Opinion
C.A. No. 99A-12-018 WCC.
Submitted: October 23, 2000.
Decided: February 28, 2001.
Elwyn Evans, Wilmington, Delaware, for plaintiff.
Frederick L. Cottrell, Wilmington, Delaware, for defendant.
Dear Counsel:
This is an appeal from the Order issued on December 23, 1999 from the Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
There is no dispute as to the critical facts surrounding this litigation. On December 15, 1994, the appellant, Ann C. Capron, A.I.A., a professional architect, contracted with the appellees, Robert and Bernadette Buccini, to provide preliminary and working drawings for the construction of a prospective home to be built in Delaware. The agreement between the parties required any disputes arising under the contract to be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. When a dispute between the parties arose, an arbitration hearing was held on December 19, 1996 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and an award of $10,924.02 was issued in favor of the appellant.
Nearly two years later on October 7, 1998, the appellant filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery seeking confirmation of the award pursuant to the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act ("Act") found in 10 Del. C. § 5701, et al. As a result of a Motion to Dismiss filed by the appellee, it became clear that the action was barred by the statute of limitations found in 10 Del. C. § 5713, and the appellant abandoned relief under the Act and sought recovery under the principles of common law. Since the Chancery Court jurisdiction was solely based on the Act, it dismissed the litigation and the case was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas.
After being transferred, the parties stipulated that the appellant was allowed to amend the complaint to encompass the common law theory of recovery. Summary judgment motions were subsequently filed by the parties, and the Court of Common Pleas issued an opinion on December 22, 1999, finding that the one year statute of limitations period set forth in 10 Del. C. § 5713 continued to bar the appellant's claim. As a result, summary judgment in favor of the appellees was granted. A subsequent appeal to this Court was filed by the appellant.
Regardless of how the appellant attempts to characterize the action filed in the Court of Common Pleas, this litigation is simply an effort by her to enforce an arbitration award issued on December 26, 1996. It is not an independent claim to recover from a contract dispute regarding the architectural services allegedly provided by the appellant nor is it an independent action to enforce the arbitration provisions found in the contract. The award has already been made by the arbitrator, the provisions of the contract have been complied with as it relates to a dispute concerning services provided, and the appellant having recovered an award, simply seeks judicial intervention to enforce it.
The proper procedure to follow when seeking confirmation of an arbitration award is to file an action in the Court of Chancery under 10 Del. C. § 5713. Once confirmed, if the award is for monetary damages, the Chancery Court order would be filed with the Prothonotary of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, and once filed, it would act as a judgment and a lien on the real estate of the debtor. 10 Del. C. § 5718. As such, there is a clear statutory framework for this process, which the Court believes is recognized by all the parties to this litigation. It is only because the appellant failed to act promptly once obtaining an award that this litigation has now arisen.
In an attempt to correct this error, the appellant has argued that there is an independent basis to pursue this litigation under the theory of common law, which would allow her to disregard the statutory scheme created by the General Assembly under the Act. While such action may have existed prior to; 1972, to allow it to continue in light of the clear intent and legislative action of the General Assembly in passing the Act would significantly undermine and abrogate the purpose of the statute. As stated by then Vice Chancellor Hartnett in Pettinaro Construction Company v. Harry C. Partridge, Jr., Sons, Inc., Del. Ch., 408 A.2d 957, 961 (1979):
The Uniform Arbitration Act reflects a policy designed to discourage litigation, to permit parties to resolve their disputes in a specialized forum more likely to be conversant with the needs of the parties and the customs and usages of a specific industry than a court of general legal or equitable jurisdiction, and to provide for the speedy resolution of disputes in order that work may be completed without undue delay. See City of Wilmington v. Wilmington Firefighters, Del. Supr., 385 A.2d 720, 724 (1978). Accordingly, the public policy of this State is now to enforce agreements to arbitrate without regard to the justiciability of the underlying claims. 10 Del. C. § 5701. It is no longer of any consequence that a court, otherwise competent to hear the dispute, is ousted of its jurisdiction by the arbitration process.
This position was further confirmed by Vice Chancellor Chandler in 1996 in General Electric Company v. Star Technologies, Inc., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 14923, Chandler, V.C. (July 1, 1996), Mem. Op. at 1:
Because pre-twentieth century courts refused to allow arbitrators to oust their jurisdiction by contract, the common law disfavored arbitration agreements. Courts demonstrated their dislike of arbitration agreements by allowing parties to revoke such agreements and refusing to specifically enforce them. Pettinaro Constr. Co. v. Partridge, Del.Ch., 408 A.2d 957, 961 (1979). Over time, however, judicial policy evolved and some courts began to permit parties to resolve their disputes outside of the court in a less costly and more specialized forum. Other courts, however, continued to abide by the old common law rule. Id. The Delaware Legislature recognized that it needed to enact a provision setting forth the policy of the state to abolish this common law rule and to resolve a split in the courts. Thus, in 1972, the Delaware Legislature adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, 10 Del. C. § 5701 — 5725 (the "Act"), codifying at Section 5701 the current public policy of this State to enforce agreements to arbitrate without regard to the justiciability of the underlying claim. Id.See also Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Truitt, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96C-01-035, Lee, J. (June 27, 1997) (Mem. Op.).
Consistent with these opinions from the Court of Chancery, this Court finds that the Act is the exclusive remedy now available to the appellant to confirm an arbitration award. Since the jurisdictional forum for such action lies in the Court of Chancery, the appellant's action filed in the Court of Common Pleas should have been dismissed since that court lacked jurisdiction.
However, the jurisdictional issue was not addressed by the lower court and summary judgment was granted by the Court of Common Pleas on the premise that the statute of limitations for such action had run. While the Court agrees with the ultimate outcome of the Court of Common Pleas's decision, it cannot totally accept the way the lower court reached its conclusion. Inconsistent with the opinion of this Court set forth above, it appears that the lower court believed that a common law action to enforce arbitration awards continued to be valid and enforceable, and as such, the jurisdictional and procedural requirements of the Act could be bypassed. However, after making this finding, the lower court then found that the applicable statute of limitation was found in the Act even in the context of a common law application. This Court believes such piecemeal application of the statute is inappropriate, and one may not pick and choose the bits and pieces of an act they like and ignore the rest.
The lower court is correct that the statute of limitations is one year as found in 10 Del. C. § 5713, but it is only correct because the Act is applicable to this action in both a procedural and jurisdictional context. As a result, the appeal of this matter is dismissed because the Court of Common Pleas did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the issue and as such, there is no appellate right to this Court. Furthermore, the applicable statute of limitations found in 10 Del. C. § 5713 prevents the matter from proceeding.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 28th day of February, 2001.