Opinion
2:19-CV-00034-DCLC
11-12-2021
Terry CASH-DARLING, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Paul Cash, Decedent, Plaintiff, v. RECYCLING EQUIPMENT, INC., Defendant
Catherine Hilliard, Jessica J. Pritchett, John C. Duff, Pro Hac Vice, John Martinez, Marion M. Reilly, Robert C. Hilliard, Rudy Gonzales, Jr., T. Christopher Pinedo, Pro Hac Vice, Hilliard Martinez Gonzales LLP, Corpus Christi, TX, Mark Ledbetter, Halliburton & Ledbetter, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff. Ronald S. Range, Jr., Ronald S. Range, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Cladwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Johnson City, TN, for Defendant.
Catherine Hilliard, Jessica J. Pritchett, John C. Duff, Pro Hac Vice, John Martinez, Marion M. Reilly, Robert C. Hilliard, Rudy Gonzales, Jr., T. Christopher Pinedo, Pro Hac Vice, Hilliard Martinez Gonzales LLP, Corpus Christi, TX, Mark Ledbetter, Halliburton & Ledbetter, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.
Ronald S. Range, Jr., Ronald S. Range, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Cladwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Johnson City, TN, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Clifton L. Corker, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Terry Cash-Darling ("Plaintiff"), as personal representative of the estate of decedent Paul Cash ("Decedent"), brought this wrongful death action against Defendant Recycling Equipment, Inc. ("REI"), alleging theories of negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liability [Doc. 39]. REI has filed a motion for summary judgment [Doc. 93], Plaintiff filed a response [Doc. 98] and REI replied [Doc. 104]. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is GRANTED .
REI has also filed a Motion to Strike Certain of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts and to Strike Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts [Doc. 105]. For an analysis of this motion, please refer to the Court's Order on that motion filed contemporaneously herewith.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2018, Decedent was killed by an aluminum dust explosion while working at Lighting Resources, LLC ("LR"), a fluorescent light and airbag recycler in Johnson City, Tennessee [Doc. 39, ¶ 4; Doc. 95, ¶¶ 1, 2]. The explosion occurred in the company's "shredder room," where employees would load materials to be shredded and recycled into a large hammermill shredding machine assembly [Doc. 101-1, pg. 32]. To use the shredding assembly, LR employees would load materials to be recycled onto an "infeed conveyor," which would transport them into the "hammermill shredder" to be pulverized [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 4; Doc. 101-1, pg. 32]. The hammermill shredder was the "primary piece of equipment, which actually did the grinding and pulverizing" of the materials [Doc. 95, ¶ 13]. After the hammermill shredder processed the materials, the resulting scrap metal was then transported onto an "exit" or "discharge conveyor" to be separated into "ferrous and non-ferrous materials" and deposited into bins [Doc. 101-1, pg. 32; Doc. 101-9, pg. 3]. The materials deposited in the bins were a variety of sizes, "including fine particles or dust." [Doc. 101-1, pg. 30]. Decedent and another employee were loading seatbelt pretensioners onto the infeed conveyor of the shredder assembly when a fire ignited in one of the collection bins [Doc. 101-1, pg. 32]. Decedent was trying to extinguish the fire when the explosion occurred, killing him and injuring the coworker [101-1, pg. 32].
The hammermill shredder assembly was specifically designed to recycle and collect scrap metal from seatbelt pretensioners and airbags from automobiles that had not yet been detonated [Doc. 95, ¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 13].
The shredding assembly involved in the explosion was the second of its kind used by LR. Steven Barnett ("Barnett"), LR's Vice President of Operations, purchased and assembled the first hammermill shredder assembly in 2016 when LR first began processing air bags and seat belt parts [Doc. 95-1, ¶¶ 2, 4]. Barnett built the first assembly from used parts he "found and purchased" from various sources [Doc. 95-1 ¶ 4]. This first system had an "exhaust fan in place" to handle "visible smoke" caused by the explosive charges from the recycled airbags [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 4]. LR used Barnett's first hammermill assembly for over a year before Barnett determined that it was not durable enough to handle the large volume of materials LR was recycling [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 5].
Barnett reached out to Defendant REI to help find a "more durable, more heavy-duty shredder" to replace the existing one [Doc. 95-1, ¶¶, 5, 6; Doc. 95, ¶¶ 3, 5, 6, 8]. REI locates and sells used recycling equipment and produces new manufactured components depending upon the customers' needs [Doc. 95, ¶ 3]. At Barnett's direction, REI located and purchased a used hammermill shredder equipped with a used infeed conveyor, and then built a new discharge conveyor to accompany the used components [Doc. 95, ¶ 12, 16; Doc. 95-1, ¶ 6]. It is this second shredder system that exploded and killed Decedent.
