and he rejected it.
There was no error. "Parties may not stipulate to the legal conclusions to be reached by the [jury,]" Goddard v. Goucher , 89 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 45 (2016), quoting from Texas Instruments Fed. Credit Union v. DelBonis , 72 F.3d 921, 928 (1st Cir. 1995), and "[t]he judge was not ... bound to accept as controlling [Collins's] stipulation[ ] ..., particularly where [it] is based on ... an incorrect application of legal principles." Goddard , supra at 46–47. It is clear from the record that Collins did not appreciate the difference between stipulating that she was a "substantial cause" of the accident as opposed to "a cause," and the judge correctly sent that question to the jury. The judge decided to admit the stipulation after the close of evidence. There was no prejudice to Cass where Collins's stipulation was admitted, the judge gave instructions on substantial cause, and the jury found that her negligence was a substantial cause of the accident. "In our view, the judge was well within his authority to reject [Collins's] highly problematic stipulation" that her negligence was a substantial cause of the accident. Id. at 47 n.12.
3. Remaining claims . We deal briefly with Cass's remaining claims. We discern no error in the judgment against Collins where neither the judgment nor the jury slips are included in the record. Cass argues that the verdict in favor of Dandridge was against the weight of the evidence; however, "[t]he weight and credibility of the evidence is the province of the jury." Commonwealth v. Gomez , 450 Mass. 704, 711 (2008).
Neither an order nor an endorsement denying Cass's motion for a new trial are in the record, and we see no abuse by the judge of his discretion to "deny ... a new trial based on the weight of the evidence." Jamgochian v. Dierker , 425 Mass. 565, 571 (1997). "The fact that the jury could have found [against Dandridge] does not make their verdicts against the weight of the evidence or inconsistent with substantial justice," ibid. , and, because there was no error in the judge's evidentiary and pretrial rulings, he correctly denied Cass's motion for a new trial on those grounds.
Judgments affirmed .
Order denying motion for new trial affirmed .