Opinion
No. CV99 0170237 S
April 19, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiffs, Concerned Homeowners of Greenwich (CHG) and various individual Greenwich homeowners, appeal the adoption of an amendment to the Greenwich building zone regulations by the defendant, the Greenwich Planning and Zoning Commission (the PZC). Count one is an administrative appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-8 and 8-10 and count two is a petition for a declaratory judgment seeking a determination that the amendment is unconstitutional.
The various Greenwich homeowners include: Dominick L. Campformio, Robert G. Donnalley, Jr., William Geisler, Gordon Hale, individually and as co-executor of the Estate of Albert Clayburgh, Peter W. Jayes, Peter Lauridsen, Priscilla Lauridsen, Alan Small, George Suter, and Paula Sutliffe. On November 16, 2001, the court, granted Peter W. Jayes' motion to withdraw.
The record reveals the following facts: The PZC proposed an amendment to regulations § 6-205 which would alter the floor area ratios (FAR) in zones RA-1, R-20, R-12, R-7, and R-6, and it would create new FARs for zones RA-4 and RA-2 (the amendment). On October 9, 1998 the PZC published notice in the Greenwich Time of a public hearing wherein they would "consider and take action on" amending § 6-205 (the public hearing). This notice described the date of the public hearing as October 20, 1998 and the location thereof as the Greenwich Town Hall, 101 Field Point Road, Greenwich, Connecticut. This notice was republished a second time in the Greenwich Time on October 16, 1998. On that same date, directly beneath this republished notice, was a third notice of the public hearing that was entitled "Change of location of meeting." This third notice advised that the public hearing would be held in the auditorium of Western Middle School at 1 Western Junior Highway. The public hearing on October 20, 1998 was in fact held in the auditorium of Western Middle School at 1 Western Junior Highway in Greenwich, and was continued for further hearing to November 10, 1998, notice of which was published in the Greenwich Time on October 30, 1998 and November 6, 1998.
Greenwich building zone regulations (regulations) § 6-205, is entitled: "Schedule of Required Open Spaces and Limiting Heights and Bulk of Buildings for Residential Zones for Single Family Uses."
A floor area ratio (FAR) is "the percentage of floor space between the exterior walls of a building in relation to the total lot. This includes not only the main building, but also garages, barns and guest houses."
The PZC adopted the amendment of § 6-205 at a regular meeting on November 17, 1998. Notice of the PZC's adoption of the amendment having been published in the Greenwich Time on December 1, 1998, the plaintiffs now appeal that decision to this court.
General Statutes § 8-8 governs an appeal from a planning and zoning commission to the Superior Court. "A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created." Bridgeport Bowl-O-Rama, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 195 Conn. 276, 283, 487 A.2d 559, on remand 4 Conn. App. 68, 491 A.2d 436 (1985), quoting Farricielli v. Personnel Appeal Board, 186 Conn. 198, 201, 440 A.2d 286 (1982).
As to count one, the administrative appeal, the plaintiffs must plead and prove that they are aggrieved by the amendment in order to have standing. "[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal. . . . It is [therefore] fundamental that, in order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved." (Brackets in original; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402, 409, 788 A.2d 1239 (2002). The burden of proving aggrievement rests with the plaintiff.Quarry Knoll II Corp. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 256 Conn. 674, 701, 780 A.2d 1 (2001). "Aggrievement falls within two broad categories, classical and statutory." Cole v. Planning Zoning Commission, 30 Conn. App. 511, 514, 620 A.2d 1324 (1993), aff'd on remand, 40 Conn. App. 501, 671 A.2d 844 (1996); Zoning Board v. Planning Zoning Commission, 27 Conn. App. 297, 300, 605 A.2d 885 (1992).
In this case, the various Greenwich homeowners plead that they are statutorily and classically aggrieved by the PZC's amendments. The CHG pleads that it is classically aggrieved.