Once REI purchased or built all of the component parts of the replacement hammermill system, REI assembled it "outside" at its own facility before installing it at LR [Doc. 101-2, pg. 6, 17:8-16]. REI then conducted a test of the assembled system to ensure it met with LR's needs [Doc. 101-2, pg. 6-7, 17:10-20:18]. Barnett was present at REI during the test and provided airbags to run through the assembly [Id. ]. The test lasted about ten minutes, using twenty to thirty airbags, after which Barnett approved the assembly for installation [Id. ]. REI did not use any sort of dust collection system during the test, and LR did not rely upon REI to perform a safety analysis during the test [Doc. 95, ¶ 23; Doc. 101-2, pg. 7, 19:21-25].
When it came time to install the shredder system at LR, Ethan Eichelberger of REI ("Eichelberger") created drawings of the system so LR would know how large the room had to be to house the system [Doc. 95, ¶ 17; Doc. 101-9, pgs. 2-6]. Eichelberger drew the system to show its "physical footprint," or dimensions, when assembled, but did not design any of its individual components [Doc. 95, ¶¶ 17, 18]. Barnett had experienced issues with smoke from the first, smaller hammermill system, so he asked REI to provide a fan for "smoke evacuation." [Doc. 95, ¶ 21]. In response, REI provided LR with a used fan from its warehouse [Doc. 95, ¶ 22]. REI's invoice for the hammermill assembly listed a "dust collector" as one of the items provided, and Barnett understood this to be the "exhaust fans and related parts" he had asked for to deal with this "visible smoke." [Doc. 95, ¶¶ 19, 20; Doc. 95-1, ¶ 10; Doc. 101-5]. In early 2018, REI installed the replacement hammermill system at LR's Johnson City location [Doc. 101-2, pg. 13, 42:19-24].
Plaintiff disputes that Eichelberger's drawings were merely intended to illustrate the dimensions of the system. Plaintiff states the drawings "show more than how large to build the room at REI [sic] they also include definitions of systems integrator, acknowledge that REI is the distributor of the system, and have general notes, Proprietary Information, Safety Review and Application Review information." [Doc. 100, ¶ 17]. The Court notes this information appears at the bottom of each drawing but finds it does not suffice to refute REI's statement that Eichelberger drew the system to illustrate its dimensions.
REI states that Mr. Barnett knew he was only getting a device to "help with visible smoke, not dust." [Doc. 95, ¶ 20]. Plaintiff disputes this, saying that REI's invoice, signed by Barnett, specifically included a "dust collector," and that Joey Walls of REI stated "that dust and smoke were essentially the same thing for purposes of this system." [Doc. 100, ¶ 20]. While these facts diverge, Plaintiff's dispute does not undermine Barnett's declaration that he knew "exactly what LR was getting," and that, in his estimation, the assembly was complete with the fans REI had provided to deal with visible smoke.
On February 5, 2018, a first "fire or explosion" occurred in the room housing the recently installed hammermill system [Doc. 95, ¶ 24]. Barnett concluded the explosion was caused by a cavity in the hammermill shredder that was allowing unexploded airbag modules to collect and ignite in bulk [Doc. 95, ¶ 26]. Barnett asked REI to modify the shredder to prevent unexploded airbag modules from accumulating, and REI did so by "capping off" the cavity to prevent the airbags from collecting inside the hammermill shredder [Doc. 95, ¶¶ 25, 26, 27, 28]. REI made the modifications based on the specifications Barnett provided and did not play any role in its design [Doc. 95, ¶¶ 25, 28]. On March 14, 2018, the second explosion occurred, killing Decedent [Doc. 95, ¶ 29].
Plaintiff takes issue with the phrase "fire or explosion," and states that the event should "not be characterized as a fire" because TOSHA determined it to be an explosion [Doc. 100, ¶ 24]. The Court will use the term "explosion" to describe the event.
The Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("TOSHA") investigated the explosion and concluded that it was likely caused by "combustible metal dust" produced during the hammermill shredder operation [Doc. 101-1, pgs. 10, 22]. Video footage revealed that Decedent had been trying to put out a fire in one of the hammermill system's separation bins when the explosion occurred [Doc. 101-1, pgs. 24, 30]. TOSHA concluded that LR "did not have a dust-collection system in place" which allowed dust "to accumulate in the collection bins and on other surfaces," causing the resulting explosion [Doc. 101-1, pgs. 21-38]. The TOSHA report recommended LR be cited for failure to "follow combustible metal guidelines set in NFPA 484." [Doc. 101-1, pgs. 38-39].
