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Cabrera v. Hurtado Bogota

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County
May 20, 2008
C.A. No. 06C-11-247 RRC (Del. Super. Ct. May. 20, 2008)

Summary

awarding $37,856.67 in post-default judgment damages after an inquisition hearing and supplemental briefing

Summary of this case from BDO U.S., LLP v. JSCO Enters.

Opinion

C.A. No. 06C-11-247 RRC.

Submitted: April 21, 2008.

Decided: May 20, 2008.

Opinion After Inquisition Hearing.

Vivian L. Rapposelli, Esquire, Rapposelli Gonzales, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff.

Daniel R. Losco, Esquire, Losco Marconi, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendants.


Dear Counsel:

The Court is called upon to determine the amount to be awarded Plaintiff, Maria D. Cabrera, after default judgment was entered against Defendants, Ricardo Hurtado and Grupo Bogota, Inc.

On January 29, 2007, Plaintiff served Defendants with a complaint alleging breach of contract stemming from an employment agreement with Defendants. Defendants failed to file an answer within the applicable time period, and Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for default judgment on May 18, 2007. The Court scheduled a hearing on the motion for June 12, 2007. A day before the hearing, Defendants' newly acquired counsel, James S. Green, Esquire, filed an answer to the complaint.

The Court conditionally allowed vacation of the default judgment, provided that Defendants paid $350 in attorney's fees by June 18, 2007. Defendants failed to do so, and the Court entered default judgment as to liability against Defendants on June 22, 2007.

On July 31, 2007, the Court held an inquisition hearing, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 55(b)(2), to determine the amount of damages to be awarded to Plaintiff. At that hearing, Mr. Green represented both Defendants. After both sides presented their evidence and arguments, the Court ordered the parties to submit post-hearing letter memoranda with references to the transcript of the inquisition hearing.

The parties negotiated for several weeks in an attempt to settle the case, but to no avail. Mr. Green was ultimately allowed to withdraw from representing Defendants.

Plaintiff contends that she should be awarded the following: $6,750 for unpaid health insurance benefits; $4,500 for her payments to her fulltime assistant; $1,333 for unaccounted client payments; $11,573.67 for actual commissions; $11,600 for estimated commissions; $1,200 for Plaintiff's flat consultant fee; and $1,000 for "the inconvenience and service charges associated with numerous bounced checks." Plaintiff has also requested attorney's fees in the amount of $7,950, citing Defendants' failure to comply with court procedures as grounds, and has also requested $695.91 in costs.

Pl. Post-Hearing Letter Memorandum, at 6-7.

Pl. Letter of April 4, 2008.

Defendant Ricardo Hurtado, on behalf of both himself and (purportedly) Grupo Bogota, Inc., filed a response to Plaintiff's post-hearing letter memorandum on December 26, 2007. In that letter memorandum, Defendants recited many "facts" that were not introduced by them in the inquisition hearing. In a letter to the parties dated December 27, 2007, the Court advised Mr. Hurtado that Mr. Hurtado's letter memorandum on behalf of corporate defendant Grupo Bogota, Inc. would not be considered because Grupo Bogota, Inc. was not represented by counsel, as required by Delaware law. On January 7, 2007, Daniel R. Losco, Esquire entered his appearance for Grupo Bogota, Inc., and requested that the Court consider the arguments in Mr. Hurtado's letter memorandum on behalf of Grupo Bogota, Inc., which request the Court granted. Thus, both Defendants' arguments are set forth in Mr. Hurtado's letter memorandum.

Defendants contend that since allegedly Plaintiff did not use all of her health insurance benefits, she is not entitled to receive compensation for them. Defendants call the request for $4,500 for payments made to Plaintiff's assistant "confusing," and state that Plaintiff's "husband/boyfriend did not testify as to what he actually did during the so-called months not paid," and maintain that this "category [of] damage only shows the overreaching taken by [Plaintiff]." Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to substantiate the $1,333 in client payments. Defendants call the request of $11,573.67 for actual commissions "astronomical," and maintains that a lower figure (of $1,402.61) is more appropriate, given, Defendants allege, Plaintiff's increasingly deficient performance. Defendants maintain that the estimated commissions of $11,600 should not be awarded since those figures do not correspond with actual sales numbers. Defendants assert that the $1,000 for "inconvenience" is inappropriate. Finally, Defendants maintain that attorney's fees are not warranted, since Defendants did not act in bad faith.

