Summary
holding that section 240 liability existed where a plaintiff injured his back after he bore the full weight of a pump while descending a ladder because his co-workers lost their grip, even though neither the plaintiff nor the pump "fell"
Summary of this case from Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.Opinion
June 5, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Paula Omansky, J., and a jury).
Plaintiff claims that together with an employee of defendant managing agent and another person, he was carrying a 200-pound hot water circulating pump down a ship's ladder of the rooftop engine room when the employee and the other person lost control of the bottom end of the pump, forcing plaintiff to hold the full weight of the pump so that it would not fall on the two below him. As a result, plaintiff suffered back injuries. We reject defendants' and third-party defendant's contention that these allegations do not state a cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1). The removal of the pump from the engine room for the purpose of repairing it constituted the repair of a structure within the meaning of the statute, not routine maintenance ( Holka v. Mt. Mercy Academy, 221 A.D.2d 949, lv dismissed 87 N.Y.2d 1055), and posed an elevation-related hazard for which the ship's ladder proved inadequate ( supra; see also, Kirchner v. BRC Human Servs. Corp., 224 A.D.2d 270; Oprea v New York City Hous. Auth., 226 A.D.2d 310), and which, according to expert testimony, called for the provision of a hoisting device. The opinion of plaintiff's expert that hoisting equipment should have been used was admitted upon a proper foundation, including proof that the expert took measurements of the ship's ladder, the opening to which it led and the pump. That plaintiff neither fell from a height nor was struck by a falling object does not require dismissal of his section 240 (1) claim, the proof being sufficient to show that his injury was caused by his effort to prevent the pump from falling ( see, Wensley v. Argonox Constr. Corp., 228 A.D.2d 823, lv dismissed 89 N.Y.2d 861; Prekulaj v Terano Realty, 235 A.D.2d 201). There is no merit to defendants' argument that the court's charge on section 240 (1) did not adequately set forth the correct legal principles.
However, the trial court did err in not granting defendants a directed verdict on their cause of action for common-law indemnification against third-party defendant, plaintiff's testimony clearly establishing that it controlled and supervised the pump removal work ( see, Guillory v. Nautilus Real Estate, 208 A.D.2d 336, 338-339, appeal dismissed and lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 881), and we modify accordingly.
We also find that, to the extent indicated, the damages awarded for past and future pain and suffering deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation for plaintiff's herniated disc, which required steroid injections and ultimately surgery, has rendered plaintiff unable to lift heavy loads, and will require pain medication indefinitely ( cf., Peck v. Tired Iron Transp., 209 A.D.2d 979; Wendell v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 189 A.D.2d 1063; Ostrowski v. Apex Mar. Corp., 123 A.D.2d 257, 259).
Concur — Wallach, J.P., Rubin, Williams and Andrias, JJ.