The "National Fire Protection Association" ("NFPA") is a nonprofit organization that promulgates standards for fire and electrical hazards. See https://www.nfpa.org/About-NFPA, last visited November 4, 2021. NFPA 484 sets forth the NFPA's standard for combustible metals. See https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=484, last visited November 4, 2021. The NFPA provides, in relevant part: "Machines that produce fine particles of combustible metal shall be provided with hoods, capture devices, or enclosures that are connected to a dust-collection system having suction and capture velocity to collect and transport all the dust produced." [Doc. 101-1, pg. 38 (citing NFPA 484 Paragraph 9.4.1)].
Plaintiff brought this action against REI as the manufacturer and seller of the hammermill shredder assembly, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liability in violation of the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-101 et seq. ("TPLA"). REI moved to dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing Plaintiff's general statements that the shredder was defective or unreasonably dangerous failed to state a claim [Doc. 46]. The Court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged REI "is a manufacturer or excepted seller under the TPLA," and that Plaintiff had successfully identified a particular defect in the hammermill shredder because it "lacked a dust collection system or an adequate warning of the potential for a combustible dust explosion." [Doc. 62, pgs. 4, 9]. In its decision, the Court stated that "evidence of industry standards is more appropriately addressed at [summary judgment]" and the matter of "when the shredding machine left Defendant's control is a factual issue." [Doc. 62, pg. 7].
REI now seeks summary judgment [Doc. 93], arguing it is not responsible for any alleged design defect because it did not design the hammermill system, but only helped Barnett locate and install the component parts [Doc. 94]. REI asserts that this is a design defect case because Plaintiff claims the lack of dust collection device "rendered the entire system defective and unreasonably dangerous." [Doc. 94, pg. 7]. As such, REI claims it cannot be held liable because it did not design the system [Id. ].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc. , 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Leary v. Daeschner , 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may meet this burden either by affirmatively producing evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact or by pointing out the absence of support in the record for the nonmoving party's case. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant has discharged this burden, the nonmoving party can no longer rest upon the allegations in the pleadings; rather, it must point to specific facts supported by evidence in the record demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc. , 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
At summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence; its role is limited to determining whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough; the Court must determine whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record. Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy , 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). If not, the Court must grant summary judgment. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
III. ANALYSIS
The parties agree that Plaintiff's claims are governed by the Tennessee Products Liability Act ("TPLA"), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-101 et seq. [Doc. 94, pg. 6; Doc. 99, pg. 2]; see Jones v. WFM-Wo, Inc. , 265 F. Supp. 3d 775, 778 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (The TPLA broadly defines "products liability actions" to include "all actions based upon ... strict liability in tort, negligence, [and] breach of warranty].") (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(6) ). Regarding a manufacturer or seller's liability for a defective product, the TPLA provides:
[a] manufacturer or seller of a product shall not be liable for any injury to a [person] caused by the product unless the product is determined to be in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105(a). In its motion, REI does not dispute that it is a seller or manufacturer of the integrated hammermill shredder system. Nor does REI dispute that the hammermill shredder as integrated was defective and/or unreasonably dangerous, though it repeatedly asserts that Plaintiff bears the burden to establish this element [See generally Doc. 94]. Not at issue is whether the hammermill shredder assembly was dangerous. Plaintiff has shown that the assembly exploded when it was put to its intended use. See Jones v. WFM-Wo, Inc. , 265 F. Supp. 3d 775, 779 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) ("If [a] plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to create a question of fact that the product was dangerous, then the general rule in Tennessee is that the issue of whether a product is defective or unreasonably dangerous is one for the jury[.]") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). REI offers no facts or arguments to the contrary.
The TPLA defines "seller" as a "retailer, wholesaler, or distributor," and "any individual or entity engaged in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for resale, or for use or consumption." Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-28-102(7). There is no dispute that REI sold the hammermill system to LR after purchasing used or building the component parts. The Act defines "manufacturer" as "the designer, fabricator, producer, compounder, processor or assembler of any product or its component parts." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (4). Though the parties agree that "REI did not build or manufacture the hammermill shredder" component part [Doc. 95, ¶¶ 14, 15], REI assembled the shredder assembly's components into a whole, and thus qualifies as a manufacturer because it is an "assembler" of the shredder assembly's component parts.
