Opinion
No. 06-17-00124-CR
08-18-2017
CHAD ALAN CAPPIELLO, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 8th District Court Hopkins County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1725811 Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Chad Alan Cappiello appeals from the trial court's refusal to admit him to bail pending the appeal of his conviction for theft of property in the amount of $1,500.00 or more, but less than $20,000.00. Cappiello argues that the summary denial of his motion for bail pending appeal was an abuse of discretion. This summary denial took place immediately after Cappiello was sentenced, when the trial court indicated that it would deny any request that a reasonable bail be set in this case. Because Cappiello was not provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard, we must agree.
Cappiello was convicted of a second theft of property offense in the amount of $1,500.00 or more, but less than $20,000.00. In companion case number 06-17-00125-CR, he also appeals the denial of bail pending appeal in that case.
See Act of May 29, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1234, § 21, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3302, 3310 (amended 2015) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.01 (West Supp. 2016).
This case is governed by Article 44.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04 (West Supp. 2016). Cappiello was sentenced to twenty-four months' confinement and is entitled to bail pending appeal, unless one of the circumstances outlined in Article 44.04(c) applies. That Article provides, "[T]he trial court may deny bail and commit the defendant to custody if there then exists good cause to believe that the defendant would not appear when his conviction became final or is likely to commit another offense while on bail." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04(c).
We review the decision to deny bail using an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Putnam v. State, 582 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Ex parte Dueitt, 529 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Davis v. State, 71 S.W.3d 844, 845-46 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). We reverse a decision only if it "was made without reference to any guiding principles or was, in other words, arbitrary or unreasonable." Ex parte Jackson, 257 S.W.3d 520, 521 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). We will not interfere with the ruling as long as it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, even if we would have reached a different result. Id. (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391 (op. on reh'g)).
Although no language exists in Article 44.04 requiring that notice be given or a hearing held before denying bond pending appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that due process imposes such a requirement when an appellant is statutorily eligible for bail pending appeal. See Shockley v. State, 717 S.W.2d 922, 923, 924 n.2, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). In fact, a hearing before deciding on bail pending appeal is "one of the most rudimentary constituents of due process and due course of law." Ex parte Jackson, 602 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (orig. proceeding). A "right to bail on appeal would be rendered meaningless if the trial court could avoid review of [its] action by denying a forum to the requesting defendant." Shockley, 717 S.W.2d at 926 (quoting Ex parte Williams, 630 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, pet. ref'd) (per curiam)).
An appellant's "meaningful opportunity to be heard" before being denied bond pending appeal requires reasonable notice and a hearing. Id.; see Cortez v. State, 36 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2001, pet. ref'd). Otherwise, the decision to deny bail is arbitrary, depriving an appellant "of the due process required under the Fourteenth Amendment." Shockley, 717 S.W.2d at 927.
See also Ex parte Mohammed, No. 02-15-00151-CR, 2015 WL 5093313, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 27, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Cruz v. State, No. 09-96-00006-CR, 1997 WL 34390, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 29, 1997, no pet.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication). Although these unpublished cases have no precedential value, we may take guidance from them "as an aid in developing reasoning that may be employed." Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref'd).
Because Cappiello was statutorily eligible for bail pending appeal, due process required that he be afforded reasonable notice and a hearing. Short of this, summary denial of bail was arbitrary and, thus, an abuse of discretion. See id.
We sustain Cappiello's sole point of error to the extent that a hearing was not held on his motion requesting bail pending appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Cappiello's motion for bail pending appeal and remand to the trial court for a hearing to be conducted on the motion.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice Date Submitted: August 7, 2017
Date Decided: August 18, 2017 Do Not Publish