Opinion
No. 01-07-00222-CV
Opinion issued June 12, 2008.
On Appeal from the 333rd District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2003-06574.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, HANKS, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal of a take-nothing judgment, entered on a jury verdict in an automobile collision case. Autumn M. Canales argues that the trial court erred by entering the judgment, because the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We affirm.
Background
This case arises from an automobile collision between Canales and Kevin H. Womack. Directly before the accident, Womack was stopped in a gas station driveway and intended to turn into the left-hand lane by crossing both right-hand lanes. An 18-wheeler was parked on the street to the left of the driveway and obstructed Womack's view of oncoming right lane traffic. Womack began driving across the right-hand lanes, but collided with Canales's car when he reached the second right-hand lane.
Canales sued Womack. At the conclusion of trial, the jury was asked, "Did the negligence, if any, of Kevin H. Womack proximately cause the occurrence in question?" Ten of the 12 jurors responded "no." Based on the jury's verdict, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment for Womack. Canales now appeals.
Factual Sufficiency
In her sole issue, Canales argues that the trial court erred by entering a take-nothing judgment for Womack because the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
Standard of Review
In determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's finding, courts of appeals are to weigh all the evidence, both for and against the finding. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge to a finding where the burden of proof is on the complaining party, that party must show that "the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence." Id. In conducting our review, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury, which is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003).
Analysis
Canales asserts that the evidence presented at trial clearly establishes that Womack failed to exercise reasonable care. She argues that Womack's own testimony unequivocally establishes his negligence.
At trial, Womack admitted that Canales had the right of way, he hit Canales's car in her lane of traffic, he was not critical of Canales for anything she failed to do, and he was responsible for the accident. He testified that the 18-wheeler was blocking his view to the left and that it would have been reasonable for him to enter the left-hand lane by turning right and then making a U-turn, but that he did not do so because it is "faster and easier" to drive across both right-hand lanes. Furthermore, Canales points out that Womack apologized to her after the accident and explained that his foot had slipped off the brake and onto the accelerator. Rather than deny making such a statement, Womack merely testified that he does not recall apologizing and, because he cannot remember, he will defer to her. Nevertheless, he disputed Canales's contention that his foot slipped off the brake and onto the accelerator and testified that he inched his way forward by letting his foot off the brake and not pressing the accelerator.
While it is undisputed that Womack testified that he failed to yield the right-of-way and was responsible for causing the accident, a driver's failure to yield the right-of-way does not give rise to negligence as a matter of law. See, e.g., Middleton v. Palmer, 601 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Instead, where there is evidence that the driver exercised some care, the jury determines whether a reasonably prudent driver would have acted in the same way:
Section 545.256 of the transportation code requires the operator of a motor vehicle emerging from an alley, driveway, or building in a business district to, on entering the roadway, yield the right-of-way to an approaching vehicle. However, when the driver exercises some degree of care, it becomes an issue of fact as to whether the driver's conduct was negligent.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.256 (Vernon 1999).
County of Dallas v. Poston, 104 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (citation omitted).
Here, Womack testified that, because the 18-wheeler blocked his view of oncoming traffic, he inched his way forward in order to see around the 18-wheeler and avoid an accident, and did not see Canales until their cars collided. He also introduced photographs showing minimal damage to both vehicles in support of his contention that he had inched his way into the street and that the impact was slight. In a case involving almost identical facts, we held that the jury's finding that appellee was not negligent was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence:
The jury may have believed appellee's version of events: that appellee stopped and looked for on-coming vehicles before he entered the street from the parking lot; that parked cars on the street blocked appellee's view of appellant's vehicle; that appellee proceeded at a slow rate of speed; that appellee did not see appellant's vehicle until the moment of impact, when appellant's vehicle ran into appellee's driver's side.
McKinley v. Chang, No. 01-93-01150-CV, 1994 WL 362716, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 14, 1994, writ denied) (not designated for publication). Similarly, the jury could have believed Womack's testimony and found that he drove in a reasonable manner.
We recognize that Canales attempts to differentiate her situation from other cases dealing with a failure to yield the right-of-way. First, she notes that Womack had a reasonable option to turn right and make a U-turn instead of creeping around the 18-wheeler. However, this was simply another fact for the jury to consider in determining the reasonableness of Womack's driving. Second, Canales points out that Womack admitted that he was responsible for causing the accident. However, because causation and breach are separate elements of negligence, Womack's testimony that he caused the accident is not dispositive of whether he breached any duty in doing so. See W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005) ("To prevail on [a] negligence cause of action,[plaintiff] must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach").
In light of all the evidence, Canales has not shown that the jury's verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 242. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in entering a take-nothing judgment for Womack on the jury's verdict.
We overrule Canales sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.