Opinion
CV-22-01813-PHX-DWL
10-28-2022
Cable One Incorporated, Plaintiff, v. DataCloud Technologies LLC, Defendant.
ORDER
Dominic W. Lanza, United States District Judge
On October 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the complaint, seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement of various U.S. patents and damages for violations of the Arizona Patent Troll Prevention Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 441422 et seq., “because Defendant has made it clear through correspondence to Cable One that it intends to sue Cable One for alleged infringement of the Asserted Patents.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff also filed a motion to seal three of the seven exhibits to the complaint. (Doc. 9.) For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion to seal will be denied.
The public has a general right to inspect judicial records and documents, such that a party seeking to seal a judicial record must overcome “a strong presumption in favor of access.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). To do so, the party must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure . . . .” Id. at 1178-79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court must then “conscientiously balance the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Id. at 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted). “After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The “stringent” compelling reasons standard applies to all filed motions and their attachments where the motion is “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). The “compelling reasons” standard applies to the motion for preliminary injunction and the exhibits thereto. It goes without saying that it also applies to the complaint and the exhibits thereto. See, e.g., In re Google Location Hist. Litig., 514 F.Supp.3d 1147, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“[T]his Court and many others have held that the compelling reasons standard applies to the sealing of a complaint precisely because the complaint forms the foundation of the lawsuit.”); Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 565 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the “compelling reasons” standard applies to most judicial records).
Plaintiff asserts that Exhibits A, F, and G “contain[] highly sensitive communications between Plaintiff and Defendant, the disclosure of which, if publicly disclosed, would harm the Parties” and that “the public does not need access to these exhibits because relevant, general information, relating to these communications is explained in the Declaratory Judgement Complaint.” (Doc. 9 at 2.) As to the latter contention, Plaintiff provides no support for its contention that the strong presumption in favor of public access is dispensable so long as the public can view a litigant's generalized summary. As to the former contention, a vague, conclusory assertion that information is “sensitive” and disclosure would “harm” the parties is not enough.
Conclusory allegations of harm do not meet the “compelling reasons” standard. Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2014). “The party seeking to seal any part of a judicial record bears the heavy burden of showing that the material is the kind of information that courts will protect and that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure.” Id. at 1026 (emphasis added). Litigation sometimes airs the internal workings of a company which are otherwise not available to the public. Vaguely asserting that disclosure of certain material would result in harm-without explaining why or how this is so-will not suffice. Id. It is the moving party's burden to provide facts, arguments, and legal authority that would allow the Court to “articulate the factual basis”-“without relying on hypothesis or conjecture”-for ruling that compelling reasons “outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff may file a renewed motion to seal which “must explain, with specificity, why each proposed redaction meets the standard for sealing.” Paul Johnson Drywall Inc. v. Sterling Grp. LP, 2021 WL 4170676, *1 (D. Ariz. 2021). Furthermore, pursuant to the Court's preliminary order (Doc. 13 at 5), Plaintiff must lodge under seal an unredacted version of the materials to be sealed in which all of the material Plaintiff seeks to seal or redact is highlighted.
The more specific and compelling the reasons and facts provided are, the more likely it is that the Court will find that compelling reasons justify sealing documents or portions of documents. However, where a party puts certain information at issue, that party's ability to claim an interest in privacy is weakened. See, e.g., Weisberg v. Takeda Pharm. U.S.A., Inc., 2018 WL 6252458, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“[A] patient-litigant has no privilege as to communication relevant to an issue concerning the patient's condition, if the patient put that condition at issue.); Shapiro v. Hasbro Inc., 2016 WL 9137526, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“Hasbro put these documents at issue in the litigation and thus fails to [] make a particularized showing of compelling reason[s] to file these exhibits under seal.”); B.F. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 WL 4597492, *2 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“By bringing this lawsuit against Defendants, [Plaintiffs] have put [information sought to be sealed] directly at issue, and cannot reasonably expect filings in this case not to include details about [that information].”); Longoria v. Kodiak Concepts LLC, 2020 WL 4501456, *1 (D. Ariz. 2020) (“Plaintiffs cannot reasonably bring this action and then expect confidentiality ....”). But cf. Cramton v. Grabbagreen Franchising LLC, 2019 WL 1077869, *1 (D. Ariz. 2019) (“The medical records contain a great deal of sensitive and private information about [Plaintiff's] health, beyond just the information relevant to the case. The public's interest in knowing intimate details of Cramton's health beyond the scope of this case is minimal, and Cramton's interest in keeping them private is significant.”).
Where, as here, Plaintiff has put materials at issue by attaching them to the complaint, the Court is particularly skeptical of an assertion that the public interest in the litigation can be outweighed by a remaining privilege in confidentiality. If Plaintiff chooses to bring another motion seeking leave to file certain documents (or portions of documents) under seal, Plaintiff must demonstrate-for each document or portion of a document sought to be sealed-that the material is beyond the scope of what is at issue in this action.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED denying without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to seal. (Doc. 9.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to LRCiv 5.6(e), the lodged documents will not be filed, but will remain under seal. The Court will extend the time provided by LRCiv 5.6(e) for Plaintiff to act. Plaintiff may, within 15 days of the entry of this Order, (1) file unredacted versions of the exhibits in the public record or (2) file a new motion to seal that conforms with the requirements delineated in this order.