Opinion
CR-17-1236
04-12-2019
Derrick CALHOUN v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Derrick Calhoun, appellant, pro se. Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and Carrie G. Shaw, asst. atty. gen., Department of Corrections Legal Division, for appellee.
Derrick Calhoun, appellant, pro se.
Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and Carrie G. Shaw, asst. atty. gen., Department of Corrections Legal Division, for appellee.
McCOOL, Judge.
Derrick Calhoun appeals the Montgomery Circuit Court's dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a prison-disciplinary proceeding in which he was found guilty of violating the administrative rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections ("the DOC"). Specifically, Calhoun was found guilty of two counts of violating Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Corrections), Admin. Reg. no. 403, rule violation 911, forcible sexual assault. For each violation, Calhoun was punished with loss of canteen privileges for 60 days, loss of telephone privileges for 60 days, loss of visiting privileges for 60 days, and disciplinary segregation for 45 days. Calhoun did not lose any good time as a result of the violations.
The DOC charged Calhoun with two counts of violating Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Corrections), regulation no. 403, rule violation 911, and served him with notice of the charges on March 22, 2016. The charges were based on an investigation that revealed that Calhoun had sexually assaulted two inmates. After conducting a disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer determined that Calhoun was guilty as charged. On March 24, 2016, the warden approved the hearing officer's decision and recommended sanctions, and Calhoun was served with a completed copy of the disciplinary report, which detailed the decision and sanctions against him. In June 2018, Calhoun petitioned the Montgomery Circuit Court for a writ of certiorari asking the circuit court to "reverse the judgment of the [DOC] disciplinary hearing officer." (C. 8.) In response, the DOC moved the circuit court to dismiss Calhoun's petition. The DOC's sole argument was that Calhoun's petition "falls under the auspices of the Alabama Prison[er] Litigation Reform Act," § 14-15-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("APLRA"), and, thus, the petition is barred by the one-year limitations period set forth in § 14-15-4(i), Ala. Code 1975. (C. 23-24.) The circuit court issued an order summarily dismissing Calhoun's petition. The only stated basis for the circuit court's decision was that Calhoun's petition was "untimely." (C. 26.)
Section 14-15-4(i) of the APLRA provides that "[n]o prisoner may file a petition for writ of certiorari more than one year after the incident or omission complained of or one year after any administrative remedy has been exhausted, whichever comes later." In the present case, it is undisputed that on March 24, 2016, the hearing officer's decision and recommended sanctions were approved by the warden and Calhoun was served with a completed copy of the disciplinary report that detailed the approved decision and sanctions against him. Calhoun did not file his petition for writ of certiorari challenging the DOC's decision until June 2018, well beyond the one-year limitations period set forth in § 14-15-4(i), Ala. Code 1975. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Calhoun's petition.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Kellum, J., concurs; McCool, J., concurs specially, with opinion, joined by Cole and Minor, JJ.; Windom, P.J., concurs in the result.
McCOOL, Judge, concurring specially.
Clearly, Calhoun's petition for a writ of certiorari was filed beyond the one-year limitations period set forth in § 14-15-4(i), Ala. Code 1975; thus, the Montgomery Circuit Court did not err in dismissing Calhoun's petition. However, I write specially to invite the Alabama Supreme Court to clarify whether this Court has jurisdiction to review a circuit court's dismissal of a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding in light of the enactment in 2013 of the Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, § 14-15-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the APLRA"), and the Alabama Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ex parte Cook, 202 So.3d 316 (Ala. 2016).
Section 12-3-9, Ala. Code 1975, sets forth this Court's appellate jurisdiction:
"The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all misdemeanors, including the violation of town and city ordinances, habeas corpus and all felonies, including all post conviction writs in criminal cases."
An appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari concerning a prison-disciplinary proceeding in which the prisoner does not lose any good time does not appear to fall under any of the areas set forth in § 12-3-9. A petition for a writ of certiorari concerning a prison-disciplinary proceeding does not involve a misdemeanor, habeas corpus, or a felony and, thus, is not included in § 12-3-9. Further, although this case involves a writ that happened to be filed after Calhoun had been convicted of a crime, Calhoun's petition is not a "post conviction writ[ ] in [a] criminal case[ ]," such as a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief, because Calhoun's petition has nothing to do with his conviction or resulting sentence. In fact, the word "including" in § 12-3-9 indicates that the postconviction writ is a specific area within the previously listed general areas, i.e., misdemeanor, habeas corpus, or felony. Again, Calhoun's petition does not involve a misdemeanor, habeas corpus, or felony. Instead, Calhoun's petition is a civil case involving a challenge to an administrative agency's actions taken against Calhoun in a prison-disciplinary proceeding concerning conduct that occurred while he was incarcerated and that was completely unrelated to his conviction or sentence that gave rise to his incarceration.
