Opinion
No. CV03-0176771S
August 13, 2003
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The defendant City of Waterbury moves for summary judgment in this tax appeal brought pursuant to General Statues § 12-119. Section 12-119 provides that an application to the Superior Court for relief challenging the assessment of real property "may be made within one year from the date as of which the property was last evaluated." According to the affidavit of the Waterbury Tax Assessor, "the real property that is the subject of the above-captioned tax appeal was taxed for the Grand List of 2001 by determining its value as of October 1, 2001 and assessing 70% of that value."
The return date of this action is March 25, 2003, some eighteen months after the October 1, 2001 valuation of the plaintiff's property. Defendant moves for summary judgment arguing that one-year limitation period for bringing an action, as prescribed by § 12-119, commenced October 1, 2001, making this appeal untimely. Defendant counters by arguing that the commencement of the one-year limitation period is defined by General Statutes § 12-55 (a) which requires the tax assessor to file and sign an assessment on or before the 31st day of January following the October 1 assessment. Section 12-117 (a)(1) provides that the January 31 deadline set forth in § 12-119 may be extended for one month. In this matter, the Assessor signed the October 1, 2001 Grand List on February 28, 2002. Because this action was filed on February 21, 2003, the plaintiffs contend that they are within the one-year limitation period set forth in § 12-119.
The court is not aware of any case directly addressing the question raised in this appeal, namely whether the one-year period for commencement of an action pursuant to § 12-119 is measured from the October 1 Grand List or the date that the assessor files and signs the list which may be either January 31 or one month thereafter. The defendant refers the court to General Statues § 12-62a which specifies that "Each municipality . . . shall establish a uniform assessment date of October first." In Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 122 (1992), the Supreme Court observed that § 12-119 reflects "a legislative preference . . . for the prompt resolution of challenges to assessments, and the need for the stability of our towns' tax rolls. Public policy requires . . . that this court not permit tax issues to be the subject of perpetual litigation, at any time, to suit the convenience of the taxpayer."
The court concludes that the provision of § 12-119 allowing an appeal within one year from the date as of which the property was last evaluated (emphasis supplied) refers to the uniform October 1 assessment date set forth in § 12-62a. Such construction promotes the principle of uniformity articulated in Wilson v. Kelley, supra, and is consistent with the commonly understood meaning of "evaluated." State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537 (2003). Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
SO ORDERED.
HOLZBERG, J.