Instead, REI repeats that Plaintiff must establish the product was defective or unreasonably dangerous to prevail but provides no argument or facts to refute Plaintiff's claim on this point [See Doc. 94, pgs. 2, 6].
REI points out that Plaintiff alleges the overall build of the hammermill system, and not any individual component, was defective for lack of a dust collection device [Doc. 94, pg. 7]. REI argues it cannot be liable for this defect because it did not design the overall system, but merely followed Barnett's direction in finding and assembling the component parts [Doc. 94, pg. 7]. Plaintiff counters that REI is liable because it "substantially participated in the integration of the hammermill system" in that it found and built the component parts, tested the system, and installed the assembly at LR [Doc. 99, pg. 7]. Tennessee law supports an imposition of liability "when a component manufacturer substantially participates in the integration of non-defective components into the design of the final product." Davis v. Komatsu Am. Indus. Corp. , 42 S.W.3d 34, 42 (Tenn. 2001). Accordingly, if Plaintiff can show that REI substantially participated in the integration of the hammermill system, then REI can be held liable for the defective lack of dust collection device.
REI cites three cases to support its argument that it did not substantially participate in the integration of the hammermill system [Doc. 94, pgs. 8-10]. Each case involves an employee that was injured when their employer declined to include or install certain safety features on their equipment. In each, the court found the manufacturer of the equipment not liable because they had reasonably relied on the purchaser employer's specifications and plans. In Spangler v. Kranco, Inc. , the plaintiff was injured on the job by a crane that his employer chose not to outfit with a bell or other warning device. 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973). The court held that the defendant crane manufacturer was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries because it had reasonably relied on the employer/purchaser's plans and specifications in building the crane. Id. at 375 (internal citations omitted). In Austin v. Clark Equip. Co. , the plaintiff was injured while driving a truck owned by her employer, which the employer had not outfitted with safety features. 48 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff sued the truck's manufacturer on design defect and failure to warn theories. Id. The court held the manufacturer was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries because the purchaser had opted not to buy available safety features. Id. at 837 ("... a manufacturer is not liable for a design defect if the product is manufactured according to the buyer's specifications, unless the specifications are obviously dangerous and should not be followed.") (quoting Spangler , 481 F.2d at 375 ). In Hoverman v. Harnischferger Corp. , the plaintiff was injured by a crane at his place of employment and sued the defendant crane manufacturer for failure to supply the crane with a lockout device that would have prevented it from rolling laterally onto him. 1991 WL 158768, 941 F.2d 1209, at *1 (6th Cir. 1991). At trial, the district judge allowed a jury instruction that the defendant manufacturer would not be liable if the jury found the manufacturer had "carefully and precisely carried out the plans, specifications, and directions given to them [by the purchaser.]" Id. at *2. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the jury instruction, stating:
Plaintiff argues that these cases are "inapplicable to the present case" because Spangler "involved a directed verdict and not a motion for summary judgment," Austin "only addressed the issue" of "open and obvious danger," and Hoverman was an appeal from a jury instruction and as such is "inapplicable at the present stage of these proceedings." [Doc. 99, pgs. 15-18]. After a careful review of these cases, the Court finds them salient to the issue of whether REI substantially contributed to the design of the hammermill shredder and is therefore not persuaded by Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary.
We find additional support [from Spangler ] that the products liability rule holding a manufacturer liable does not apply where the product has been manufactured in accordance with the plans and specifications of the purchaser except when such plans are so obviously dangerous that they should not reasonably be followed.
Id. at *3 (citing Spangler , 481 F.2d at 375 ).
It is true that REI had more of a hand in installing and testing the hammermill shredder system than any of the defendants in Spangler, Austin , or Hoverman. In those cases, the manufacturer built the products at their own locations and then shipped them to the employers' facilities, whereas here REI tested the hammermill shredder at its own facility, and then installed the assembly on location at LR. REI also modified the hammermill component after the first explosion. This case is also distinguishable from Spangler and Austin because in those cases the products did not violate any safety regulations, whereas here the TOSHA investigator found the lack of dust collection device violated TOSHA regulations.
