Opinion
No. 5-649 / 05-0026
Filed October 12, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink, Judge.
The petitioner appeals from a district court ruling that upheld the denial of his application for licensure. AFFIRMED.
R. Ronald Pogge, Thomas P. Murphy, and Barrie J. Terrones of Hopkins Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Emily Kimes-Schwiesow, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Zimmer, JJ.
John Cannon appeals from a district court ruling that upheld the decision of the Board of Psychology Examiners of the State of Iowa (Board) denying his application for licensure. We affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In October 2002 Cannon received a Ph.D. in psychology from the Saybrook Graduate School and Research Center (Saybrook). Saybrook offers "a mixed model of instruction" that combines long-distance learning with face-to-face instruction. In the psychology doctoral program the face-to-face component consists of "residential seminars" that are held twice each year for six days. Cannon participated in eleven such seminars and completed 792 hours of in-residence study. Saybrook is accredited by a regional accrediting entity, but is not accredited by the American Psychological Association (APA).
After receiving his degree, Cannon filed an application for licensure with the Board. Pursuant to rules promulgated by the Board, an applicant must have received a doctoral degree from either an APA-accredited program or a program that meets eleven specific criteria. The Board denied Cannon's application, determining Saybrook's program did not meet one of the eleven criteria; specifically, that the program did not "require a minimum of one year's residency at the educational institution granting the doctoral degree" as required by Iowa Administrative Code rule 645-240.3(2)(i).
Cannon filed an appeal. Following a contested hearing, the Board upheld its prior decision to deny Cannon's application. The Board determined "the rule as written contemplated residency only as actual attendance and study at the educational institution from which the degree was obtained over the course of an academic year."
Cannon filed a petition for judicial review. He asserted the Board erred in interpreting rule 645-240.3(2)(i) as requiring continuous residency over one academic year, and moreover that the Board's interpretation denied him equal protection under the law. Cannon also contended that rule 645-240.2(2)(i) was unconstitutionally vague. The district court affirmed the Board's decision. Cannon appeals, reasserting the issues he raised before the district court.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Iowa Code chapter 17A (2003) governs judicial review of final agency decisions made by the Board. See Iowa Code §§ 17A.2(1), 17A.19. Typically, our review is confined to the correction of errors at law. Miller v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 609 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa 2000). However, assignments of error which present constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. Id.
As the party challenging the Board's action, Cannon bears the burden of demonstrating the action's invalidity and resulting prejudice. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a). This can be shown in a number of ways, including proof the action was unconstitutional or based upon an unconstitutional legal provision, was legally erroneous, or was "[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable interpretation of a provision of law whose interpretation has clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." See id. § 17A.19(10). Where matters have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the Board, we give appropriate deference to the Board's view. Id. § 17A.19(11)(c).
III. Discussion.
Cannon first contends the Board erred in interpreting rule 645-240.3(2)(i) as requiring a continuous "one year's residency" because the Board is reading a requirement into the rule that does not appear on its face. Cannon asserts the Board's interpretation of the rule is unreasonably restrictive, as it effectively forecloses licensure for all candidates receiving degrees from non-traditional, non-APA-accredited institutions. He asserts it is more reasonable to interpret the rule as requiring only the equivalent of in-class instructional hours obtained by the average graduate student over the course of one academic year, which two witnesses opined would average between 270 to 300 hours. He points out he has received more than twice that amount of in-class instruction.
We are sympathetic with Cannon's position. However, an agency is entitled to substantial deference when interpreting its own regulations. TLC Home Health Care, L.L.C. v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 638 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Iowa 2002). "This is particularly true in the case of . . . regulations entrusted to agencies responsible for licensing professionals." Al-Khattat v. Engineering Land Surveying Examining Bd., 644 N.W.2d 18, 23 (Iowa 2002). Having reviewed the rule, we cannot agree with Cannon's contention that the Board's interpretation of its own rule is "irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable." See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(l).
The legislature has clearly vested the Board with the authority to adopt and enforce rules governing educational qualifications. See Iowa Code §§ 147.76, 154B.6.