The plaintiffs allege the following in their amended complaint: "2. Plaintiff, Dominic Campformio, owns 16 Hawthorne St. South, Greenwich, Connecticut 06831 which property is located in the R-7 zone. 3. Plaintiff Robert G. Donnalley, Jr. is the owner of 17 Intervale Place, Greenwich, Connecticut which property is located in the RA-2 zone. 4. Plaintiff, William Geisler is the owner of 43 Saw Mill Lane, Greenwich, Connecticut which property is located in the RA-1 zone. 5. Plaintiff, Gordon Hale, individually, is the owner of real property on Gamecock Island, Connecticut which property is in the R-12 zone. 6. Plaintiff, Gordon Hale, [c]o-executor acting by and for the [e]state of Albert H. Clayburgh, is the owner of real property located at 244 Byram Shore Road, Greenwich, Connecticut and which property is located in the R-20 zone. 7. Plaintiff Peter W. Jayes owns 11 Angelus Drive, Greenwich, Connecticut which property is in the RA-1 zone and is nonconforming. 8. Plaintiff, Peter Lauridsen, is the owner of 44 Mimosa Drive, Greenwich, Connecticut which property is in the RA-1 zone. 9. Plaintiff, Priscilla Lauridsen, is the owner of 32 Barton Lane, (Cos Cob) Greenwich, Connecticut which property is located in the RA-2 zone. 10. Plaintiff, Alan Small, is the owner of property located at 86 Buckfield Lane, Greenwich, Connecticut 06831 which property is located in the RA-4 zone. 11. Plaintiff, George Suter, is the owner of 69 Old Orchard Road, Greenwich, Connecticut and which property is located in the R-12 zone. 12. Plaintiff, Paula Sutliffe, owns 16 Salem Street, (Cos Cob) Greenwich, Connecticut which property is located in the R-7 zone. . . . 14 The [p]laintiffs, except for the CHG, are statutorily and classically aggrieved by the actions of the [PZC]. . . ."
"The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all the members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that the specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)Harris v. Zoning Commission, supra, 259 Conn. 410 (2002).
On the other hand, "[s]tatutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." Lewis v. Planning Zoning Commission, 62 Conn. App. 284, 288, 771 A.2d 167 (2001), citing, Cole v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 30 Conn. App. 514-15. "In the case of a decision by a . . . planning and zoning commission . . . `aggrieved person' includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board." General Statutes § 8-8 (a) (1).
With regard to the various Greenwich homeowners' claims of aggrievement, homeowners Peter Lauridsen, Priscilla Lauridsen, and Alan Small testified that he or she owned certain property within a zone affected by the amendment, and also testified as to the authenticity of the deed to each such property. The testimony of the testifying homeowners was uncontradicted.
The court concludes that the testifying Greenwich homeowners have proven that they have satisfied the first prong of classical aggrievement because they have successfully demonstrated a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the amendment since their pleadings, uncontradicted testimony, and deeds prove that they are owners of land within a zone affected by a zoning change. See Harris v. Zoning Commission, supra, 259 Conn. 414 (2002) (trial court could reasonably have concluded that plaintiffs have specific personal and legal interest in given amendment because amendment affects land that they own); see also Wilson v. Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 552212 (July 23, 2001, McLachlan, J.) ("[a]lthough the plaintiff did not submit copies of the deeds, the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff is sufficient to prove ownership for the purpose of establishing aggrievement in a zoning appeal.") As to the second prong of the classical aggrievement analysis, the testifying Greenwich homeowners testified that they are injured by the amendment because the amendment decreases the value of their properties. The court finds that the testifying Greenwich homeowners have pleaded and proven that they have a specific interest that has been injured by the PZC's adoption of the amendment. Thus, they have satisfied both prongs of classical aggrievement and therefore are aggrieved and have standing as to count one.
Because the testifying Greenwich homeowners have pleaded and proven the two prongs of classical aggrievement, it is unnecessary to decide whether they were also statutorily aggrieved. See Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 415 n. 15 (2002) ("Because the plaintiffs established that they were classically aggrieved by the commission's decision, and, therefore, that they had standing to appeal from that decision, we need not decide the propriety of the trial court's determination that the plaintiffs also were statutorily aggrieved.").
The non-testifying Greenwich homeowners provided no proof by testimony or otherwise that they are classically aggrieved by the actions of the PZC, nor is there any evidence that they are statutorily aggrieved by virtue of owning land that abuts or is within a radius of 100 feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the Commission or affected by the amendment. C.G.S. § 8-8 (a) (1).
The nontestifying Greenwich homeowners include: George Suter, William Geisler, and Gordon Hale, individually and as co-executor of the Estate of Albert Clayburgh.