Despite these differences, these cases are still on point because in each of them, the employer/purchaser of the product chose not to include certain safety devices, and that choice resulted in harm to an employee. Here, LR, as employer/purchaser of the hammermill product, chose not to include a dust collection device with the hammermill shredder assembly, and this choice resulted in harm to Decedent. Further, LR's Vice President Barnett, and not REI, designed the shredder assembly, and controlled what safety features would or would not be included at the LR facility. It is undisputed that Barnett directed the integration of the hammermill assembly and took responsibility for the safety of its operation. Barnett asked REI to purchase the system's components based on LR's existing system [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 6]. Barnett "did not rely upon REI to conduct any type of safety analysis or assessment" for the shredder assembly [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 11]. Instead, Barnett relayed to REI the need for an exhaust system to remove "visible smoke created by processing air bag modules." [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 9]. At Barnett's direction, REI installed a "fan system" at the rear of the building, and later installed a larger fan at the front of the building to address the visible smoke issue [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 9]. Barnett felt the placement of this larger fan at the front of the building "resolved the issue" of visible smoke created by the assembly [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 9]. Though REI's invoice stated that it included a "dust collector," Barnett "believed that the exhaust fans and related parts described ... were what REI was referring to on the invoice as a ‘dust collector.’ " [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 10]. And even though Barnett requested of REI a fan to deal with smoke, the record contains no evidence that Barnett and REI ever discussed this in conjunction with necessary safety precautions. Finally, when REI modified the shredder component after the first explosion, it did so wholly under Barnett's "request and direction," and "played no role in the design of the modification." [Doc. 95-1, ¶ 12]. In sum, Barnett directed each step of integration from what components to purchase, to how to test the assembly, to installation and modification. REI relied on Barnett at each step, and therefore did not substantially contribute to the design or modification of the hammermill shredder assembly.
Plaintiff disputes REI's statement that "LR did not rely upon REI to perform any sort of safety analysis" related to the hammermill shredder install [compare Doc. 95, ¶ 23 with Doc. 100, ¶ 23]. But, as stated in the order on motion to strike, Plaintiff offers no facts sufficient to contradict Barnett's declaration that LR did not rely on REI for a safety analysis of the shredder system.
Nor can Plaintiff show that Barnett's plans were so obviously dangerous that REI should not have followed them. Plaintiff admits that "[i]t was impossible for REI to warn LR about the likelihood of combustible dust because REI tested the machine where dust does not accumulate[.]" [Doc. 99, pg. 14]. In fact, Plaintiff expounds on REI's ignorance to state that "REI had never manufactured, assembled, or sold a machine like this before," and "failed to understand the important factor of dust collection, and the explosion risks associated therewith." [Doc. 99, pg. 11]. Plaintiff shows that REI employees believed the integrated machine to be "very dangerous" and "scary," but does not offer facts to relate these observations to any danger from dust accumulation [Doc. 99, pg. 11]. These facts show the danger of combustible metal dust was not obvious to REI. REI relied on Barnett's instructions for integrating and testing the assembly, and this reliance was not unreasonable, especially when REI knew Barnett had experience with this type of shredder assembly and had used one for at least a year at the LR Johnson City location [See Doc. 95-3, pg. 2, 13:12-18]. REI did not substantially contribute to the design of the hammermill shredder assembly, and reasonably relied on Barnett's instructions and expertise with recycling metals of this kind. Therefore, REI is not liable to Plaintiff for the defective system under the TPLA and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's design defect claim.
Plaintiff also alleges that REI was "negligent in the design, integration, testing, advertising, warning, marketing, maintenance, repair, service and supply of the subject conveyor and hammermill [as] an ‘integrated machine system’ ...." [Doc. 39, ¶ 6] and that "the REI conveyor and hammermill, as an integrated system, was in breach of the implied warranty of merchantability [and/or] an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose[.]" [Doc. 39, ¶ 8]. As with Plaintiff's design defect claim, her negligence and breach of warranty claims are governed by the TPLA. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(6) (" ‘Product liability action’ ... includes ... all actions based upon ... negligence [and] breach of warranty[.]").
Under the TPLA, "[i]t makes no difference whether the complaint is couched in terms of negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty ... in order for a plaintiff to recover under any theory of product liability, [she] must establish that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer." Fulton v. Pfizer Hosp. Prod. Grp., Inc. , 872 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Higgs v. General Motors Corp. , 655 F. Supp. 22, 23 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) ). As discussed above, though the hammermill shredder assembly was defective, REI is not liable because it did not substantially contribute to the design of the assembly. For this reason, REI is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, REI's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's second amended complaint [Doc. 39] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE . Accordingly, Defendant's motions in limine [Docs. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, and 114] and Plaintiff's motion in limine [Doc. 108] are DENIED as MOOT .
SO ORDERED.