"If the language used in the [rule] is clear and unambiguous, the court applies a plain and rational meaning in harmony with the subject matter of the statute." See City of Cedar Rapids v. James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Iowa 2005). Here, as the Board noted, interpreting "one year's residency" as requiring one academic year comports closely to the plain and ordinary meanings of the words used. See also Iowa Code § 4.1(40) (defining "year" as "twelve consecutive months"). In contrast, under Cannon's interpretation the rule must be read as encompassing some form of multi-year equivalency calculation that is not defined or even contemplated elsewhere in the rules. Moreover, the Board explained that, in its opinion, "there is a value to residential study at an institution over the course of a year that extends beyond the mere value of the hours spent in a classroom setting." In light of the foregoing, the Board's interpretation of its own rule is rational and justifiable.
We therefore turn to Cannon's claim that the Board's interpretation deprives him of equal protection under the law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. Because this matter involves neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right, the rational basis test applies. Miller, 609 N.W.2d at 482. To prevail on his claim, Cannon must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated with persons who have been treated differently by the Board, and (2) the Board has no rational basis for the dissimilar treatment. Rosen v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 539 N.W.2d 345, 352 (Iowa 1995).
There is no evidence the Board applied a different standard in evaluating Cannon's application than it has in evaluating the applications of other individuals who received degrees from non-APA-accredited schools. Thus, Cannon's claim rests upon the conclusion that the group of "similarly situated" individuals is composed of all applicants for licensure. Cannon contends he is being treated differently than applicants who receive degrees from APA-accredited schools because at least one of those schools, the Fielding Graduate Institute, also combines long-distance learning with twice-a-year residential seminars.
Like the Board and the district court, we conclude Cannon is not similarly situated to applicants from APA-accredited schools. APA accreditation provides the Board with assurance that a program has met certain minimum qualifying standards. Where such assurance is lacking, the Board is free to create and has created its own standards for educational qualifications. Those standards may be, but are not required to be, the same as those employed by the APA.
Because Cannon has not demonstrated that he is being treated differently than similarly situated individuals, we need not consider whether there is a rational basis for the dissimilar treatment. We note, however, that even if Cannon had established disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals, the record reveals a rational basis for the disparate treatment.
A "rational basis" exists if the rule's requirements (1) serve a legitimate governmental interest and (2) bear a rational relationship to that interest. Glowacki v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 501 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 1993). The first prong of this test is clearly met. States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and . . . as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2016, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572, 588 (1975).
The second prong of the test is also met. When the Board is unable to rely upon an APA accreditation, it must set standards that assure only individuals with sufficient educational qualifications become licensed psychologists in the State of Iowa. Requiring one academic year's residency, which has inherent value "beyond the mere value of the hours spent in a classroom setting," is rationally related to achieving that goal. Neither the Board nor the district court erred in rejecting Cannon's equal protection claim.
Finally, we turn to Cannon's contention that rule 645-240.3(2)(i) is unconstitutionally vague. A rule is unconstitutionally vague for the purpose of due process, see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, "when its language does not convey a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct." Devault v. City of Council Bluffs, 671 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Iowa 2003). However,
[i]f the [rule's] meaning is fairly ascertainable by reliance on generally accepted and common meaning of words used, or by reference to the dictionary, related or similar [rules], the common law or previous judicial constructions, due process is satisfied.
Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, "[a] presumption of constitutionality exists that must be overcome by negating every reasonable basis on which the statute can be sustained." Id.
We have already noted that the plain and ordinary meanings of the terms used indicate the residency requirement is satisfied by the completion of an academic year, rather than by meeting some form of multi-year in-class equivalency standard. The Board and the district court properly rejected Cannon's due process challenge.
IV. Conclusion.
As previously noted, we have sympathy for Cannon's situation. This sympathy appeared to be shared by the Board, which noted that it had adopted rule 645-240.3(2)(i) "at a time when dispersed study programs such as that offered by Saybrook were not at all common and of a dubious reputation." The Board also appeared to find some merit in Cannon's contention that holding him to a different standard than an applicant from a school like Fielding was simply unfair. However, as the Board further noted, a change in policy is most appropriately pursued through a change in the rules.
Cannon has failed to demonstrate that the Board's interpretation of its own rule was erroneous, or that the rule deprived him of his rights to equal protection and due process. We accordingly affirm the district court.