Nevertheless, the Alabama Supreme Court has explicitly held that this Court has jurisdiction over appeals from the dismissal of petitions for writ of certiorari challenging prison-disciplinary proceedings. See Robinson v. State, 12 So.3d 58 (Ala. 2008) (holding that the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction to hear an inmate's appeal of the trial court's denial of his petition for the writ of certiorari challenging a disciplinary action by the DOC); see also Collins v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 982 So.2d 1078 (Ala. 2007) (holding that the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction to hear an inmate's appeal of the trial court's denial of his petition for the writ of certiorari challenging his classification by the DOC as a heinous offender). It is well settled that "this Court is bound by the decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court and has no authority to reverse or modify those decisions." Doster v. State, 72 So.3d 50 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). However, those prior decisions did not analyze § 12-3-9, Ala. Code 1975, and they were decided before the enactment of the APLRA and the Supreme Court's decision in Cook, which specifically analyzes this Court's appellate jurisdiction under § 12-3-9 and the APLRA.
In Cook, two inmates each filed a "petition for release order" seeking their release from prison pursuant to the APLRA. The trial court denied the inmates' requests for in forma pauperis ("IFP") status. Then, the inmates each filed with this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus in which they sought an order from this Court directing the trial court to set aside its orders denying their requests for IFP status. This Court stated that it did not have jurisdiction over the petitions for the writ of mandamus and transferred the petitions to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals likewise determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the petitions and transferred the petitions to the Alabama Supreme Court. Concerning jurisdiction, the Alabama Supreme Court stated:
"The APLRA, which became effective on April 24, 2013, applies ‘to all pro se civil actions for money damages relating to terms and conditions of confinement brought under the laws of this state, or for injunctive, declaratory, or mandamus relief, brought by prisoners incarcerated in any state correctional facility.’ § 14–15–2, Ala. Code 1975. The APLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a civil action under state law. § 14–15–4(b), Ala. Code 1975. Should a prisoner commence an action seeking relief in the form of a release order, he or she must file with the petition for release a request for a three-judge court and materials sufficient to indicate that certain prerequisites, found in § 14-15-10(a), Ala. Code 1975, have been met. § 14-15-10(d), Ala. Code 1975. One limitation on relief prescribed by the APLRA is that a state court may order a prisoner's release from incarceration only when a three-judge court finds from clear and convincing evidence that ‘[c]rowding is the primary cause of the violation of a right’ and ‘[n]o other relief will remedy the
violation of the right.’ § 14-15-10(f)(1) and (2), Ala. Code 1975.
"....
"Although no party argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over these matters, we briefly address, for thoroughness, that court's appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction ‘of all misdemeanors, including the violation of town and city ordinances, habeas corpus and all felonies, including all post conviction writs in criminal cases.’ § 12–3–9, Ala. Code 1975. Because Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions arise from actions seeking relief based on the conditions of their incarceration, rather than from actions giving rise to their incarceration, the proceedings underlying the petitions are civil, not criminal, in nature. That determination is supported by the fact that the APLRA consistently refers to actions seeking relief pursuant to the procedures set forth in the APLRA as civil in nature. See, e.g., § 14-15-2, § 14–15–3(1), § 14–15–4(b), and § 14–15–10(a) and (b). In addition, § 14–15–2 expressly provides that the APLRA does not apply to actions brought pursuant to § 15–21–1, Ala. Code 1975, which governs habeas corpus proceedings. Thus, although the APLRA provides that a prisoner may seek release from incarceration as a form of relief, our legislature clearly intended to make a distinction between a prisoner's action seeking release from incarceration pursuant to the procedures set forth in the APLRA and a prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because Cook's and Holt's petitions for release seek relief as prescribed by the APLRA, we conclude that their petitions are not in the nature of habeas corpus petitions. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals does not have jurisdiction over Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by the filing of their petitions seeking relief under the APLRA. Accordingly, appellate jurisdiction over an action seeking relief prescribed by the APLRA must lie either with the Court of Civil Appeals or with this Court.