Def. Post-Hearing Letter Memorandum, at 4.

The Court notes that Defendants have asserted, in Defendants' post-hearing letter memorandum, a detailed factual background of his version of the case (mostly unrelated to the issue of damages), as well as numerous arguments as to liability. The Court will not address these arguments, since default judgment for liability has already been entered against Defendants. Def. Post-Hearing Letter Memorandum, at 1-3.

After reviewing the record, the Court has determined that a substantial portion of the damages Plaintiff has requested has gone essentially unchallenged by Defendants, and Defendants do not raise legally cognizable arguments in their response to Plaintiff's contentions for damages. Plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to the following:

For example, Defendant Hurtado asserts in his memorandum: "I don't think that [Plaintiff] should be paid health insurance monthly premiums which according to her total $6,750." Def. Post-Hearing Letter Memorandum, at 4.

1) $6,750 for unpaid health insurance benefits. Plaintiff calculated the benefits at $250 per month for 27 months, or $6,750, which the Court finds reasonable.
2) $4,500 to reimburse Plaintiff for her payments to her full-time assistant. As part of her employment agreement Plaintiff was to receive $900 per month to pay a full-time staff assistant. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff in September 2003, and Defendants did not pay Plaintiff that amount for the last four months of Plaintiff's employment.
3) $1,333 for unaccounted client payments. Plaintiff was not informed of several client payments made either by check or credit card. Plaintiff showed that sales transactions generated by Defendant were $6,665, to which Plaintiff was entitled 20%.
4) $11,573.67 for actual commissions. This amount "represents the difference between the 20% commissions [Plaintiff] was supposed to have received and the arbitrarily reduced commissions, unilaterally decided by Defendant, that she was actually paid."
5) $11,600 for estimated commissions. In the last four months of her employment, Plaintiff received no payments for commissions. Plaintiff earned approximately $2,900 per month in commissions during her employment; thus, Plaintiff would have earned approximately $11,600 in commissions were it not for Defendants' breach of contract.
6) $1,200 for Plaintiff flat consultant fee, which Plaintiff was to receive as part of her compensation, and which Defendant never paid.

Tr. 17 at 16-17.

Tr. 9 at 11.

Tr. 16 at 3-12; Tr. 20 at 15-23.

Tr. 11 at 16.

Pl. Post-Hearing Letter Memorandum, at 4-5.

Tr. 22 at 8-13.

The total amount of the award is $37,856.67.

The Court does not award the $1,000 requested by Plaintiff for the "inconvenience" she alleges that she experienced as a result of Defendants' bounced checks. Defendants correctly assert that this substantial amount is incongruous to any inconvenience to Plaintiff.

Additionally, this case is not one where an award for attorney's fees is appropriate. An award for attorney's fees is justified if the Court concludes that the cost of the litigation was increased by the bad faith conduct of a party. Plaintiff has only identified errors, delay, and tardiness on behalf of Defendants, none of which is justifiable, but none of which rise to the required level of bad faith or outrageous conduct that would warrant an award for attorney's fees. Plaintiff also seeks "costs," which, aside from the dollar amount, are unspecified, but are apparently related to attorney's fees. Since the Court does not award attorney's fees, neither will the Court award these "costs."

Slawik v. State, 480 A.2d 636, 639 (Del. 1984) (applying the "American rule" when determining whether an award of attorney's fees was appropriate).

Pl. Letter of April 2, 2008.

For the preceding reasons, the Court awards Plaintiff $37,856.67 as damages resulting from breach of contract, as well as post-judgment interest at the applicable rate of interest.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Cabrera v. Hurtado Bogota

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County
May 20, 2008
C.A. No. 06C-11-247 RRC (Del. Super. Ct. May. 20, 2008)

awarding $37,856.67 in post-default judgment damages after an inquisition hearing and supplemental briefing

Summary of this case from BDO U.S., LLP v. JSCO Enters.
Case details for

Cabrera v. Hurtado Bogota

Case Details

Full title:Maria Cabrera v. Ricardo Hurtado and Grupo Bogota, Inc

Court:Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

Date published: May 20, 2008

Citations

C.A. No. 06C-11-247 RRC (Del. Super. Ct. May. 20, 2008)

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