The nontestifying Greenwich homeowners, Robert G. Donnalley, Jr. (Donnalley), Paula Sutliffe and Dominick L. Campformio did not testify at trial either, although affidavits signed by them attested that they owned property affected by the amendments. These affidavits were marked for identification purposes. "Exhibits for identification are not in evidence. . . ." C. Tait, Connecticut Evidence (3d Ed. 2001) § 1.29.3, p. 85, citing Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 373, 306 A.2d 857 (1972); Johnson v. Palomba Co., 114 Conn. 108, 115, 157 A. 902 (1932). "It is elementary that only full exhibits may be relied upon by the finder of fact." A. Secondino Son, Inc. v. American Arbitration Association, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 401937 (September 25, 1997, Hodgson, J.). Because Donnalley, Sutliffe and Campformio did not testify at trial, and they did not provide any evidence to prove that they owned property within a zone affected by the amendments, the court finds that they failed to satisfy their burden of proving aggrievement.
In determining whether the CHG, as an association, is aggrieved, the court engages in a three-pronged associational aggrievement test. "[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Associated Builders Contractors v. Hartford, 251 Conn. 169, 185, 740 A.2d 813 (1999).
As to the first prong, an association must put forth evidence that at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his or her own right. See Alliance to Preserve Somers Center, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. 074573 (July 24, 2001, Sullivan, J.) (association failed to prove aggrievement because it did not present evidence that any member of association has standing to sue in own right); Laurel Hill Association v. Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 320464 (July 23, 1996, Riefberg, J.) (same). In the present appeal, no plaintiffs testified that they were members of the CHG, and the CHG did not provide any evidence that any member of the CHG had standing to sue in their own right. The CHG has failed to prove the first prong of associational standing and therefore has no standing to maintain this administrative appeal. SeeConnecticut Associated Builders. Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 185 (because association failed to meet first prong of the associational aggrievement test, the court was not required to analyze whether the remaining prongs were met.)
In summary, only Peter Lauridsen, Priscilla Lauridsen, and Alan Small, (collectively, the plaintiffs) have pleaded and proven aggrievement and they are the only plaintiffs that have standing with regard to count one.
The plaintiffs argue that the notice of the public hearing on October 20, 1998 was defective and deprived the PZC of jurisdiction to amend the regulations. They maintain that the notice failed to accurately identify the place of the hearing as required by General Statutes § 8-3 (a). For support, the plaintiffs rely on Cocivi v. Plan Zoning Commission, 20 Conn. App. 705, 707, 570 A.2d 226, cert. denied, 214 Conn. 808, 573 A.2d 319 (1990). For the following reasons, the court agrees that the PZC's notice was defective and, consequently the PZC did not have jurisdiction to amend the regulations.
"Notice of the time and place of such [public] hearing shall be published in the form of a legal advertisement appearing in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in such municipality at least twice at intervals of not less than two days, the first not more than fifteen days nor less than ten days, and the last not less than two days, before such hearing. . . ." General Statutes § 8-3 (a). "Compliance with prescribed notice requirements is a prerequisite to a valid action by a zoning board of appeals and failure to give proper notice constitutes a jurisdictional defect." Wright v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 174 Conn. 488, 491, 391 A.2d 146 (1978). "Without proper public notice, zoning authority actions are null and void." Cocivi v. Plan Zoning Commission, supra, 20 Conn. App. 707.
In Cocivi v. Planning and Zoning Commission, supra, 20 Conn. App. 705, the heading of the notice published by the commission correctly identified the public hearing date. The text of this first notice published by the commission correctly identified the public hearing date. The text of this first notice, however, contained a date that had already passed. A second notice of this public hearing was published but it contained no such error in the text. The Cocivi court found that "[c]ompliance with the notice procedures requiring that the time of a scheduled public hearing be published at least twice, is a prerequisite to valid zoning authority actions." (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 707. "[T]his notice invited speculation. The commission, moreover, took no corrective action but merely ignored the mistake. . . . Nor was the defect cured by the second, correct notice . . . because a single publication does not satisfy the statutory mandate [under § 8-3 (a)]." Id., 708. TheCocivi court, therefore, concluded that the "notice was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the commission to act. . . ." Id., 709.
The court finds that the statutory mandate as outlined by the Cocivi court requires the time of the hearing to be published twice as well as the location thereof. See General Statutes § 8-3 (a). In the present appeal, the location of the October 20, 1998 hearing was published only once in the notice entitled "Change of location of meeting." For this reason, the court finds that the PZC failed to publish proper notice according to § 8-3 (a) and that such a failure constitutes a jurisdictional defect. See Wright v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 174 Conn. 491.
Accordingly, the amendment of the regulations by the PZC is null and void and the plaintiffs' administrative appeal is sustained. As a result, it is unnecessary for the court to address the plaintiffs' second count petitioning for a declaratory judgment that the amendment is unconstitutional.
So Ordered.
D'ANDREA, J.T.R.