"The petitioners argue that the Court of Civil Appeals has jurisdiction over their mandamus petitions because, they say, the Court of Civil Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs arising from decisions of administrative agencies. The respondents, on the other hand, argue that this Court has jurisdiction over the mandamus petitions because, they say, the petitions do not fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals.
" Section 12–3–10, Ala. Code 1975, provides that the Court of Civil Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
" ‘of all civil cases where the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $50,000, all appeals from administrative agencies other than the Alabama Public Service Commission, all appeals in workers' compensation cases, all appeals in domestic relations cases, including annulment, divorce, adoption, and child custody cases and all extraordinary writs arising from appeals in said cases.’
"The only area of the Court of Civil Appeals' exclusive jurisdiction that could conceivably encompass Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions is that court's jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs ‘arising from appeals’ from decisions of administrative agencies. However, Cook's and Holt's petitions for
release filed in the trial court are not appeals from an administrative agency. These are not cases in which an administrative agency has denied a petitioner requested relief and that petitioner has appealed the agency's decision either to a circuit court or to the Court of Civil Appeals. Although the basis for the relief sought by the petitioners concerns the DOC's alleged failure to address overcrowding in Alabama's prisons, the DOC has no authority under the APLRA to grant the petitioners the relief they seek; the relief they seek can be granted only by a three-judge court. § 14-15–10(b). The mere fact that the DOC is the agency charged with overseeing Cook's and Holt's incarceration does not bring their mandamus petitions within the Court of Civil Appeals' exclusive appellate jurisdiction of ‘all appeals from administrative agencies’ and ‘all extraordinary writs arising from appeals in said cases’ as envisioned by § 12–3–10. Thus, we conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals does not have jurisdiction over Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions. Because no other appellate court has jurisdiction over Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions, jurisdiction lies with this Court. Ala. Const.1901, Art. IV, § 140 (c); § 12–2–7(1), Ala. Code 1975."
202 So.3d at 318-20 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
The applicability section of the APLRA provides:
"This chapter shall apply to all pro se civil actions for money damages relating to terms and conditions of confinement brought under the laws of this state, or for injunctive, declaratory, or mandamus relief, brought by prisoners incarcerated in any state correctional facility. Nothing in this chapter shall apply to actions brought pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure or pursuant to Section 15-21-1 [ (habeas corpus) ]."
Although the applicability section explicitly includes certain actions and excludes others, it does not explicitly include or exclude petitions for the writ of certiorari. However, § 14-15-4(i) of the APLRA explicitly provides that "[n]o prisoner may file a petition for writ of certiorari more than one year after the incident or omission complained of or one year after any administrative remedy has been exhausted, whichever comes later." This one-year limitations period explicitly includes petitions for writ of certiorari, and this time limit was the only reason relied on by the DOC and the circuit court for dismissing Calhoun's petition. It appears that § 14-15-4(i) would have no application outside a situation like the present situation; thus, I agree with the DOC and the circuit court that the APLRA applies to the present case.
In Cook, the Supreme Court held that the prisoners' actions governed by the APLRA and subsequent mandamus petitions did not fall within this Court's appellate jurisdiction as set forth in § 12-3-9, Ala. Code 1975. Likewise, Calhoun's petition for a writ of certiorari is governed by a section of the APLRA and it could certainly be argued that his subsequent appeal is not within this Court's appellate jurisdiction as set forth in § 12-3-9. As the Supreme Court stated: "[A]ppellate jurisdiction over an action seeking relief prescribed by the APLRA must lie either with the Court of Civil Appeals or with [the Alabama Supreme Court]." See Cook, supra. However, earlier decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court explicitly held that this Court has jurisdiction over appeals from the dismissal of petitions for writ of certiorari challenging prison-disciplinary proceedings, and Cook did not explicitly address this specific issue or explicitly overrule those prior decisions. Because this Court is bound by those prior decisions, I believe that this Court should affirm the circuit court's judgment in the present case, but I invite the Supreme Court to reexamine those prior decisions and to clarify whether this Court has jurisdiction to review a circuit court's dismissal of a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding, especially in light of the enactment of the APLRA and the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Cook.
Cole and Minor, JJ., concur.