Opinion
August 12, 1999.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Huff, J.).
We agree with the motion court that the lack of evidence that plaintiff employee fell or was struck directly by a falling object is not fatal to his Labor Law § 240 Lab.(1) cause of action, since the facts, as asserted by plaintiffs, suggest that the injuries were caused by a defective safety "device, `[that] proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object'" ( Dominguez v. Lafayett-Boynton Hous. Corp., 240 A.D.2d 310, 312, quoting Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501; see, e.g., Skow v. Jones, Lang Wooton Corp., 240 A.D.2d 194). We disagree with the motion court, however, as to its dismissal of plaintiffs' Labor Law § 241 Lab.(6) claim. Based on evidence that a hand-cranked hoist, although expected to lock automatically with a click, did not do so, a triable issue of fact is raised as to whether the Industrial Code provision is sufficiently specific that its breach may serve as a ground for imposing liability pursuant to Labor Law § 241 Lab.(6) (see, Mattison v. Wilmot, 228 A.D.2d 991, 992, lv dismissed 89 N.Y.2d 917; cf., Narrow v. Crane-Hogan Structural Sys., 202 A.D.2d 841, 842). Moreover, unlike the situation here, in Brown v. New York City Economic Dev. Corp. ( 234 A.D.2d 33, 34), which the motion courtfelt constrained to follow, the plaintiff's injury was unrelated to the hoisting device in use at the time.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Tom, Lerner and Andrias, JJ.